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THE REPEAL OF FAIR HOUSING IN CALIFORNIA: AN ANALYSIS OF REFERENDUM VOTING*

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In the summer of 1963 the California legislature passed the Rumford Act, prohibiting racial discrimination by realtors and the owners of apartment houses and homes built with public assistance. California real estate and property management interests, which had fought the Act's passage, then placed on the November 1964 ballot an initiative provision (Proposition 14) that would amend the state constitution to repeal the Rumford Act and prevent the state or any locality within it from adopting *any* fair housing legislation. During most of 1964 intense and lavishly financed campaigns were fought by supporters and opponents of Proposition 14.¹ Almost 96 per cent

of the people who turned out on election day voted on the measure, which passed by a ratio of two to one. In one sense the campaign and balloting were an exercise in futility, for in May of 1967 the United States Supreme Court declared Proposition 14 unconstitutional. Some short-term consequences of its passage were apparent, however. For several years there was a severe weakening of legal sanctions against racial discrimination in housing, resulting in abandonment of many cases that were underway before the 1964 election. For eighteen months the federal government froze \$120 million in funds for California urban renewal projects. Less tangibly, it is claimed that the proposition's overwhelming popularity contributed to the Watts riots and other racial violence in California.

Our purpose is to describe various aspects of the voting decision, both for their historical interest and as evidence on more general problems of political behavior, including the role of campaigns in clarifying the choices before voters, the adequacy of "direct democracy" devices such as referenda, the degree to which whites are willing to support Negro aspirations for equality, and the ways in which civil rights attitudes and voting behavior differ among various population groups. We will trace the voters' responses at different stages of the campaign, assess the level of support for the proposition from various elements of the population, and explore to some extent the motivations

campaign may be found in Thomas W. Casstevens, *Politics, Housing, and Race Relations: California's Rumford Act and Proposition 14* (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, 1967.)

* Most of the data on which this article is based were collected by the Field Research Corporation. We are grateful to Mervin Field, Robert Heyer, and Penny Dufficy of this organization and June Chacran and Charles Y. Glock of the Survey Research Center of the University of California at Berkeley for their kind help in making the data available to us. For invaluable advice and assistance in data processing we are indebted to John Gilbert and Ted Cooper. Hale Champion, Russell Murphy, James Payne, Nelson W. Polsby, Edward R. Tufte, and Barbara Kaye Wolfinger made useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, which was delivered at the 1965 annual meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research. Financial assistance was provided by the Graduate Division of Stanford University, the Stanford Computation Center, and the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

¹ A brief account of the background and passage of the Rumford Act and the Proposition 14

that lay behind this voting, touching as we proceed on some broader issues that the Proposition 14 election illuminates.

The major source of data for this analysis is five state-wide sample surveys conducted by the Field Research Corporation's California Poll in March, May, early September, early October, and late October of 1964. Each sample included approximately 1200 persons. The margin of difference between the late October survey findings and the outcome of several candidate and proposition elections was less than five percentage points.² We also draw occasionally on analyses of the relationship of aggregate election returns to census data on the 335 incorporated California communities with 1960 populations of 2,500 or more.

I. TWO INADEQUATE EXPLANATIONS: CALIFORNIANS' CONSERVATISM AND VOTER ERRORS

It may be well to begin by pointing out the inadequacies of two arguments that were offered to explain the election outcome. After the passage of Proposition 14 it was said that California is a conservative state and that the success of the proposition was merely a reflection of this conservatism. Another explanation, particularly common among California liberals who fought against the proposition, stressed the confusing intricacies of proposition voting and argued that voters' mechanical or perceptual errors, rather than their underlying beliefs, were responsible for the overwhelming "yes" vote.

There is a good deal of superficial evidence to support the California conservatism thesis. Senator Barry Goldwater clinched the 1964 Republican presidential nomination by his victory in the California primary, the only contested primary he won. The John Birch Society and other radical-right organizations are notoriously successful in the state, particularly in its southern counties. But much of

this and other evidence reflects intense minority right wing activity rather than widespread conservative attitudes in the population. In the California primary only Governor Nelson Rockefeller opposed Goldwater on the ballot and write-in votes were not permitted. Rockefeller's divorce and recent remarriage had alienated many voters and his young second wife had a baby a few days before the election, thus providing a fresh reminder of her husband's marital troubles. The California Poll clearly showed the thinness of Goldwater's California backing when the state's Republicans were given their choice of all presidential candidates.³ More relevant for our purposes, it does not appear that Californians are any more hostile to residential integration than people in other parts of the North. In the May 1964 California Poll, respondents were asked "If colored people came to live next door, would you move?" Only 13 per cent replied that they would. In response to the same question, 17 per cent of a Gallup sample of respondents in the Northeastern and Midwestern states said "yes" in 1963 and 10 per cent said "yes" in 1965.⁴

There are two versions of the explanations of Proposition 14's success in terms of voters' mistakes. The first version emphasizes response

³ When given a choice among all Republican presidential candidates, California Republicans were not much more enthusiastic about Goldwater than those in Oregon, where all candidates were on the ballot and Goldwater got 19 per cent of the vote. Goldwater wrote off the Oregon primary and did no serious campaigning there, while he built an extremely large and enthusiastic organization in California and spent a good deal of time there before the primary. In the May California Poll Goldwater was the first choice of 27 per cent of the Republican respondents, running second to Lodge, who did not campaign. Rockefeller was in third place and Nixon in fourth. Goldwater placed fourth (behind Rockefeller, Nixon, and Lodge) as a second choice candidate. He was most frequently chosen by Republicans as the candidate whose nomination would be objectionable.

⁴ We are indebted to Irving Crespi of the Gallup Organization, Inc. for making the non-California data available. A nationwide study of white attitudes toward Negroes conducted by the National Opinion Research Center in December 1963 showed the three Pacific states (75 per cent of whose population is in California) and the Middle Atlantic region to be the most liberal parts of the country on race relations. See Paul B. Sheatsley, "White Attitudes Toward the Negro," *Daedalus*, 95 (Winter, 1966), 226-227.

² The California Poll is financed by four television stations and a number of newspapers in the state, and conducted by the Field Research Corporation. It is based on stratified random samples. The nature of the sample varied slightly from one survey to the next. The March respondents were registered voters. May respondents were voters registered in a party who planned to vote in the June primary. September respondents were registered voters and people who intended to register. The October samples consisted of registered voters, excluding those who said they intended not to vote.

set. Californians vote on anywhere from 15 to 30 propositions in every statewide election. Many of these measures are quite esoteric; a considerable mythology has developed about the impact of mechanical aspects of the ballot on the fate of particular propositions. Since most of the 1964 propositions passed by large margins, it has been argued that the success of Proposition 14 was due in part to its ballot position; surrounded by popular propositions, it received many affirmative votes which were merely the result of inattentive repetition.

This argument may be rejected by examining the vote for two other measures on the ballot in 1964. Proposition 16 was a proposed constitutional amendment to establish a state lottery and license a particular firm, created for the purpose, to conduct the lottery. The antithesis of 16 was Proposition 13, which prohibited naming any firm in any proposed constitutional amendment considered in a referendum, and provided further that any amendment doing so would be void. The first of these contradictory propositions was defeated by 69.06 per cent; the second was passed by 69.09 per cent. Thus the voters evidently were capable of making acute distinctions in referendum voting; more than perfunctory response repetition went into voting on the propositions surrounding number 14 on the ballot.

The second, and for our purposes more interesting error argument concerns the wording of Proposition 14, which appeared on the ballot as follows:

SALES AND RENTALS OF RESIDENTIAL REAL PROPERTY. Initiative constitutional amendment. Prohibits State, subdivision, or agency thereof from denying, limiting, or abridging right of any person to decline to sell, lease, or rent residential real property to any person as he chooses. Prohibition not applicable to property owned by State or its subdivisions; property acquired by eminent domain; or transient accommodations by hotels, motels, and similar public places.

A positive vote on Proposition 14 was a negative vote on fair housing legislation, and vice versa. A number of observers felt that the voters found this confusing and voted on the proposition as they felt on the issue of fair housing. As a consequence, the argument runs, many of the "yes" votes were erroneous attempts to express support for fair housing legislation. By examining the shortcomings of this explanation of the passage of Proposition 14, we can begin to move toward a more adequate understanding of the election outcome.

Initially there was considerable confusion

about the proposition's meaning. Only half of the May respondents were sure that they had heard of Proposition 14. By September (the last survey in which the question was asked) this had grown to two thirds of the sample.⁵ The Rumford Act itself was more familiar. In March 72 per cent of the sample knew something about it; by early September this had grown to 87 per cent. For reasons that will become apparent, we think that by election day most of the initial confusion about the proposition's meaning had been dispelled by the flood of campaign propaganda, so that the vast majority of the electorate cast votes that were consistent with their attitudes toward fair housing legislation.⁶ Furthermore, as we will show, whatever confusion remained could not have contributed to the proposition's passage.

Table 1 shows voting intentions on Proposition 14 from March through late October. Throughout this period there were substantially more "yes" than "no" intentions. The "yes" vote remained stable through early September and then grew in the final two surveys. Table 2 shows attitudes toward the Rumford Act from March through September (after which the question was not asked). There was essentially no change in the two-to-one opposition to the act during the spring and summer.

The extent of confusion about how to express one's attitudes toward fair housing legislation can be measured through September by combining the respondents who favored the Rumford Act but nevertheless intended to vote for Proposition 14 with those who opposed the act but planned to vote against the proposition. As Table 3 shows, in March 38 per cent of those with attitudes on both subjects were inconsistent. By early September this proportion had dropped to 29 per cent.

In the spring such inappropriate voting intentions were most common in the lowest educational categories (Table 3) and among Negroes. The latter were particularly ill-informed about the proposition in the early stages of the campaign. In March Negroes were about

⁵ We excluded respondents who claimed knowledge but were unable to produce a fragment of an accurate description.

⁶ We do not mean to imply that confusion and ignorance rarely accompany proposition voting in California. An intensive analysis of voting patterns on individual ballots in the 1964 election indicates some tendency for voters to abstain when unable to make "quick and easy" decisions. See John E. Mueller, "Reason and Caprice: Ballot Patterns in California," (Los Angeles: unpublished doctoral dissertation, UCLA, 1965).

TABLE 1. VOTE INTENTION ON PROPOSITION 14—THROUGHOUT CAMPAIGN^a

	March	May	Early September	Early October	Late October
Would Vote Yes ^b	48%	48%	47%	54%	58%
Would Vote No	33	32	37	37	27
Do Not Know & Qualified	19	20	15	10	14
	100%	100%	99%	101%	99%

^a In the first four surveys respondents were handed a card with the wording of Proposition 14 as it appeared on the ballot and asked how they would vote. In the early October survey half the respondents indicated their choice by marking a "secret ballot" and placing it in a "ballot box." This technique did not appreciably alter the responses. In the late October survey half the respondents were handed a card with the ballot wording and half were given summaries of the pro and con arguments from the booklet distributed to voters by the Secretary of State. Results of this technique are discussed in the text.

^b I.e., to repeal fair housing legislation.

evenly split for and against the proposition, although they overwhelmingly favored the Rumford Act (Table 4).

Assuming for the moment that the level of confusion found in September persisted through election day, Table 5, which reports the vote intentions of supporters and opponents of the Rumford Act, shows why voting errors cannot have been responsible for the passage of Proposition 14, or even have added to the percentage by which it passed. Equal proportions of the friends and the enemies of the Rumford Act had the wrong idea about Proposition 14. But, as the number of cases in each column shows, there were almost twice as

TABLE 3. VOTE INTENTIONS ON PROPOSITION 14 INCONSISTENT WITH ATTITUDES ON RUMFORD ACT, BY EDUCATION—MARCH, MAY, AND SEPTEMBER^a

Educational Level	Per cent inconsistent at each educational level		
	March	May ^a	September
Less than high school	46%	39%	29%
High school graduates	38%	32%	33%
1 to 2 years of college	41%	33%	28%
More than 2 years of college	28%	19%	25%
Total inconsistencies	38%	32%	29%

TABLE 2. ATTITUDE TOWARD THE RUMFORD FAIR HOUSING ACT—MARCH, MAY, AND SEPTEMBER^a

	March	May	Early September
Approve	30%	27%	33%
Disapprove	58	57	55
Don't Know & Qualified	12	15	12
	100%	99%	100%

^a The question (after asking if the respondent has heard of the Rumford Act): "As you may know, the Rumford Act is a law which makes it illegal for apartment house owners, owners of publicly-assisted housing, and real estate brokers to discriminate against anyone because of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry in the renting or selling of housing accommodations. From what you know of it, do you approve or disapprove of the Rumford Act?"

^a Since the May sample was limited to people intending to vote in the June primary, one would expect it to be somewhat better informed than the September sample, which included everyone registered to vote in the general election or who intended to register. This table is limited to people with attitudes on both the Rumford Act and Proposition 14. There seems to be no basis on which respondents who favored the Rumford Act and nevertheless intended to vote "yes" on a proposition designed to invalidate it could be behaving consistently. On the other hand, a complex constitutional argument could be mounted for opposing the act and planning to vote "no" on Proposition 14. We believe that the voters in this second category also were responding out of confusion, however, since they scored lower than consistent voters on various indexes of political information, and since the general literature on voting behavior suggests that such complex rationalizations are not common.

many people against the act, and therefore many more mistaken votes would have been cast against the proposition than for it.

In fact, the number of "wrong" votes resulting from confusion about the proposition's impact on fair housing legislation does not seem to have been great. The rate at which confusion was resolved in the spring and summer was, as we have seen in Table 3, relatively moderate. But between Labor Day and election day this rate must have greatly accelerated. For one thing, by October Negroes were uniformly opposed to Proposition 14, a vote intention consistent with their equally unanimous support of the Rumford Act. For another, a split-sample interviewing technique used by the California Poll in the late October survey produced findings suggesting that confusion was not an important factor in the election outcome. Interviewers handed half the respondents a card bearing the description of the proposition that appeared on the ballot, as

TABLE 4. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE RUMFORD ACT AND PROPOSITION 14 THROUGH THE CAMPAIGN, BY RACE^a

	Proposition 14		Rumford Act	
	Whites	Negroes	Whites	Negroes
<i>March</i>				
Approve	50%	41%	30%	56%
Disapprove	33	38	61	16
Don't Know ^b	17	22	9	28
	100%	101%	100%	100%
<i>May</i>				
Approve	51%	29%	26%	73%
Disapprove	32	39	65	16
Don't Know ^b	18	32	9	11
	101%	100%	100%	100%
<i>September</i>				
Approve	51%	23%	31%	86%
Disapprove	36	66	61	13
Don't Know ^b	13	11	8	2
	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Early October</i>				
Approve	57%	10%		
Disapprove	34	83		
Don't Know ^b	8	6		
	99%	99%		
<i>Late October</i>				
Approve	60%	15%		
Disapprove	26	80		
Don't Know ^b	14	5		
	100%	100%		

^a Orientals have been excluded from this table.
^b Includes a few qualified responses.

TABLE 5. VOTE INTENTION OF PERSONS PRO AND CON RUMFORD ACT—SEPTEMBER

Intention on Prop. 14	Attitude toward Rumford Act		
	Approve	Disapprove	DK
Yes	26%	64%	28%
No	59	26	21
DK & Qualified (mostly DK)	14	10	51
	99%	100%	100%
N	372	625	82

they had done in previous surveys. The other half of the sample, matched to the first half, was given instead of a summary of the arguments for and against the proposition taken from the booklet distributed to all voters by the Secretary of State. This technique slightly reduced the number of "don't knows," but it provides no support for the contention that the election result was significantly affected by the wording of the proposition or by ignorance of its meaning. Virtually identical proportions of the two halves who had a definite voting intention were in favor of the proposition (67.9 per cent and 68.2 per cent).

Perhaps the most persuasive evidence that voting reflected underlying attitudes toward the Rumford Act is the remarkably close fit between attitudes toward the act in September and toward Proposition 14 in October. As Table 4 shows, 61 per cent of the white respondents were hostile to the Rumford Act in September, while in late October 60 per cent said they would vote for the proposition. This same relationship holds for subgroups in the sample.

It is evident from the Rumford Act's initial and continuing unpopularity that supporters of fair housing faced an uphill fight. The reverse wording of Proposition 14 was not as great a difficulty as many of them thought, for their chief problem was not to explain the relationship between the two measures (which seemed to be the purpose of most of their efforts), but to win converts to the cause of fair housing legislation. As it turned out, changes in response to the Rumford Act occurred most strikingly among Negroes. While Negroes consistently favored the act, many of them evidently were not well enough informed to express an opinion on it in March (Table 4). For the white population, the Rumford Act seems to have remained a fixed point of reference throughout the campaign: as voters learned how to express their attitudes toward it, their vote intentions shifted accordingly.

TABLE 6. CHANGE IN WHITE RESPONDENTS' INTENTIONS ON PROPOSITION 14 DURING THE CAMPAIGN—BY EDUCATION*

Educational Level	Change in per cent of group who will vote YES	Change in per cent of group who will vote NO	Change in per cent of group who don't know
Less than 8 grades	+23	-14	-8
9 to 11 grades	+ 9	- 8	-1
High school graduates	+15	-13	-2
1 to 2 years of college	+ 3	- 1	-2
More than 2 years of college	+ 1	+ 2	-3

* Determined by comparing vote intention of each group in March and late October.

This shift in intentions resulting from clarification probably explains the increased support for the proposition found in the October surveys (Table 1), since, as we have seen, the net effect of confusion favored the fair housing forces rather than acting against them. The likelihood that the process of clarification increased the "yes" vote also is supported by the finding in Table 3 that the greatest clarification on the proposition's consequences occurred at the lowest educational level, since opposition to fair housing is negatively related to education. This likelihood is documented more directly in Table 6, which shows that the greatest changes in the direction of a "yes" vote came in the low education categories. Thus we can see that, at least in this instance of a hard-fought, well-financed, highly publicized referendum, the campaign had the consequence of making clear to voters how to express their attitudes. It did not lead them to change those attitudes, nor—by the very nature of referendum decision making—did it lead to the typical outcome of policy formation by elected officials: some accommodation between the initial positions of the contending groups.

II. BACKGROUND VARIABLES AND THE VOTE

It is commonly believed that northern opposition to the civil rights movement has been strongest among members of the working class, particularly second- and third-generation Americans.⁷ We cannot explore this proposi-

⁷ See, e.g., Seymour M. Lipset, "Beyond the Backlash," *Encounter* (November, 1964), 11-24. For data showing that various nationality groups

sition directly with our survey data, which include no information on the generation of respondents' residence in the United States and no satisfactory information on their occupations. Our ecological data show a slight relationship in this direction; the correlation coefficient (Pearson's r) between the vote against Proposition 14 and the percentage of the labor force employed in manufacturing is $-.28$ for the state's 335 incorporated cities.⁸

are more opposed to interracial neighborhoods see William Brink and Louis Harris, *Black and White* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), p. 109.

⁸ Quite different findings are reported by Michael Rogin, who studied the vote given to Alabama's Governor George Wallace in the 1964 Democratic presidential primary in Wisconsin. For 18 suburbs in Milwaukee County, Rogin reports a correlation coefficient of $-.77$ between the vote for Wallace and the percentage of the labor force employed in manufacturing. See his "Wallace and the Middle Class: The White Backlash in Wisconsin," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 30 (Spring, 1966), 98-108.

This strong negative correlation, plus other similar data on the Wallace primary, leads Rogin to the conclusion that opposition to racial equality is more common in the middle class than the working class. Our findings suggest that this is not the case. It is not at all clear, however, that our dependent variable—voting for Proposition 14—and Rogin's—voting for Wallace—are comparable measures of anti-Negro feeling. Wallace's opponent was the very unpopular incumbent governor, who was soundly beaten in the general election that fall despite President Johnson's landslide victory in Wisconsin. There is no way of knowing how many of the middle-class Republicans who voted for Wallace were motivated by racial prejudice and how many—undistracted by a contest in the Republican primary—took advantage of this opportunity to register their hostility to the governor. Voting in another party's primary requires some effort and sophistication beyond what is needed to vote in a general election. Such qualities are more common in the middle class. Given equal levels of hostility to Negroes in the middle class and the working class, members of the former group would be more likely to express this attitude by voting in the opposition's primary.

Furthermore, Rogin's measure of racist attitudes—Wallace's percentage of the Democratic primary vote—inflates the score attained by middle-class districts. The more Republican the district, the fewer the number of Democrats voting in the Democratic primary and hence the greater the proportion of the total Democratic vote con-

Our survey data do show that people with more education were less likely to vote for the proposition. This relationship is demonstrated in Table 7, which is based on white gentiles only. (Jews, Negroes, and Orientals, groups which are unequally distributed among educational levels and which have distinctive responses to fair housing, have been excluded from this tabulation.) Only one-sixth of whites who had not graduated from high school intended to vote "no" in late October. As the level of education increases, so does the proportion of respondents planning to vote against the proposition. Only the small group with post-graduate training was predominantly opposed to the measure, however. These findings are consistent with the existing literature on the relationship between education and racial tolerance.⁹

In addition to Negroes and members of various European nationality groups, California has two more distinctive ethnic minorities: Mexican-Americans and Orientals. Discrimination in housing does not appear to be a

tributed by Republicans crossing over. In a district where, say, 75 per cent of the voters are Democrats, a vote for Wallace by a third of the Republicans will account for a far smaller proportion of the total Democratic vote than will a Wallace vote by a similar fraction of the Republicans in a district where only 25 per cent of the voters are Democrats. (We are indebted to John E. Mueller for bringing this point to our attention.)

⁹ For an inventory of the literature on racial attitudes see Frank R. Westie, "Race and Ethnic Relations," in Robert E. L. Faris (ed.), *Handbook of Modern Sociology* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 576-586. For typical survey findings, including data on the relationship between prejudice and social status, see Hazel Gaudet Erskine, "The Polls: Race Relations," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (1962), 137-148; and Mildred Schwartz, *Trends in White Attitudes Toward Negroes* (Chicago: NORC, 1967). The 1963 NORC study included an eight-item scale of pro-integration attitudes. Northern white respondents with no more than a grade school education had a mean score on this scale of 3.88; those with nine to twelve years of education averaged 5.01; and respondents who had attended college scored 5.96 (Sheatsley, *op. cit.*, p. 226). For a collection of findings specifically on housing, see Mrs. Erskine's "The Polls: Negro Housing," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 31 (Autumn, 1967), 482-498. The most recent surveys reported there show no differences in attitudes on interracial housing by education, income, or occupation (p. 491).

TABLE 7. VOTING INTENTION ON PROPOSITION 14, BY EDUCATION

Educational Level	Intention:		
	Yes	No	Don't Know
Less than high school	59%	18	23
High school graduates	66%	20	14
1 to 2 years of college	57%	29	15
3 to 4 years of college	52%	39	9
Graduate study	45%	53	2

major problem at present for either of these groups. The Orientals have attained phenomenal social mobility since the war, while Mexican-Americans frequently complain that their problems are overlooked in the currently fashionable concern for Negroes. Perhaps for these reasons, various journalists have claimed that these minorities are unduly hostile to Negroes and expressed their feelings by enthusiastic support for Proposition 14. Our data strongly contradict these assertions; 61 per cent of the Orientals planned to vote "no," as did 53 per cent of the Mexican-Americans.¹⁰ While we have far too few cases to permit controls for education, it still is clear that these minorities were much less favorable to the proposition than were whites. In addition, two-thirds of the Jewish respondents planned to vote against the proposition.

What we found more noteworthy was the importance of a third class of background char-

¹⁰ Unless otherwise indicated, all percentages given hereafter are based only on respondents with a definite voting intention in late October. Data on Mexican-Americans are from a sample survey of Los Angeles County residents directed by Professor Dwaine Marvick, to whom we are grateful for these data. It is likely that Mexican-Americans in Northern California were more hostile to Proposition 14, for reasons we discuss later. In 1960 5.6 per cent of the state's resident's were Negroes, 2.3 per cent were Orientals (fairly evenly divided among persons of Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino origin), and 9.1 per cent were Mexican-American. Ten San Francisco precincts with an average Chinese-American population of 92 per cent voted 74 per cent "no" on Proposition 14. (Source: Murray Adelman and Angus McBain, "Ethnic Voting in San Francisco," unpublished paper, Stanford University.) The principal Oriental and Mexican-American civic organizations were strongly opposed to Proposition 14.

TABLE 8. PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND VOTE INTENTION ON PROPOSITION 14 WITH EDUCATION CONTROLLED—WHITE GENTILES ONLY

Educational Level	Per cent intending ^a to vote no:	
	Republicans	Democrats
Less than high school	10%	29%
High school graduates	8%	30%
1 to 2 years of college	27%	32%
More than 2 years of college	33%	64%

^a "Don't know" responses were excluded from the bases.

acteristics—political variables—in differentiating the voters. Party identification and, even more, voting intentions in the presidential election, were much more powerful discriminating factors than education. Forty-one per cent of the Democratic respondents were opposed to the proposition, compared to 22 per cent of the Republicans.¹¹ Table 8, which compares the Proposition 14 vote intentions of white gentile Republicans and Democrats at each educational level, demonstrates the strong relationship between party identification and attitudes toward the proposition. As can be seen, a Democrat without a high school diploma was scarcely less likely to vote "no" than a Republican with a college education. These data show that party identification was, in 1964, at least as strong an independent variable as education, a finding that may serve as a corrective to interpretations of discrimination and backlash politics that place exclusive emphasis on social class as an independent variable.¹²

Preferences in the presidential election dis-

¹¹ Recent surveys showing no differences by status variables also indicate that party identification is an important independent variable: Erskine, "The Polls: Negro Housing," *op. cit.*, p. 491.

¹² Data from the University of Michigan Survey Research Center's nationwide sample surveys suggest that relationships between party identification and civil rights attitudes may have been much stronger in 1964 than in previous elections. Perceptions of the two parties' stands on this issue were far more common and much less ambivalent in 1964 than in 1960. In the earlier year only 20 respondents mentioned civil rights stands as something they particularly liked about one party or the other, and these mentions were evenly split between the two parties. But in 1964

criminated even more strongly than party identification among supporters and opponents of the proposition. Forty-six per cent of Democrats intending to vote for Johnson planned to vote "no," compared to 16 per cent of the Democrats for Goldwater. Fifty-one per cent of the Republicans for Johnson were opposed to the proposition, compared to only 12 per cent of those sticking with Goldwater. (Ten per cent of the Democrats and 27 per cent of the Republicans planned to defect to the other party's presidential candidate.)

The importance of party identification as an independent variable probably was in part a reflection of nationwide images of the two parties in 1964, which are summarized in note 12. The pronounced association in popular images of the Democratic party with civil rights doubtless resulted both from Senator Goldwater's well-publicized vote against the landmark Civil Rights Bill of 1964 and from that law itself. Although congressional Republicans played an important and constructive role in shaping and passing the bill, it seems likely that for those voters who are aware of such matters it was a Democratic bill, proposed by one Democratic President, passed by a Democratic Congress, and signed into law by another Democratic President.¹³

And at the state level the very different positions taken on the fair housing issue by the two parties no doubt helped many voters to see what position on Proposition 14 would be congruent with their own attitudes on fair housing. Governor Edmund G. Brown made passage of the Rumford Act part of his "urgent" legislative program in the 1963 session and made several strong public statements in its support during the spring. Legislators voting on the bill divided sharply by party. Re-

67 respondents mentioned the Democratic Party's civil rights stand favorably and only one liked the Republicans'. By the same token, equal numbers of 1960 respondents thought each party had gone too far on this issue, while in 1964 74 respondents said this of the Democrats, compared to only five for the Republicans. See Angus Campbell, "The Meaning of the Election," in Milton C. Cummings, Jr. (ed.), *The National Elections of 1964* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1966), pp. 267-268. More than 80 per cent of the 1964 respondents correctly identified both Johnson's and Goldwater's civil rights positions, a far higher than normal proportion. See Angus Campbell, "Civil Rights and the Vote for President," *Psychology Today*, February 1968, p. 29.

¹³ David B. Filvaroff and Raymond E. Wolfinger, *The Civil Rights Act of 1964* (in preparation).

publican state senators were unanimously against it, while all but two Democrats voted "yes." All Democratic assemblymen voted for the bill, along with three Republicans; all 25 opposed votes were cast by Republicans. (After the bill had been approved by the senate, nine more Republican assemblymen voted "yes" on final passage of the senate version.) Most Democratic officials and candidates opposed Proposition 14, as did the Democratic State Central Committee, and local clubs worked vigorously against it.

Early in 1964 the California Democratic Council, the party's grass-roots organization, passed a resolution urging that only realtors supporting the Rumford Act be patronized. Ninety-one per cent of a sample of the California delegation to the 1964 Democratic National Convention were strongly opposed to Proposition 14.¹⁴ On the other hand, the major Republican citizens groups, the United Republicans of California and the California Republican Assembly, endorsed repeal of the Rumford Act, as did Secretary of State Frank Jordan, the only Republican state-wide office holder.¹⁵ Most Republican candidates and party officials took a position of neutrality, while only seventeen per cent of a sample of Republican convention delegates were hostile to the proposition.¹⁶ Furthermore, many interest groups generally associated with the Republican party supported the proposition, while many groups usually allied with the Democrats attacked it. Thus as a consequence of the actions of national and state party leaders, the well-known cue-giving functions of voters' party identifications seem to have been in play in this referendum election, albeit to a lesser degree than would be expected in a partisan candidate election.

Finally, we want to touch on another important independent variable, the regions of the state with their intriguing and puzzling differences in political climate. Opposition to Proposition 14 varied enormously from one

city to another and from one part of the state to another in ways that are not explained by differences in any of the conventional Census demographic indices.¹⁷ The most interesting and politically important of these variations is between Southern California and the San Francisco Bay Area. The Bay Area voted 42 per cent "no," while the Los Angeles metropolitan area voted 32 per cent "no" and the rest of Southern California was even more hostile to fair housing legislation.¹⁸ Of the 25 cities which voted against the proposition only three—all of them highly deviant communities—are in Southern California.¹⁹ On the other hand, all but one of the 25 cities most in favor of the proposition are in the South, as are all but three of the 60 most favorable cities.

While this regional split is found among members of both parties, it is more pronounced among Republicans.²⁰ Analyzing regional dif-

¹⁷ Including income, white collar population, median education, ethnicity, and race. By assigning a numerical value of three to each Bay Area city, a value of one to each Southern California city, and a value of two to all other towns, we were able to compute simple and partial correlation coefficients to measure the relationship between region and votes against Proposition 14. The simple correlation coefficient (Pearson's r) is .55. When the vote for Johnson and Salinger, percentage of the labor force employed in manufacturing, median family income, and percentage non-white population are all partialled out, the coefficient is .39.

¹⁸ There are eight counties in Southern California. Los Angeles and Orange Counties, the Los Angeles-Long Beach Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, contain about three-quarters of the region's population. The other six counties, which include the San Diego metropolitan area, are, by and large, quite similar to the Los Angeles area socially, economically, and politically, and will be combined with it in the discussion that follows.

For present purposes we include the San Jose metropolitan area (Santa Clara County) in the San Francisco Bay Area, which thus includes seven counties. The remainder of Northern California, about 18 per cent of the total population of the state, is excluded from consideration in our North-South comparisons.

¹⁹ The three deviant cities are the largely Jewish communities of Beverly Hills and Lake Elsinore, and Compton, which was 40 per cent Negro in 1960.

²⁰ Cf. Totton J. Anderson and Eugene C. Lee, "The 1964 Election in California," *Western Political Quarterly*, 18 (June, 1965), p. 465. Regional differences in California generally are much larger

¹⁴ Edmond Costantini and Kenneth Craik, "Two Faces of Republican Leadership: Goldwater and Rockefeller Elites in California" (Davis, California: unpublished paper, 1967), p. 10.

¹⁵ A few Republican leaders, including Senator Thomas Kuchel and Caspar Weinberger, a former state chairman, opposed the proposition. Joseph Martin, Jr., having resigned as Republican National Committeeman to work for Rockefeller in the primary, subsequently became Northern California co-chairman of the anti-14 campaign.

¹⁶ Costantini and Craik, p. 10. Three-fifths of the Rockefeller slate defeated in the June primary were opposed to Proposition 14.

ference by party and region explains much more of the variance than when either independent variable is examined singly. Forty-four per cent of Bay Area Democrats and 32 per cent of those in Southern California intended to vote "no." The difference among Republican respondents was much greater: 33 per cent of the Bay Area Republicans planned to vote "no," compared to only 14 per cent of Southern California Republicans.

The populations of the two regions are virtually identical in education, income, occupation, and age. It is especially interesting that the two regions did not differ on one set of factors of obvious relevance to voting on Proposition 14: attitudes toward Negroes. White respondents from Southern California were no more or less liberal in their responses to a series of questions about race relations asked in the May California Poll.²¹

How then are we to account for the regional split in voting on Proposition 14? An important clue is the finding that results when regional variations in Proposition 14 voting are examined by various indices of socioeconomic status.

The regional difference is greatest at the highest status levels. In the Bay Area 57 per cent of white gentile respondents with three or more years of college intended to vote against Proposition 14; only 31 per cent of the same subgroup in Southern California planned to vote "no." The figures for respondents with less than three years of college are 32 per cent for the Bay Area and 22 per cent for Southern California. The regional difference for the better educated group is 26 per cent, compared to 10 per cent for the less educated respondents.²² The same phenomenon can be seen by

in Republican primaries than in general elections. In the 1964 presidential primary, for example, Governor Rockefeller carried the Bay Area by more than 60 per cent, but got scarcely 40 per cent of the vote in Southern California.

²¹ Twenty-two per cent of persons moving to Southern California from 1955 to 1960 migrated from the southern and border states, compared to 16 per cent of such newcomers to the Bay Area. However the 1963 NORC survey found that "Northerners who formerly lived in the South (and these may be either Southern migrants or Northerners who spent some time in the South) are only slightly less pro-integrationist than their neighbors who have never been exposed to Southern life" (Sheatsley, *op. cit.*, p. 227).

²² For further data and analysis of this point see Raymond E. Wolfinger and Fred I. Greenstein, "The Political Regions of California," (forthcoming in this REVIEW).

comparing regional variations in voting returns from cities with different income levels. Bay Area cities with 1959 median family incomes of less than \$6000 had a mean "no" vote only six percentage points higher than comparable cities in Southern California, whereas Bay Area cities in the over-\$8000 category had a mean "no" vote 19 per cent higher than their southern counterparts. The greatest differences of all are found in the richest communities in the two regions. For example, Southern California's San Marino, which had the highest median income (\$16,728) of any incorporated city in the state, voted 14 per cent "no." Pacific Heights, the highest status neighborhood in San Francisco (\$18,381 median family income and 36 per cent of all families making over \$25,000), voted 48 per cent "no." Both San Marino and Pacific Heights are adjacent to Negro districts.

We explore elsewhere the proposition that the roots of California's political split may be found in the very different orientation of the leadership groups in the two parts of the state.²³ California's regional voting patterns seem to be most divergent in referendum and primary elections. Voting choices in such contests are likely to be more responsive to leadership group influence than those in general election voting, where party identification guides most voters. Thus in the former elections newspaper endorsements, for example, will tend to be far more important.²⁴ Most newspapers in Southern California urged their readers to vote for Proposition 14, while those in the Bay Area were largely opposed. The proposition was the creation of the California Real Estate Association, which also contributed a good deal of money to the election campaign; but several real estate boards in the Bay Area passed resolutions opposing it. The San Francisco Junior Chamber of Commerce also took a stand against the proposition. In the North bumper stickers—an index of opinions of the politically active—were predominantly against the proposition; in the South the vast majority urged support for it. Southern California is, of course, a center of highly organized and vociferous radical right activity. While the actual number of people engaged in these activities is small in absolute terms, it amounts to a much larger proportion of the electorate there than around the Bay Area.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Or so the conventional wisdom tells us. On the other hand, Mueller's analysis of patterns on individual ballots in the 1964 election indicates minimal press influence on proposition voting decisions (Mueller, *op. cit.*).

Santa Clara County, at the south end of San Francisco Bay, provides an example of the effects of unusually intense leadership activity in the form of campaigning. In addition to the core city of San Jose, the county includes traditional farm towns as well as a variety of suburbs ranging from brand-new, working-class tract cities to established, well-to-do communities. Palo Alto and other suburbs heavily settled by people from Stanford University and adjacent scientific industries were the source of an intensive anti-14 effort. This area produced more than 2000 precinct workers who campaigned against the proposition in all parts of the county, and also contributed \$65,000 to the state-wide campaign. Several local real estate boards passed resolutions opposing Proposition 14. The effects of this activity, and the general opinion climate that it both reflected and enhanced, can be seen in the voting returns. Santa Clara County voted 47 per cent against the proposition. More significantly, none of the 15 cities in the county voted less than 42 per cent "no."²⁵

A particularly striking example of the impact of precinct work and other efforts to shape community sentiment can be found in Table 9, which compares the socioeconomic characteristics and voting performance of two quite similar towns, one (Milpitas) in Santa Clara County and the other (Newark) a few miles up the freeway in another county. Both communities are quite new and both are populated largely by skilled and clerical workers who live in moderately priced subdivisions. As Table 9 shows, the demographic characteristics of the two towns' residents (many of whom work in a mammoth automobile assembly plant in Milpitas) are almost identical. Yet Milpitas voted 47 per cent "no" and Newark voted 30 per cent "no." We find it difficult to explain this difference except as a result of the vigorous anti-14 campaign waged in Santa Clara County.

The voting patterns of those parts of Northern California outside the Bay Area also suggest that campaign activity and the positions taken by particular community leaders may have had considerable impact on voting patterns. California contains vast stretches of very thinly populated land which is unsuitable for farming. The occasional towns in this area, which comprises most of California to the north

TABLE 9. COMPARISON OF VOTING AND
CENSUS DATA FOR MILPITAS
AND NEWARK

	Milpitas (Santa Clara County)	Newark (Alameda County)
Per cent No on Prop. 14	47	30
Per cent for Johnson	72	69
Per cent for Salinger	63	57
Per cent employed in mfg.	44	44
Per cent non-white	6	2
Median family income	\$6700	\$6700

of San Francisco, depend for their livelihood on logging, fishing, livestock, and mining. The only county of the 58 in California which returned a majority against 14 is Modoc County, located beyond the main range of the Sierra Nevada in the extreme northeastern corner of the state, more than 300 miles from San Francisco. The local newspaper there opposed Proposition 14, as did the only metropolitan daily with any circulation in the county. A very active campaign against the proposition was conducted in Modoc County, in good measure by an articulate and energetic minister who organized discussion groups, stimulated the circulation of literature, and easily bested proponents of the proposition in debate. Various prominent citizens in the area publicized their hostility to Proposition 14, as did civic organizations. Not nearly so much was done by the proposition's supporters.

Modoc County is the most striking example of a somewhat surprising finding: many of the places where Proposition 14 was most unpopular are in the backwoods. Several cities in the remoter parts of California even returned majorities against the proposition. On the other hand, other similar towns voted quite strongly for it. Either the long-term character of these towns or the more or less fortuitous inclinations of those people who participated actively in the 1964 campaign, or some combination of these factors, evidently had a good deal to do with the voting in these communities.²⁶

²⁵ Another example of the effect of precinct work is Marin County, a well-to-do suburban area just north of San Francisco. The county as a whole voted 48 per cent against Proposition 14 and no city in the county voted less than 42 per cent "no."

²⁶ At the county level, the proposition fared worst in three counties in the Bay Area: Marin, Santa Clara, and San Francisco (47 per cent "no"); and three backwoods counties, all hundreds of miles from any city of consequence: Modoc, Siskiyou (48 per cent "no"), and Shasta (48 per cent "no"). It was most popular in a disparate pair of counties: Orange, the famed heartland of Southern California conservatism (22 per

There are very few Negroes in the remote parts of California and civil rights is not much of an issue there.²⁷ We think it likely that the lower salience of the issue in such places increased voter susceptibility to the influence of leading citizens or, for that matter, anyone who happened to exert himself on one side or the other on the proposition, even without intensive door-to-door campaigns of the sort mounted in Santa Clara County.

III. MOTIVATIONS UNDERLYING VOTING ON PROPOSITION 14

Opponents of Proposition 14 based their case on the desirability of providing equal housing opportunity for minority groups, particularly Negroes. The "no" vote was solicited, in the phrase of the bumper stickers, as "a vote against prejudice and discrimination." Needless to say, the proposition's proponents did not argue in favor of "prejudice," "discrimination," and "inequality," at least not in their public messages. The "yes on 14" forces stressed the principles of "property rights" and "non-compulsion," and succeeded in wording the proposition accordingly: the state and its subdivisions were barred from limiting the "right of any person to sell, lease, or rent residential real property to any person . . . he chooses" [our emphasis].

What attitudes and values actually lay behind the voting? Can we attribute the proposition's success simply to race prejudice? Or was it *in part* a vote in favor of "property rights," as many optimistic liberals and complacent conservatives claimed? Were some

people voting for the principle of noncompulsion in social relationships, or perhaps just in real estate transactions?

We have already dismissed the contention that Californians voted "yes" on Proposition 14 mistakenly because of response set or inability to understand that one had to vote "no" on the proposition in order to express approval of fair housing legislation. A rather more sophisticated voter-confusion thesis might be called the "item wording hypothesis." This hypothesis argues that the wording of the proposition, by stressing certain positively valued symbols—"rights," "any person . . . he chooses"—succeeded in winning over the electorate, and that a proposition in support of fair housing, if equally positively worded, would have been approved by the electorate. This explanation falls apart when we look at the California Poll's wording of its question about the Rumford Act. The Act was explained to respondents (after their level of familiarity with it had been ascertained) in positive terms which are fully consistent with current rhetoric in defense of the American Creed:

... the Rumford Act is a law which makes it illegal for apartment house owners, owners of publicly assisted housing, and real estate brokers to discriminate against anyone because of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry in the renting or selling of housing accommodations.

Nevertheless, we have seen that the voters consistently expressed their disapproval of the act—initially even more so than their approval of Proposition 14. The unpopularity of fair housing legislation among white voters is evident. Homeowners were about 8 per cent more hostile to the Rumford Act, but because they were also more likely to be Republicans, Southern Californians, etc., we are unsure that this finding can be interpreted as indicating the importance of a belief in "property rights."

One serious impediment to believing that opposition to the Act (and opposition to civil rights laws in general) was based on anything but prejudice is the commonplace use of non-prejudice arguments by opponents of such measures in circumstances when it is obvious that these arguments are a mask for intolerance. This is particularly clear, of course, in the southern case against national civil rights legislation. Hence it is difficult to accept such "philosophical" arguments when they are advanced elsewhere. For example, allegations that dislike of "compulsion" underlies opposition to civil rights laws meet the fact that until very recently Jim Crow laws compelling sepa-

cent "no"), and Mono, a vast expanse of deserts and mountains behind the Sierra Nevada (22 per cent "no").

The phenomenon of sharply divergent voting by ecologically similar (and typically rural) political units has been reported for such diverse settings as Indiana, Alabama, and southern Italy. See V.O. Key, Jr. and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: the Case of Indiana," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck (eds.), *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 281-299; V.O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1949), p. 282; and Sidney G. Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 193.

²⁷ Rogin found that Wallace was less successful in Wisconsin's rural counties and attributed this to the paucity of Negroes and consequent abstract quality of the race issue there (*op. cit.*, pp. 105-106).

ration of the races in various contexts were commonplace in the South. Similarly, it seems likely that most of the people, in both North and South, who still support laws against miscegenation are undeterred by "constitutional" objections to compulsion. It has been less than fifteen years since California law prohibited people born in the Orient from owning land in the state.²⁸ In short, the pitfalls in such interpretations are enormous.

Yet the simple explanation of the election result in terms of "race prejudice" is unsatisfactory, since race prejudice is not a simple, unidimensional phenomenon. The conception that Gunnar Myrdal introduced in his formulation, "rank order of discrimination"²⁹—that attitudes toward different aspects of racial equality can be ranked in descending order of popularity—is now well established by research, although different studies show slight variations in rankings depending upon such considerations as the time and place of the survey and the precise wording of the question.³⁰ And it is also well established that in all regions of the United States there has been a steady increase in receptivity toward equality for Negroes in various spheres, as well as a general decrease in negative stereotypes about Negroes.³¹

As our comparison of the May 1964 California Poll findings with data from other states indicates, Californians clearly have participated in the general trend toward liberalization of racial attitudes; they also fall in the familiar pattern of contextual variation in the extent to which they support Negro equality. Thus in the May survey the substantial disapproval of the Rumford Act was not part of a general pattern of racism: we have already noted that only 13 per cent said they definitely would move if Negroes "came to live next door." Two-thirds favored national legislation requiring equal treatment of Negroes in public accommodations (restaurants, hotels, etc.). Eighty-eight per cent would have no objection to "sending your children to a school where a

few of the children are colored." Fifty-eight per cent favored a substantial program of Federal expenditure for Negro education and job training. On the other hand, large majorities (of about 75 per cent) were opposed to Negro mass demonstrations and when the questions about school and residential integration were phrased so as to raise the spectre of substantial numbers of Negroes in the school or neighborhood, white opposition rose sharply.

Attitudes toward residential integration appear to occupy a peculiar position in "the rank order of discrimination" of white Americans, particularly Northerners. These attitudes seem to stand almost as a watershed between areas in which resistance to accepting Negroes as equals is high enough to be virtually at the taboo level and areas in which resistance now has become relatively slight, possibly because of the implications for intimacy of personal association that residential integration has for many people. Thus in a 1966 Harris survey the percentage of whites who would object if their teenage child "dated a Negro" was 88; if a close friend or relative married a Negro, 79. But few objected to more segmented, impersonal interracial relationships—for example, to sitting next to a Negro in a restaurant (16 per cent) or movie (20 per cent). Other studies show that resistance to job and political equality is low. The proportion of objections in the Harris survey to "a Negro family moving next door" was 48 per cent, roughly half way between the two clusters of responses.³² As Hyman and Sheatsley point out in their review of liberalizing trends in racial attitudes over a 22-year period, "the shift of attitudes in the North . . . has been smallest on the residential issue."³³ Surveys taken since 1964 indicate that this trend has stopped altogether, at least for the moment.³⁴

We have analyzed the May California Poll findings on racial attitudes in order to see how these attitudes relate to views on fair housing legislation. The general finding that emerges is that people who are opposed to all forms of racial contact and to other civil rights legislation are very likely to be hostile to the Rumford Act, while the most "extreme" minority on the other side, those people who take the liberal position even when it is quite unpopular,

²⁸ This was done by means of the alien land law, which, made largely inoperable by court decisions, was repealed by referendum in the 1956 election: 1,391,000 people voted against its repeal.

²⁹ Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: McGraw-Hill paperback edition, 1964; originally published in 1944), I, pp. 60ff.

³⁰ See the works cited in note 9.

³¹ Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "Attitudes toward Desegregation," *Scientific American* (July, 1964), 16-23; and Schwartz, *op. cit.*, ch. 1.

³² *Newsweek* (August 22, 1966), p. 26.

³³ Hyman and Sheatsley, *op. cit.*, p. 19. Their review does not consider the taboo areas of interracial marriage and dating. Attitudes on these issues seem to have been reasonably stable.

³⁴ Erskine, "The Polls: Negro Housing," *op. cit.*, pp. 491, 493, 495.

TABLE 10. IMPRESSIONS OF THE RUMFORD ACT, OF WHITE SUPPORTERS AND OPPONENTS

	Attitude toward the Rumford Act	
	Approve	Disapprove
Equality in housing	47%	19%
Force, taking away freedom of choice	4%	44%

are by no means as likely to be wholehearted supporters of the act. Only about one-eighth of the white respondents would definitely move if a Negro family moved in next door; about 14 per cent of these people favor the Rumford Act. Only eight per cent of the minority of whites who are opposed to a public accommodations law favor the Rumford Act. But liberal minorities do not display anything like this level of unanimity. The quarter of whites who say they would not move if many Negroes moved into their neighborhood, the group which might be considered most tolerant of residential integration, divides about evenly on the Rumford Act. Similar relationships are found on other questions where the most liberal position is taken only by a minority.³⁵ In short, the most tolerant respondents are split on the Rumford Act, while the most prejudiced minority is almost wholly opposed to it.

Can reasons other than antipathy to Negro neighbors help explain the unwillingness of Californians to accept the Rumford Act? The data in Table 10 provide some preliminary clues. In March respondents were asked what the Rumford Act was about. Table 10 shows certain of the answers of white supporters and

opponents of the Act. People hostile to the law seem quite concerned about the element of compulsion involved, while its supporters are totally unconcerned about this aspect. In contrast to the Act's supporters, its opponents do not appear to care much about discrimination—perhaps because they ignore it, but perhaps in at least some cases because they are unaware of it. It appears that a substantial proportion of the white population does not believe that Negroes are discriminated against. Fifty per cent of the May California respondents did not feel that Negroes were denied job opportunities in California, compared to 33 per cent who acknowledged that this was the case. And nationally, the great bulk (69 per cent) of Americans feel that "most Negroes are treated fairly in the United States," a percentage that (unlike anti-Negro prejudices) has not changed markedly since the early 1940's.³⁶ These and other data suggest that fair housing propaganda emphasizing the theme of racial discrimination is quite ineffective with many people, since their perspectives on this issue do not include acceptance of the fact of discrimination.³⁷ We have no way of knowing how much of this is due to ignorance of and indifference to the problem, and how much to selective perception resulting from anti-Negro sentiment or other stereotyped orientations.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

To summarize: the voting outcome cannot be attributed to the putative conservatism of

³⁶ Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, *Social Change and Prejudice* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 13. See also Schwartz, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72. There appear to be no useful data on white recognition that Negroes are denied equal opportunities to obtain decent housing (*ibid.*, pp. 52-53), except perhaps for the 1966 Harris finding that two-thirds of all whites think that Negro housing is worse than white housing (Brink and Harris, *Black and White*, *op. cit.*, p. 136). This latter finding is not quite the same thing as saying that two-thirds of all whites attribute the disparity in housing to racial discrimination.

³⁷ For research suggesting the existence of a group of "naive non-perceivers," i.e., unprejudiced people who are unaware of anti-Negro discrimination, see Edward R. Tufte, Paul Ekman, and Louis S. Levine, "The Perception of Discrimination Against the Negro and Support for Civil Rights" (Princeton: unpublished paper, 1967). For a journalistic account making the same point see Rodney Stark and Stephen Steinberg, "Jews and Christians in Suburbia," *Harper's Magazine* (August, 1967).

³⁵ The extensive nationwide survey of attitudes on racial issues by Louis Harris Associates in 1963 produced similar findings: for any given aspect of race relations a great many more whites said they were for integration than supported laws aimed at securing it. Thus 88 per cent approved equal job opportunities, but only 62 per cent supported federal fair employment practices legislation. See William Brink and Louis Harris, *The Negro Revolution in America* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1964), p. 142. Conceivably this is a case of white hypocrisy: lip service in favor of equality and unwillingness to do anything to bring it about. But if talk is so cheap in an interview, if the respondent is insincere in his protestations of belief in equality, why should he become frank when talking about legislation?

the California electorate; there is no evidence that California voters are more conservative on civil rights than those of other northern states. Nor can it be attributed to mistakes resulting from the complexities of voting on the proposition. Whatever confusion existed at the early stages of the campaign worked against the measure's passage; and most of the confusion seemed to have disappeared by election day as a result of the intensive campaign conducted by both sides.

The fixed point in the campaign was attitudes toward the Rumford Act. Voters were heavily opposed to the Act from the start and remained so, although no doubt the stable percentages on this point conceal some change in both directions. During the final period of the campaign there was a slight increase in the "yes" vote—probably a result of voters' greater ability to connect their views on the Act to the appropriate vote intention. Sympathy with fair housing legislation and opposition to Proposition 14 were positively associated with education, minority group status, Democratic party identification, and residence in the Bay Area as opposed to Southern California. The greater conservatism of Southern California on this and other electoral issues is particularly evident in high income communities; it may be that these communities are especially responsive to the conservative press in Southern California and the region's well-organized conservative and radical right groups.

The motivations underlying Californians' consistently negative response to fair housing legislation cannot be fully explored with our data; but aspects of the data and of the broader body of literature on racial attitudes suggest that residential segregation is a particularly sensitive issue to whites and that white resistance to Negro equality is particularly strong where housing is concerned.³⁸ In 1967 only 35 per cent of a national sample favored a national fair housing law, 54 per cent opposed it, and the rest had no opinion.³⁹

The numerous propositions on the California ballot in every general election—many of them quite arcane—are a survival from the

Progressive era, when the referendum was considered a way to reduce the influence of special interests.⁴⁰ Among contemporary political scientists it is more common to assume that asking voters to pass judgment on substantive policy questions strains their information and interest, leading them to decisions that may be inconsistent with their own desires. The consequence is subversion of representative government and the exercise of undue influence by groups that can afford to gather the signatures to qualify a measure for the referendum ballot and then wage a publicity campaign that will have an impact on voters.⁴¹

Most of these criticisms are not too relevant to the present case, however. Few referendum items are voted on with the same amount of publicity, debate, and voter information as Proposition 14, where the issue was both immediate and easily understood. But there are other elements in the situation that must be considered in assessing the referendum as a device for making policy. The most obvious point of departure is a comparison of how the Rumford Act has fared in the legislature—the alternative to the referendum as a law-making arena. The remarkable thing about this comparison is the disparity in outcomes between

⁴⁰ While the initiative and referendum are employed in some other states, these devices are most frequently used in California, where there has been an average of 22 propositions on the ballot in every general election since their inauguration in 1911. See Joseph P. Harris, *California Politics*, 4th edition (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1967), pp. 112–113.

⁴¹ A measure is qualified for a place on the ballot by submission of petitions bearing the valid signatures of eight per cent of the vote in the preceding gubernatorial election (currently about 500,000 signatures). This task almost always is done by a signature-collecting firm, which currently charges about \$250,000 to qualify a single measure (*ibid.*, p. 115). Proposition 14, however, was put on the ballot by signatures that were collected almost exclusively by volunteers (Casstevens, *op. cit.*, p. 50). In 1964 more than half a million dollars was spent on each proposition on the ballot. See Thomas W. Casstevens, "Reflections on the Initiative Process," in Eugene C. Lee (ed.), *The California Governmental Process* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 89. While the anti-referendum viewpoint is the current conventional wisdom among political scientists, the California system does have its academic defenders: see, e.g., Henry A. Turner and John A. Vieg, *The Government and Politics of California*, 2nd edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 77–87.

³⁸ Myrdal has pointed out that, in the North, residential segregation has performed in much the same fashion as southern Jim Crow laws as a barrier to interracial contact (*op. cit.*, pp. 618–627).

³⁹ Erskine, "The Polls: Negro Housing," *op. cit.*, p. 491. The figures given in the text are based on the three-fifths of the Gallup sample who could give a satisfactory explanation of the term "open housing."

the two processes, for the legislature has persistently failed to reflect the wishes of the state's voters. In 1964 there were no signs that either the governor or the legislature was giving serious consideration to repealing the Rumford Act, even as its widespread unpopularity became clear. But two years later, in the aftermath of the Watts riots, black power, and the white backlash, Governor Brown lost by a million votes to a candidate who made capital out of these developments.

Does this mean that those politicians responsible for the passage of the Rumford Act (notably Brown and the Democratic legislators) behaved irrationally? From the standpoint of electoral advantage, it appears that the answer is negative. The state legislators running for re-election in 1964 did not appear to have suffered because of their votes on the Act, despite the electorate's overwhelming repudiation of it.⁴² Moreover, in 1967, after Brown's defeat, a bill to repeal the Act passed the state senate but was handily defeated in the assembly.⁴³ The assembly's bill to modify

⁴² Our data provide no indications that there was any significant backlash in the 1964 senatorial and presidential voting in California. The state legislators running in the 1964 election undoubtedly were somewhat insulated by a general lack of public awareness of their activities, if not of their identities. Even at the congressional level public awareness of individual legislators and their activities is slight: see Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (Winter, 1962), 531-546. Nationwide, President Johnson probably gained some votes on the civil rights issue, for while he suffered a small net loss of support from Democrats, this was more than balanced by the Republicans and Independents with positive Civil Rights attitudes who voted for him. (See Campbell, "Civil Rights and the Vote for President," *op. cit.*, p. 31).

⁴³ Ironically, the Rumford Act was passed in 1963 by a notoriously malapportioned state senate and rejected four years later by a senate that had been reapportioned on a one-man-one-vote basis. Between the 1961 and 1965 apportionments the 21 northernmost counties had four per cent of California's population but elected ten of the 40 members of the state senate. Seven of these senators voted for the Rumford Act, two voted against it, and the tenth abstained. (The ten largest counties, with 70 per cent of the state's population, also had ten senators, five of whom voted "yes," four "no," and one abstained.) These seven "cow county" legislators provided

the Act (supported by Governor Ronald Reagan and bitterly denounced by the California Real Estate Association) was rejected by the senate and the session ended with the Rumford Act intact, still the law of the state. In 1968 Governor Reagan became more favorably inclined toward the Rumford Act and the likelihood that it would be repealed dwindled close to zero.

We have no way of knowing if the Act would have passed in the first place if the state's politicians had known how unpopular it was, but other considerations than the quantitative distribution of attitudes seem to have been highly relevant in the calculations made by the politicians who brought about its passage. The Rumford Act was passed on Governor Brown's insistence, after a long and difficult struggle. In the course of the battle a group of young civil rights workers chained themselves to a stairway in the capitol building as part of a four-week sit-in that ended only when the bill passed. This episode embarrassed the bill's sponsors, who felt that it would alienate moderate white opinion and offend undecided legislators. But it also must have been to some politicians a sign of the depth of Negro feeling. Some Democratic legislators must have been more worried about losing Negro votes than about the real estate and apartment interests.

We noted earlier one of the advantages of the legislative over the plebiscitary decision-making process: the former not only permits but is characterized by compromises between the initial demands of groups of varying size and intensity. In referenda, of course, compromise is impossible once the issue has been formally posed. A second, closely related advantage of legislatures is that they typically take account of the intensity of demands as well as their numerical support, while in referenda every voter's preference, no matter how casual, is equally weighted. The legislative process is responsive to intensity because legislators (consciously or unconsciously) ask themselves how much the interested parties care about the issue since they want to find out what the cost in votes and other forms of campaign support will be of disappointing one side or the other.

Calculations about intensity are relevant to

the Act's margin of victory. It appears that, unconstrained by constituent opinion, they were free to indulge their own liberal beliefs (in some cases) or accede to the claims of party loyalty (all were Democrats) and the Governor's insistence on passing a fair housing bill.

considerations other than electoral advantage. First, a politician may feel on principle that, all things being equal, he would rather respond to an intense minority than a more or less lukewarm majority, particularly if he thinks the minority's claim is legitimate. It appears that Governor Brown's strong support of the Rumford Act was based on such a view, along with a belief that fair housing was essential to any strategy of coping with the Negro problem. Second, as the history of California race relations since Watts reminds us, judgments about intensity are crucial data for the enterprise of making policies designed to minimize civil strife. A key consideration in assessing civil rights proposals is whether their passage or failure will increase or reduce the likelihood of racial disturbances.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ We think that similar calculations by national politicians were the basis of the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968. We know of no survey data on white attitudes to such legislation which were collected in the spring of 1968, when the bill was passed by both houses of Congress. The most recent findings seem to be those of a year earlier, which showed whites opposed to the proposal by a ratio of three to two (see note 39). We think it un-

While politicians inevitably are imperfect in their calculations about intensity, voters are unlikely to make such judgments at all, particularly when their views are channeled through the referendum process. Nor are they likely to be disposed or able to make calculations about the possible ways in which a policy which they desire might detract from other of their preferences—such as for civil peace. If, as seems likely, the next several years of civil rights politics in the North are characterized by confrontations between angry, demanding Negroes and intransigent whites, with violence a common recourse of disappointed Negroes, then the referendum will become an increasingly inappropriate political tool and processes leaving room for calculation and compromise will be more necessary than ever. But we have no doubt also that the referendum will continue to be a tempting opportunity.

likely that white opinion on this issue changed very much, but the intensity of Negro protest increased considerably. This discussion is, of course, strongly influenced by Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955).

FACTIONS AND COALITIONS IN ONE-PARTY JAPAN: AN INTERPRETATION BASED ON THE THEORY OF GAMES

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I. "COALITION GOVERNMENT" IN JAPAN¹

In constitutional form and in practice, the Japanese national government is parliamentary. Authority is centered in the Diet,² and power is held by the parties in the Diet. Unlike the pre-war system, for example, the Diet parties really do choose the Prime Ministers.

The post-war party system changed fundamentally in 1955, when the non-socialist parties combined and formed the mammoth Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP). Since its formation in 1955, the LDP has always had a safe majority in both Houses of the Diet. But, from its beginning as a union of several political streams to the present, the LDP has been made up of several rather stable factions. These factions are the key actors in the biennial election of the party president, who naturally becomes the Prime Minister. As a general rule, votes in a party presidential election are on straight lines. So a Prime Minister is chosen by a coalition of LDP factions which controls a majority of votes at the party convention. Furthermore, the factions present nominees for Cabinet posts, and Ministers are chosen from among these nominees. Cabinet posts become rewards for the factions which voted for the Prime Minister, inducements to opposing factions to enter the Prime Minister's coalition, and buffers to soften or weaken the opposition of hostile factions. In short, the struggle over top political leadership in Japan—the president and the top officials of the ruling party, the Prime Minister, and other Cabinet members—is waged by the LDP factions. (The struggle over policy, on the other hand, is waged by

other actors, within the framework established by the outcome of the factions' struggle over leadership.)³ And because of the wide range of opinion within the LDP, the outcomes of the factions' struggle over top political leadership are very important for Japan. A switch from an Ishibashi to a Kishi, or from a Kishi to an Ikeda, is certainly as significant as, say, the replacement of a Laniel by a Mendès-France.

A brief digression is necessary in order to make clear the peculiar nature of the LDP factions, because these factions are not typical of factions in Japan or elsewhere.⁴ The year after its formation, the LDP decided that its president would be chosen by vote, with LDP Diet members holding practically all the votes.⁵ Up until this radical innovation, and for a little while after it, factions in the LDP were more or less what factions in Japan—or anywhere—had always been: a nucleus of a few key lieutenants around a leader, with a rather unreliable following. But after this innovation was put into operation, in the election of Ishibashi Tanzan as LDP president in 1956, the nature of the factions changed. In Ishibashi's election, Kishi Nobusuke, who was the "obvious" winner, the strong man who certainly would have

³ The LDP is at the center of policy-making, and has developed an elaborate organizational structure within the party paralleling the organs of the Diet and the Ministries. But the factions are not unified actors in policy-making. There is some evidence of policy agreement within the "extreme" factions—the Kishi-Fukuda and Nakasone factions, for instance—but it is clear that most factions contain serious internal divisions on policy, and that the factions do not usually attempt to set a policy "line" for their members. All this does not deny, of course, that faction leaders may play an important part in policy making.

⁴ But for a different view, see for example, R. Scalapino and J. Masumi, *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan* (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1962), *passim*.

⁵ On earlier methods of choosing Japanese political party leaders, see Watanabe Tsuneo, *Toshu to Seito (Party and Party Leader)*, (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1961), Chap. 7, and the same author's *Seiji no Misshitsu (The "Smoke-filled Room" of Politics)* (Tokyo: Sekkasha, 1966).

¹ The research reported on in this article was conducted under the auspices of a Fulbright Fellowship, 1965–67. The material gathered in the course of this research has also been used in "Coalition Government in Japan," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan* (forthcoming), "Jiminto to wa, Renritsu Seiken to Mitsuketari," *Chuo Koron* (August, 1967), and "Coalition Politics in One-Party Japan," *The Study of Coalition Behavior*, S. Groennings, W. E. Kelley, and M. Leiserson (eds.) (Holt-Rinehart-Winston, forthcoming).

² "National Assembly" would be a better translation, but "Diet" is official.

won if the old method of *hanashiai* or "talks" had been used, did not win. Parliamentary arithmetic—that is, the skillful coordination of factions into a coalition which was numerically a majority—defeated Kishi and proved just how significant the innovation had been. Thereafter, within two years, the factions became like army "divisions," headed by a "general" who was advised by his "General Staff."⁶ There were "line officers," fixed and known memberships, offices, publications, regular sources of funds, and so forth. In a word, the factions became institutionalized, and, because of that change, became able to perform some of the functions of parties in a coalition cabinet system of government.⁷

There have been five LDP Prime Ministers, four of whom gained power after the election system was inaugurated.⁸ Ishibashi Tanzan was elected in 1956 by a coalition of five factions, led by Ishii Mitsujiro, Ikeda Hayato, Ono Bamboku, Miki Takeo, and Ishibashi himself. Prime Minister Ishibashi began his term with great personal popularity and amid widespread hopes for improvement of relations with Mainland China. But he was stricken with a severe illness less than two months after taking office, and was replaced by Kishi Nobusuke, who had opposed him in the December election. In that election Kishi had been supported by his brother Sato Eisaku and by Kono Ichiro, and later the Ono faction joined this coalition. This main-stream of Kishi-Sato-

Kono-Ono ruled Japan from 1957 until mid-1959 when, shaken by the controversy caused by the unpopular Police Duties Law revision bill, the Prime Minister changed his coalition. The powerful Ikeda faction, which had been leading the anti-Kishi forces, entered the ruling coalition, and the weaker Kono faction was expelled.

This new ruling coalition or main-stream of Kishi-Sato-Ikeda-Ono governed Japan until the end of 1960, through the great storm which arose over the Security Treaty revision in 1959-60. The same coalition, minus the Ono faction, elected Ikeda to follow Kishi as Prime Minister, over the opposition of all the other factions. But the Kishi-Sato-Ikeda coalition did not last much longer. In 1960-61 the Kishi faction split and the Kishi-Fukuda group went into opposition. Prime Minister Ikeda countered this development by bringing the Kono and Ono factions into his coalition, but this only antagonized the Sato faction, which saw Sato's position as Ikeda's successor to the Prime Ministership in danger. The Prime Minister countered this further loss of support by drawing the Miki faction into the ruling coalition. Thus, when Ikeda, riding the wave of prosperity generated by his "double the national income" plan, was re-elected for a third term in 1964, the ruling coalition was composed of Ikeda-Kono-Ono-Miki-Kawashima. The anti-main-stream was Kishi-Fukuda-Sato-Ishii-Fujiyama. Nevertheless, when Prime Minister Ikeda was stricken by cancer later that year, he nominated Mr. Sato to succeed him as Prime Minister. As his brother had done seven years before, Prime Minister Sato quickly turned his minority coalition into a winning coalition, by the addition of the Miki and Kawashima factions. The ruling coalition of Sato-Kishi-Fukuda-Miki-Kawashima (plus some others: see Section V) has continued to govern Japan to the present, restoring relations with South Korea, surviving the *kuroi kiri* scandals of 1966, and re-electing Prime Minister Sato to a second term of office last December.⁹

⁶ The terms are those used by Japanese newspaper reporters. The present and following historical remarks in the text are based on the vernacular press of the time.

⁷ This does not touch at all upon the fascinating question of what maintains the factions. See G. O. Totten and T. Kawakami, "The Functions of Factionalism in Japanese Politics," *Pacific Affairs* (1966); 109-122; Watanabe Tsuneo, *Habatsu: Nihon Hoshuto no Bunseki (Factions: An Analysis of Japan's Conservative Party)*, (Tokyo: Kobundo, rev. ed., 1964), Chap. 10; and Kawakami Tamio, "Habatsu Rikigaku ni tsuite no Ichi Kosatsu" (A Study of the Dynamics of Factions"), in *Kodo Kagaku Kenkyu (Behavioral Science Research)* 2 (1966), 29-36.

⁸ The most informative and perceptive research on the LDP factions in English has been done by Hans H. Baerwald. See his "Factional Politics in Japan," *Current History* 46 (April, 1964), 223-229, and his yearly summaries of developments in the January issue of *Asian Survey*, 1964, 1965, 1967. The best description of the history of LDP presidential elections is in Watanabe, *Habatsu*, *op. cit.*, Chap. 9.

⁹ Mr. Ishii is presently Speaker of the Lower House. Mr. Ono held various posts in his long career, including the LDP vice presidency under Prime Ministers Kishi and Ikeda, but died in 1964. Miki Takeo is presently Foreign Minister. Mr. Kono was a perennial strong-man in many Cabinets, and a leading contender for the Prime Ministership, until his death in 1965. Fukuda Takeo later served as Minister of Finance, and is presently the Secretary-General of the LDP. Kawashima Shojiro is a pre-war party veteran

TABLE 1. LDP PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, PRIME MINISTERS, AND COALITIONS

Date of LDP Presidential Election	Victor, i.e., Prime Minister	Main-stream (besides P.M.'s faction)	Neutrals, Opposition
Before 12/56	Hatoyama	Kono, Kishi, Ono, Ishii	Miki, Ikeda, Sato
12/56	Ishibashi	Ikeda, Ishii, Miki, Ono	Kishi, Sato, Kono
2/57	Kishi	Sato, Kono, Ono	Miki, Ikeda, Ishii, Ishibashi
-----general election-----			
1/59	Kishi	Sato, Kono, Ono	Miki, Ikeda, Ishii, Ishibashi
7/60	Ikeda	Kishi (Fujiyama, Kawashima, Fukuda), Sato	Kono, Ono, Miki, Ishii, Ishibashi
-----general election-----			
7/62	Ikeda	(ran unopposed; an "era of good feelings")	
-----general election-----			
7/64	Ikeda	Kono, Ono, Miki, Kawashima	Kishi-Fukuda, Sato, Fujiyama, Ishii
11/64	Sato	Kishi-Fukuda, Miki, Kawashima, Ishii, Murakami	Kono, Fujiyama, Funada
12/66	Sato	Kishi-Fukuda, Miki, Kawashima, Ishii, Murakami, Mori-Shigemasa	Nakasone, Fujiyama, Funada, Maeo
-----general election-----			

Notes: For a similar list, see Watanabe's *Seiji no Misshitsu*, pp. 152, 156. In 1960-61 the Kishi faction split into the Fujiyama, Kawashima, and Kishi-Fukuda factions. After the deaths of Ono and Kono in 1964-65, their factions split into the Funada and Murakami, and Nakasone and Mori-Shigemasa factions, respectively. The Ikeda faction continued after its leader's death; the new leader was Mr. Maeo. The "Miki" faction was once the "Miki-Matsumura" faction. Before 12/56 several factions' leaders were different.

This brief history, which is summarized in Table 1, suggests four questions. First, why did the winner win in each election for party president? That is, why Ishibashi in 1956, Kishi in 1959, Ikeda in 1960 and 1964, and Sato in 1966?¹⁰ Second, when the Prime Minister resigned because of illness and his successor was

who has held various Cabinet and party posts; currently he is the LDP vice president. His faction emerged from the Kishi faction when the latter split in 1961. Fujiyama Aichihiro, for many years president of the Japan Chamber of Commerce, entered full-time politics to become Prime Minister Kishi's Foreign Minister in 1957. His faction was also built up largely out of the old Kishi faction. He was the opposition candidate versus Mr. Sato in Dec., 1966.

¹⁰ Prime Ministers Kishi, Ikeda, and Sato won in uncontested elections in 1957, 1962, and 1964, respectively.

chosen through "talks," why was the particular successor chosen? Why did Kishi follow Ishibashi in 1957, and why did Sato follow Ikeda in 1964? Third, why did the Prime Minister change his ruling coalition? Why did Kishi drop Kono for Ikeda?¹¹ Fourth, what is happening now? Is the ruling coalition changing again, and if so why? Who will follow Prime Minister Sato? These are the questions I will try to answer in what follows.

II. A THEORY OF COALITION BEHAVIOR

To answer these questions in a systematic and consistent way requires a theory of coalition behavior. Such a theory was presented over twenty years ago by von Neumann and

¹¹ The question of why Prime Minister Ikeda changed his coalition is answered, in a narrow sense at least, by the observation that the breakup of the old Kishi faction created a new situation.

Morgenstern in *The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*. The N-M theory is the basis of the propositions developed in this section.¹²

First, three assumptions and some definitions. (1) Actors know what they want. That is, they know what the possible outcomes are (for example, what the winning coalitions are, what a winning coalition wins), and can rank these outcomes as more or less desired. They know what each other wants, in the same sense. Definition: a "payoff" to an actor is the worth of an outcome to him. Tautologically, an actor tries to get more payoff rather than less payoff. Definition: a "payoff vector" is a list of the payoffs received by each actor. Payoff vector $X = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$, where the entry x_i shows the payoff to actor i .

(2) A coalition controls its member actors' payoffs in the sense that these actors cannot receive the controlled payoffs without entering the coalition. For example, only the members of the Government coalition receive Cabinet posts. Definition: the "value of a coalition" is all the various payoffs which all a coalition's members may individually receive, if the coalition forms. That is, $v(S) = (X, Y, \dots)$, where X, Y , etc., are the payoff vectors which the members of coalition S control.

(3) Coalitions are worth forming. For example, if two distinct losing coalitions combine together and become a winning coalition then the payoff vectors in $v(S)$ for the larger, winning coalition certainly include all the payoff vectors in both $v(S)$ s for the smaller, losing coalitions.

Given only these assumptions it is possible to define an N-M "solution." Some payoff vectors are dominated by other payoff vectors. This happens when all the members of a coalition prefer one payoff vector to another (that is, for all these actors the individual payoffs to them listed in the one vector are more valuable than the individual payoffs to them listed in the other vector), and when at the same time the preferred payoff vector is controlled by that coalition (that is, the preferred payoff vector is one of the vectors in $v(S)$). In symbols,

¹² The N-M volume is now available in a Wiley Science Editions paper back (1964). The following relies on the formulation of L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik, "Solutions of n -person Games with Ordinal Utilities," *Econometrica* 21 (1953), 348-349, with one important modification (avoiding the notion of an "effective set") which was suggested by R. J. Aumann and B. Peleg, "Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side-Payments," *Bull. Amer. Math. Soc.* 66 (1960), 173ff.

a payoff vector Y is dominated by a payoff vector X if X is in $v(S)$ and if x_i is greater than y_i for each member i of S . (Intuitively, in open negotiations, Y would be rejected in favor of X). Call the set of all payoff vectors which are dominated by payoff vector X as $D(X) = \{Y: Y \text{ is dominated by } X\}$.

Finally, label the set of all payoff vectors in which each actor receives no less than what he could achieve by himself alone, not in a coalition with anyone else, as C . Intuitively, C is the set of all possible payoff vectors.

Then a solution is defined as a set of payoff vectors $V = (X, Z, \dots)$, which has two properties. (1) Every payoff vector in the set ($C-V$) is in $D(X)$ for some X in V . That is, a possible payoff vector which is not in the solution set is dominated by some payoff vector which is in the solution set. (2) No payoff vector in V is in $D(X)$ for any X in V . That is, no payoff vector in the solution set dominates another payoff vector in the solution set. These conditions may be combined: $V = C - D(V)$. That is, the solution is a set of possible payoff vectors which do not dominate each other.

Obviously it is not easy to discover V , since the definition is circular (but *not* tautological). However, the problem is greatly simplified when the actual situation one is studying has the two properties: "constant-sum" and "simple." A simple coalition situation is defined as one in which every coalition is either losing or winning.¹³ A constant-sum simple coalition situation is defined as a simple situation in which every winning coalition controls exactly the same payoffs.¹⁴ If W is any winning coalition, then in a constant-sum simple coalition situation, $v(W_i) = v(W_j)$, for any W_i and W_j .

In a constant-sum simple coalition situation,

¹³ This is the N-M definition. Shapley has refined the concept; according to his classification the definition in the text is of a "strong simple game." See L. S. Shapley, "Simple Games," *Behav. Sci.* 7 (Jan., 1962), 59-66.

¹⁴ Until this point, interval scale measurement has not been assumed, but strictly speaking this statement is meaningless without such an assumption. However, in a situation where the actual physical quantities which underlie the payoffs are in fact constant (as when there are simply 17 Cabinet posts, for example), then I feel that it may be permissible to speak of "constant-sum" without actually demonstrating that interval scale measurement is possible. (And, of course, one can certainly speak of constant-sum without implying that utility is linear with money or some medium of exchange; i.e., there is no assumption here that utility is "transferable.")

the "minimal winning coalitions" are very important. A minimal winning coalition, W^m , is defined as a W which would become losing if any member left the coalition. (There are usually several W^m , and the number of actors in each W^m , and the total resources of each W^m , are not necessarily the same). The reason why the W^m are so important in a constant-sum simple coalition situation is that only the W^m are relevant when considering dominance relations among payoff vectors.¹⁵

In order to apply the N-M solution theory to constant-sum simple coalition situations (which are the type of situation the LDP factions are in), it is helpful to give a concrete interpretation of what defines a W . This can be done by the use of "weights." If one knows which coalitions are winning, then usually he can assign weights to the actors so that a coalition with a majority of the weights is always winning.¹⁶ For example, consider the LDP after the 1958 general elections, the time when Prime Minister Kishi had to form a coalition which would pass the Security Treaty.

Kishi-Sato	Ikeda	Kono	Ono	Miki	Ishii	other	
36%	15%	9%	11%	9%	9%	11%	=100%

where the percentages show how many LDP Dietmen were in each faction. In this situation (considering "intangible" factors as well as these percentages), I think that the W^m were: The Kishi-Sato bloc plus Ikeda, the Kishi-Sato bloc plus any two of Kono, Ono, Miki, or Ishii, and Ikeda plus any three of Kono, Ono, Miki or Ishii. So the weights that should be assigned to these actors in this situation are:

Kishi-Sato	Ikeda	Kono	Ono	Miki	Ishii
$w_i = 3$	2	1	1	1	1

¹⁵ This was proven by N-M, but the idea is intuitively clear also. If there is a W^m and an actor j not in the W^m , then by the constant-sum condition, $v(W^m) = v(W^m + j)$. So j is unnecessary, from W^m 's viewpoint. Any payoff which the members of W^m can get, they can get without j 's help. Thus only W^m needs to be considered when calculating dominance relations among payoff vectors.

¹⁶ Actually the problem of assigning weights is more complex than this hurried treatment shows. Two key questions are: do the weights make blocking coalitions impossible, and is the sum of the weights in any W^m always the same? The N-M theory, as they formulated it and as used here, only applies if both of these questions can be answered positively.

Clearly the same W^m still exist; shifting from resources and "intangibles" to these particular weights has not changed the strategic possibilities for forming coalitions.¹⁷

When winning coalitions are defined with the aid of weights such as these, the N-M solution theory becomes strikingly simple. It states that in a constant-sum simple coalition situation, when an actor is in the actually-formed coalition, his payoff—if it is in the N-M solution—will be directly proportional to his weight.¹⁸ In the example, the N-M solution payoffs, if expressed on an interval scale, are:

Kishi-Sato	Ikeda	Kono	Ono	Miki	Ishii	
0	0	0	0	0	0	if losing, and
3/5	2/5	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5	if in W^m ,

or some multiple of these numbers. (Here, clearly, the constant-sum = 1; i.e., $v(W) = 1$; for any W). Note that N-M define a solution as a set of payoff vectors, *any* of which may happen. The whole solution Set is:¹⁹

¹⁷ See the Sources to Table 2 for an explanation of the meaning and the use made here of "intangible" factors. Briefly, the intangible factors I considered in assigning the factions' weights were (1) the financial backing of each faction, and (2) the likelihood that the "others" (not-factionally-aligned LDP members) would support each faction. These factors had to be considered, in assigning weights, since the percentages based upon memberships do not have the properties which N-M theory requires for weights. (See footnote 16.)

However, in the analyses of Sections III, IV, and V, I have used only the memberships of the factions, and a definition of "majority" as 51% of LDP Dietmen, when dealing with coalitions. The weights given in Table 2 were used only for making predictions on payoffs, as in Table 4. (Using the weights would not change any results for N-M theory, but using memberships makes it possible to contrast N-M theory with Riker's and Gamson's theories, as in Section IV.)

¹⁸ This is not how N-M put it; see Section 50.8.1 in N-M. The reason for this phrasing is given in footnote 22.

¹⁹ The reader can verify by inspection that none of these vectors dominates another. That one of these vectors dominates any other which is not in the solution will become clear simply by imagining some other vector and comparing it with these. For example, take (0, 1/3, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 0), for Kishi-Sato, Ikeda, Kono, Ono, Miki, and Ishii, respectively. Incidentally, it is known that N-M solution payoffs in situations like the present have

Kishi-Sato	Ikeda	Kono	Ono	Miki	Ishii	Coalition
(3/5,	2/5,	0,	0,	0,	0)	K-S+Ikeda
(3/5,	0,	1/5,	1/5,	0,	0)	K-S+K+On
(3/5,	0,	1/5,	0,	1/5,	0)	K-S+K+M
(3/5,	0,	1/5,	0,	0,	1/5)	K-S+K+Is
(3/5,	0,	0,	1/5,	1/5,	0)	K-S+On+M
(3/5,	0,	0,	1/5,	0,	1/5)	K-S+On+Is
(3/5,	0,	0,	0,	1/5,	1/5)	K-S+M+Is
(0,	2/5,	1/5,	1/5,	1/5,	0)	Ik+K+On+M
(0,	2/5,	1/5,	1/5,	0,	1/5)	Ik+K+On+Is
(0,	2/5,	1/5,	0,	1/5,	1/5)	Ik+K+M+Is
(0,	2/5,	0,	1/5,	1/5,	1/5)	Ik+On+M+Is

This N-M theory can be modified in order to make its basic proposition more applicable to on-going coalition situations. The modification takes the form of two supplementary propositions, which concern uncertainty in bargaining and dynamics (passage of time). The effect of the former proposition is to identify which of the several coalitions in the N-M solution set is likely to occur. The effect of the latter proposition is to identify certain contexts in which the N-M proposition should not be expected to hold. In time it may be possible to integrate these propositions into the N-M theory, but at present they are merely qualifications of the basic theory.²⁰

The proposition regarding bargaining is that as the number of actors increases there is a tendency for each actor to prefer to form a W^m with as few members as possible. If there are, say, ten actors, and the size of the W^m ranges from three to seven actors, then there will be a very strong tendency for the W^m with three members to form. The reasons for this tendency, briefly, are (a) that the members of the smaller W^m will prefer to form them, since negotiations and bargaining are easier to complete, and a coalition is easier to hold together,

ceteris paribus, with fewer parties, and (b) that the bargaining advantage objectively held by the members of the smaller W^m vis-a-vis the actors who are not in the smaller W^m (which is reflected in the higher weights and higher pay-offs) can only be guaranteed by using the threat which causes the advantage—i.e., by forming the smaller W^m . Because these reasons involve bargaining considerations, I will call this proposition—that W^m with fewest members form—the bargaining proposition.

The proposition regarding dynamics is that when a coalition situation requires only "periodic decisions" (e.g., an election every two years, and the winner is certain to remain the winner all during the entire inter-election period, as in elections for the LDP president), then the N-M solution theory must be modified so as to allow for inter-decision "maintenance" of the winning coalition. More than merely perpetuating the last W^m , by maintenance is meant: ensuring that the ruling coalition (or some part of it) is still (in) a winning coalition at the next time of decision. Over time many features of the situation may change: actors' weights may change (e.g., a general election results in different possibilities for W^m), an actor may even cease to exist (e.g., a faction splits), and so on. An attempt merely to perpetuate the last winning coalition would possibly produce a losing coalition at the next time of decision. Therefore, the N-M theory should be expected to account for the observed coalitions only at the times of decision. The coalitions during the inter-decision period should be easily explained as required by the "maintenance" process. For example, if at one decision-time the W^m $ABCD$ forms, and at the next decision-time the W^m CDE forms, but during the interim there is a coalition of $ABCDE$, then it seems clear that $ABCDE$ is a result of the "maintenance" process.²¹

a very desirable property: any deviation from a payoff vector in the solution set guarantees that the actor who benefited from the deviation will be absolutely worse off when a solution vector is reimposed (as "must" happen, since the solution vectors dominate all others). See W. Vickrey, "Self-Policing Properties of Certain Imputation Sets," in A. W. Tucker and R. D. Luce (eds.), *Contributions to the Theory of Games IV* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1959), pp. 213ff.

²⁰ In honesty, it must be admitted that these two propositions contradict an essential feature of the N-M concept of a solution, namely, that it is possible for *any* outcome in the solution set to occur. This contradiction points to a serious weakness in my theory. (Cf. footnote 25.)

²¹ In the following section a model of coalition maintenance is described, and a proposition (by

To sum up. (1) In a constant-sum simple coalition situation the observed result (coalition formed, payoffs received) will be one of the vectors in the N-M solution. Therefore, (2) a W^m will form, and its members' payoffs will be directly proportional to their weights.²² (3) However, when the number of actors is large, as in the LDP, the observed coalition will not be any coalition predicted under (1) but the W^m , or one of them, with the fewest member actors. (4) These propositions will not hold during the inter-decision period when decisions are made only periodically (at fixed and known intervals), as in the LDP; instead the phenomenon of "maintenance" will be observed.

III. EXPLAINING "COALITION GOVERNMENT" IN JAPAN

In this section, the propositions developed in the previous section are applied to the situation described in the first section, in order to answer the questions listed at the end of the latter.

The actors are the conventionally recognized factions within the LDP. Independents (very few) and prefectural delegates to the party conventions are not actors, and do not figure in any way in determining outcomes; they are ignored. Thus a winning coalition is a coalition of factions whose Lower and Upper House Diet members combined make up over one-half of the total number of LDP Dietman.²³ The strengths of all factions over time, and the weights derived from those strengths are given

in Table 2; data sources and method are explained in footnote 24.²⁴

²⁴ Figures on factions' memberships have been drawn from the vernacular press, plus the books of Watanabe cited in footnotes 5 and 7, the *Asahi Nenkan*, the *Kokkai Binran*, the *Asahi Journal* (weekly), and the *Gendai no Me* (monthly). The newspapers contain about 40 independent estimates of the strength of each faction in the Lower House at 12 different times since 1955, usually just before and after a general election or LDP presidential election, and the other sources contain about another 10 estimates. (A dotted line indicates a general election.) Of the total of roughly 50 independent estimates, 22 list the names of all the members of each faction as well. Thus I obtained 12 reliable estimates of the strength of each Lower House faction, by taking the average of the 3, 4, or 5 estimates available for each point in time. The same sources and procedure were used for the Upper House. However, since until 1963-64 most of the LDP Upper House members were not tied to a particular faction but rather to one of three clubs, it was necessary to estimate the proportion of a club which belonged to one of the factions in that club. (This was done on the basis of reported voting in Upper House elections, such as for LDP caucus chairman, and in the LDP presidential elections.) But the Kishi and Sato factions in the Upper House have always made up one club by themselves; those figures are precise, based on the names in the official membership list.

Insofar as the "weights" differ from the memberships, this is due to information on the financial strengths of the factions, and on the ties between various of the "others" and the factions. Data on finances was obtained from the *Kampo*, the Official Report (of the Government), all months since 1956. This data was not used precisely, because reporters, politicians, and factions' staffers assured me that the data is not reliable; instead, relying on my data, which agrees with the widespread rumor that Kishi, Sato, and Ikeda (and Ishii, slightly) have the strongest financial backing, I gave these factions a slight edge when memberships were not clearly decisive. Similarly, depending on newspaper reports of the ties and attitudes of the "independents," I gave the appropriate factions a slight advantage in figuring the proper weights.

For example, in January, 1959, the *Kampo* data show that the factions with the strongest financial backing (in 1958) were Kishi-Sato, Ikeda, and Ishii, while contemporary newspapers said that the small Ishibashi faction was thoroughly hostile to Kishi, although unable to

which maintenance is "easily explained" in the sense used above) concerning inter-decision period payoffs is derived from the model. However, that model was discovered *ad hoc* (which is the reason why it is discussed in the following section).

²² Thus, even if the N-M solution is not known, and even if payoffs are not measured on an interval scale, this proposition—derived from N-M theory as a logical consequence—can be applied!

²³ This definition of a winning coalition clarifies the meaning of the assumption that the prefectural delegates do not affect the party presidential election. That is, a winning coalition must be able to win in the LDP Diet factions' struggle, without the aid of the prefectural delegates. While the former wording may seem unjustified, the latter certainly reflects the real situation, in my opinion.

TABLE 2. FACTION MEMBERSHIPS AND WEIGHTS^a

Date	Item ^b	Kishi-Sato ^c	Ikeda	Kono	Ono	Miki	Ishii	Ishibashi	Hato-yama	neutral	total
12/56	%Diet	30	7	8	9	10	11	2	—	23 — ^d	100 ^e
1957	%LH	24+9	9	13	10	14	8	6	—	7 —	98
12/56-5/58	<i>w_i</i>	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	7
6/58	%LH	23+12	15	11	12	11	8	5	—	3	100
1/59	%Diet	36	15	9	11	9	9	4	—	7	100
7/60	%Diet	42 ^a	16	9	9	8	8	3	—	5	100
6/58-11/60	<i>w_i</i>	3	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	9
1962-63	%LH	9+17	17	11	10	11	5	9	8	3	100
12/60-11/63	<i>w_i</i>	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	11
12/63	%LH	8+16	16	16	10	12	4	7	7	5	101
7/64	%Diet	27	13	15	10	10	7	5	7	6	100
12/63-? ^f	<i>w_i</i>	4	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	13
12/66	%LH	9+16	16	9-6	5-4	11	5	6	6	5	98
	%Diet	29	14	6-3-4	3-2-3	10	6	4	7	8	99
1967-68	<i>w_i</i>	Kishi-Sato 4	Mao 2	Naka-sone 1	Funada 1	Miki 2		Kawa-shima 0			11

^a On the use of these data, see footnotes 17 and 24.

^b %Diet=percentage of all LDP Dietmen in a faction; %LH refers to the to the Lower House. *w_i* indicates "weight" as discussed in the text; note that the total of the weights is not constant over the years.

^c The Kishi and Sato factions (after 1960, the Kishi-Fukuda and Sato factions) are inseparable because in the Upper House they form one Club. Also, Kishi and Sato are brothers; they have never opposed one another in an LDP election.

^d The small Hatoyama faction no longer acted as a unit after its leader resigned.

^e Includes Fujiyama and Kawashima; neither was independent yet.

^f The Kono and Ono factions split gradually. The double and triple entries in the following rows show the splinter groups' members. The weights in this row do not satisfy the second condition of footnote 16.

^g Because of the numbers of neutrals, a majority is defined here as $(100 - 23 + 1)/2 = 39$.

agree upon a leader among themselves to succeed the ailing Ishibashi. Moreover, the neutrals were said to include a group who were close to or indebted to Prime Minister Kishi, although unable to admit this publicly by joining his faction. Finally, the rest of the neutrals included a group of ex-Liberal Party members who were said to be willing to support either Kishi-Sato or Ikeda, whichever was more expedient, but did not want them to fight each other. On the basis of this information, I reasoned as follows.

- a. Kishi+Ikeda are already winning (51%), and in reality they are even stronger than

their memberships indicate;

- b. Kishi+any two of Kono, Ono, Miki, and Ishii are already winning (54% or 56%), and in reality may be slightly stronger than their memberships indicate;

- c. neither Ikeda+any three of Kono, Ono, Miki, and Ishii, nor Kishi+any one of the same four, is winning on the basis of the memberships; considering the Ishibashi faction's hostility to Kishi, its 4% can always be counted in with the anti-Kishi coalition; financially, an Ikeda vs. Kishi fight would rather evenly split the big

What does such a winning coalition win? It wins what it can control of what the LDP factions want. Specifically, a winning coalition controls such valued things as Cabinet posts, the Prime Ministership, the probability that a certain faction leader will become Prime Minister at a later time, a position of influence within the party for a faction or its leader, party endorsement of a faction's nominees in a general election, party funds, and so on. Further, it seems to me, all these aspects of winning are roughly equivalent to, or are reflected in the acquisition of Cabinet and high party posts. For example, an incumbent Prime Minister might promise the leader of a faction to support the latter in the next party presidential election. But if the Prime Minister does not give the man's faction valuable Cabinet and party posts, the promise will not be believed.²⁵

money; the neutrals would also divide rather evenly. Hence these calculations seem reasonable:

Ikeda + Kono + Ono + Miki
 = 44 + Ishibashi's 4 + 3½ neutrals = 51½
 Ikeda + Kono + Ono + Ishii = ditto
 Ikeda + Ono + Miki + Ishii = ditto
 Ikeda + Kono + Miki + Ishii
 = 42 + Ishibashi's 4 + 3½ neutrals = 49½

But still, this last coalition too would be winning if it should form, even versus Kishi-Sato + Ono + 3½ neutrals = 50½, since Ikeda and Ishii—with their money and their influence in the ex-Liberal Party-dominated Ono faction—could break the unity of the Ono faction (especially in the Upper House, where Ono's extra strength lay).

In short, in this typical example of the calculations behind Table 2's weights, the memberships determined which were the W^m for seven coalitions, the memberships plus the factors of money and unofficial ties determined three other minimal winning coalitions, and those factors plus an arbitrary judgment based upon knowledge of probable defections decided the last W^m .

²⁵ The assumption that the posts are or reflect all the winnings to be won seems valid except for one serious problem. It is *not* correct to say that a faction leader's calculations regarding his future chances of succeeding to the Prime Ministership depend solely upon the posts his faction wins. Moreover, such calculations about future potentialities seem to be very important in determining the strategies and tactics chosen by faction leaders. The failure to include in the operational

There are many reasons why these posts are valuable to a faction—to further the faction's members' careers, to control policy, to strengthen the faction, to get funds, and so forth—which are not important here. But what is important is that these posts can be evaluated, can be ranked according to their value to a faction. On the basis of research and interviews, I believe that the following ranking accurately measures how the faction leaders themselves evaluate the various posts.²⁶

- A: Prime Minister;
- B: Finance Minister, party Secretary-General;
- C: Trade and Industry Minister, Agriculture-Forestry Minister, Transportation Minister, Construction Minister, party Executive Board chairman, party Policy Board chairman;
- D: Foreign Minister and Economic Planning Agency chief—when held by a faction leader; Deputy Prime Minister, Cabinet Minister Without Portfolio, party Vice President;
- E: Foreign Minister and Economic Planning Agency chief—when not held by a faction leader; Education Minister, Welfare Minister, Labor Minister, Defence Agency chief, Justice Minister, Postal Minister, Interior Agency chief, 1958–1960, Interior Minister, 1960–present.
- F: Administrative Management Agency chief, Hokkaido Development Agency chief, Science and Technology Agency chief, Prime Minister's Office chief, 1965–present, Interior Agency chief, beginning-1957.

In brief, what a winning coalition wins is con-

definition of payoff anything corresponding to these calculations about the future is a second serious weakness in my research. (Cf. footnote 20.)

²⁶ Of course, any list such as this can be criticized. There is not space here to raise and answer all of the possible questions which should be asked. Three omissions must be explained, however. The Chief Cabinet Secretary (*kanbochokan*) I have lumped together with the Prime Ministership, since the former is always a "right-hand man" of the P. M. The political under-secretaries (*seimujikan*) I have omitted on the advice of several newspapermen who insisted that these posts are not part of the same "game." Diet posts—committee chairmanships, speakerships, etc.—are omitted for the same cause: they are given to *individuals*, and for reasons which are different from the reasons governing the distribution of Cabinet and top party posts.

trol over all these posts, whose value is crudely measured by the A-F ranking.²⁷

At first blush, it might seem likely that a winning coalition would give these posts only to itself, that is, only to members of the factions in the winning coalition. This would be possible, but it has never happened, and the reason is not hard to find. A winning coalition does not exist merely at one point in time. It exists over time, and is vitally concerned with prolonging its period of rule. Posts are given not simply as rewards for supporting a Prime Minister in the past, but also as encouragement to support him in the future. Indeed, posts may be given to factions simply to keep them from stirring up trouble, to silence them, or to weaken them internally. For these reasons, a Prime Minister's basic support coalition does not monopolize all the rewards, the posts. Therefore, the members of a Prime Minister's support coalition are not the only members of the Cabinet. And for this reason, the relations between the *support coalition* and the *Cabinet coalition* can become quite complex.

Nevertheless, it is possible to sketch out in a general way how this system works, showing the relationship between the support coalition and the Cabinet coalition. At some point, a party presidential election is held, and a winning coalition—the new support coalition—elects the party president. This victor, acting as Prime Minister, then forms a Cabinet and makes appointments to the top party posts. The individuals who receive these posts are members of the factions which supported the Prime Minister in the election, plus some other factions' members. It may even be that all factions will be represented in the Cabinet, but the valuable posts (i.e., the B- and C-level posts) will be given only to the members of the support coalition plus one or two other factions. In a sense, the Prime Minister uses the posts in two ways: as payments on debts he incurred in the election, and as capital investment. Thus a Cabinet is born, and continues for about a year. Then the Prime Minister makes some changes. Now he has fewer "fixed costs" to meet, and so he can "invest" larger amounts than before. This does not mean, of

course, that he can ignore the members of his support coalition. If he is to keep their allegiance, he must invest with them as well as with newcomers. The factions are now looking to the future. If a faction's rewards decline (for example, if a faction receives only two E-level posts and one F-level post now, whereas immediately after the election it received two C-level posts and an F-level post), then that faction will start feeling and behaving more like an opposition or neutral faction than like a main-stream faction. But, on the other hand, an increase in the value of a faction's rewards will not necessarily buy its support for the Prime Minister. Memories are long, and no one likes to be had cheaply. Thus the Prime Minister is faced with a problem. The supply of rewards is limited. If he starts giving more valuable rewards to opposing factions, in hopes of luring them into supporting them, then he will have less to give to the old support coalition. And it is probable that his "return on investment" will be less if he invests with opposition factions than if he invests with his old support coalition. But, on the other hand, if he does not diversify his investments he will become completely dependent upon his old support coalition. Such dependence would make the Prime Minister vulnerable to threats of desertion by his erstwhile supporters, and thus put him in a weak bargaining position. The Prime Minister must resolve this dilemma by distributing rewards (the posts) skillfully enough to guarantee that he will be supported by a winning coalition in the next election, at which time the whole process begins again.

If this is the way that the "coalition cabinet" system within the LDP works—and I think it is—then a proposition follows immediately. *A Prime Minister will have a winning coalition in support of him if, by his distribution of rewards to the factions, he has kept the allegiance of enough of his old support coalition and earned the allegiance of enough of his old opposition that the two groups together constitute a majority of the electors in the party presidential election.* To keep the allegiance of one of his old supporters, I think, a Prime Minister must continue to give him, in every Cabinet, rewards valued at not less than one C-level post. To have a chance of gaining the allegiance of a new supporter, a Prime Minister must give him rewards valued at least as much as one C-level post in at least the Cabinet preceding a party presidential election.

To sum up: if the payoffs of inter-election Cabinet coalitions obey the above proposition on coalition maintenance, then it seems fair to

²⁷ Thus, while the measurement of the payoffs is only ordinal scale level, because the physical "goods" which underlie the payoffs are a constant amount for any winning coalition, and because all the factions do in fact want these posts roughly equally badly, it seems defensible to claim that the situation is constant-sum. (See footnote 14, above.)

TABLE 3. PAYOFFS^a

Prime Minister, date	Kishi ^b	Sato	Ikeda ^c	Kono ^c	Ono ^c	Miki	Ishii	Ishibashi	Remarks	
Ishibashi* 12/56	2c d, f	—	b	c d	c d	b, c 2d, e	c d, e	a e	a classic balancing act	
Kishi 2/57	a, 2c d, f	—	b	c d	c d	b, c 2d, e	c 2d, e, f	e	Kishi kept the same Cabinet	
Kishi 7/57	a, 2b, c 2d, e	+c d	c	2c-c 2d, f	d f	2c	d 2e, f	d	Miki, Ikeda down; Kono, Sato up	
Kishi 6/58	a, b, 3c d	b 2d	d f	2c 2e	3d f	d e, f	d	—	clearly the Main-stream cleans up	
Kishi* 1/59	a, b, 2c d	b 2d	c	2c 3e	3d f	—	d	d	Ikeda coming back	
Kishi 6/59	a, b, 2c 2d	b 2d	c d, e	d e	2c d, e, f	d	c	—	Ikeda in, Kono out. Ono being courted	
Ikeda* 7/60	2c 2d	3c	a, b 5d, e	—	b d	—	c	—	the Main-stream cleans up; some insurance	
Ikeda 12/60	2c e	c 2d	a, b, c 4d	c	b	d	—	Fujiyama 2c	Kono up, Sato down	
Ikeda 7/61	d	2c	a, b 3d	2c	b d, f	e	d	d c f d, 2e	Kawashima c d, 2e	Kishi down
Ikeda 7/62	c	b d	a, b 3d	2c	c d, f	d	d	c c d, 2c	c c d, 2c	no one opposed Ikeda in the election, are these the rewards?
Ikeda 7/63	d	b 2e	a, b 2d	c	c 2d, f	c d	d	2c c e	c e	Kishi out; a bid to get Miki and Fujiyama.
Ikeda* 7/64	—	b d, e	a, 2c 2d	2c d, f	2d	b, c	—	d c 2d, f	c 2d, f	Miki was loyal in vote; Fujiyama double-crossed.
Sato 11/64	—	a, b d, e	2c 2d	2c d	2d	b, c	—	d c 2d, f	c 2d, f	Sato kept the same Cabinet
Sato 6/65	b d	a, b, 2c d	c 2d	d	2e	2c	d	d f	c 2d, f	the new Mainstream; Ikeda down
Sato 8/66	b d, e	a, b, 2c d	c d, e	e	c	c d	d	d f	c 2d, f	Ikeda hanging on; Funada up.
Sato* 12/66	b, c d	a, 3c d, 3e	d	—	b	c 2d, f	d	—	c d	Ikeda out, Kawashima down; Funada up.

* Cabinet formed just after a party presidential election.

^a To Lower House members. By custom, the Upper House receives three posts, one for each LDP club there. (But in the 13 different Cabinets since 7/57, one Upper House club got no post on seven occasions!) These three posts are almost always of low value. Of the 40 posts given in the 13 Cabinets (four were given in 7/64), four were C, 26 were D, and 10 were E. The 4C went to the *Seishin* club, the Kishi-Sato faction in the Upper House, in 6/58, 1/59, 12/60, and 7/61. (Including these 4C in Table 4's analysis would not change any results.) The Upper House post-holders in 12/56-2/57 were not club-affiliated.

^b In a few instances, there is confusion over which of the Kishi-Sato brothers was closer to the post-holder; in 7/61-7/63, I have called Kaya Okinori and his associate Ueki Koshiro as Kishi-Fukuda.

^c The dotted lines indicate the faction leaders' deaths. For Kono, the man who received D in 6/65 was later in Nakasone; the E in 8/66 went to Mori. For Ono, the 2D in 7/64-11/64 went to a man later in Murakami; the 2E in 6/65 went to a "neutral" between Funada and Murakami. Sources: Faction affiliations of post-holders were obtained from the sources cited to Table 2. Names of post-holders are from yearbooks, like *Asahi Nenkan*, and the newspapers.

conclude that those interim Cabinets are "easily explained" by the requirements of the maintenance process, as demanded in the previous section.

Table 3 presents the data on payoffs in all Cabinets since the first election of an LDP

president. An examination of this historical record shows that the maintenance proposition is consistent with the victories of Kishi in 1959, Ikeda in 1960 (with Kishi's coalition), and Ikeda in 1964. In each case the Prime Minister held together some of his previous

support coalition, by not decreasing the value of the rewards too much, and earned the support of previous opponents, by increasing the value of their rewards, and so he (or his nominee), was re-elected (or elected) successfully. (See also the "Remarks" in Table 3.)

If Table 3 allows the conclusion that *inter-election* coalitions were being maintained in an obvious manner, it does not answer the earlier questions about, Why the particular winner? Why his particular allies? To answer these questions the bargaining proposition—that the observed election support coalition will be one of the W^m with the smallest number of members—is needed. (Plus the data in Table 2).

To return to the historical situation, in 1958 the ruling coalition of Kishi-Sato-Kono-Ono was backing Prime Minister Kishi strongly. Prior to the 1958 general elections this 4-member coalition was stable in the sense that no smaller winning coalition was possible. However, after the 1958 elections, the situation changed significantly. The results of those elections changed the membership of the factions in such a way that a winning coalition composed of just three members was possible. There was only one such winning coalition with only three members. Its members? Kishi, Sato, and Ikeda! And, just as the prediction derived from the bargaining proposition asserts will happen, and as mentioned in Section I, the old coalition of Kishi-Sato-Kono-Ono was broken and a new coalition of Kishi-Sato-Ikeda took its place.

A little bit earlier, when Prime Minister Ishibashi resigned, each of the smallest winning coalitions had to contain one faction. The faction which was in every possible smallest winning coalition was the Kishi faction. Again, as the bargaining proposition predicts, and as Table 1 shows, someone joined the Kishi coalition; Kishi, because of his unique position of power, became Prime Minister.

Again, when Prime Minister Ikeda had to resign in 1964, there were several possible winning coalitions with the fewest member actors. But each of these possible smallest winning coalitions had to contain the Kishi-Sato alliance. It was impossible for a smallest winning coalition to form without the Kishi-Sato alliance. Therefore, as the bargaining proposition predicts, a winning coalition centered upon the Kishi-Sato alliance did form, and Sato became Prime Minister.

The 1964 situation is especially interesting, because for that situation the coalition maintenance proposition and the bargaining proposition give different predictions. Prime Minister Ikeda was maintaining a coalition satisfactorily according to the coalition maintenance

proposition. Ikeda's coalition was maintained by Ikeda's distribution of rewards to his supporters, but it was not viable except insofar as those rewards made his supporters loyal to him. As a winning coalition, it was unstable for the reasons summed up in the bargaining proposition, namely, that some of its members could hope to receive more valuable rewards from a different coalition. Thus, *Ikeda* could win with this coalition, and did in July, but at the time of Ikeda's resignation in the fall of the same year it was impossible for *Kono* (the heir-apparent) to hold the old Ikeda coalition together. Some of its members deserted, to support Sato.²⁸

The last remaining question concerns the election of Ishibashi Tanzan. At that time the Prime Minister's coalition was in effect irrelevant, since Prime Minister Hatoyama was retiring from politics without naming a successor, and the new method of electing the party leader was just being inaugurated. So the coalition maintenance proposition is irrelevant. There were three alliances at that time, none of which was winning: the Kishi-Sato-Kono alliance, the Ishii-Ikeda alliance (the former Liberal Party), and the Ono-Miki-Ishibashi alliance. In this situation, then, there were two possible winning coalitions with five members and one with six members. The bargaining proposition asserts, clearly, that one of the smallest, that is the 5-member, winning coalitions will form, but it cannot say which one. As Table 1 shows, the coalition which formed in this case was the 5-member coalition of Ishii-Ikeda-Ono-Miki-Ishibashi, as predicted.²⁹

²⁸ Many observers would dispute this interpretation, arguing that Ikeda himself actually double-crossed Kono, under the influence of one of his close aids, Ohira Masayoshi, who was very friendly with Mr. Sato's top advisor, Tanaka Kakuei. See, e.g., Hans Baerwald, "Japan: The Politics of Transition," *Asian Survey* 5 (Jan., 1965), especially pp. 34-38. Others would simply assert that it was fore-ordained that Sato follow Ikeda, by ex-Prime Ministers Yoshida and Kishi and the business community. Both of these explanations would have Mr. Miki merely realizing which way the wind was blowing, and trimming his sails to fit it. But I have talked with some political insiders who feel that Mr. Miki's switch to support of Mr. Sato came *first*, and was the main cause of Prime Minister Ikeda's decision to nominate Mr. Sato.

²⁹ At this time, just after the formation of the LDP, there were three major streams within the party: former Liberals, former Progressives, and people who bolted from the Liberal Party during

TABLE 4. WEIGHTS AND PAYOFFS FOR MEMBERS OF RULING COALITIONS

Ishibashi (12/56)	Predict:	Miki $\geq$ Ishii = Ono $\geq$ Ikeda > Ishibashi
	actual:	b, c c c b e 2d, e d, e d
Kishi (7/57)	Predict:	Kishi-Sato > Kono $\geq$ Ono
	actual:	2b, c + c 2c - c d 3d, e 2d, f f
Kishi (6/58)	Predict:	Kishi-Sato > Kono = Ono
	actual:	2b, 3c 2c 3d 3d 2e f
Kishi (6/59)	Predict:	Kishi-Sato > Ikeda
	actual:	2b, 2c c 4d d, e
Ikeda (7/60)	Predict:	Kishi-Sato > Ikeda
	actual:	5c b, 5d 2d e
Ikeda (12/60)	Predict:	Kishi-Sato > Ikeda
	actual:	3c, 2d b, c 3e 4d
Ikeda (7/63)	Predict:	Ikeda > Kono = Ono = Miki $\geq$ Kawashima
	actual:	b c c c c 2d 2d, f d e
Ikeda (7/64)	Predict:	Ikeda = Kono > Miki $\geq$ Ono $\geq$ Kawashima
	actual:	2c 2c b, c 2d c 2d d, f 2d, f
Sato (6/65)	Predict:	Kishi-Sato > Miki $\geq$ Kawashima
	actual:	2b, 2c 2c c, 2d, f 2d
Sato (8/66)	Predict:	Kishi-Sato > Miki $\geq$ Kawashima
	actual:	2b, 2c c c 2d, e d 2d, f

Finally, here is a summary of this application of N-M theory and the two modifying proposition to coalition politics within the LDP. In the elections of 1956, 1959, 1960, and 1964, the winning coalition was a W^m . In three of these elections (all but 1960) this W^m was unstable according to the bargaining proposition, i.e., the observed W^m did not have a minimal number of member actors. In all three of these cases, within a year the unstable W^m was replaced by a predicted W^m , i.e., by a W^m

1953-54. Tabulating each faction's members' ties with these three streams shows marked differences. (Using data in the *Seito-kai-ha Hen* of the *Gikai Seido 70 Nenshi*.) An analysis of the composition of the three factional alliances which existed in 12/66, in terms of these ties, assuming that an alliance is more likely to join with another alliance if their members share the same historical ties, leads to the conclusion that, of the two possible 5-member winning coalitions, the Ishii-Ikeda-Ono-Miki-Ishibashi coalition was much more likely to form!

with the minimal number of member actors at the time. (The reasons why the unstable W^m formed were explained above; briefly, they are: pre-election alliance (1956), maintenance (1964) and a change in the situation due to general election results (1959).) Payoffs to actors who were not in the winning coalition can plausibly be construed as required by the "maintenance" process. (However, it must be admitted, in the absence of a theory of coalition maintenance, the model of maintenance used here is *ad hoc*, and for that reason not fully satisfactory.) The post-1964 period is discussed in Section V.

The foregoing has dealt entirely with the question of who are the coalition members, ignoring the payoffs received by those actors. But the heart of the N-M theory is its argument about payoffs. Table 4 presents the relevant data (taken from Table 3) for a consideration of whether the payoffs to the members of the winning coalitions were in proportion to their weights (in Table 2), as is predicted by N-M theory.

Several points about Table 4 should be

clarified, since it is the most important part of the application of N-M theory. First, the Prime Ministership itself is not included, since the decision about that office is made "for good" at the party convention. Also, since that office cannot be divided up and is so valuable, inevitably the faction which gets its leader in will get "too much" payoff—even if, as in Ishibashi's case, the faction takes nothing else. So to allow any test of the basic N-M proposition at all, the Prime Ministership must be excluded. Second, Cabinets are not in the table if they were merely hold-over Cabinets (when a Prime Minister suddenly resigned due to illness), nor if the Main-stream was changing. The latter omissions are indicated by a dotted line. Third, for the Sato Cabinets, factions which I regard as "satellites" of the Kishi-Sato bloc are not listed in the prediction. These satellites are discussed in Section V. Their inclusion in the table would improve the performance of the theory.

The predictions of payoffs can be interpreted in various ways. First, most strictly, one may demand that equal weights produce *precisely* equal payoffs, and of course that unequal weights produce corresponding unequal payoffs. Then of the 45 pairs in Table 4, 37 can be unambiguously compared,³⁰ and of these 22 are correct and 15 are wrong. Since the *a priori* probability of two things being precisely

³⁰ Ambiguity occurs because the payoffs are only ranked; distances between two ranks are unknown. E.g., it is not clear whether a payoff of $2c+2e$ is greater or less than a payoff of $3d+f$. The ambiguous cases are identified below. Two cases which are strictly speaking ambiguous I have classified as clear because they *seem* unquestionable: K-S vs. Ikeda in 7/60, and Ikeda vs. Ono in 7/63. (I.e., I assert that $5c > b+d+e$; and that $b > c+f$.) Of course, to call these two cases ambiguous would not make N-M's correct predictions on them into failures; it would just remove them from the analysis.

equal approaches infinity, a fair statistical significance test is hard to construct. But even making the *most* stringent assumption—that any predictions would be correct by chance alone one-half of the time—this 22 out of 37 result is significant at $p < .13$, using the binomial test. However, since all of the 15 errors involve equalities, and since strict equality must be as strange as a straight line to nature, this test is not very meaningful.

Second, one may simply look at the *strict inequalities* in Table 4, to see whether the basic relationships of power expressed in the weights have been preserved in the observed payoffs. There are 25 such pairs involving strict inequality. Of these three are ambiguous (Ikeda-Miki and Kono-Miki in 7/64, and Kishi-Sato-Ikeda in 12/60), and 22 allow a comparison. Of these 22, *all* are correct.

Finally, desiring to make some sort of evaluation of the fit between weight and payoff in the 20 cases where weights are equal, one may relax the requirement that payoffs in these cases be precisely equal. For example, when two actors' weights are equal but their memberships in the Lower House are markedly different, it seems to be in keeping with the spirit of the N-M proposition to predict that their payoffs will diverge from equality just as their memberships do. Thus, if two factions each have the same weight, but one has a membership which is larger by eight or more Lower House Dietmen, one may expect that the payoff to the larger faction will be greater than, if it is not equal to, the smaller faction's payoff. (Of course, the strict inequalities must still hold.) If one does reason in this way, then of the 15 pairs in question which are not ambiguous, 10 become weak inequalities; these are written " $\geq$ " in Table 4. (The ambiguous cases are Ishii-Ikeda and Ono-Ikeda in 12/56, Kono-Ono in 6/58, Miki-Kawashima in 7/64, and Miki-Kawashima in 6/65.) Of these 10 cases, seven are correct.

Of the remaining five cases of strict equality,

TABLE 5. SUMMARY OF N-M PREDICTIONS

Prediction on Payoffs:	Clear Comparisons		Comparisons are Ambiguous	Total
	Correct	Wrong		
Predictions are:				
Strict inequalities	22	0	3	25
Weak inequalities	7	3	4	14
Equalities	0	correct on major posts, small difference on minor posts: 4; other: 1	1	6

all payoffs are equal insofar as major—i.e., C-level or above—posts are concerned. They differ only on the minor posts. These differences from equality are small (e, d, d+f, d-f, and 2d+f), with one exception (the last).

This analysis of Table 4 is summarized in Table 5.

IV. EVALUATION OF THE THEORY

A final judgment on whether the N-M proposition is correct for the data in question is difficult. But a temporary judgment is possible, by comparing the performance of N-M theory with the performance of other theories: Riker's theory of coalition formation (the "minimum size" hypothesis), Gamson's theory of coalition formation and payoffs (payoffs will be proportional to resources), the Shapley-Harsanyi theory of "value" (in a constant-sum situation payoffs are proportionate to power in the "pivot" sense), and the Japanese newspapers' theory that Cabinet appointments are made in two ways: either to balance all factions, or to benefit primarily the Mainstream.³¹ (Another "null model" could be the proposition that coalitions form at random, and that payoffs are distributed without rhyme or reason. Another could be that "traditionalistic" factors—personal loyalties, family connections, etc.—determine all the outcomes. Another could be that the *zaikai*, the top business and financial world, pulls the strings on the politician-puppets. But the first is clearly so wrong that there is no point in using it, and the latter two are not disconfirmable.³²)

³¹ See W. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1962), and W. A. Gamson, "A Theory of Coalition Formation," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.* 26 (June, 1961), 373-382. The Shapley theory of value, which John C. Harsanyi and others have developed further, is best known to political scientists in the guise of the Shapley-Shubik *a priori* power index; see L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," this *Review*, 48 (1954), 787-792. What I call the newspapers' theory is one of several common sense explanations of "the game of politics in Japan." Two others are mentioned in the parenthesis.

³² The "traditionalistic factors proposition" is not disconfirmable because there are so many such factors; after the fact it is *always* possible to find some such explanation. The "*zaikai* proposition" is not disconfirmable because the *zaikai* is not, usually, unified; some part of the *zaikai* "wins," even when an Ishibashi defeats a Kishi. Of course, to be not disconfirmable is not to be incorrect, just useless for present purposes.

Rather than to present a full application of each of these theories, it is sufficient, and instructive, to show how they differ from the N-M theory, and how these different predictions compare with the data.

First, the difference between a W^m , a W^m with fewest member actors, and a W of minimum size must be clear. N-M theory predicts the first, the bargaining proposition of this paper predicts the second and Riker's and Gamson's theories predict the third. The first two have already been explained; the third refers to the resources controlled by the members of a coalition.³³ For example, consider the illustration used earlier, of the LDP after the 1958 general election, with the "others" members distributed among the actors so as to make the percentages reflect the intangible features of the situation. (This tampering with the data is only for purposes of illustration).

Kishi-Sato	Ikeda	Kono	Ono	Miki	Ishii	
37%	18%	11%	12%	11%	11%	=100%

The W^m here are still the Kishi-Sato bloc plus Ikeda, Kishi-Sato plus any two of the four weak factions, and Ikeda plus any three of the four weak factions. The W^m with fewest member actors is still Kishi-Kato plus Ikeda. But the W of minimum size is Ikeda plus Kono, Miki, and Ishii, with 51% of the LDP Dietmen.

Second, the type of predictions about payoffs made by these different theories must be clear. Riker's theory does not make predictions about payoffs, except in special cases. Gamson's theory predicts that the actors' payoffs will be proportional to their resources, for those actors who succeed in forming a coalition. (Thus in a constant-sum situation you get more from one coalition than from another if and only if your resources are a larger proportion of the coalition's total resources, so you prefer the coalition with smaller total resources.) The Shapley-Harsanyi theory of value predicts that in a constant-sum simple coalition situation *each* actor will receive a payoff which is proportionate to his pivot-power, i.e., to how often his addition to a losing coalition makes it into a winning coalition. The payoffs predicted by these theories in the above example are:

³³ Gamson explicitly states that his theory's predictions depend on resources. Riker says "weights," but in his own applications uses memberships. (If Riker's weights are the same as N-M's weights, then his theory is no different from theirs.)

	Kishi-Sato	Ikeda	Kono	Ono	Miki	Ishii
Riker:	0	?	?	0	?	?
Gamson:	0	.35	.22	0	.22	.22
Shapley:	.4	.2	.1	.1	.1	.1

(If the difference in size between Ono and the other weak factions is considered insignificant, then Riker and Gamson predict any coalition of Ikeda plus any three weak actors. The size of Gamson's payoff predictions will still be the same, and both Riker and Gamson still predict that Kishi-Sato get zero.)

This example, when contrasted with Section II's exposition of the N-M predictions for the same situation, illustrates the following points of comparison. These points are also true in general.

1. In constant-sum simple coalition situations, Riker's and Gamson's theories predict the same coalition, but only Gamson's predicts payoffs.

2. Riker-Gamson theory predicts a unique coalition, while N-M theory predicts a set of coalitions.

3. The Riker-Gamson predicted coalition does not always contain the strongest actor(s), but rather tends to be a large group of weak actors. The bargaining proposition, on the other hand, predicts a small coalition which

always contains the strongest actor(s). The N-M solution set contains both of these predictions, necessarily.

4. Riker-Gamson theory, like N-M theory, predicts zero payoffs to actors who are not in the coalition which forms.

5. Gamson's predictions on payoff are not the same as N-M's, but they preserve roughly the same rank order (of larger and smaller predicted payoffs) as do N-M's predictions.

6. Shapley-Harsanyi value theory, in sharp contrast to all of these other theories, asserts that *all* actors receive some payoff. Thus it makes no predictions, even implicitly, about coalition formation; there is a "consensual" or "fair play" spirit in the theory.

7. The size of value theory's predictions preserves the same rank order as do N-M and Gamson's theories. But the predictions are more extreme than in the latter two theories, since the same constant pie has to be split up among everybody.

Since the payoffs to the LDP factions are only rank-ordered, point 5 shows that it is not possible to contrast Gamson's theory with N-M theory on payoffs. So Riker-Gamson theory can only be compared with N-M theory on coalition formation. Referring to the resources of Table 2 (not to the weights), the comparison is given in Table 6.

TABLE 6. COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE THEORIES^a

Date	Riker-Gamson	N-M	Bargaining Proposition	Actual
12/56	(Ikeda + Ishii) + (Ono + Miki + Ishibashi)	any W^m	same as R-G, or (Kishi-Sato + Kono) + (Ikeda + Ishii)	(Ikeda + Ishii) + (Ono + Miki + Ishibashi)
2/57 ^b	K-S + Ikeda + Ishii; Ikeda + Kono + Miki + Ishii + Ishibashi	any W^m	K-S and any two (except Ishibashi)	K-S + Kono + Ono
1/59	K-S + Ikeda; K-S + Ono + Ishibashi	any W^m	K-S + Ikeda	K-S + Kono + Ono, quickly became K-S + Ikeda
7/60	K-S + Kono; K-S + Ono	any W^m	K-S + Ikeda; K-S + Kono; K-S + Ono	K-S + Ikeda
7/64	five coalitions with 52%, all contain K-S	any W^m	three coalitions with 3 members, all contain K-S + Kono. ^c	Ikeda + Kono + Ono + Miki + Kawashima, quickly became K-S plus several

^a Based upon the percentages (not weights) in Table 2.
^b Using Lower House percentages for 1957, and a winning coalition defined as holding 50% (since the total is 98%).
^c Of course this coalition did not occur, since Kono and Sato were fighting to succeed Ikeda. But the bargaining proposition in this situation necessarily includes Kishi-Sato in its prediction (after the predictions listed, its next prediction would be K-S plus any three), while Riker-Gamson only "accidentally" includes K-S (its next prediction after the 52%-level coalitions is Ikeda + Kono + Ono + Miki + Kawashima, at 53%).

Clearly, N-M was always right. The bargaining proposition and Riker-Gamson were both right in 12/56, and both became right quickly in 1/59. Both were wrong in 7/64, but became right in that Kishi-Sato did dominate the new coalition which formed in the fall after Prime Minister Ikeda's resignation. But the bargaining proposition was right, and Riker-Gamson wrong, in 2/57 and 7/60.

To compare N-M and Shapley-Harsanyi theory, points 6 and 7 above show that the key contrast involves the payoffs to the actors who are not in a coalition. For those actors, N-M theory predicts no payoff, while value theory predicts the same payoffs that they would receive if they were in a coalition. Both predictions are wrong, as Table 3 has already shown. However, the discussion of "maintenance" earlier showed that there is a plausible explanation for N-M theory's failure, an explanation which does not contradict the assertion that the winning coalition controls all the payoffs. Whether there is a comparable modification for value theory is not clear; at any rate, I have found one. Changes in payoff which correspond to entry into, or exit from the ruling coalition, without any change in resources, seem to contradict the basic assertion of value theory (that it is the over-all strategic possibilities, and not the temporal coalition, which determines payoff). Note in Table 3, for example, the change in payoffs to Kishi from 7/64 to 6/65, and to Kono from 1/59 to 7/61. Moreover, changes in payoffs to actors who were not in the ruling coalition, without any change in resources, also seem to contradict the basic assertion of value theory. For example, the payoffs to Fujiyama from 12/60 through 7/64 look much more like an attempt to buy at least neutrality from him in the 1964 election, than like an attempt to reward him in accord with his strategic position.

Finally, what of the common sense proposition that Cabinets will be either balanced or dominated by the Main-stream? This may be adequate as a rough description of Table 3, but closer examination shows that the proposition is incorrect unless it is taken as describing two "ideal types" of Cabinet. (Except for Ishibashi in 12/56, there has been no Cabinet in which posts have been even approximately equally distributed. On the other hand, as noted earlier, the Main-stream has never completely dominated the Cabinet.) But even as a description of two "ideal types," this proposition is not really very helpful, since the *only* sort of payoff distribution which it excludes is a Cabinet where the Main-stream does not get payoffs and the outsiders do.

The foregoing evaluation of the performance of N-M theory can be summed up briefly. N-M theory performed well, in predicting both coalitions and payoffs in the LDP during 1956-66. It was more successful than alternative theories. However, its predictions on payoffs must be modified as was done by constructing a "coalition maintenance" model. If one tries to narrow down the number of predicted coalitions within the N-M solution set, the bargaining proposition should be used rather than Riker-Gamson theory.

V. PROSPECTS

In conclusion, a brief picture of the present, and some predictions.

There is not space to describe in detail the shifting situation within the LDP since the deaths of Ono, Kono, and Ikeda in 1964-65. The percentages in the last lines of Table 2 show at least that the situation has become more complex. The bottom line of Table 2 gives my guess, on the basis of field research and interviews, about how the situation is shaping up (assuming that there is no general election before 12/68). The weights given there are based on the following judgments. The Ishii and Fujiyama factions, and the Mori and Murakami splinters of the old Kono and Ono factions, are no longer actors. The Ishii faction is split. One of its leading members ran and won 11 votes against Prime Minister Sato in 12/66, although Mr. Ishii himself was backing Prime Minister Sato. The two splinter groups are satellites of the Kishi-Sato-Fukuda bloc. They back Sato even though they don't receive rewards, which no faction has ever done before. The Fujiyama faction, while able to unite around the candidacy of their leader (many say that the reason Mr. Fujiyama has run so many times for LDP president is precisely to hold his faction together), is too divided to act as a unit in any other context. Since it is likely that Fujiyama himself will not be a serious candidate in 1968, it appears that some of his faction will follow the Kishi-Sato lead and others will oppose it. On the other hand, the remaining factions all appear to be cohesive and capable of acting autonomously. But with all these satellites and fringe members, the Kishi-Sato bloc is far stronger than its official membership figures indicate. It can only be defeated if both of the medium-sized factions (the old Ikeda faction and Miki) join with at least two of the weak factions.

The maintenance model, applied to the payoffs in Table 3, says that Maeo (old Ikeda) and Nakasone are bound to be in opposition to

Sato in the next election in 12/68. If the trend begun for Kawashima in 12/66 continues, he will be in opposition, too. Miki and Funada are Sato's probable partners, but the maintenance model allows that they may double-cross him, as Sato and Fujiyama did Ikeda in 7/64.

The W^m , considering that Maeo, Nakasone, and Kawashima will not be in a coalition with Kishi-Sato, are: Kishi-Sato+Miki, and Maeo+Nakasone+Miki+Kawashima. (Because of the weights, whether Funada joins or not makes no difference.) Of course, if Prime Minister Sato changes his coalition by making a radically new distribution of payoffs before 12/68, other W^m would be possible. But as

³⁴ This manuscript was completed in June, 1967. In December, 1967, Prime Minister Sato reshuffled his Cabinet and changed most of the top LDP executives. Messrs. Nakasone, Kawashima, Miki, Ishii, and Fukuda are now all in some top position in the Government or party, as is the number two leader of the former Ikeda faction (Ohira Masayoshi). The total distribution of rewards is as follows (with the December, 1966, payoffs from Table 3 included for comparison). The single post (an "e") given to the satellites of the Sato faction is included in the rewards for the latter. Also, incidentally, the allotment of Parliamentary Vice Ministerships (*seimujikan*) did not follow the same pattern as this distribution of major rewards. Rather, the Maeo and Nakasone factions received three and four, respectively, while the Sato and Kishi-Fukuda factions received five and two, respectively. The Miki and Ishii factions received one each, and the Fuji-

things look now, these two coalitions are likely; Miki holds the key. Which of these two coalitions will occur depends on factors outside the present theory, namely, whether Mr. Sato himself runs again—in which case Mr. Miki is more likely to back him—or withdraws, in which case Fukuda Takeo will be the Kishi-Sato bloc's candidate, and Mr. Miki is more likely to join the opposition coalition. If the coalition is Kishi-Sato+Miki, the former will receive the larger payoff. If the coalition is Maeo+Nakasone+Miki+Kawashima, Miki and Maeo will receive roughly equal payoffs, both larger than Nakasone's and Kawashima's payoffs, which will also be roughly equal.³⁴

yama, Funada, and Kawashima factions received none.

This change in the distribution of rewards from 12/66 to 11/67 is an excellent example of the maintenance proposition at work. Prime Minister Sato is attempting to hold together his old support coalition (asterisked factions), while making overtures toward the major opposition factions, Maeo and Nakasone. The effect of Mr. Sato's skillful reshuffle is to have made it possible for the Maeo and Nakasone factions to consider supporting Mr. Sato in the coming LDP presidential election this fall. Therefore the conclusion above, that the Miki faction will determine the outcome of the forthcoming election by choosing between Kishi-Sato+Miki and Maeo+Nakasone+Miki+Kawashima, is no longer valid. Rather, the Kishi-Sato bloc would appear to have the option of coalescing with a variety of partners in different winning coalitions.

	Kishi-Fukuda*	Sato*	Ikeda (Maeo)	Nakasone	Funada	Miki*	Ishii*	Fujiyama	Kawashima*
12/66	b, c d	a, 3c d, 3e	d	—	b	c 2d, f	d	—	c, d
11/67	b, c f	a, 2c 2e, 2f	c 2e	c	b	d, e	e	—	c d

* Voted for Mr. Sato in the 12/66 LDP presidential election.

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASES*

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The literature discussing the responses of lower court judges to decisions of the United States Supreme Court is limited, and the few comparative analyses of state and federal judicial behavior have tended to be speculative rather than empirical. It has been suggested that a controversial Supreme Court decision is likely to be supported more strongly by federal judges than by state judges, that state courts will probably construe a Supreme Court mandate more narrowly than will federal courts, and that federal courts can be expected to move in a direction hinted at by the Court more aggressively than state courts.¹ Since all federal judges are appointed for life, it is only logical that they should be more independent of local pressures than state judges, many of whom are elected, or appointed for limited periods. The fact that state and federal judges owe their appointments to different levels of the political party hierarchy, and the historical fact that federal judges are less likely

to seek future political office than are state judges, suggest a similar conclusion. Finally, the very fact of being a federal judge may produce a sense of identification with the Supreme Court which state judges would not share.²

The purpose of this paper is to subject these theoretical assertions to empirical examination. Unfortunately, the American legal system impedes the construction of a research design for this purpose. Ideally, one would want to compare the responses of state and federal judges to the same case—thereby holding “inputs” constant. Thus Professor Stuart Nagel’s study of the relationship of party affiliation to judicial behavior compares the responses of Republican and Democratic judges to cases in which they had all participated.³ Obviously, this procedure cannot be followed in the present situation; state and federal judges do not hear the same cases. One is forced to resort to a less desirable basis of comparison—judicial behavior in “similar” cases.⁴ The value of the results will depend on the observer’s ability to select a universe of cases which present truly comparable situations to state and federal judges. Of even

* I would like to thank Professor George Marcus, Director of the Social Science Quantitative Laboratory at Williams College, for his generous assistance.

¹ The leading work in this field is that of Walter F. Murphy. See especially “Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power,” this REVIEW, 53 (December, 1959), 1017, 1018, 1022; and *Elements of Judicial Strategy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 95–97, 107. A similar conclusion is suggested by John R. Schmidhauser, *The Supreme Court: Its Politics, Personalities, and Procedures* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), pp. 82–83; and by Frank Sorauf, *Political Parties in the American System* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), pp. 123, 124. Monrad G. Paulson has demonstrated that some state supreme court judges continued to employ the doctrine of substantive due process to implement their economic theories despite the United States Supreme Court’s abandonment of this practice in 1937: “The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States,” 34 *Minnesota Law Review* 91 (1950). The only published work which compares state and federal judicial behavior on the basis of empirical research is Kenneth Vines’ “Southern State Supreme Courts and Race Relations,” *Western Political Quarterly* 18 (1965), 5.

² Murphy, “Lower Court Checks. . .,” pp. 1017, 1022.

³ “Political Party Affiliation and Judges’ Decisions,” this REVIEW, 55 (December, 1961), 843–850.

⁴ This problem could be avoided by means of a simulation technique, such as that employed by Theodore Becker in a different context. If differences in the behavior of state and federal judges result from the pressures of their political environments, it is likely that they would not be revealed by such a procedure. If, however, the significant differences between state and federal judges are a function of the judge rather than his situation (if state and federal judicial systems recruit differentially, or if state and federal judges have internalized different role perceptions, for example) then such a technique should produce positive results. Theodore L. Becker, *Political Behavioralism and Modern Jurisprudence* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964); “A Survey Study of Hawaiian Judges: The Effect on Decisions of Judicial Role Variations,” this REVIEW, 60 (September, 1966), 677–680.

greater importance will be his ability to limit his comparisons to those aspects of "similar" cases in which the stimuli to which the two categories of judges are subjected are truly comparable. The significance of this point will be developed with respect to the specific hypotheses tested below.

I. THE DATA

This study is based on the decisions dealing with legislative apportionment which federal district courts and state courts of last resort announced after the Supreme Court's 1962 decision in *Baker v. Carr*, but before its "one man, one vote" ruling in *Reynolds v. Sims* (1964).⁵ The reapportionment cases provide a particularly useful basis for a comparative analysis of the state and federal judicial bureaucracies for several reasons. As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in *Colegrove v. Green*, both federal and state courts (with some exceptions) had declined to intervene in apportionment cases.⁶ Thus neither federal nor state judges were especially familiar with such cases, nor had they developed local precedents or specialized methods of dealing with them. Suddenly in 1962, as the consequence of a Supreme Court opinion which was generally understood to apply equally to state and federal courts, both sets of judges were faced with a large number of cases dealing with the same subject. Since the state and federal cases were decided during the same period of time, the political and judicial climates are held constant.⁷ Finally, the geographic distribution of the relevant state and federal courts does not appear to differ significantly.⁸

⁵ *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Note that we are comparing state appeals courts of last resort and federal trial courts.

⁶ *Colegrove v. Green*, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).

⁷ Strictly speaking, this is not correct. Since a ruling in a legislative reapportionment case occurs within the context of all previous decisions in that subject area, by necessity, this context must differ for each subsequent decision. However, this study does exclude the impact of additional stimuli by the United States Supreme Court, or of major national political events related to the subject matter of the cases. Also, the distribution of the state and federal cases throughout the time period under study is shown to be comparable, in a statistical sense, by means of the Mann-Whitney U Test.

⁸ The federal cases occurred in Alabama, California, Colorado (two cases), Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia (three cases), Idaho,

The subject matter of these cases is especially well suited to accentuate anticipated differences between the state and federal judiciaries. As Alexander Bickel put it, "[A]pportionment is a very high percentage of politics with a small admixture of definable principle."⁹ Legislative apportionment is a major concern of those political interests generally regarded as being able to influence state judges to a greater extent than federal judges. Since, as the law review commentators hastened to point out, the Supreme Court's mandate in *Baker v. Carr* was anything but precise, lower court judges had room in which to maneuver.¹⁰ This was, then, a situation in which differences between state and federal judges should readily have appeared.

One major weakness in the data must be noted. Since all of the apportionment cases were brought by litigants seeking to benefit from the Supreme Court's decision in *Baker*, attorneys could be expected to avoid those courts in which they anticipated resistance to the Court's decision. Presumably this would

Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma (two cases), Pennsylvania, Tennessee (two cases), Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.

The state cases occurred in Alabama, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan (two cases), Mississippi, New Hampshire (two cases), New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island (two cases), Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Vermont.

The obvious sectional bias to consider is an overproportion of southern states in either group. Following V. O. Key's usage of treating the 11 states of the Confederacy as southern, we find that 10 of the 29 federal cases were decided in southern courts, as were 4 of the nineteen state cases. This difference is not statistically significant. Fisher's Exact Probability Test for this distribution produces a *p* of .16.

⁹ Alexander Bickel, "The Durability of *Colegrove v. Green*," 72 *Yale Law Journal* 39, 42 (1962).

¹⁰ The following are illustrative of the extensive literature which can be cited to document the lack of precision in *Baker*: Neal, "Baker v. Carr, Politics in Search of Law," 1962 *Supreme Court Review* 252; McClosky, "The Reapportionment Case," 76 *Harvard Law Review* 54 (1962); Lucas, "The Meaning of Baker v. Carr," 61 *Michigan Law Review* 711 (1963) Friedelbaum, "Baker v. Carr: New Doctrine of Judicial Intervention and Its Implications for American Federalism," 29 *University of Chicago Law Review* 673 (1962).

minimize the chance that state and federal judges would differ.

A total of twenty-nine federal and nineteen state apportionment cases decided during the period between *Baker* and *Reynolds* are germane to this study.¹¹

¹¹ Federal cases: *Baker v. Carr*, 206 F. Supp. 341 (1962); *Baker v. Carr*, 222 F. Supp. 648 (1963); *Butlerworth v. Dempsey*, 229 F. Supp. 754 (1964); *Daniel v. Davis*, 220 F. Supp. 601 (1963); *Davis v. Synhorst*, 217 F. Supp. 492 (1963), 225 F. Supp. 689 (1964); *Dorsey v. Fortson*, 228 F. Supp. 259 (1964); *Drew v. Scranton*, 229 F. Supp. 308 (1963); *Germano v. Kerner*, 220 F. Supp. 230 (1963); *Hearne v. Smylie*, 225 F. Supp. 645 (1964); *Hedlund v. Hanson*, 213 F. Supp. 172 (1962); *League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh*, 209 F. Supp. 189 (1962); *Lein v. Sathre*, 205 F. Supp. 536 (1962); *Lisco v. McNichols*, 208 F. Supp. 471 (1962); *Lisco v. Love*, 219 F. Supp. 922 (1963); *Mann v. Davis*, 213 F. Supp. 577 (1962); *Marshall v. Hare*, 227 F. Supp. 989 (1964); *Moss v. Burkhart*, 207 F. Supp. 885 (1962), 200 F. Supp. 149 (1963); *Nolan v. Rhodes*, 218 F. Supp. 953 (1963); *Sanders v. Gray*, 203 F. Supp. 158 (1962); *Silver v. Jordan*, unpublished, Federal District Court, Southern District, California, Civil No. 62-953-NC (1962); *Sims v. Frink*, 205 F. Supp. 245 (1962), 208 F. Supp. 431 (1962); *Sincock v. Terry*, 207 F. Supp. 205 (1962), 210 F. Supp. 396 (1962), 215 F. Supp. 169 (1963); *Sobel v. Adams*, 208 F. Supp. 316 (1962), 214 F. Supp. 811 (1963); *Stout v. Hendricks*, 228 F. Supp. 568 (1964); *Thigpen v. Meyers*, 211 F. Supp. 826 (1962); *Toombs v. Fortson*, 205 F. Supp. 248 (1962); *Valenti v. Dempsey*, 211 F. Supp. 911 (1962); *WMCA Inc. v. Simon*, 208 F. Supp. 368 (1962); *Wisconsin v. Zimmerman*, 205 F. Supp. 673 (1962), 209 F. Supp. 183 (1962).

State Cases:

In re Apportionment of the Michigan State Legislature, 126 N.W. 2d 731 (1964), 127 N.W. 2d 862 (1964), 128 N.W. 2d 350 (1964); *Blaikie v. Power*, 193 N.E. 2d 55 (1963); *Caesar v. Williams*, 371 P. 2d 241 (1962); *Davis v. McCarty*, 388 P. 2d 480 (1964); *Glass v. Hancock County Election Committee*, 156 So. 2d 825 (1963); *Griffin v. Board of Supervisors*, 384 P. 2d 421 (1963), 388 P. 2d 888 (1964); *Le Doux v. Parish Democratic Executive Committee*, 156 So. 2d 48 (1963); *Harris v. Shanahan*, 390 P. 2d 722 (1964); *In re Legislative Reapportionment*, 374 P. 2d 66 (1962); *Levitt v. Attorney General*, 180 A. 2d 827 (1962); *Levitt v. Maynard*, 182 A. 2d 897 (1962); *Maryland Committee For Fair Representation v. Tawes*, 180 A. 2d 656 (1962), 184 A. 2d 715 (1962); *Mikell v. Rousseau*, 183 A. 2d 817 (1962); *Opinion to the Gover-*

II. HYPOTHESES TO BE TREATED

On the basis of the existing literature comparing state and federal judicial behavior, the following five hypotheses seemed appropriate:

1. State courts will be more critical of the Supreme Court's decision in *Baker v. Carr* than will federal courts.
2. State and federal courts will differ in their interpretations of the Supreme Court's instructions in *Baker v. Carr* in three respects:
 - a) Federal courts are more likely than state courts to understand the Supreme Court to have reached the merits of the Tennessee apportionment case, and to have provided substantive guidelines for lower court action.
 - b) Federal courts are more likely to see a "one man, one vote" standard required by the Supreme Court than are state courts.
 - c) State Courts are more likely to read the Supreme Court's instructions as accepting factors other than population as legitimate bases for legislative apportionment than are federal courts.
3. State courts will be more likely than federal courts to "duck" apportionment cases by failing to reach the merits of the claim, despite the ruling in *Baker v. Carr*. This difference will appear in three ways:
 - a) State courts are more likely to deny jurisdiction than are federal courts.
 - b) State courts are more likely to decline to exercise equity jurisdiction.
 - c) State courts are more likely to show deference to state legislatures, and to delay

nor, 183 A. 2d 806 (1962); *Rice v. Frink*, 143 So. 2d 848 (1962); *Scholle v. Hare*, 116 N.W. 2d 350 (1962); *Sweeney v. Notte*, 183 A. 2d 296 (1962); *Wisconsin v. Zimmerman*, 126 N.W. 2d 551 (1964); *Wyoming v. Gage*, 377 P. 2d 299 (1963).

While five of these cases did not deal with the apportionment of state legislatures, they are immediately relevant to several of the hypotheses. *Sanders v. Gray* involved the Georgia county unit system. *Blaikie v. Power* dealt with the selection of members of the New York City Council. *Heldund v. Hanson*, *Glass v. Hancock County Election Committee* and *Griffin v. Board of Supervisors* dealt with the apportionment of county governments.

Since many of the cases were handled in several stages, it is possible for a given case to appear in what would seem to be contradictory categories if a court significantly modified its position or its strategy between opinions.

judicial action in order to allow the legislature to act first.

4. In their rulings on constitutionality, state judges will permit a greater degree of population inequality than will federal judges.
5. State and federal judges will differ in the application of judicial remedies in cases in which state legislative apportionments are found to violate the Constitution. This will be made evident by two related indicators:
 - a) State judges are more likely to defer to the legislature and to decline to provide a judicial remedy while awaiting legislative action—despite the finding of unconstitutionality.
 - b) Federal courts are more likely than state courts to act to provide positive relief once the unconstitutionality of a state's apportionment is established.

This formulation of hypotheses helps to compensate for the basic problem in research design noted above: the comparison of state and federal judicial responses to "similar" rather than identical stimuli. As formulated, the hypotheses differ in the extent to which this is a problem. Hypotheses 1 and 2 require a comparison of the verbal responses of state and federal courts to the identical stimulus—the Supreme Court's decision in *Baker v. Carr*. The lower court apportionment case is the *occasion* for the response, rather than the stimulus. We need not assume that the judge's discussion of *Baker* is tied to the specifics of the case before him. To test Hypotheses 3 and 5, one compares judicial action (or lack thereof). But here too, the action reflects a response to *Baker*: may a judge still avoid apportionment cases? Must a judge grant positive relief once he has found a violation of the Constitution? Presumably the ramifications of the particular case would have more influence on the judge's action in response to *Baker* than on his verbal response.

Only Hypothesis 4—which posits that when deciding cases state judges will permit a greater degree of population inequality than federal judges—calls for a comparison of the responses of judges to different but "similar" stimuli. And as will be seen, this is a fatal weakness.

III. FINDINGS

Hypothesis 1. A test of the first hypothesis—that state courts are more critical of the Supreme Court's decision in *Baker v. Carr* than are federal courts—requires a detailed textual analysis of all the cases involved. I have presented such an analysis elsewhere.¹² It demon-

strates considerable similarity in the opinions of state and federal judges. For the most part, the lower courts did not explicitly question the Supreme Court's policy decision to intervene in apportionment cases. However, many judges criticized the procedure the high court had followed; they were particularly upset by the lack of guidance provided for them in *Baker*. In their references to the Supreme Court's craftsmanship, the remonstrances of many federal judges were at least as strong—if not stronger—than those of state judges. The following comments by federal judges are illustrative:

Until some direction is given with respect to the application of invidious discrimination to the reapportionment cases, the lower courts will continue to have difficulty in determining the standard to be applied. . . .¹³

We are unable to premise an invalidity of the provisions of the State of New York upon the *Baker v. Carr* determination by reason of the absence of applicable indicia.¹⁴

No guidelines or criteria are laid down for determining the extent or level of disproportion to constitute infringement of the Equal Protection Clause. . . .¹⁵

[W]e must confess lack of both omniscience and prescience, which it appears to us would be necessary to make a judicial appraisal and declaration that the State's time-old method of apportionment is irrational. . . .¹⁶

It is indeed difficult for judges and attorneys to fully understand the impact of *Baker v. Carr* . . . to say nothing of legislators upon whom the primary responsibility of reapportionment rests.¹⁷

The conclusion which emerges from a close reading of the lower court apportionment cases is that, with respect to their assessments of *Baker v. Carr*, federal judges differed among themselves; state supreme court judges differed among themselves; and the two patterns of

lative Apportionment by the State and Federal Courts: A Comparative Analysis of the Judicial Process" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1967).

¹³ *Davis v. Synhorst*, 217 F. Supp. 492, 497 (1963).

¹⁴ *WMCA Inc. v. Simon*, 208 F. Supp. 368, 372 (1962).

¹⁵ *Lisco v. McNichols*, 208 F. Supp. 471, 376 (1962).

¹⁶ *Hearne v. Smylie*, 225 F. Supp. 645, 651 (1964).

¹⁷ *Mann v. Davis*, 213 F. Supp. 577, 586 (1962). Dissenting opinion.

¹² Edward N. Beiser, "The Treatment of Legis-

opinion are similar. It does not appear possible to conclude—as we had hypothesized—that as a group, state judges were more critical of the Supreme Court's opinion in *Baker* than federal judges.¹⁸

Hypothesis 2. It is possible to be more precise when testing the hypothesis that state and federal courts would differ in their interpretations of the Supreme Court's instructions in *Baker*. It was anticipated that the two groups of courts would give different answers to three related questions: had the Supreme Court reached the merits of the Tennessee apportionment case, and provided substantive guidelines for lower court action? Was a one man, one vote standard required in either or both chambers of a state legislature? Could a state legitimately consider factors other than population when apportioning its legislature?

Nine of the twenty-nine federal cases held that the Supreme Court had not dealt with the merits of legislative apportionment, or provided concrete guidelines to enable lower courts to do so. Four of the nineteen state cases reached the same conclusion.¹⁹ While the difference between the state and federal courts is not statistically significant,²⁰ note that it is *not* in the anticipated direction.

¹⁸ It is important to remember that the choice between a state or federal court by a litigant was not randomly made.

¹⁹ *Daniel v. Davis*, *Davis v. Synhorst* (first opinion), *Germano v. Kerner*, *Hearne v. Smylie*, *Lisco v. Love*, *Lisco v. McNichols*, *Sobel v. Adams*, *Wisconsin v. Zimmerman*, and *WMCA Inc. v. Simon*. Citations are in note 11. The state cases were: *Caesar V. Williams*, *Davis v. McCarty*, *In re Apportionment of the Michigan Legislature*; and *Mikel v. Rousseau*. Citations in note 11.

²⁰ Fisher's $p = .20$. The negative cells in the calculation include only those courts which explicitly stated that the Supreme Court had not reached the merits of *Baker*, or indicated specific guidelines for the lower courts.

The particular results of this study allowed me the luxury of avoiding an important methodological point which may be significant in future research. While I employed Fisher's Exact Probability Test to consider whether the observed results could have occurred as a matter of chance, I am not prepared to defend this as the exclusive decision-rule for determining the validity of the hypotheses tested. Consider this example: If ten of fourteen federal judges refused to apply *Baker v. Carr* to Congressional apportionment, while only one of five state judges acted in this manner, these results would not be statistically significant. Yet I would be inclined to say that the

Four of the twenty-nine federal courts stated that *Baker* required that at least one chamber of a bicameral state legislature be apportioned strictly on the basis of population.²¹ Only one of the nineteen state courts held that a population-based apportionment was required in at least one legislative chamber.²² While this difference corresponds with our hypothesis, it is not statistically significant.²³

Twelve of the twenty-nine federal courts explicitly stated that factors other than population are legitimate bases for legislative apportionment, at least to some extent. Seven of the nineteen state decisions expressed a similar position.²⁴ Note that again the difference between state and federal courts in this respect, while not statistically significant, is not in the anticipated direction.²⁵

The language of those federal courts which rejected the one man, one vote standard the

difference between these two groups of judges ought not be rejected. The problem is that, with small N 's, when one uses the question "could this result have occurred as a matter of chance more than five times in one hundred" to decide whether observed differences are meaningful, he may be requiring results which are more extreme than he would expect on the basis of his theory and experience.

²¹ *Baker v. Carr*, *Davis v. Synhorst* (later opinion), *Moss v. Burkhardt*, and *Toombs v. Fortson*, citations in note 11. *Moss v. Burkhardt* was the only decision—state or federal—which understood the Supreme Court to require equally populated districts in both houses of a state legislature.

²² *Maryland Committee v. Tawes*. Citation in note 11. This applies only to interpretations of *Baker v. Carr*. Other courts reached such conclusions after the Supreme Court's decisions in *Gray v. Sanders* and *Wesberry v. Sanders*.

²³ Fisher's $p = .26$. The negative cells in the calculation include those courts which failed to reach the merits, as well as those courts which expressed a negative view.

²⁴ The twelve federal cases were: *Baker v. Carr*, *Daniel v. Davis*, *Germano v. Kerner*, *Lisco v. Love*, *Lisco v. McNichols*, *Mann v. Davis*, *Marshall v. Hare*, *Sanders v. Gray*, *Sobel v. Adams*, *Thigpen v. Meyers*, *Toombs v. Fortson*, and *WMCA Inc. v. Simon*. The seven state cases were: *Caesar v. Williams*, *Davis v. McCarty*, *Griffin v. Board of Supervisors*, *Levitt v. Attorney General*, *Levitt v. Maynard*, *Maryland Committee v. Tawes*, and *Sweeney v. Notte*. Citations in note 11.

²⁵ Fisher's $p = .23$. The negative cells include both courts stating that non-population factors could not be considered, and those expressing no opinion.

Supreme Court was ultimately to adopt was at least as vigorous as that of the state courts. Many relied upon an analogy with the national legislature. To a federal judge in Connecticut, "it would be revolutionary indeed for the [Supreme Court] to hold that it violates the Federal Constitution for a legislature to have one house based on population and another on the unit system."²⁶ An Illinois federal district court opinion rose to rhetorical heights:

Should that which is deemed proper when observed in the presence of the federal government be suddenly deemed improper when associated with a sovereign state? Must the subject be more royal than the king? Must the State be more democratic than the United States?²⁷

These data do not confirm the second hypothesis; it appears that the state and federal courts did not differ significantly in their interpretations of the Supreme Court's mandate in *Baker*.

Hypothesis 3. It was generally understood that *Baker v. Carr* required lower courts to deal with apportionment cases. Yet some lower courts employed a variety of techniques to avoid judicial involvement in this area. Ten of the twenty-nine federal courts and six of the nineteen state supreme courts "ducked" apportionment questions by failing to reach the merits of cases before them for resolution.²⁸ Thus contrary to our hypothesis, federal courts were slightly more likely to avoid apportionment cases than state courts; however, this result is not statistically significant.²⁹

The Supreme Court of Alabama was the only court—state or federal—which denied that it had jurisdiction in an apportionment case.³⁰

Two state courts and two federal courts declined to exercise equity jurisdiction.³¹ In seven

of the twenty-nine federal cases, judges stayed their hands in order to allow state legislatures to act first;³² two of the nineteen state cases exhibited such deference to the legislative branch.³³ This apparent difference—which is contrary to our expectation—is not statistically significant.³⁴ The data do not confirm Hypothesis 3.

Hypothesis 4. It turns out that Hypothesis 4—the expectation that federal and state judges will react differently to a given degree of malapportionment—cannot be tested in the real world. Two procedures for the verification of this hypothesis present themselves. One might apply a measurement of malapportionment to each of the states in which a court ruled on the constitutionality of the legislature's apportionment.³⁵ Having ranked the states in terms of malapportionment, it would be simple to compare the responses of state and federal judges to approximately equivalent cases. Unfortunately, this procedure would not test the hypothesis. The objective measurement of malapportionment is not necessarily an indicator of the stimulus to which the judge was exposed. The difficulty with this procedure is that we cannot know whether cases based on equivalent factual situations constitute equivalent stimuli in the context of litigation.

In order to overcome this problem, one might compare cases on the basis of the judges' articulated assessments of the degree of malapportionment involved. That is, one might order the cases in terms of the indices of population-inequality which the judges invoke in their opinions. Two statistical measures predominate in the cases under study: the ratio of the most populous district to the least populous district, and the smallest percentage of the population which could conceivably elect a majority of the legislature (The Dauer-Kelsay

²⁶ Anderson, dissenting in *Butterworth v. Dempsey*, 229 F. Supp. 754, 774 (1964).

²⁷ *Germano v. Kerner*, 220 F. Supp. 230, 233 (1963).

²⁸ The ten federal cases were: *Daniel v. Davis*, *Hearne v. Smylie*, *Hedlund v. Hanson*, *League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh*, *Lein v. Sathre*, *Silver v. Jordan*, *Sims v. Frink*, *Sincock v. Terry*, *Stout v. Hendricks*, and *Wisconsin v. Zimmerman*. The six state cases were: *Glass v. Hancock*, *In re Apportionment of the Michigan Legislature*, *In re Legislative Reapportionment*, *Maryland Committee v. Tawes*, *Rice v. Frink*, and *Wyoming v. Gage*. Citations are in note 11.

²⁹ Fisher's $p = .24$.

³⁰ *Rice v. Frink*. Citation in note 11.

³¹ The state cases were *Glass v. Hancock* and *In re Apportionment of the Michigan State Legisla-*

ture. The federal cases were *Hearne v. Smylie* and *Wisconsin v. Zimmerman*. Citations in note 11.

³² *Daniel v. Davis*, *League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh*, *Lein v. Sathre*, *Sims v. Frink*, *Sincock v. Terry*, *Stout v. Hendricks*, and *Wisconsin v. Zimmerman*. Citations in note 11.

³³ *Maryland Committee v. Tawes*, *Wyoming v. Gage*. Citations in note 11.

³⁴ Fisher's $p = .16$.

³⁵ The problem of measuring malapportionment in a way which will permit comparative analysis has been discussed recently in Glendon Schubert and Charles Press, "Measuring Malapportionment," this REVIEW, 58 (June, 1964), 302-327; 302 (1964), and Henry F. Kaiser, "A Measure of the Population Quality of Legislative Apportionment," this REVIEW, 62 (March, 1968), 208-215.

index). But Schubert and Press have demonstrated that these indices are not adequate for comparative analysis.³⁶

Thus both procedures fail. When we employ an independent, precise measurement of malapportionment, we cannot demonstrate that the cases as presented to the judges accurately reflect the degree of malapportionment. When we utilize the judicial descriptions of the extent of malapportionment, we find that the indices of malapportionment employed are so imprecise that we cannot determine which cases are equivalent. This difficulty appears to be an unavoidable consequence of the fact that this comparison of "state and federal judicial behavior is based on the responses of different political actors to "equivalent" rather than identical stimuli.³⁷

Hypothesis 5. A finding of unconstitutionality did not necessarily induce a court to take affirmative remedial action. In nine of the fourteen federal cases which ruled that a state's legislative apportionment was unconstitutional, the court declined to remedy the situation, in order to allow the legislature to act.³⁸ Similar delays were granted in all five of the state apportionment cases in which violations of either the state or federal constitutions were found.³⁹ The apparent small difference between

the behavior of the two sets of judges is in the direction hypothesized, but is not statistically significant.⁴⁰

Several of the decisions granting delays threatened court action if the legislature failed to meet judicial standards; as a group, the federal opinions tended to employ stronger language in this respect than did the state courts. Specific time limitations were imposed in five of the nine federal cases in which delays were granted, and in three of the five state cases.

Of the fourteen cases in which federal district courts found that legislative apportionments violated the Federal Constitution, positive relief was granted in four; an injunction was issued to prevent the use of Washington's apportionment statutes; aspects of two different legislative proposals were imposed by court order in Alabama; a plan submitted by plaintiffs was adopted by the Tennessee court with minor modifications; and in only one state (Oklahoma) did a federal court provide a specific apportionment plan of its own.⁴¹ It is clear that at least two additional federal courts were prepared to act when the United States Supreme Court intervened.⁴² State courts granted relief in only one of the five cases in which they held apportionment legislation to be unconstitutional: the Wisconsin Supreme Court reapportioned the state.⁴³ This difference is not statistically significant.⁴⁴

These differences in the proclivity of state and federal judges to remedy malapportionment seem far too minor to confirm our hypothesis.

IV. IMPLICATIONS

The differences in the behavior of state and federal judges which we predicted do not appear. Of course, it may be that careful selection by litigants of the courts in which they sought to benefit from *Baker v. Carr* prevented such differences from occurring. It is also possible that by comparing state courts of last resort and federal district courts we looked in the wrong place.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ Fisher's $p = .17$.

⁴¹ *Thigpen v. Meyers*, *Sims v. Frink*, *Baker v. Carr* (later opinion), and *Moss v. Burkhart*. Citations in note 11.

⁴² *Butterworth v. Dempsey*; *Drew v. Scranton*. Citations in note 11.

⁴³ *Wisconsin v. Zimmerman*. Citation in note 11.

⁴⁴ Fisher's $p = .43$.

⁴⁵ Indeed, with respect to race relations cases, Kenneth Vines suggests that "[t]he role of the southern state supreme court has paralleled that of the national Supreme Court. In both cases, the

³⁶ *Op. cit.*

³⁷ In only one instance did federal and state judges comment on the constitutionality of the same apportionment. The eight-judge Michigan Supreme Court was forced to decide which of a group of apportionment plans most closely corresponded to the requirements of the state constitution. In the course of their opinions, five of the eight applied the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution to the apportionment legislation: three held that it was constitutional, two that it was not. Shortly thereafter, a three-judge federal district court ruled—two to one—that the apportionment did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. It is interesting that the three state judges and two federal judges who upheld the constitutionality of the Republican-authored Michigan apportionment were all Republicans. The two state judges and the dissenting federal judge who held it unconstitutional were Democrats. *In re Apportionment of the Michigan State Legislature*, 126 N.W. 2d 731 (1964). *Marshall v. Hare*, 227 F. Supp. 989 (1964).

³⁸ *Baker v. Carr*, *Davis v. Synhorst*, *Drew v. Scranton*, *Mann v. Davis*, *Moss v. Burkhart*, *Sincock v. Duffy*, *Sobel v. Adams*, *Thigpen v. Meyers*, *Toombs v. Fortson*. Citations in note 11.

³⁹ *Harris v. Shanahan*, *Mikell v. Rousseau*, *Scholle v. Hare*, *Sweeny v. Notte*, *Wisconsin v. Zimmerman*. Citations in note 11.

Nonetheless, it is interesting that these results are in accord with the only published empirical comparison of federal and state judicial behavior. Professor Vines concluded that differences in the treatment of Negroes by southern state and federal courts were less than might have been expected. While Negroes "have a better chance for favorable decisions in the federal courts than in the state courts, . . . the difference is not one of very great magnitude."⁴⁶ Vines found that "in some states, Negroes fared better in the state court than in the federal courts."⁴⁷

Two explanations for the failure of the predicted differences to appear seem plausible. It may be that state supreme court judges are as well (or nearly as well) insulated from political influence as are lower federal judges. Formal-legal factors governing judicial selection, tenure of office, and so on may be less significant than

judicial reformers would imagine. It is also possible that the demands of one's role as a "lower court judge" are of greater significance than either differences in recruitment pattern or institutionalized position. The "bureaucratic phenomenon" may suppress the appearance of differences between state and federal judges.

One virtue of the methodology employed in this paper is that it can be applied extensively to existing data. State and federal judicial responses to virtually every past Supreme Court decision which is viewed as innovative in significant respects can be studied. It would seem desirable that such analyses be based on the comparison of responses to specific stimuli which confronted both state and federal judges. For example, rather than categorizing opinions as "pro-Negro," one might ask: were federal judges more likely than state judges to apply *Brown v. Board* to non-educational facilities?

Clearly, the present study will not support generalizations about the behavior of state and federal judges. But it appears in order to ask that the received wisdom be reconsidered, and that judgment be suspended until further empirical research is carried out.

higher court has tended to protect minority groups by reversing decisions made against them in lower courts." Vines, *op. cit.* (note 1) p. 16.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 10

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

VOTING TURNOUT IN AMERICAN CITIES*

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Writing about local elections in 1968, Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press report that, "It is not known whether . . . state and national voting-population characteristics fit municipal voting, too."¹ Although a number of important studies of politics and elections in individual communities have emerged in recent years, the data are far from sufficient to permit more than the most speculative generalizations about the nature of the local electorate.² This study draws back the curtain, albeit only a bit, on one aspect of local political participation—voting turnout. The data presented constitute, so far as we know, the first attempt at a comprehensive comparison among American cities with respect to turnout. As will be suggested and become obvious, the breadth of the data is not matched by their depth; data were received from only 80 percent of the 729 cities above 25,000 population in 1962, and we were able to utilize comparative turnout figures from only 282 of these. While relationships are suggested between turnout, political and governmental structure, and characteristics of the population, these relationships must be regarded more as leads to future research, than as clear and unambiguous findings.

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¹ Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press, *Governing Urban America*, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 95.

² Alvin Boskoff and Harmon Ziegler's study, *Voting Patterns in a Local Election*, provides a brief review of the state of the literature: (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964), Chapter 1. See also Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965); but note that references to city elections are infrequent.

Previous work by the present authors has pointed to the importance of the political and social variables included in this analysis of American cities. Lee suggested in a study of nonpartisan elections and politics in California cities that nonpartisanship might tend to reduce voter participation.³ In a study of American cities, this hypothesis was confirmed in a preliminary analysis of the same data used in this article.⁴ The median turnout in partisan elections was 50 percent, compared to 30 percent in nonpartisan cities; in addition, the related characteristics of council-manager government and the appointed mayor were also seen to have a negative relationship to voter participation. It was not possible, however, to determine whether these relationships were independently associated or, rather, merely reflected underlying characteristics of the cities themselves.

Parallel work on form of government by Alford and others posited the existence of a relationship between form of government and socioeconomic characteristics. For example, "white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, growing, and mobile cities are highly likely to be manager cities; ethnically and religiously diverse but nonmobile industrial cities are highly likely to be mayor-council cities." Other features of so-called "reform" type local government—nonpartisan elections, at-large elections, small city councils, local elections which are not concurrent with state or national elections—have a similar social base.⁵ In this paper, the data and

³ Eugene C. Lee, *The Politics of Nonpartisanship* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), Chapters 9 and 11.

⁴ Eugene C. Lee, "City Elections: A Statistical Profile," in *Municipal Year Book* (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1963), 74-84.

⁵ Robert R. Alford and Harry M. Scoble, "Political and Socioeconomic Characteristics of American Cities," in *Municipal Year Book* (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1965), p. 95. See also Leo F. Schnore and Robert R. Alford, "Forms of Government and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Suburbs," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 8 (June, 1963), 1-17;

theoretical notions derived from these previous works are combined. The paper also draws upon two as yet unpublished studies, one of which included a factor analysis and multiple regression of these data.⁶

I. CONCEPTS AND DATA

The Meaning of Voting Turnout. Voting turnout in local elections is the most direct measure of participation in the electoral process, and possibly an indicator of other forms of political participation. We assume that a high level of voting turnout implies several things about the characteristics of the local electorate, although we do not have the data directly to test these assumptions.

For example, where there is a high level of voting turnout, one might assume there has been communication of political information to voters both about the particular election and about the political system of which elections form a part. This political information might be conveyed through a variety of reference groups—neighborhood groups, ethnic groups, political parties, voluntary associations—or through mass media such as television, radio and the press. Whether such political communication exists or not, either the community as a whole or particular groups within it possess norms which define voting as appropriate and proper behavior. Voting turnout is defined thus as the dependent variable, although it would be just as legitimate to turn the question around and attempt to determine the consequences of

higher versus lower levels of voting turnout. A few studies have dealt with this question, particularly with reference to referenda, finding that higher turnout is associated with negative voting.⁷ There is no necessary connection between the causes and the consequences of different levels of voting turnout, however.

Varying levels of voting turnout in American cities may also be a consequence of political organization at the local level. For example, the more activity there is of groups interested in electoral outcomes, the more activity of party or other organizations seeking to get out the vote or to mobilize support behind slates of candidates, the higher voting turnout may be. On the other hand, high turnout may occur because of norms encouraging vote turnout held by members of other groups in the community with very little activity of political organizations *per se*.

As the above assumptions indicate, we see voting turnout as linked to the political and social structure of the local community. It seems possible, however, that relationships of characteristics of a community with voting turnout may be cancelled out by idiosyncracies of a particular election: the personality of the mayor, the issues which happen to be salient at the moment, the accident of having a controversial referendum or bond issue on the ballot, whether or not the local election happens to be held at the same time as a particularly important state or national election. Unfortunately, comparative data are not available to test such "situational" factors influencing voting turnout, and we shall assume that the correlations that we discuss are only reduced by the operations of these situational factors, and not reversed.⁸ It seems plausible to infer

and John Kessel, "Governmental Structure and Political Environment: A Statistical Note about American Cities," this REVIEW, 66 (September, 1962), 615-620. Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler present data at some variance with the above and suggest that there are not significant class differences between reformed and unreformed cities, although there is "some support for the argument that reformed cities are more homogeneous." However, as they suggest, varying samples may produce varying conclusions. In any event, the differences between these studies are not central to this analysis of voting participation. See their "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," this REVIEW, 61 (September, 1967), p. 706.

⁶ Ruth B. Dixon, "Predicting Voter Turnout in City Elections," unpublished M.A. thesis in Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, 1966; Ruth B. Dixon, "The Reform Movement in American City Government: Has Democracy Been Sacrificed to Efficiency?", unpublished paper, Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, 1965.

⁷ Maurice Pinard, "Structural Attachments and Political Support in Urban Politics: The Case of Fluoridation Referendums," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (March, 1963), p. 518. A similar study reported that in cities with high levels of citizen participation, associated with a well-educated population, the local government was frequently immobilized from making decisions on such issues as bond referenda and fluoridation controversies. Robert L. Crain and Donald B. Rosenthal, "Community Status as a Dimension of Local Decision-Making," *American Sociological Review*, 32 (December, 1967), 970-984.

⁸ See Robert R. Alford, "The Comparative Study of Urban Politics," in Leo F. Schnore and Henry Fagin (eds.), *Urban Research and Policy Planning* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1967), 263-302, for an analytic scheme which distinguishes "situational" from "cultural" and

that if unique electoral issues and personalities account for most of the variation between cities in voting turnout, there should not be consistent associations between turnout and structural features of the local government and community. As indicated below, however, this is not the case, and relationships do exist. Given the nature of the data in the study, particularly the fact that they relate to only one election for each city, the fact that even modest relationships can be discovered on a national basis is significant.

Our perspective here is one which looks at a "population of elections," not a "population of individual voters," as V. O. Key put it. Correlatively, electorates are not merely "arithmetic sums of individuals," but rather "units playing special and significant roles in the political process and therefore worthy of analysis in their own right," in Austin Ranney's words.⁹ We are thus not inferring from our data on voting turnout anything about the characteristics of individual voters, nor do we invoke any social-psychological properties of individuals to explain our ecological correlations between characteristics of cities and the level of voting turnout. It would certainly be possible to develop propositions about the intervening processes of communication, definition of the political situation, and the formation of political identities in individuals and groups which connect structural features of American cities to the probability of high or low voting turnout, but these tasks are beyond our scope. We attempt, therefore, to avoid the pitfalls of "the ecological fallacy" (the generalization from group data to individuals) and "the

contextual fallacy" (the prediction of group action from the characteristics of individuals).¹⁰

The Data. It is essential to an understanding of the data reported below that the nature of the original turnout figures and the ambiguity of certain of the variables be clearly understood.

(1) No national source either collects or reports local voting statistics; few states do so. The data utilized here were collected by the International City Managers' Association in late 1962 from approximately 80 percent of the nation's 729 cities above 25,000 population.¹¹ The missing cities tended disproportionately to be partisan, mayor-council and Eastern, all characteristics noted below as being associated with high voting turnout.

(2) For the bulk of the report, data are utilized only for those cities whose local election was *not* held concurrently with a state or national election, for we do not know for concurrent elections whether the turnout figures represent only the local increment—for example, the vote for mayor—or the vote in the larger race—for example, a vote for governor in 1962. Thus, a valid comparison of concurrent and nonconcurrent elections is impossible, and it is essential to use the narrower base, even though it reduces the number of cities to be analyzed by one-third.

(3) An understatement of the mayor-council vote may result from the fact that in an undetermined (but quite small) number of such cities, only ward elections were held in 1961–62, which—in an unspecified (but even smaller) number of cities—involved only a portion of the city.

(4) The data do not distinguish, either in mayor-council or manager cities, those elections in which a mayor appeared separately on the ballot from those in which he did not. The presence of the mayor on the ballot tends to increase voter turnout,¹² and the separately elected mayor is more likely to be found in mayor-council cities than in council-manager cities. Thus, the fact that in a small number of the mayor-council cities the mayor was not on the ballot in the election here reported tends to understate voter turnout in mayor-council cities, insofar as the impact of the mayor is concerned.

(5) The data do not indicate whether the election reported was a run-off or a primary.

"structural" factors in explaining decisions, policies and roles of government in urban politics. Situational factors themselves have causes and may be patterned, of course, but, by definition, are not predictable from structural or cultural factors. Voting turnout figures for four Wisconsin cities in April and November elections from 1950 to 1964 ranged from 14 percent to 91 percent, which is partly explainable by situational factors. See Robert R. Alford, with the collaboration of Harry M. Scoble, *Bureaucracy and Participation: Political Cultures in Four Wisconsin Cities* (Chicago: Rand McNally, forthcoming), Chapter VII.

⁹ V. O. Key, Jr., "The Politically Relevant in Surveys," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (1960), 54–61; and Austin Ranney, "The Utility and Limitations of Aggregate Data in the Study of Electoral Behavior," in Ranney (ed.), *Essays in the Behavioral Study of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), p. 99.

¹⁰ Crain and Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, p. 984.

¹¹ The following table compares characteristics of American cities above 25,000 population in 1960 and the cities used in this study.

¹² Lee, "City Elections . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 81.

Characteristics	Cities in 1960		Cities Reporting Turnout		Cities with Nonconcurrent Elections Used in this Study	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
Form of Government:						
Mayor-Council	259	38%	130	30%	73	26%
Commission	77	11	37	9	30	11
Council-Manager	330	50	261	61	179	63
		100%		100%		100%
Form of Election:						
Partisan	193	29%	99	23%	50	18%
Nonpartisan	479	71	329	77	232	82
		100%		100%		100%
Region:						
East	164	24%	84	20%	43	15%
Midwest	190	28	122	29	67	24
South	191	28	118	28	95	34
Far West	131	19	104	24	77	27
		100%		100%		100%
Total	(676)	100%	(428)	100%	(282)	100%

See Table 1 for the states comprising each region. By 1962, when the voting data were obtained, there were 729 cities over 25,000 population.

(Approximately 20 percent of the nation's cities employ a run-off if no candidate receives a majority in the initial general election.) The consequences of this fact for turnout are not known. The local elections reported were held in 1961 and 1962, while the demographic data derive from the 1960 Census. Thus, as much as two years may have elapsed from the census to the election, so that changes in population characteristics in the intervening period are not reflected. Inasmuch as the voter-registration ratio is used as a measure of turnout, rather than the voter-adult population ratio, the impact of such changes is minimized insofar as the turnout percentages themselves are concerned. However, similar flaws exist with reference to the registration figures. States employ different laws, and cities and counties often administer the laws quite independently. Thus, the registration base in one city may be full of deadwood, another up-to-date, and the resulting percentage turnout figures be incomparable.

(6) Finally, the use of "partisan" and "nonpartisan" as terms to describe the form of elections is a measure, not of the reality of political party activity, but merely of the form of ballot. While we assume that the existence of the party label on the ballot—the definition of

a partisan election generally employed—is associated with a higher degree of party activity than is the case in which the nonpartisan ballot is employed, we have no evidence to support the assumption. "As some formally partisan cities are nonpartisan in fact, so some formally nonpartisan cities are *de facto* partisan in varying degrees."¹³ Party activity may have a closer relationship to voter participation than the ballot form, but we have no way of assessing this on a comparative basis. Thus, we are forced to utilize a legal definition of partisan and nonpartisan elections, rather than an actual measure of partisan involvement. Similarly, the mayor-council form of government, associated with a separately elected mayor, includes mayors with widely varying powers and, theoretically, a wide range of impact upon the electorate and, indirectly, upon voter turnout. Again, however, we must employ a legal definition rather than a test of actual mayoral influence which might, in fact be more significant.

¹³ Charles E. Gilbert and Christopher Clague, "Electoral Competition and Electoral Systems in Large Cities," *The Journal of Politics*, 24 (May, 1962), p. 330.

While none of these shortcomings appears crucial to us, they do suggest the tentative nature of both the data and the findings themselves, as well as the need for additional controls in subsequent studies.

Correlates of Voting Turnout. We shall consider three general categories of factors which may be related to the level of voting turnout in American cities: *political structure*, *social structure*, and *community continuity*. In addition, we shall include region as a separate category, although one of a totally different theoretical nature. The first two categories encompass a variety of possible specific factors related either to the institutions of government, party, and elections or to the demographic and group composition of the community. The third category is of a different order, referring to the development over time of interrelationships, contacts, or communications between different elements of political or social structure.

First, *political structure*. Institutions which allow greater access to political leaders and, theoretically, greater responsiveness to political demands should encourage higher levels of voting turnout. So, too, should the existence of institutions explicitly designed to mobilize the electorate. We shall follow the assumptions of the recent literature in taking the existence of *mayor-council form of government*¹⁴ and *partisan elections* as indicating a greater probability of responsiveness "to class, racial, and religious cleavages . . . the enduring conflicts of political life."¹⁵ We have already noted that earlier analysis of some of the data presented in this paper showed that the presence of the "reformist" institutions—council-manager government and nonpartisan elections—was associated with lower voting turnout.¹⁶ The causal direction of the relationship is difficult to infer, however, since the activity of groups which favor certain political forms may influence both political structures themselves and also the level of

turnout, or, on the other hand, once in existence, a political structure may be sufficiently inaccessible and unresponsive to discourage electoral participation.

Second, *social structure*. The existence in a community of groups which provide a social base for political organization would seem to be an important element of social structure which might be associated with voting turnout. Which elements or characteristics of population heterogeneity have an impact on turnout is an important theoretical question; we can only suggest a few possibilities, not all of which are testable with the data available. Religion, ethnicity, education, occupation, neighborhood, and race are obvious and standard bases of social differentiation in American communities. Yet it is not self-evident that variations in any or all of them should be systematically related to levels of voting turnout, at least as measured by aggregate and crude indicators such as those available for comparative studies. It may be, too, that variations in religious or ethnic composition expressed as a percentage of the total population are inadequate measures to relate to voting turnout. Very low or very high ethnicity, for example, may suggest little social cleavage and low turnout; figures between these two extremes, however, might reveal a divided community, high cleavage and high turnout. Only limited data exist on the numbers and social organization of religious or ethnic groups, or on the voluntary associations based on persons with similar occupation or education vis-a-vis aggregate data on their proportion in the electorate. We must, therefore, infer something about social structure from census data on the socioeconomic and ethnic composition of the communities.

We shall use the *ethnic* composition of a city, as measured by the proportion of foreign-born persons and persons of foreign or mixed parentage, and the educational composition of the city as our two indicators of social structure.

Arguments and some data on the persistence of ethnic voting are provided in several recent articles; the point is made that the political system is not merely a dependent variable, but that parties and candidates may continue to serve as a "mediator and mobilizer of minority symbols and interests."¹⁷ Although admittedly

¹⁴ We use "mayor-council" and "nonmanager" interchangeably, although the category includes some 30 commission cities, 10.6 percent of the total of nonmanager communities with nonconcurrent elections.

¹⁵ Lineberry and Fowler, *op. cit.*, p. 715. This article provides a succinct summary of these hypotheses.

¹⁶ Lee, "City Elections . . .," *op. cit.*, 74-84. Ecological data from Des Moines, Iowa, show a similar pattern; see Robert H. Salisbury and Gordon Blake, "Class and Party in Partisan and Non-Partisan Elections: The Case of Des Moines," this REVIEW, 57 (September, 1963), 589-590.

¹⁷ Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification," this REVIEW, 61 (September, 1967), p. 717. An earlier statement of this thesis is found in Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Some Consequences of Ethnic Politics," in M. Kent Jennings and Harmon Ziegler

a very inadequate measure, the proportion of persons of foreign stock is closely related ($r = .62$) to the only indicator of religious composition of a city which is available from the census (the proportion of children in private schools), and we shall use the former as a more direct measure of the religious-ethnic characteristics of a city.

Education would seem to be associated with voting turnout, if the logic of the oft-reported individual correlation of education with political participation can be extended to the ecological or aggregate level.¹⁸ We might expect higher voting turnout in cities with a higher proportion of better-educated persons. Yet, such persons are often in a minority in a city, and therefore their behavior alone may not be able markedly to determine the absolute level of voting turnout. The opposite hypothesis also seems plausible: the higher the proportion of less well-educated persons and workers in a community, the higher the voting turnout, for these groups could form the social base for political movements likely to have a stake in influencing local leaders through elections. Here is a case which provides a direct test of alternative hypotheses suggested by an analytical framework which includes both individual level data and ecological level data.

Third, *community continuity*. The longer a community has existed, the more likely it is that there are groups, institutions and individuals with a stake in the city's political and governmental structures. Similarly, regardless of the age of the community, the more stable the population within the city, the greater the likelihood that such political attachments will exist. Thus, both the age of a city and the stability of its population would seem to have a probable relationship to voting turnout. We shall use two indicators to measure the continuity of the local social and political systems of American communities: *the age of the city* and *the geographic mobility* of its population. The age of the city, as measured by the decade in which the city reached 25,000 population, is a direct measure of the length of time that a

social and political organization has existed on a given territorial site. City age does not measure, however, the age of either form of government or form of elections, both of which may have been altered one or more times during the life of the city. Thus, only indirect statements may be made about the continuity of *particular* political institutions. Geographic mobility—as measured by the proportion of the population who moved to their present home from a different county between 1955 and 1960—is an indirect indication of the continuity of a given set of families and households in a community. Where such mobility is low, a high level of out-migration may or may not have taken place, and thus geographic mobility may not be a good measure of population change. However, for that very reason it is appropriate for our purposes. The “residue” of families left behind is the appropriate population which is attached or unattached to the electoral system. Conversely, a city which has experienced a high level of movement of its population from one county to another probably contains many residents who have lost their ties to social groups and political networks which have been their channels of communication of political stimuli.

Finally, *region*. It is difficult both conceptually and analytically to suggest or to test the notion that “region” has an independent relationship to voting turnout. As Lineberry and Fowler suggest, “region as a variable is an undifferentiated potpourri of socioeconomic, attitudinal, historical and cultural variations.”¹⁹ Nevertheless, while not capable of adequate analysis in this study, the possibility remains that such factors as political tradition or culture—the previous existence of particular institutions, the impact of previous events, or the existence of particular value systems—may have a relationship to the character of the community and, thus, to voter participation.²⁰ For example, our data do not permit us to measure the existence—past or present—of leaders or bosses, of citizen organizations and community controversies that may have an enduring impact upon patterns of community politics, including voting turnout. Such characteristics may not be randomly distributed throughout the country and may not be adequately “explained” by normal demographic

(eds.), *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966). See also Raymond E. Wolfinger, “The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting,” this REVIEW, 59 (December, 1965), 896–908. Robert Lane has suggested that “the seat of ethnic politics is the local community, not the national capitol.” See his *Political Life* (New York: The Free Press, 1959), p. 239.

¹⁸ See, for example, Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 222; Boskoff and Ziegler, *op. cit.*, p. 16; Milbrath, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

¹⁹ Lineberry and Fowler, *op. cit.*, p. 707.

²⁰ For an example of the use of “political culture” as a variable in categorizing American states, see Daniel J. Elazar, *American Federalism: A View from the States* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1966).

data. Thus, the oft-asserted likelihood that working-class Eastern and Midwestern cities are more likely to have political machines with a stake in controlling local elections and getting out the vote is not revealed by the data available in this broad national survey.²¹ Similarly, we cannot assess the possible impact, suggested by David Rogers, that many southern communities have an authoritarian and conservative value system, reflected in a rigid class structure and one-party politics, all of which would be likely to have an effect on voter participation.²² Nor are our data adequate for us to have confidence that the "independent effect" of region can be isolated. Nevertheless, the regional differences suggested below may well hide more important variables than those which are available from census data.

II. FINDINGS

Table 1 displays the correlations of the various indicators of social and political structure and community continuity with four different measures of voting turnout in American cities. In order to avoid the problem of variations in registration from city to city, both the proportion of registrants voting and of adults voting are shown. Also, because cities with elections which are concurrent with state or nation elections have higher turnout than those with nonconcurrent elections, cities are divided into those two categories. Thus, we have two independent replications based on two populations of cities.

All four general factors are associated with the level of voting turnout, regardless of whether the proportion of adults or registrants voting is considered, and regardless of whether the local election was concurrent or nonconcurrent. With regard to political structure, cities without the council-manager form and with partisan elections have higher voting turnout than cities with other forms. With respect to social structure, cities with highly ethnic populations and less well educated populations have higher voting turnout. With respect to community continuity and region, cities with stable populations, which are older, and which are located in the East have higher voting turnout than cities with a high level of in-

migration, which are younger, and which are located in the Far West or South.

The same general patterns are found if other related indicators are used, such as the percent of foreign born, the percent of persons with five years of education or less, the percent of college graduates, the percent of children in private school, or the decade in which the city reached 10,000 population. Nor do other dividing lines for regions alter the general relationships.

We shall present only the proportion of *registrants voting* in subsequent tables, because we are concerned with the factors which bring eligible voters to the polls, not with the factors which influence the possibility of registration. Analytically, the two bases are distinct in terms of their relevance for political processes, since it is possible for a city to have an extremely high proportion of registrants voting but a very low proportion of adults voting (particularly in the South), although not vice versa. The act of registration is of course, an important aspect of political participation.²³ In any event, the correlation between adults and registrants voting in this study is high (.81), and separate analysis of the data shows that the relationships described here would not be altered by the use of the "adult" base.

As noted above, we shall report further data only for those cities whose local election was not held concurrently with a state or national election. The correlation of concurrence with the proportions of registrants voting was .30, with adults voting .35. The mean voting turnout of adults in cities with concurrent elections was 43.5 percent, for nonconcurrent elections 31.2 percent, and the "advantage" of concurrent elections is maintained in every sub-group we examined. Concurrent elections are slightly more likely in the East, in cities with partisan elections and a mayor-council form of government, and in older cities, all characteristics themselves linked to higher voter turnout. But, as Table 1 shows, the association does not account for the correlations of these other characteristics with voter turnout. While not included here, all subsequent tables shown were also separately computed for cities with concurrent elections, and the same patterns of relationships hold.

Political Structures and Voting Turnout. Table 2 attempts to assess the *independent* influence of political structural characteristics upon the level of voting turnout. The table

²¹ We are indebted to Raymond Wolfinger for bringing this point to our attention.

²² David Rogers, "Community Political Systems: A Framework and Hypothesis for Comparative Studies," in Bert E. Swanson (ed.), *Current Trends in Comparative Community Studies* (Kansas City, Mo.: Community Studies, Inc., 1962), p. 39.

²³ Stanley Kelley, Jr., Richard E. Ayres and William G. Bowen, "Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First," this *Review*, 61 (June, 1967), 359-379.

TABLE 1. CORRELATES OF LOCAL VOTING TURNOUT IN AMERICAN CITIES, 1961-62*
(Cities over 25,000 population in 1960)

Characteristic	Cities With:	Correlations with:			
		Registrants Voting		Adults Voting	
		Nonconcurrent Elections	Concurrent Elections	Nonconcurrent Elections	Concurrent Elections
Political Structure					
<i>Non-council-manager</i> vs. council-manager		.43	.34	.50	.35
<i>Partisan</i> vs. nonpartisan elections		.28	.43	.29	.38
Social Structure					
Ethnicity: Percent of the popu- lation native of foreign or mixed parentage, 1960		.32	.36	.51	.49
Education: Percent of persons 25 years old and over who com- pleted four years of high school or more, 1960		-.28	-.16	-.15	-.22
Community					
Mobility: Percent migrant to a different county, 1955-60		-.32	-.32	-.40	-.49
Age of City: Decade in which the city reached 25,000 popula- tion		.27	.27	.28	.23
Regional Location					
<i>East</i>		.39	.58	.45	.51
<i>Midwest</i>		.04	-.13	.21	.02
<i>South</i>		-.15	-.29	-.44	-.45
<i>Far West</i>		-.19	-.25	-.10	-.20
Mean Registrants Voting		46.9%	59.0%		
Mean Adults Voting				31.2%	43.5%
N =		(282)	(142)	(294)	(146)

* Entries are product-moment correlations of the actual percentages of registrants voting or adults voting in the last local election held in the given city. Cities in which the local election was held concurrently with a state or national election are separated from those in which it was not concurrent. The N's shown are approximate for a few correlations, since not all data were available on political structure. The direction of the correlation is indicated by the italicized word. The two political structure variables and regional location were treated as dummy variables (presence or absence of the attribute named) for the correlations. All other correlations were computed from the actual percentages. Data on political structure were obtained from the *Municipal Year Book*, 1963, and all other data are from the 1960 U. S. Census of Population. The correlations are not significantly altered if commission cities are grouped with manager cities for the purpose of constructing a mayor-council/nonmayor-council dummy variable.

States comprising the indicated regions are as follows:

East: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, District of Columbia.

Midwest: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska.

Far West: California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Alaska, Hawaii, Montana, Idaho, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, New Mexico.

South (and Border): Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee.

TABLE 2. CORRELATES OF REGISTRANTS VOTING WITH POLITICAL STRUCTURES CONTROLLING FOR SOCIAL STRUCTURE, COMMUNITY CONTINUITY, AND REGION*
(Cities with Nonconcurrent Local Elections)

Characteristic	Controlling for Social Structure and Community Continuity					Correlation within Region			All Cities
	Ethnicity	Education	Mobility	Age of City	East	Midwest	South	Far West	
<i>Nonmanager vs. council-manager form of government</i>	.38	.37	.34	.38	.40	.38	.28	.30	.43
<i>Partisan vs. non-partisan elections</i>	.27	.25	.23	.25	.14	.40	.27	-.01	.28
N =	(279)	(279)	(279)	(279)	(43)	(67)	(95)	(77)	(282)

* See Table 1 for the states comprising each region and the measures of each variable. Entries are product-moment correlates of the percentage of registrants voting with the two characteristics of political structure indicated. Entries under "Social Structure and Community Continuity" are partial correlations, controlling for each of the variables indicated. The direction of the correlation is indicated by the italicized word.

shows that the overall correlations of political structure and voting turnout remain while controlling for each demographic characteristic and the four regions, although the magnitudes change. (The single disappearance of the association occurs for form of election in the Far West; in that region only 6 of the 77 cities with nonconcurrent elections also had partisan elections.) We may summarize Table 2 simply by noting that both aspects of political structure—the form of government and the form of elections—are related to the proportions of registrants voting, even when important characteristics of social structure and region are held constant.

The correlations suggest that form of government has a stronger relationship to turnout than form of elections. In an attempt to assess this more adequately, Table 3 examines each structural variable, holding the other constant. Form of government does have a more signifi-

cant relationship to turnout than form of election. The election of a mayor (which occurred in 77 percent of the mayor-council cities in the nonconcurrent elections covered by this study) may be a stronger motivating force in relation to turnout than the existence of the partisan ballot. The latter is much more ambiguous in terms of its practical meaning; a partisan ballot, as we have noted, may mask a wide range of party activity, ranging from the total absence of political party organization to total mobilization. Thus, it is not surprising that the more clear-cut variable demonstrates a clearer relationship.

These findings are consistent with those reported by Ruth Dixon, utilizing the same base data as in this study. Analyzing all cities, regardless of the concurrency of the election, she reported a correlation of *-.48* between council-manager form of government and percent of adults voting and *-.38* between adult turnout

TABLE 3. THE CORRELATION OF REGISTRANTS VOTING WITH EACH ELEMENT OF POLITICAL STRUCTURE*
(Cities with Nonconcurrent Elections)

Characteristic	Correlation within Form of Election		Correlation within Form of Government	
	Partisan	Nonpartisan	Nonmanager	Manager
<i>Nonmanager vs. manager form of government</i>	.45	.36	—	—
<i>Partisan vs. nonpartisan elections</i>	—	—	.24	.11
N =	(50)	(232)	(103)	(179)

* Entries are product-moment correlates of the percentage of registrants voting with each aspect of political structure, controlling for the other. The direction of the correlation is indicated by the italicized word.

TABLE 4. CORRELATES OF REGISTRANTS VOTING AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE, CONTROLLING FOR POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND REGION*
(Cities with Nonconcurrent Local Elections)

Charac- teristic	Correlation within				Correlation within Region				All Cities
	Form of Government		Form of Election						
	Non- man- ager	Man- ager	Par- tisan	Non- par- tisan	East	Midwest	South	Far West	
Ethnicity	.38	.15	.26	.33	.29	.09	.21	-.06	.32
Education	-.23	-.15	-.43	-.20	-.32	-.33	-.19	-.03	-.28
N =	(103)	(179)	(50)	(232)	(43)	(67)	(95)	(77)	(282)

* Entries are product-moment correlations of the actual percentages for each city. States comprising the regions are given in Table 1 with the measures of ethnicity and education.

and the nonpartisan ballot. Furthermore, in a multiple-correlation regression including eight political variables, form of government accounted for 22 percent of the variance in turnout, concurrency of election for an additional 11 percent, type of election for 3 percent and form of registration for 2 percent. The author notes Lord Bryce's suggestion that "the most important single factor in affecting turnout is the color and appeal of the candidates," and goes on to state that "the predictive power of these governmental variables is considerable in view of the multitude of factors that are brought into play in influencing citizens to vote."²⁴

Social Structures and Voting Turnout. Table 4 shows the correlates of measures of ethnicity and of educational level with the voting turnout of registered persons in cities with non-concurrent elections. Although several of the correlations are very weak, cities with more highly ethnic or less well-educated populations generally have higher levels of voting turnout, regardless of form of government and elections and in each of the four regions. (Again, the Far West does not have many cities with a highly "ethnic" population.)

In noting the relationship between ethnic populations and the existence of mayor-council form of government, Kessel had suggested that the foreign-born "would be especially dependent on political activity because of its exclusion from alternative agencies of community integration."²⁵ Although our data are not strictly comparable, the parallel existence of a

relationship between ethnicity and turnout would seem to support Kessel's assumptions.

However, the findings relating education to turnout appear to fly in the face of accepted conventional wisdom. If voting turnout reflects an "adding up" of the predispositions of individuals in cities to participate in politics, then we would expect that education would be closely correlated with voting turnout. This is not the case. Although not high, the ecological or aggregate correlation of registrants voting with education is the opposite of the well-known individual correlation.²⁶ (Use of other measures of education does not alter this generalization.)

Voting turnout (registrants voting) is thus *inversely* correlated with the educational level of a city. We conclude that high educational level of the city as a whole either has no effect or reduces the level of voting turnout. Although better-educated individuals may indeed vote more frequently than less-educated individuals, less well-educated communities vote more (or at least not less) than well-educated communities. We leave for further study the question of whether the relationship between education and voter turnout is curvilinear, a question

²⁴ Dixon, "The Reform Movement . . .," *op. cit.*

²⁵ Kessel, *op. cit.*, p. 617.

²⁶ It should be noted that while these correlations are based upon measures of education as a continuous variable, the measure itself is not continuous for a given city, but rather a single proportion of persons who have achieved a given level of education. See Robert R. Alford and Harry M. Scoble, "Sources of Local Political Involvement," this REVIEW (forthcoming) for an analysis of the relative importance of a variety of factors, including education, for political involvement.

TABLE 5. CORRELATES OF REGISTRANTS VOTING AND INDICATORS OF COMMUNITY CONTINUITY,
CONTROLLING FOR POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND REGIONS*
(Cities with Nonconcurrent Elections)

Characteristic	Correlation within Political Structure				Correlation within Region				
	Form of Government		Form of Elections		East	Mid-west	South	Far West	All Cities
	Non-manager	Manager	Partisan	Nonpartisan					
Mobility	-.23	-.16	-.41	-.26	-.49	-.47	-.03	-.06	-.32
Age of City	.11	.24	.22	.24	.15	.18	.03	.34	.27
N =	(103)	(179)	(50)	(232)	(43)	(67)	(95)	(77)	(282)

* Entries are product-moment correlations of the actual percentages for each city. States comprising the regions are given in Table 1 with the measures of mobility and city age. The direction of the correlation is in terms of the *age* of the city; thus, the earlier the city reached 25,000 population, the higher the turnout.

unanswered by the existence of the single correlation. It may well be that turnout is lowest at either end of the aggregate educational scale but proportionally higher in communities falling between these two extremes.

Community Continuity and Voting Turnout. Table 5 shows the correlates of the age of the city and the geographic mobility of its population with voting turnout, holding form of political structure and region constant. The older the city and the less mobile its population, the lower the voting turnout, regardless of either form of government or form of election.

Mobility remains highly correlated with voting turnout in the East and Midwest, but drops to nothing in the South and Far West. The age of the city, however, is not correlated with voting turnout in any region except the Far West.

Such findings do not necessarily mean that these factors have no influence in those regions, but rather that we must reconceptualize their relationships to each other and to voting turnout. Community continuity does not appear to be a "factor" influencing voting turnout in the same way as contemporary features of the social and political structure of the city, but rather—we suggest—indicates a greater probability that stable communication networks linking social and political groups to political leaders in a community may have developed. Also, sets of norms encouraging political participation may have developed as a consequence of the existence of networks of access to and influence upon political leaders. These, in turn, may bear some relationship to voting turnout, but a relationship too complex to be revealed by the gross data here employed.

The above findings concerning the positive relationship of mobility and ethnicity and the negative relationship of education to voter turnout are corroborated in a separate study by Dixon. Using multiple-correlation regression involving clusters of related demographic factors, she concluded that "the single most important factor to be considered in predicting the voter turnout of a city is the residential mobility pattern of its inhabitants, which alone can account for 31 percent of the variability in turnout. Knowing the ethnic composition of the city increases the power of prediction an additional 19 percent . . . [while] the factors 'age composition,' 'social status' [which included education as a variable], 'employment stability' and 'city size' contribute little or no information about whether a city has high or low turnout in local election."²⁷

Region. The regional location of a city is associated with a wide variety of political and social characteristics, as Table 6 shows, and many of these characteristics are also associated with voting turnout. Eastern cities are older, have more out-migration and little immigration, and have more persons native of foreign-born parentage. In addition, they are more likely to have partisan elections and less likely to have the council-manager form of government. Western cities are at the other extreme in all of these characteristics. Thus, it is no surprise to find that important differences exist among regions with respect to voter turnout, as has been suggested in tables presented above. The distinction is most apparent in a

²⁷ Dixon, "Predicting Voter Turnout . . .," *op. cit.*, 50-52.

TABLE 6. CORRELATIONS OF REGIONAL LOCATION OF A CITY AND SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS RELATED TO VOTING TURNOUT*

(Cities with Nonconcurrent Elections)

Characteristic	Region			
	East	Midwest	South	Far West
Political Structure				
Council-manager form vs. non-council-manager form	-.29	-.33	.23	.32
Nonpartisan vs. partisan	-.13	-.20	.13	.18
Social Structure				
Ethnicity	.56	.14	-.60	.06
Education	-.23	.03	-.21	.41
Community Continuity				
Mobility	-.34	-.22	.17	.32
Age of City	.29	.12	-.10	-.26
Mean registrants voting	64%	48%	43%	41%
Mean adults voting	49%	37%	23%	30%
N =	(43)	(67)	(95)	(77)

* Note that the table does *not* present correlates relating the characteristics to turnout, but shows the relationship of the characteristics to region. Entries are product-moment correlations of each variable listed with the regional location of a city, treated for computation purposes as four different dummy variables. Thus, "East"-*"Not East"* is a "variable" for purposes of computation of the correlations. See Table 1 for the states comprising the regions and the measures. The total number of cases is 282

comparison of Eastern and Far Western cities. Eastern location is positively correlated with all the variables associated with high turnout. Eastern cities have a mean turnout figure of 64.0 percent, compared to but 41.2 percent in the Far West. Nevertheless, the table also reveals once again the difficulty of dealing theoretically and analytically with region as an independent variable. Since we are unable to control for other than a very limited number of these variations, we only note the regional characteristics but offer little by way of explanation other than our previous reference to the possible existence of such factors as political tradition and culture.

Socio-Political Structures, Historical Continuity, Region and Voting Turnout. In the pages above, relationships of varying strength have been noted between form of government, form of elections, ethnicity, education, and mobility and voting turnout. Age of city was seen to have little relationship independent of other characteristics, while region did seem associated with turnout but presented both theoretical and analytical problems which could not be resolved by the data here available. In the tables to follow, we review some of the above findings by the use of other data, in this case the mean turnout in various categories and sub-categories of cities. (The substitution of

median for mean does not alter the results; the two have a correlation of .97.) The demographic variables previously utilized are dichotomized above and below the median value for all cities in the United States, in order to develop a primitive typology of cities along the dimensions we have distinguished.

In Table 7, the average voting turnout is shown for cities classified simultaneously by form of government, form of elections, and the four demographic variables. In every comparison, the relationships appear as predicted. Holding all other variables constant, both partisan elections and non-manager (typically mayor-council) government show a higher turnout than nonpartisan elections and manager government. Similarly, again paralleling the results indicated above, the average turnout among cities with high ethnicity, low education and low mobility is higher (with one minor exception) than among cities with reverse characteristics. Older cities, regardless of their form of government or election, are more likely to have higher voting turnout than younger cities, although the mean differences are not as great as for the political structural characteristics.

Table 8 presents average turnout data by form of government and form of elections, classified according to region. As indicated

TABLE 7. MEAN PERCENT OF REGISTRANTS VOTING, BY SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE*
(Cities with Nonconcurrent Local Elections) % and (N)

Characteristic	Partisan				Nonpartisan			All Cities		
		Non-manager	Manager	All	Non-manager	Manager	All	Non-manager	Manager	All
Ethnicity	High	65 (19)	45 (9)	58 (28)	58 (44)	42 (57)	49 (101)	60 (63)	42 (66)	51 (129)
	Low	62 (15)	49 (7)	58 (22)	48 (25)	40 (106)	41 (131)	53 (40)	40 (113)	44 (153)
Education	High	59 (10)	45 (10)	52 (20)	53 (42)	39 (110)	43 (152)	54 (52)	39 (120)	44 (172)
	Low	66 (24)	50 (6)	62 (30)	57 (27)	44 (53)	48 (80)	61 (51)	44 (59)	52 (110)
Mobility	High	60 (10)	40 (10)	50 (20)	52 (26)	39 (122)	41 (148)	54 (36)	39 (132)	42 (168)
	Low	65 (24)	58 (6)	64 (30)	56 (43)	44 (41)	50 (84)	59 (67)	46 (47)	54 (114)
Age of City	Old	66 (21)	47 (10)	60 (31)	57 (41)	43 (63)	49 (104)	60 (62)	44 (73)	51 (135)
	Young	60 (13)	45 (6)	55 (19)	51 (28)	38 (100)	41 (128)	54 (41)	39 (106)	43 (147)
All Cities		64 (34)	47 (16)	58 (50)	55 (69)	40 (163)	44 (232)	57 (103)	41 (179)	282

* 1. "Low ethnicity" means that there were less than 15 percent of persons in the city native of foreign-born or mixed parentage in 1960. "High ethnicity" more than 15 percent. This figure is the median for all 676 cities in the United States over 25,000 population in 1960.

2. Educational level was dichotomized, with "Low education" comprising cities which had 43 percent or less persons 25 years or more who had completed high school in 1960.

3. Mobility was dichotomized with "Low mobility" comprising cities which had 15 percent or less persons 5 years and over who were migrant from a different county between 1955 and 1960, "high mobility" those cities with more than 15 percent migration.

4. Cities which reached 25,000 population by the census of 1930 are classified as "Older," those in the censuses of 1940 to 1960 as "Younger."

above, region is itself related to various demographic characteristics themselves associated with turnout; multivariate analysis is thus handicapped by the small size of the frequencies in many of the sub-categories. Again, partisan non-manager cities tend to command a larger turnout than non-partisan and manager cities. However, the impact of other variables hidden under the "region" label is similarly indicated. In the East, for example, the average turnout in nonpartisan non-manager cities is higher than in partisan mayor-council cities. Whether this reflects the impact of form of government—for example, the possibility that the office of mayor "means" more in the East

than in other parts of the country—or the association of these cities with demographic variables associated with turnout, or a number of other possibilities, cannot be determined with any degree of confidence from these data. Similarly, in the Far West, average turnout in nonpartisan-manager cities is the same as that in the very small number of partisan-manager cities, in contrast to the general pattern. Here, the ambiguous nature of "partisan" as well as "region" is evidenced, as well as the difficulty of generalizing from the very small number of deviant cases. It may well be that partisanship is lacking in those few Western cities, ballot form notwithstanding, that there is a "spill-

TABLE 8. MEAN PERCENT OF REGISTRANTS VOTING, BY REGION AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE*
(Cities with Nonconcurrent Elections) % and (N)

Region	Partisan			Nonpartisan			All Cities		
	Non-manager	Manager	All	Non-manager	Manager	All	Non-manager	Manager	All
East	66 (11)	— (1)	67 (12)	69 (19)	54 (12)	63 (31)	68 (30)	56 (13)	64 (43)
Midwest	61 (16)	53 (5)	59 (21)	49 (28)	35 (18)	43 (46)	53 (44)	39 (23)	48 (67)
Far West	— (1)	39 (5)	40 (6)	56 (7)	40 (64)	41 (71)	55 (8)	40 (69)	41 (77)
South	69 (6)	43 (5)	57 (11)	47 (15)	40 (69)	41 (84)	53 (21)	40 (74)	43 (95)
Total	64 (34)	47 (16)	58 (50)	55 (69)	40 (163)	44 (232)	57 (103)	41 (179)	47 (282)

* See Table 1 for states comprising the regions.

TABLE 9. MEAN PERCENT OF REGISTRANTS VOTING, BY REGION AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE*

(Cities with Nonconcurrent Elections) % and (N)

Region	Ethnicity		Education		Mobility		Age of City		All Cities
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	Old	Young	
East	64 (41)	— (2)	56 (17)	69 (26)	52 (9)	67 (34)	66 (31)	60 (12)	64 (43)
Midwest	48 (40)	49 (27)	45 (41)	53 (26)	41 (25)	53 (42)	52 (39)	43 (28)	48 (67)
South	53 (10)	42 (85)	41 (45)	45 (50)	43 (70)	43 (25)	42 (45)	43 (50)	43 (95)
West	40 (38)	43 (39)	41 (69)	39 (8)	41 (64)	41 (13)	48 (20)	39 (57)	41 (77)
Total	51 (129)	44 (153)	44 (172)	52 (110)	42 (168)	54 (114)	51 (135)	43 (147)	47 (282)

* See Table 7 for explanation of demographic categories, Table 1 for stages comprising the regions and the other measures.

over" effect from the prevailing nonpartisan policy of the area. Again, the data utilized here do not permit an evaluation of these important distinctions.

In Table 9, demographic and regional variables are examined simultaneously. Again, the mean turnout figures reported for the nation as a whole are consistent with the findings already noted: older cities with high ethnicity, low education, and low mobility show higher turnout than cities with the opposite characteristics. However, the relationships are reduced sharply and sometimes reversed when region is controlled. The tendency of Eastern cities to have a higher turnout, even when demographic characteristics are held constant, suggests again that the history and traditions of a region, its political culture, in short, may be as important variables as those which we have been able to utilize in this exercise. Our gross data do not allow a more extensive exploration of the links between the political and social structure of cities and their origins and development within a particular region.

In sum, the tables utilizing mean turnout data are generally consistent with the findings based on correlations. The fact that these two approaches yield much the same results gives confidence in our conclusion that, regardless of the vulnerability of the data and the generally modest nature of the relationships, there is an association between voter turnout and the variables utilized. Cities with partisan elections, mayor-council (or nonmanager) government, high ethnicity, low education, low mobility, and Eastern location tend to have a higher voting turnout than cities with nonpartisan elections, council-manager government, low ethnicity, high education, high mobility and Far Western location.

III. CONCLUSIONS

Voting turnout is generally higher in cities with either or both "unreformed" political structures and more explicit class or ethnic

cleavages. Voting turnout is higher, not lower, in cities with less well educated populations, perhaps because in those cities political cleavages based on economic interests are more explicit and visible than in middle-class suburbs or other communities likely to have high proportions of college-educated persons. Cities with more stable populations also have higher levels of voting turnout, possible because of the greater likelihood of integration of the different elements of social and political structure. Whether or not there are direct links of community continuity—as represented by population stability—and stages of development to accessible and responsive political structures and to the existence and organization of social cleavages is a question we cannot answer from our own data. However, some evidence on the matter of integration can be inferred from a recent study.

Lineberry and Fowler found that cities with "reformed" political structures were less likely to be responsive to cleavages in their population than unreformed cities. Specifically, they found that there were higher correlations of ethnicity and religion (as measured indirectly by private school attendance) with taxation and expenditures in cities with the mayor-council form of government and partisan or ward elections. They suggest that reformed cities have "removed" the influence of party as a mechanism for aggregating interests, and therefore they expected that the "effects" of social composition would be seen more clearly in unreformed cities. In brief, they suggest that the *political* structures of unreformed cities are likely to be more integrated with their *social* structures than those of reformed cities and that "the electoral institutions of reformed governments make public policy less responsive to the demands arising out of social conflicts in the population."²⁸ The fact that voting turnout tends to relate independently and posi-

²⁸ Lineberry and Fowler, *op. cit.*, p. 716.

tively both to "unreformed" political institutions and to characteristics of community cleavage is consistent with Lineberry and Fowler's conclusions.

With respect to partisanship, it comes as no surprise to find that in the absence of the political party label on the ballot and the assumed reduced likelihood of party organization and activity, voter turnout is generally less. Although there are many advocates of nonpartisanship who would espouse the thesis that local citizen participation should be just as great without the "artificial" injection of partisan politics, the fact remains that the party remains an agent of political mobilization, both symbolically and practically. To some, this is unfortunate. Richard Childs, perhaps the leading exponent of nonpartisanship and one of its "founding fathers" takes the view that "In partisan local elections, two prominent national party organizations consider it their noble duty to combat the other organization, disparage its achievements, advance rival candidates, and the 'outs' consider it necessary to oust the 'ins,' no matter how good a record the 'ins' may have been making. No matter how meaningless the contest for office may be in a given year, both forces must be marshalled for a fight. But what good is that, even if it does bring out a high percentage of the adult population to the polls?"²⁹

Regardless of the various merits of nonpartisan elections, and there are many,³⁰ Childs' view overlooks the fact that elections and participation in the electoral process are not just a means to an end—the election of qualified citizens to public office—but an end in themselves. In fact, one may well ask in 1968 whether a high rate of participation in local elections and the possible reduction of a sense of alienation of many citizens from their community would not more than offset the possible loss of an outstanding candidate.

Insofar as relatively greater turnout in non-manager cities is concerned, both the theoretical and analytical questions are more elusive. The separate election of the mayor would seem to be the prime factor distinguishing manager and mayor-council cities (although there are some manager cities with a separately elected mayor and some mayor-council cities with an appointed mayor). Yet mayors have a wide range of roles in American cities, ranging from

figure-head to strong executive; it would seem that these varying roles and the public's response to them would bear a direct relation to voter interest and turnout, but our data provide no assistance to assess such relationships. Nor do we have data, other than these gross turnout figures, to assess the importance of a separately elected chief executive to the community. Does the existence of an election for mayor serve to increase a citizen's attachment to and interest in the political life of the community? Does the personalization of politics around a contest between two individuals, so familiar at the state and national levels, serve in some sense as a bridge between the citizen and his government? We can only hint at the host of the social-psychological questions which the existence or non-existence of a contest for mayor may suggest.

An alternative, but not mutually exclusive, explanation is that electoral politics is simply regarded as less important in council-manager cities than in nonmanager communities. Council-manager theory notwithstanding, it may well be that the citizen feels that the manager has, in fact, reduced the scope of authority and responsibility of the city's elected officials. The manager hires and fires the department heads; the manager submits the budget and, in so doing, resolves many of the basic resource allocation policies before the council ever sees the document. Such matters may well fall on the administration side of the ancient administration-policy dichotomy, but they represent in many citizens' minds the stuff of city government and politics. Their removal, rightly or wrongly, from the overt political scene may be one explanation of the apparent relationship of the council-manager form to lower voter turnout. In a similar fashion, it could well be that the result of the manager plan and an effective manager is to so "manage" conflict and issues that they do not become political and, eventually, electoral issues. A resulting depressant effect on voter attention and participation would be a likely by-product.

In general, relatively high levels of voting turnout are probably the result of the combined influences of sustained and continuous political organization of parties, wards, neighborhoods, voluntary associations with local political concerns, and simply traditional behavior by social groups which does not require the mobilizing influence of political organization. Where there is high turnout without high activity of parties and interest groups, votes may be "available" for manipulation by political elites, because in such cities individuals

²⁹ Letter to one of the authors dated January 29, 1964.

³⁰ Lee, *The Politics of Nonpartisanship*, *op. cit.*, Chapter 11.

vote because of their party identification and not their involvement in political organizations. Where there is a high level of activity of political organizations *without* high turnout, on the other hand, we might expect that the lack of electoral sanctions would result in a high level of competition and conflict between the relatively better-educated leaders of the active organizations.

Paradoxically, voting turnout may *not* necessarily be a good index of the politicization of the electorate. Voting may be a form of traditional behavior produced by membership in ethnic and other groups which have a certain party identification as part of their group identity. In such cases, a high vote turnout need not mean high issue consciousness or a high level of political conflict. Conversely, voting turnout may be low without denying the possibility of a high level of conflict and concern with issues among the minority of voters who have a high level of political interest.

Thus, it is possible that a high level of action on such policies as urban renewal and poverty programs may be found in cities with low conflict and issue-concern but high voting turnout, precisely because votes can be delivered by political leaders, and bargains and negotiations between local leaders and state and national leaders are possible. A highly active community may have so much conflict that activity leads to stalemate, because leaders are not able to mobilize clear majorities or count on the passive acquiescence of majorities. This argument is consistent with that of Crain and Rosenthal concerning the impact of high levels of education upon participation, conflict and stalemate in fluoridation and other decisions. Although they noted exceptions at the highest educational level, they argued that high-status cities, precisely because they have citizens ready and able to participate in politics, will be less likely to be able to innovate new community programs and less able to make decisions because of higher levels of conflict which lead to stalemate.³¹ The authors examined data on various types of community decisions—urban renewal, fluoridation, school desegregation, and others—which are related to the educational level of the population in the cities, and found that by and large the cities with better-educated populations have been *less* likely to undertake such programs.

Unfortunately, they did not have data on the key intervening variable in their theoretical proposition: political participation. Our

data indicate that, in fact, cities with higher levels of education among the population are *less* likely to have high voting turnout than cities with low levels of education. This finding casts doubt upon the plausible assumption that political participation at the level of the city as a whole has the same relationship to education that it does at the individual level. But if, in fact, there is *less* political participation in cities with high levels of education, this explanation of differences in decision-making processes cannot rest upon a presumed correlation between education and participation.

As suggested, the answer may partly rest on the possibility that voting turnout may be a poor indicator of other forms of the political activity of groups in cities. Groups composed of better-educated persons may have other channels through which to influence policy than mere voting turnout. Effective political participation by such groups might tend to resolve issues before they become relevant to a campaign and election. In any event, our findings about relatively low turnout in better-educated cities do at least raise questions about the assumption that correlations at the individual level can be casually extended to the level of community social organization. Crain and Rosenthal make the same methodological point in a different substantive context, suggesting that the greater likelihood of better-educated persons to accept innovation may not be true when the same factors are measured at the community "ecological" level.³²

An investigation of the individual correlations of education and political participation in cities with different demographic and economic characteristics is clearly called for. It may well be true—and we suspect—that in *all* cities, the better educated are more likely to vote than the less well-educated, despite the higher overall levels of voting turnout in less well-educated cities. In high turnout cities, for example, the better-educated stratum in those cities may respond to the political mobilization of the ethnic less-educated majorities by even higher political participation than the majority social groups themselves exhibit. Nor would one expect that in middle-class, better-educated, Far West cities with low vote turnout, there would necessarily be any counter-response by the less well-educated elements in those cities to participate at higher levels. The very fact of the recent migration of less well-

³¹ Crain and Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, 970-984.

³² *Ibid.*

educated persons to Western cities should serve to break their ties to the local ethnic neighborhood organizations or other community groups which sustained high voting participation in the Eastern cities from which they came. Thus, a plausible case can be made for expecting the "normal" pattern of individual correlation between education and political participation in both types of cities. It would be possible to compute possible ranges of variations of the individual-level correlations, given certain marginal distributions of educational composition and voting turnout levels in cities, but that problem is beyond our present scope.

A final word on the implications of our data for the controversy over local political subcultures. The operations and functions of a political "ethos" or political culture at the local level may be best understood through a historical perspective of the continuity of social and political structures and the norms of behavior which they enforce, rather than through the current attitudes of social groups in a community. We have noted the difference in direction of the correlation between education and voting turnout at the city and individual levels. This may indicate that the consequences of structural features of a political system, derived in turn from its history, may be visible in collective patterns of political behavior, such as partisan strength, levels of voting turnout, or referenda outcomes, but not at all visible in correlations of political attitudes with individual characteristics.

Banfield and Wilson's original article³³ used ecological data on ethnic and class composition of tracts, in relation to referenda voting, which we would regard as appropriate kinds of data for inferences to collective processes, but their theoretical framework was based upon assumptions about *individual* behavior, not necessary to and even possibly misleading about the actual causal processes involved. Wolfinger and Field questioned that certain ethnic groups hold "private-regarding" or "public-regarding" values, and therefore favor certain political structures in their community. They noted that when region was controlled, the correlations between ethnicity and various aspects of political structure and governmental functions presumed to be predicted by the "ethos" hypothesis vanished. And they suggested that

regional variations in the age of cities may explain more than the "ethos" of groups residing in cities. As they put it, "regional variations may reflect to some extent interaction between cities' natural histories and prevailing political enthusiasms at crucial periods in those histories."³⁴ Our data indicating significant regional differences, particularly the tendency of Eastern cities to have relatively high voting turnout regardless of form of government, method of balloting and social characteristics is consistent with this view. Whereas region may not be a useful analytical tool, *as such*, the variations among regions suggest the need to introduce into the conceptual framework and research design a recognition of such phenomena as Wolfinger and Field describe.

The regional or even the state location of a city may not be sufficient to identify its political culture accurately. Samuel C. Patterson has recently suggested that while there may be interstate variations in basic political orientations, there are also important variations within states. A few studies have analyzed this topic.³⁵

We have suggested that there is likely to be variation in community political systems linked to the regional location of the city, its age, and the extent of out-migration or immigration. Sheer length of existence, as well as the proportion of the population which has lived in the city for a long or a short time, would seem to be plausibly related to the degree to which there is historical continuity of leadership patterns and policy-making patterns in a city. Again, these are indirect indicators, because, for example, some cities may have experienced what amounts to a revolution in leadership continuity in certain periods of

³⁴ Raymond E. Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," this REVIEW, 60 (June, 1966), p. 326. While we take full note of the Wolfinger-Field vs. Banfield-Wilson controversy as to the use and abuse of "ethos," we make no attempt here to enter into their discussion as to what the latter pair said or implied in *City Politics*. The issue is discussed in letters to the editor of each pair in the December, 1966, issue of this REVIEW. See "Communications," 998-1000.

³⁵ Samuel C. Patterson, "The Political Cultures of the American States," *The Journal of Politics*, 30 (February, 1968), 204-207; Alford, with the collaboration of Harry M. Scoble, *op. cit.*, and Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, *Four Cities* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963).

³³ James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," this REVIEW, 58 (December, 1964), 876-887.

their history. But we hypothesize that our indicators would correlate with more direct measures of continuity of leadership and policy-making.

Over a period of years, we suggest, communication networks between social groups and political leaders develop which have some continuity, although incumbents may change.

Political roles and institutionalized locations for those roles develop which are linked to the historical success of certain groups in winning electoral victories or exerting informal influence over policy-making processes. High voting turnout may be one consequence of the development over time of these links of social groups to political organization.

SOVIET ELECTIONS AS A MEASURE OF DISSENT: THE MISSING ONE PERCENT*

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A few questions are still hotly debated among students of the Soviet political system, but certainly the nature of Soviet elections is not one of them. Everyone agrees that they are more interesting as a psychological curiosity than as a political reality. They are seen by various writers as ritualized affirmations of regime legitimacy, as methods of involving the masses in supportive activity, as a means of publicly honoring model citizens, and as a crushing display of unanimity designed to isolate the potential nonconformist. Both Western and Soviet writers see Soviet elections from the positive side, from the side of the dutiful 99 percent who invariably vote for the single candidate on the ballot.

In fact, Soviet and Western writers are in very close agreement on the major functions of elections in the Soviet Union, although their value judgments tend to differ along the lines one would expect. Taking one typical example from the general Western literature on the Soviet political system, we find the purposes of a Soviet election defined as "a public demonstration of the legitimacy of the regime . . . an invaluable educational and propaganda exercise . . . and perhaps most important of all, . . . proof that the system of control is unimpaired."¹ In the more detailed Western works on Soviet elections we find the same approach. Thus, Howard Swearer, in a very insightful and valuable article on Soviet local elections, states that "in the Soviet Union, the formal act of voting is comparable in purpose to such civic rituals as singing the national anthem or saluting a country's flag. It is a public display of personal reaffirmation of the Soviet way of life and the party leadership."² Swearer further suggests that the function of Soviet elections "is not only to legitimize the leadership in the

mass mind and to help identify the people with its policies, but also to reassure the leadership itself of its popularity and infallibility."³ In a similar vein, Richard M. Scammon, after personally observing a Soviet election, reported that Soviet elections reflect "the need felt by every regime (even a one-party regime) for popular endorsement and consent to its program, no matter how unreal the conditions under which that endorsement be produced."⁴ Max E. Mote, after studying an election in Leningrad at close hand, suggests that the very idea of an election as a choice between alternatives is not comprehended by the average Soviet citizen, who thinks of voting as "both a patriotic and a social activity, invested with the diverse pleasures which most people derive from performing a commendable action."⁵

Soviet writers agree with the Western analysis of Soviet elections as essentially positive, participatory, legitimizing, demonstrative, educational and patriotic. One of them writes: "Our elections are not simply acts of selecting people's representatives for the organs of state power. They are a most important form of participation of the masses in the implementation of state power, and of their education and organization in the struggle for socialism and communism."⁶ Generally, Soviet commentators see elections as expressions of the pervading unity of Soviet society, a condition brought about by the absence of class conflict. The fact that only one candidate is nominated for each elected position is explained in terms of this assumed underlying unanimity of the Soviet "working masses." Michael Kalinin, titular head of state during Stalin's reign, remarked that the single candidate is "a feature of socialism, a sign that

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¹ Leonard Schapiro, *The Government and Politics of the Soviet Union*, rev. ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 108.

² Howard R. Swearer, "The Functions of Soviet Local Elections," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 5 (May, 1961), p. 149.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

⁴ Richard M. Scammon, "Why the Russians Bother With Elections," *The New York Times Magazine*, April 6, 1958, p. 63.

⁵ Max E. Mote, *Soviet Local and Republic Elections*, Hoover Institution Studies No. 10 (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution, 1965), p. 77. See also George Barr Carson, *Electoral Practices in the U.S.S.R.* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), pp. 99-100.

⁶ A. I. Kim, *Sovetskoe izbiratel'noe pravo* (Moscow, 1965), p. 7.

amongst the working masses there is not and cannot be any internal disagreements such as is found within bourgeois society.”⁷

Thus on both sides of the political fence that used to be an iron curtain, observers have fixed their glance firmly on the positive role of Soviet elections as massive demonstrations of ritualized affirmation. Ninety-nine percent support is indeed a dazzling achievement in an age when many governments achieve power without even receiving the votes of a majority of the registered electorate—and some achieve power without even receiving a majority of the votes cast. It would be difficult to quarrel with the prevailing view of Soviet elections in regard to the functions they perform *for the ninety-nine percent*. But what of the others? Every year in which elections are held (actually three out of every four years), approximately two million votes are cast against the official candidates, under an electoral procedure which, as we shall see, makes this act difficult, at least potentially disadvantageous, and largely ineffectual. All the positive functions described by Soviet and Western observers have no meaning when discussing these non-conformists. These people have apparently taken the word “election” literally, and have made the only choice Soviet procedure allows.⁸

It is therefore useful to consider whether Soviet elections may be studied as elections are studied in other countries where two or more candidates are usually nominated for each elected position. Such a study could be made if the following conditions do in fact exist:

1) If the Soviet electoral procedure, while heavily biased toward achieving affirmative unanimity, does permit the possibility of registering dissent, and the possibility of avoiding consequent sanctions against the dissenter.

2) If reasonably detailed and comprehensive data are available.

3) If the data are accurately and honestly compiled, or if the falsification and inaccuracy are randomly or evenly distributed.

It is obvious that under present conditions, Soviet electoral results cannot be considered an accurate reflection of the true state of Soviet public opinion. A heavy bias in favor of the regime is introduced by the well-established system of pressures, controls and propaganda, and until this system is dismantled the relationship between Soviet voting and Soviet

public opinion will remain an enigma. This does not mean, however, that there is nothing to be gained by studying Soviet electoral statistics. If the study is restricted to a systematic comparison of groups, areas and periods in the Soviet system, the environment of pressures—which produces the ninety-nine percent—can be considered either a constant or a random variable, and the variations in results can be analyzed for clues to the *location* and *relative incidence* of dissent to be found in the Soviet Union. For comparisons, we require only the three conditions mentioned.

There can be no doubt that the first precondition does exist in the Soviet Union. Curiously enough, Soviet electoral law is written as though the drafters expected contested elections.⁹ The present statute governing election of deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet states that “the voter, in the place set aside for filling out the ballot, leaves on each ballot the name of the candidate for whom he wishes to vote, and crosses out the names of the others.”¹⁰ In actual practice, of course, only one name appears on each ballot, the name of the candidate representing the “people’s bloc of Communists and non-party members.” The voter can cast his ballot for the “bloc” candidate by simply folding and depositing his ballot in the appropriate receptacle. In order to vote against the candidate, he must repair to a booth or room, provided by law to ensure “secret” balloting, and cross out the name of the candidate. Since this act invites attention, the Soviet voter’s reluctance to take the legal guarantee of secret ballot seriously is quite understandable. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that he will take the risk or will mark the ballot surreptitiously. Many Soviet voters, wishing to demonstrate their super-patriotism, take pen in hand and write patriotic slogans on the ballot, and this practice could distract attention from the occasional dissenter who crosses out the approved name while proceeding to the ballot box.¹¹ Regardless

⁹ This may have been the case. See Carson, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

¹⁰ *Polozhenie o vyborax v Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR*, as amended to March 19, 1966 (Moscow, 1966), p. 23. In this and other cited respects, this statute is typical of all statutes regulating elections to the various levels of soviets.

¹¹ In this connection Carson remarks: “Considering the character of the soviet election campaign—the voter’s opportunity to stand in public and be counted on the right side—secrecy presents curious problems. The voter has an interest in breaking the secrecy so it will be known that he voted correctly. . . . Many a voter, there-

⁷ As quoted in P. V. Tumanov, *Porjadok organizatsii i provedeniia vyborov v Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR* (Moscow, 1958), p. 23.

⁸ The Russian word for elections, *vybory*, literally means choices, selections, alternatives.

of the technique used, the fact that it is possible both to cast a negative vote and to escape serious sanctions is amply evidenced by Soviet statistics. Since approximately two million negative votes are cast year after year, and since many of these votes must be cast by the same people who have become habitual dissenters, it follows that the act of voting "no" does not bring about sufficient sanctions to cow a rather large number of brave Soviet souls.¹² Indeed, the futility of the act, rather than the danger, might very well be the major deterrent for many potential dissenters who follow the crowd without enthusiasm, and are counted in the ninety-nine percent.

The second precondition, the availability of detailed and comprehensive data, places some limitations on any examination of Soviet elections, but does not eliminate the possibility of making such a study. In the Soviet Union, publication of data is a "sometime thing," sometimes remarkably consistent, sometimes exasperatingly incomplete. The best data, including not only percentages but also absolute numbers of voters, are published for the elections to the local soviets, which occur every even-numbered year.¹³ These data are the most detailed, and therefore the most useful for the purpose of comparison.

The existence of the third precondition, honesty and accuracy in compiling electoral results by Soviet officials, is not so easily determined. We know that the electoral laws have been amended to provide heavy criminal penalties for "a responsible person or member of the electoral commission who commits a forgery of the electoral documents or deliberately miscounts votes or violates the secrecy of balloting,"¹⁴ but we cannot be sure that such strictures are always observed. A further check on possible corruption is provided by the electoral laws in the provision that "certified representatives of public organizations and workers' associations, and representatives of the press have the right to be present during the counting of ballots."¹⁵ Leonard Schapiro's evaluation of these safeguards is that "it is less likely now than in the past that blatant electoral fraud

could be practiced in the presence of so many witnesses,"¹⁶ and one would have to agree that the presence of witnesses from outside organizations makes obvious fraud rather unlikely. But if one is disinclined to accept the reality of these formal safeguards from a system notoriously contemptuous of formal rules, there is another argument which seems more convincing: the environment of pressures is so effective that the desired result—a rousing affirmative vote of over 99 percent—could be achieved without recourse to such dirty business as falsifying election returns. Furthermore, in those relatively few cases where the local candidate is very unpopular, it is probably more advantageous for the regime to permit his defeat than to falsify his victory, since it is quite simple to find a more suitable candidate for the required second election in that district. In a system so heavily biased in its favor, the regime can well afford to "let the chips fall where they may," especially since this attitude may provide the leadership with a useful source of information on the location of dissent and the efficiency of local party and government organizations.

It should be emphasized, however, that we don't require a perfect record of honesty and accuracy of the Soviet Electoral Commissions. Our requirements in this regard are reduced by the fact that in dealing with Soviet electoral data we do not have merely a small *sample* of the voting population, we have in effect the *entire population*. This means that we can afford to be tolerant of isolated incidents of fudgery and forgery. In addition, since we will deal only with *comparisons* of data within the system, we can permit uniformly distributed falsification of even major proportions, such as would be produced if every affirmative vote across the country were raised by five percent. Thus our modest requirements, in combination with the Soviet leadership's need for accurate feedback information and the legal safeguards provided by the electoral statutes, permit a certain degree of confidence in asserting that our requirements have been met.

I. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOVIET ELECTIONS

Soviet voters cast ballots for delegates ("deputies") to the soviets (councils) established on all levels of governmental administration. From the spontaneous and often riotous gatherings that the soviets were during the revolutionary year of 1917, they have become docile tools of the party-state leadership, although with increasing administrative re-

fore, took the precaution . . . of writing in his name and address on his ballot." *Op. cit.*, p. 75.

¹² It should be kept in mind that each Soviet voter casts several ballots—as many as seven—so that the two million negative votes represents perhaps on the order of 500,000 to 700,000 dissenters.

¹³ So-called local elections are those held for all levels below the level of republic.

¹⁴ *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, 1088 (December 27, 1961).

¹⁵ *Polozhenie* . . . , p. 25.

¹⁶ Schapiro, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

sponsibilities involving limited discretionary powers. Nominations of candidates for the soviets are endorsed by open meetings of various public and work organizations, but it is no secret that these nominations are actually decided by the party nucleus in prior, closed meetings. Nomination for candidature is considered a reward for model behavior and outstanding achievement in work, and these are the criteria apparently used in making the selection. Indeed, in the few cases reported in which the pre-selected nominee was rejected by the open meeting of the collective, the major difficulty seems to have been that the party nucleus had chosen someone who did not possess sufficient Soviet virtue.¹⁷ Because the nucleus takes some considerable care in selecting fitting objects for public approbation, the nomination procedure at open meetings tends to be *pro forma*.¹⁸ It would seem that most Soviet citizens have accepted the idea of nomination as reward for virtue rather than as the first step in a competitive selection process. Max E. Mote reports that a typical Soviet response to the question of why only one candidate is advanced would be: "You see, it would indicate a lack of confidence in the candidate if you were to nominate two men for the same post. It would mean you think one of them is not good enough for the office. We don't want to insult our candidates."¹⁹

After nominations are completed, a "campaign" of about six weeks ensues, with daily press coverage in the form of biographical sketches of the candidates, reports on the progress of organizing electoral commissions and of establishing agitation centers (*agitpunkty*). Press coverage is generally more complete and intensive during elections for soviets at the all-union level (USSR Supreme Soviet) and republic level (Supreme Soviets of the republics) than it is for local elections, in which there are thousands upon thousands of candidates. Nevertheless, even during local elections, many a homely, honest and happy face appears under the heading, "Candidates of the People."

The scope of Soviet organization for elec-

tions is truly impressive. This is certainly one area where the system demonstrates its great ability to mobilize large numbers of people to accomplish a short-term, and clearly defined task. Before the "campaign" reaches its closing hours, a significant proportion of the electorate becomes involved in one or another of the many electoral organizations. (In 1967, one out of every 16 qualified voters in the U.S.S.R. was involved in the work of the electoral commissions alone.²⁰) The Soviet electorate is divided into precincts (*izbratel'nye uchastki*) and constituencies (*izbratel'nye okruga*), the former being temporary units for the counting of ballots, and the latter being actual units of representation in the various types of soviets. There is virtually no escape from the all-embracing organization of the precincts. They are established on board ships with 20 or more voters, in hospitals, rest homes and sanatoria, in railroad stations, airports and on board long-distance trains—in fact, wherever human life is to be found within the borders of the U.S.S.R.²¹ The invalid is visited in his home by a representative of the local electoral commission, accompanied by a portable ballot box; the isolated weather-observation team sends its votes from the northern frozen wastelands by radio. The network is so all-inclusive and so carefully articulated that it is virtually impossible to avoid voting—in fact, it is probably easier to vote against the nominated candidate than it is to escape the grasp of the local precinct organization and abstain. In this regard, as in so many others, the system demands active involvement, participation that gives visible evidence of one's loyalty. From this point of view, inaction, purposeful non-involvement, is just as despicable as negative action.

The regime attempts to make each election a plebiscite, in which the sole issue, as George Barr Carson puts it, is "support or non-support on a question which no one publicly dares reject—do you favor the soviet system?"²² The front page of all newspapers on election day is decorated with a standardized drawing of stalwart voters ready to deposit ballots marked "For Communism." Press reports of interviews with voters invariably yield such remarks as: "I voted for the candidates so that our splendid Motherland would develop even further, and the cause of peace would win," or "I voted for peace and the flowering of our great Soviet Motherland."²³ Thus the vast array of propaganda media attempts to bend

¹⁷ For example, a milling machine operator in Ivanovo was turned down by the collective of the measuring instruments factory because he "didn't share his experience with other workers," and another worker in another locale was refused nomination because of "an incorrect attitude toward criticism." See M. Tarasov, "K itogam vyborov v mestnye sovery," *Partiinaya zhizn'*, No. 5, 1957.

¹⁸ See Mote, *op. cit.*, p. 35, for a description based upon personal observation.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

²⁰ From data in *Pravda*, March 26, 1967.

²¹ See *Polozhenie . . .*, p. 10.

²² Carson, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

²³ *Turkmenskaia iskra*, March 16, 1965.

the attention of the voter away from local issues—and real potential grievances—and toward the ultimate question of loyalty to the regime and “Soviet patriotism.” In other words, the regime attempts to remove issues from the elections entirely. This is done not only by a propaganda campaign and by choosing model, “non-controversial” candidates, but also by a positive attempt to satisfy local grievances in advance of election day. Thousands of “agitators” are sent out to explain the causes of past deficiencies, laud past accomplishments and promise all sorts of future improvements in local living conditions.²⁴

The reason for this emphasis is not hard to discover. The Soviet voter has been molded in a political environment which permits the voicing of dissent *exclusively* on local issues, on issues that essentially involve the implementation by local officials of policies decided at higher levels. Thus if these issues of local implementation were thrust into the forefront of the election campaign, there is every reason to suspect that the negative vote, and the number of defeated local candidates, would rise sharply. This is particularly true of certain regions where the local party and state organizations have been thoroughly roasted in the official press for shortcomings in past performance. In a country still far short of Utopia, still displaying its full share of corruption and mismanagement, it is still necessary to make each vote against every last officially-sponsored candidate a vote of “no confidence” in the entire regime, and thus a potentially traitorous act.

By this means, the regime attempts to remove elections entirely from the area of limited grievances and to make it a simple test of allegiance to the system. The Soviet voter, in effect, is told to seek redress of his grievances through other administrative channels, and at election time to stand and be counted on the ultimate issue of loyalty. Soviet propagandists make the point that on certain local issues “all the instructions of the voters are collected after the election, and measures are taken to carry them out.”²⁵ It is quite clear, however, that such “instructions” are communicated to the candidates informally, and are in no way, either in theory or in practice, connected with the act of voting.

²⁴ See, for example, the article, “Razgovor byl interesen,” *Sovetskaia Estoniia*, March 3, 1965.

²⁵ N. G. Starovoitov, *Poriadok organizatsii i provedeniia vyborov v verkhovnye sovery soiuzykh i avtonomnykh respublik i v mestnye sovery deputatov trudiashchikhsia* (Moscow, 1963), p. 76.

But what of the negative voter? Is he, by reverse logic, dissenting against the entire Soviet system when he crosses out the name of the “bloc” candidate on the ballot? Some Western observers, such as Mote, make this simple reversal: “If casting a vote on election day is a sign of support of the regime, then not casting a vote is a sign of opposition.”²⁶ Unfortunately, the matter is not quite so simple. It cannot be assumed that all negative votes and abstentions are expressions of total rejection of the system. These negative votes may also express disapproval of the particular candidates, or local grievances, or personal grievances (resulting from bureaucratic bungling, being passed over for job promotion, etc.), or crankiness, or eccentricity, or even frivolity. Finally, such a negative vote may actually express genuine antagonism to the values of the regime or its basic structure, but this is only one possibility which must be weighed with the others. Some Soviet voters simply may not heed the warnings of the regime that voting is a test of loyalty, and not a means of expressing particularized dissent. They may derive psychological satisfactions from negative voting; they may be deluded into thinking that positive results will issue from this act, or they may simply take Soviet propaganda at face value when statements are made that “the electoral system in the U.S.S.R. shows that constitutional principles combined with practical guarantees ensure genuine democracy and respect for the rights of citizens.”²⁷

As this quotation from a typical Soviet source indicates, the dissenting voter does have some support from official Soviet doctrine. The question of elections illustrates the basic ambivalence of current Soviet ideology, which stands athwart two contrary notions of human society and personality. On the one hand, there is the commitment to the model of the conflictless social monolith, and its assumption that there is a single “correct” answer to every problem to which all will agree, once their basic interests are harmonized by the removal of classes. On the other, there is the idea of “the free development of the individual human personality,” with its assumptions of great creativity and variety of expression. The two principles are not miscible, despite the vigorous efforts of Soviet ideologists to shake up a single solution. As we have already seen, Soviet elections contain elements of both principles, the idea of the monolithic plebiscite

²⁶ Mote, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

²⁷ A. Gorshenev and I. Cheliapov, *Sovetskaia izbiratel'naia sistema* (Moscow, 1959), p. 5.

on the one hand, and the legal provisions for secret ballots, several competing candidates, and run-off elections on the other. Even though the heavy emphasis in the propaganda—especially in the press—is on the plebiscite theme, the knowledgeable Soviet dissenter can take refuge in the contrary, thoroughly respectable concept of Soviet ideology if he wishes. This is especially important since he would most likely justify his negative vote in terms of the inadequate qualifications of the particular candidate. This interpretation of his negative vote would be unanimously seconded by the learned Soviet experts on ideology. In explaining why some candidates are defeated in local elections, two such experts write:

This act [i.e., defeat of a candidate] is only evidence of the high activism of the voters and of the fact that the public organizations and meetings obviously made a mistake when they nominated the candidate. The mistake has been corrected. As a result of new elections in all such areas, other deputies will be elected.²⁸

Thus the dissenter could conceivably relate his negative vote to his high sense of public responsibility and "activism" when confronted with a "mistake" of the nominating organizations.

In any case, one need not accept the interpretation that all negative votes are anti-regime votes in order to conclude that the phenomenon bears closer investigation than has been accorded it in the past. In the absence of opinion polls, we cannot determine the distribution of dissenting views, but the existence of electoral data does permit some analysis of the location of dissent and the frequency of its expression through the ballot.

II. MEASURING DISSENT

The present study of electoral returns is restricted to the biennial elections for the local soviets. There are two reasons for this approach: the reported data are more complete and detailed for these elections, and the relative closeness of these soviets to local issues, and of the candidates to the electors, makes the dissenting vote in these elections more interesting and significant. As already mentioned, the Soviet regime is more permissive toward localized dissent than toward dissent on national issues, and the Soviet voter has consequently become depoliticized on the larger issues. Furthermore, even though negative votes are registered in elections for the all-union Supreme Soviet and the Supreme

TABLE 1. MEAN SIZE OF ELECTORAL UNITS,
U.S.S.R., 1967*

Unit	Registered Voters Per Unit
<i>krai</i>	1,603,717
<i>oblast'</i>	887,946
<i>city raion</i>	89,566
<i>okrug</i>	53,861
<i>city</i>	41,895
<i>raion</i>	26,477
<i>poselok</i>	3,767
<i>selo</i>	1,525

* Data calculated from *Pravda*, March 26, 1967.

Soviets of the republics, the candidates for these soviets are relatively remote from the voter and their qualifications are generally of a higher, more irreproachable level than the local candidates. In fact, as we shall see from the data, the frequency of dissent is inversely related to the size of the electoral unit when other factors are held constant.

As indicated in Table 1, the size of the electoral units is extremely variable in local elections. The average *krai*, with more than 1.6 million voters can hardly be considered a unit of "local" representation at all, especially since these units are generally vast and sparsely populated. On the other hand, the *selo* (village) unit is more than 100 times smaller than the *krai*, and can be considered truly local in character. The *poselok* (settlement), with almost four thousand electors, can also be counted as a local unit. It is a peculiarity of Soviet electoral organization that such small units are found only in rural areas, for the smallest unit of urban voters (the city soviet) numbers approximately forty thousand.²⁹

Two kinds of information reported in the Soviet press are useful for analysis of dissent: the number of negative voters and absentees, and the number of defeated candidates. Since it is virtually impossible to miss voting by accident, only design or sheer physical incapacitation can account for absenteeism.³⁰ In fact, the vote-getting machine is so marvel-

²⁹ The city *raion* is found only in relatively large cities, which are subdivided. This explains the fact that they have, on average, considerably more voters than the city soviets.

³⁰ It should be added that those who happen to be away from home on election day receive a "Certificate of the Right to Vote," which they can exchange for ballots at any polling place in the Soviet Union.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

ously efficient that in the Tadzhikistan *raion* elections of 1957, 1961, 1963 and 1965, with over 400,000 registered voters, not a single lonely Tadzhik absented himself from the polls. Because of this rather awe-inspiring organization, one can assume that in the vast majority of cases, absenteeism is the result of purposeful abstention—one must be an artful dodger, and not merely absent-minded!

Thus it seems reasonable to add the number of absentees to the number of negative voters as an indication of total dissent expressed through the ballot. Since this information is given for the various administrative units shown in Table 1, and since it is given separately for each union republic in the union-republic newspapers, a useful basis of comparison can be established. This figure, expressed as a percentage of the total registered voters for the various units will be termed the Individual Dissent Index (IDI), since it is essentially a measure of *individual* negative choices, made presumably without communication or discussion with others. It represents the acts of a small minority, engulfed in an atmosphere of conformity.

The other piece of published information, the number of defeated candidates, leads to a rather different analysis. The data reveal that candidates are *never* defeated in any but local elections, and that even in local elections candidates are defeated only in the smaller electoral units. In fact, 98.2 percent of all defeated candidates in the elections studied systematically (1957, 1961, 1963 and 1965) were from the smallest electoral units, the *selo* and *poselok*. There was not a single recorded instance in the elections studied of a defeated candidate in any unit larger than the city soviet. This is certainly not the result of increased pressure on the voter in balloting for larger units. In order for a candidate to be defeated, he must receive less than a majority of the votes cast, and under Soviet conditions this can occur only in small, relatively cohesive and relatively isolated communities. Only in a small, cohesive community could there be sufficient communication of the dissenting view prior to the election to assure each voter that he would actually be a member of the *majority* by voting "no." Only as a majoritarian could he be absolutely assured of being counted as an "activist" who corrected a "mistake" of the nominating organizations. Only in an isolated community, far from the party-state control levers, could discussion be open enough to achieve a dissenting consensus. Thus the published information on defeated candidates serves as a measure of *group* dissent rather than individual

dissent in the Soviet Union. Since the different units and republics elect vastly different numbers of deputies, a convenient unit of comparison would be the number of successful candidates for each defeated candidate, which we shall call the Group Dissent Index (GDI). As one might expect, this number in all cases is quite large, for the defeated candidate is a rather rare animal in the Soviet Union, generally representing less than .001 percent of all candidates in any given election.

These two indices are readily obtainable from published Soviet data and provide excellent measures of comparison for two different types of dissent: the dissent of the individual nonconformist surrounded by conformity, and the dissent of the small, cohesive group against the local authorities. The two indices are almost completely independent, for the votes cast against the defeated candidates form a very small proportion (less than one percent) of the total negative vote. In adjudging the reasons for individual dissent, the full range of possibilities already discussed must be considered. The IDI is important as an over-all measure of dissent on all levels in the Soviet Union. Group dissent, because of its rarity and its heavy concentration in small, rural communities of the RSFSR, is not as useful as a comparative measure of dissent in different areas of the Soviet Union—for example, in three elections studied, the Turkmenian and Tadzhik Republics did not report a single defeated candidate—but it does provide us with a clearer picture of a particular type of dissent, based on a consensus opposed to local conditions or candidates.

The two indices can be compared both statically (eliminating the time dimension by averaging results from different areas or electoral units over a period of years) and through time (by following trends shown in successive elections). Because of limitations of data, nine of the fifteen union republics of the U.S.S.R., representing 89.2 percent of its population, have been included.³¹ Complete data for calculation of the IDI were reported by the Soviet press only for the local elections of 1957, 1961 and 1965, although data on defeated candidates have been reported for all local elections.³²

³¹ Data for the missing republics (Armenia, Azerbaidzhan, Georgia, Kirgizia, Moldavia, Uzbekistan) were not readily available or were not completely reported in the local press for one or more elections.

³² Curiously enough, when local elections coincide with elections for the republic supreme soviets—a situation which occurs every four

Static Analysis. A quite revealing comparison can be made of variations of IDI among the nine union republics studied. Table 2 shows the average IDI of the nine republics for three elections, and reveals a striking difference in the amount of dissent registered by the voters in differing areas. Although the republics in general are distinguished by differing national cultures, large-scale population movements of past decades have complicated the picture. Particularly in some of the smaller republics, the in-flow of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians has tended to dilute the distinctive national culture of the area.³³ Nevertheless, national differences do remain, and the borders of the union republics can still be taken as approximate lines of division between different peoples.

As shown in Table 2, Estonians are significantly more likely to be dissenters—at least at election time—than any of the other national groups. One can easily relate this opposition sentiment to Estonia's troubled times in the recent past, its brief period of independence, forced entry into the Soviet Union during the Second World War, and Stalin's post-war repressions and the settlement of many ethnic Russians in Estonia. One would be satisfied with this explanation were it not for the fact that the Lithuanians, who for the most part shared the Estonians' fate, indicate very little dissent at election time. This difference in frequency of dissent can only be explained by a careful study of contemporary conditions in the two neighboring republics, a subject beyond the scope of this essay.

Another result which bears some discussion is the high IDI for the Russian Republic. It must be kept in mind that the Russian Republic, which stretches from the Baltic to the Pacific, and contains more than half the population of the Soviet Union, also contains many non-Russian nationality groups living quite remote from the power centers in Moscow and Leningrad. All indications are that these groups, and the Russians who have settled in the austere new towns of the Siberian plains, contribute more than their share to the amount of dissent shown in Russian Republic elections.

The average GDI for the union republics

years—the press reports only incomplete data. One explanation might be that the subject of elections is allocated a fixed amount of scarce Soviet newsprint regardless of the number of elections held.

³³ For example, the Kazakh people contribute only 30 percent of Kazakhstan's population, and the Kirgiz form only 40.5 percent of Kirgizia, according to the last census (1959).

TABLE 2. MEAN IDI BY UNION REPUBLIC, ELECTIONS OF 1957, 1961 AND 1965*

Republic	Mean IDI (%)
Estonia	1.18
RSFSR	0.86
Kazakhstan	0.55
Latvia	0.44
Turkmenistan	0.32
Belorussia	0.29
Ukraine	0.27
Lithuania	0.25
Tadzhikistan	0.21

* Sources:
Sovetskaia Rossiia, March 19, 1965; March 12, 1961; March 8, 1957
Pravda Ukrainy, March 20, 1965; March 10, 1961; March 7, 1957
Sovetskaia Belorussia, March 19, 1965; March 24, 1961; March 7, 1957
Kazakhstanskaia pravda, March 20, 1965; March 11, 1961;
Alma-Atinskaia pravda, March 14, 1957
Turkmenskaia iskra, March 19, 1965; March 9, 1961; March 7, 1957
Kommunist Tadzhikistana, March 20, 1965; March 17, 1961; March 7, 1957
Sovetskaia Litva, March 26, 1965; March 9, 1961; March 7, 1957
Sovetskaia Latvija, March 20, 1965; March 22, 1961; March 14, 1957
Sovetskaia Estonija, March 26, 1965; March 22, 1961; March 15, 1957

during these years is shown in Table 3. Three republics, the RSFSR, Estonia, and Latvia show markedly less reticence in defeating candidates than the others, and these three republics also score high in individual dissent as shown in Table 2. Over-all, the rank-order correlation of GDI and IDI for the nine republics is +0.62. Kazakhstan's pattern of relatively high IDI and low GDI fits very well the picture of a district which has seen a large influx of young people (during Khrushchev's Virgin Lands program) who have subsequently become disillusioned but who have not yet established solidary groups. This hypothesis is supported by the figures, which indicate a rather high level of dissent manifested almost exclusively through individual action.

Another method of comparison has been used to determine if any significant differences exist between urban and rural areas, and between large and small electoral units, in the

TABLE 3. MEAN GDI BY UNION REPUBLIC,
ELECTIONS OF 1957, 1961, 1963,
AND 1965*

Republic	Mean GDI
RSFSR.....	6630
Estonia.....	7353
Latvia.....	8022
Lithuania.....	11220
Belorussia.....	12117
Ukraine.....	28120
Kazakhstan.....	28629
Turkmenistan.....	—**
Tadzhikistan.....	—**
Mean (above nine republics).....	8344

* For sources see Table 2

** No defeated candidates reported in three elections

Note: High numerical values of GDI indicate low incidence of dissent.

expression of electoral dissent. In this study three types of electoral units were compared: large urban (city soviet), large rural (*raion* soviet), and small rural (*selo* and *poselok* soviets). The IDI's for each of these units were aggregated for all nine republics, with the results shown in Table 4.

The results indicate that individual dissent is highest in urban areas, which might indicate a weak Soviet reflection of the urban malaise that has afflicted other industrial or industrializing nations. Another interesting result is that small rural units show considerably more dissent than large rural units, *even though for the most part the same voters are involved in both cases*. This means that there are thousands of rural voters who cast their ballots for their *raion* candidate, and at the same time vote against their local candidate. Thus the evidence supports the hypothesis that rural voters are more likely to voice their discontent over

TABLE 4. MEAN IDI FOR DIFFERENT ELECTORAL
UNITS, NINE REPUBLICS, ELECTIONS OF 1957,
1961, 1965, AND 1967*

Electoral Unit	IDI (%)
Large urban	0.75
Small rural	0.64
Large rural	0.48

* Data in *Pravda*, March 26, 1967 permit this calculation, but not comparison by republic. For other sources, see Table 2.

TABLE 5. ABSENTEEISM AS A PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL NEGATIVE CHOICES

Electoral Unit	Absenteeism (%)
Large urban	11.3
Large rural	7.9
Small rural	5.9

local conditions than over larger, "political" issues.

Table 5 gives a further indication of differences between urban and rural voting patterns. The results clearly show that the urban voter is more likely to show his opposition by staying away from the polls than the rural voter. It is plausible to conclude that the difference lies not so much in the psychology of the voters, but in the increased opportunities for evasion that are provided by the mass concentration of voters in the cities. The rural voter might be just as apathetic, but he is organized in smaller, more self-contained groups making escape more difficult. This conclusion is given added support by the fact that in rural areas, absenteeism is higher for the large units than for the small units, even though the large units have a lower IDI.

Comparison of urban and rural units for indications of group dissent shows, as already mentioned, that this phenomenon is almost exclusively found in rural areas. Of 910 candidates defeated in five local elections (1957, 1961, 1963, 1965, 1967) throughout the U.S.S.R., only ten were candidates for city soviets. The fact that defeated urban candidates represent only 1.1 percent of all defeated candidates is directly related to the size of urban and rural electoral units, as shown in Table 6. It is quite apparent that on the aver-

TABLE 6. MEAN NUMBER OF ELECTORS FOR EACH
CANDIDATE, U.S.S.R., 1967*

Candidate for:	Mean Number of Electors
<i>krai</i> soviet	5432
<i>oblast'</i> soviet	4355
<i>okrug</i> soviet	571
<i>raion</i> soviet	339
city soviet	328
city <i>raion</i> soviet	430
<i>poselok</i> soviet	68
<i>selo</i> soviet	48

* Calculated from data in *Pravda*, March 26, 1967

age it would take only a bare majority of 48 voters to defeat a candidate for the smallest rural unit (*selo*), while it would take a majority of 328 voters to defeat a candidate for the smallest urban unit. If the hypothesis is correct that pre-election communication of dissent among the voters is required to defeat a candidate, it would follow that the process would be much more difficult in a group of over three hundred than in a group of less than fifty. In addition, the urban group is far less likely to have developed the necessary group solidarity because of the greater fluidity of movement in the urban environment.

Based upon the record of past local elections, then, one can draw the following general conclusions about voting patterns and dissent in the Soviet Union:

1. *The amount of individual dissent indicated in elections is inversely related to the size of the electoral unit.* The Soviet voter is more likely to dissent against local conditions than against policies of wider importance. In this attitude, he reflects the values of the regime, which permits criticism of local implementation, but not of national policies.

2. *There is more individual dissent in the cities than in the countryside.* This may be the result of the greater education, "sophistication," and diversity of the urban population in comparison with the peasantry of the villages.

3. *There is far more group dissent in the countryside than in the cities.* This clearly demonstrated phenomenon can be related to the greater solidarity, cohesiveness and isolation of rural groups, as well as the much smaller size of the minimal rural electoral units (*selo* and *poselok* soviets). It is probably true, however, that this rural group dissent is not directed toward politically significant issues.

4. *Opportunities for abstention from voting are greater in the cities than in the countryside.* This conclusion, which emerges from the data on urban and rural absenteeism, is based on the assumption that absentees are for the most part willfully abstaining.

5. *There is significantly more individual and group dissent in the Russian Republic (RSFSR) and Estonia (followed closely by Latvia and Kazakhstan) than in the other republics studied.*

Trend Analysis. Some very interesting and quite unexpected results were obtained from analysis of trends in Soviet voting during the past ten years. As shown in Figure 1, there has been a general and steady decline in electoral dissent over the past decade in both urban and rural areas. This would seem to contradict the expectation that with increased liberalization of Soviet society, with the growth of diversity

and stratification of the population and with loosening of controls over political expression, there would be an increase in nonconformity and diversity of opinions. This cherished idea—or perhaps hope—need not be discarded on the "garbage heap of history," as Trotsky was wont to say, if we recall the previous conclusion that most negative voting throughout the Soviet Union is probably based on economic and local issues rather than on "purely political" issues of national policy. In this case, the decrease in negative voting can be related to the general improvement in living conditions which has occurred in the Soviet Union in the past ten years. As already suggested, the typical dissenting voter has probably resisted the regime's heavy-handed invitation to vote on the ultimate issue of loyalty to communism, and has instead cast his "*Nyet*" as a little reminder that he hadn't been pleased with the last pay raise, or the increase in food prices, or the lack of adequate recreation facilities in his village. Students of American voting habits will realize that this is far from a frivolous or fanciful explanation of voting behavior.³⁴ It is far less fanciful under Soviet conditions, where the government, if not each candidate, is clearly and wholly responsible for the economic problems that trouble the souls of Soviet voters. A corollary explanation would be that the increased liberalization of Soviet society has opened up more effective channels for the communication of moderately dissenting views and grievances than existed in the past, and that some negative voters have abandoned an act they always knew was more symbolic than effective, and taken advantage of those new channels that can achieve demonstrable results.

The general pattern of decline in individual dissent is repeated in all the union republics studied (see Figure 2), except Tadzhikistan, Kazakhstan and Latvia, which show a slight to moderate increase. A roughly comparable decline in group dissent is indicated in Table 7, although the poor agricultural conditions of trade in 1961 resulted in a sharp increase in group dissent (i.e., lower GDI) during the election of that year. The general decrease of rural group dissent can be ascribed to well-known improvements in the conditions on the collective farms. The effects of the Brezhnev-Kosygin "new deal" for agriculture, announced in March 1965, may possibly be related to the

³⁴ See Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), pp. 393-401.




FIG. 1. Decline in IDI by Electoral Unit 1957-1967




FIG. 2. IDI by Union Republic 1957-1965

TABLE 7. U.S.S.R. AVERAGE GDI FOR FOUR
LOCAL ELECTIONS

Year	Average GDI
1957	9278
1961	7316
1965	9664
1967	15855

marked decline in rural group dissent shown (in Table 7) for 1967.

III. CONCLUSIONS

If our hypothesis is correct that increased liberalization of Soviet society, and the general improvement in living conditions results in a decreased use of elections as a vehicle for the expression of dissent, the study of Soviet elections might prove to be a less rewarding enterprise in future years. On the other hand, there is the possibility that in the long run the idea of an election as a choice between alternatives could make some headway. It is not altogether unreasonable to suggest the possibility that:

Russians are being educated in the procedures of modern elections, and some day in the future may be allowed a choice of candidates on election day. . . . Certainly there can be no argument that the legal machinery for elections on western European or American lines is all present. Not a word of the present laws would need to be changed.³⁵

Even this prospect, however, should be treated with caution. It is not enough to offer "a choice of candidates on election day," if these candidates are all hand-picked selections of a single ruling party. This sort of system has been used in Poland without producing any notable increase in the democratic content of Polish politics.³⁶

The Soviet regime has not permitted even this limited choice, and has chosen to emphasize the ceremonial aspects and the theme of social unity. As a result it has had to face the

inevitable consequence of social apathy. The long-term problem is that Soviet elections in their present form present a basic contradiction between structure and function. The structure of Soviet elections in its formal aspect conforms to the functional requirements of a contested election between candidates representing differentiable alternatives. The function of Soviet elections at present, however, is to symbolize mass patriotism and allegiance through a day-long public ceremony. The contradiction is not subtle, and one can assume that it is recognized by many Soviet citizens. By ritualizing the elections, the regime has removed the element of uncertainty and drama which make elections intrinsically interesting, even when the choices offered to the electorate are not. But when choices are not even offered, excitement disappears, and the regime must struggle mightily with pen and loudspeaker to generate enthusiasm.

Under such circumstances, one could imagine two possible alternatives to the present system: the Soviet authorities could eliminate elections entirely, or they could permit a limited choice between pre-selected candidates, as in Poland. The first choice could be easily justified in ideological terms, under the assumption that the stage of pure communism is being approached; it would save money and time, and it would remove the patent ambiguity of the present electoral practices. Still, the regime would lose the positive symbolic benefits, and the citizen's commitment-through-action that the elections provide. The second choice might therefore seem more advantageous since it would retain the symbolic and active supportive elements and at the same time permit a competitive—and possibly even interesting—campaign based on the qualifications of the candidates.

One suspects, however, that the most likely future for Soviet elections will be a continuation of the present. They have become entrenched through time as a symbol of regime legitimacy, and as the Soviet regime passes its fiftieth anniversary, it seems more reluctant than ever to tamper with such symbolic institutions. Although Soviet elections do not create much excitement, they still provide a splendid opportunity for the regime to test its mobilization powers, and to prove to the world—and to itself—that it can make just about every able-bodied adult in the Soviet Union perform a useless task at a prescribed time and place—and do it with a smile! But as long as it does this, the few scowling faces in the crowd will provide us with some useful information on dissent in the Soviet Union.

³⁵ Carson, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

³⁶ See B. A. Strashun, *Izbitatel'noe pravo sotsialisticheskikh gosudarstv* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 175-76; Hansjakob Stehle, *The Independent Satellite: Society and Politics in Poland since 1945* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 183-189; and Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Elections and Voting Behavior in Poland," *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics*, ed. Austin Ranney (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 235-251.

SOVIET ELITE PARTICIPATORY ATTITUDES IN THE POST-STALIN PERIOD*

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This paper, part of a larger study, is a comparative analysis of five Soviet elites—the central Party *apparatchiki*, and four specialist elites: the central economic bureaucrats, the military, the literary intelligentsia, and the legal profession. By content analyzing representative periodicals for each elite, data are collected on elite attitudes toward participation in the political system. The overall goal is to gain a measure of the direction and scope of Soviet elite attitudinal change since Stalin; more specifically, (1) to measure the extent to which the elites perceive themselves as participants in the policy-making process, (2) to determine whether the elites perceive their participatory role as expanding over time, and (3) to demark changing patterns of Party-specialist elite relations from 1952–65.

To ground this study in a theoretical framework, analytical categories and hypotheses—derived in part from Brzezinski and Huntington's *Political Power: USA/USSR*—are formulated to test the perceived extent of elite participation in the Soviet political process.¹ Synoptically, models of political systems may be built by reducing to essentials the mode of interaction between the regime and society. A key variable in analyzing this interaction between superstructure and base is the role and efficacy of societal groups in influencing policy formation and implementation. Following this tack a descriptive continuum may be set up for classifying political systems. At one end of the continuum are ideological systems (e.g., the

USSR), at the other “instrumental” systems (e.g., the United States). In instrumental systems the relationship between the political and social system is characterized by “access and interaction.” In an ideological political system—with totalitarianism at the polar extreme—social groups are infiltrated, controlled, manipulated, and denied effective participation in the political process.

Brzezinski, along with a growing number of Western scholars, notes some degree of Soviet systemic change over time, arguing that the central Party apparatus—still dominant in policy-making and implementation—is being forced to tolerate greater elite participation in the political process. The extent to which the specialist elites perceive themselves and are perceived by the other elites as participants is the focal point of this study and the major variable in determining the degree of systemic change along the continuum toward a less ideological political system.

The ideological-instrumental continuum may be graphically portrayed as a five-point scale ranging from perceived Party dominance on the ideological side of the continuum to perceived specialist elite participation at the instrumental end of the continuum, with 3.0 representing joint, relatively equal, Party-specialist elite participation. The analytical categories are comparably scaled and designed to generate data suitable for plotting elite attitudes on the continuum.

The scaled positions within the participatory categories are:

- 1.0 Party participation solely
 - 2.0 Party participation primarily
 - 3.0 Joint Party-specialist elite participation
 - 4.0 Specialist elite participation primarily
 - 5.0 Specialist elite participation solely
- (See Figure 1.)

In this hypothetical situation the Soviet political system is Party-dominant—all the elites are participating within the ideological parameters (1.0–2.9) of the political arena. Instrumentality—operationally defined as specialist elite participation in the political process—would characterize the political system if specialist scores were in the 3.0–5.0 range.

Within the Party's espoused values for the “transition to communism” the knowledge and

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¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: Viking Press, 1964), Pt. I.




Fig. 1. Ideological-Instrumental Continuum.

skills of specialists, it is reasoned, are indispensable. "No single strategic elite," writes Suzanne Keller, "can today know all there is to be known, and none can perform all the functions involved in social leadership."² If it is true that the Party and specialists are becoming increasingly interdependent, what, from the Party's perspective, would be the ideal Party-specialist relationship? Ruling out either polar extreme as systemically dysfunctional, a tentative "mix" may be a mini-max position in which the maximum degree of specialist participation is tolerable which still allows for Party dominance in the policy and decision making arena. With 3.0 corresponding to relatively equal Party-Specialist participation, the Party's optimal position would be in the 2.5-2.9 range where the Party could capitalize on specialist elite participation without surrendering control.

I. RESEARCH METHOD

Western analyses of Soviet politics must, of necessity, rely heavily on published sources. Both the totalitarian and Kremlinological models typically portray Soviet communication channels as being monopolistically controlled by the central Party *apparatus*. Rejecting both approaches, this project is premised on the assumption that Soviet specialist elites—due to their strategic role in society—enjoy sufficient leeway in the system to articulate a range of beliefs and values in their specialist journals.

Soviet spokesman grudgingly acknowledge

² *Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society* (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 70; the five elites in this study generally conform to Keller's concept of strategic elites and fulfill the expectation that elite participation will increase over time.

and Western analyses have demonstrated that specialist journals are vehicles for the limited articulation of elite attitudes.³ Representing a functional sphere of activity in the political system, specialist journals primarily perform an *instrumental* role—authors, as experts, elaborate on policies within their sphere of competence, suggest ways and means for improving implementation, mobilize support, and most important of all, criticize shortcomings. The overwhelming majority of sampled articles are achievement oriented, that is, are chiefly concerned with questions of how best to fulfill the plan, increase efficiency, and overcome weaknesses.

Within this orientation authors are predominantly concerned with specifics: a manager of a textile factory in Petropavlosk argues that Party interference in the running of the plant resulted in decreased production; a Marshal complains that criticism of company com-

³ Soviet references to this problem are numerous. See, e.g., the authoritative editorial titled "Concerning Discussions in Scholarly Journals," in *Kommunist*, No. 7, 1955, which, after stating that Marxism-Leninism must be the "essential" framework within which specialist discussion should take place, bemoans the fact that scholarly articles "often" by-pass Party formulas and all too frequently attempt "to reverse fundamental theses of the Party." For a general discussion of the increasing leeway for instrumental criticism in the post-Stalin period, see Sidney Ploss, *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). A quantitative analysis comparing Soviet elite values manifested in journals is found in Robert Angell's "Social Values of Soviet and American Elites," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 8 (December, 1964), 330-385.

manders at Party meetings undermines the officer's authority and reduces troop morale; a jurist warns that a Central Committee decree calling for the exemplary punishment of "parasites" undercuts the Party's campaign to strengthen socialist law; Tvardovsky, editor-in-chief of *Novy mir*, favorably comments on "truthfulness" in literature, while Khrushchev rails against the young writers' emphasis on "decadent" themes. In sum, although specialist journals are rarely vehicles for an open and direct confrontation with the Party, specialist attitudes are articulated through instrumental proposals and criticisms—within the Party's espoused values of productivity, efficiency, and "communism"—without overtly challenging the Party's role in policy integration. In the Soviet context, rejection of the Party's integrative role is opposition, elite participation in the formulation and implementation of specific policies is politics. Direct opposition is rare, politics is ubiquitous. With the decline of terror in the post-Stalin period controversies are no longer zero-sum games.

By content analyzing articles in specialist elite journals and aggregating the frequencies of occurrence, elite attitudinal trends may be compared. Categories are formulated and data collected on elite beliefs—who is described as actually making decisions), and elite values (preferences on who *should* make decisions). The resultant analysis of elite beliefs and values yields a measure of attitudinal trends toward a more participatory, less ideological, political system. All references to elite participation therefore refer to attitudinal, not actual, participation and may be treated as *indicators* of systemic change.

The Elites. For each elite, "representative" periodical(s) were selected for content analysis:

The Central Party Apparatus	<i>Kommunist</i> (Communist) <i>Partiinaya zhizn</i> (Party Life)
The Economic Elite	<i>Voprosy ekonomiki</i> (Problems of Economics) <i>Ekonomicheskaya gazeta</i> (Economic gazette)
The Military	<i>Krasnaya zvezda</i> (Red Star)
The Legal Profession	<i>Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo</i> (Soviet State and Law) <i>Sovetskaya yustitsia</i> (Soviet Justice)
The Literary Elite	<i>Oktyabr</i> (October) <i>Literaturnaya gazeta</i> (Literary Gazette) <i>Novy mir</i> (New World)

The Sample. To satisfy the definitional re-

quirement of objectivity in content analysis systematic sampling procedures are required.

I. The unit of analysis is the article. Articles in the sample were chosen from the periodicals on the basis of a quota sample. The issues from each periodical were selected at intervals so as to cover the entire year and avoid the inclusion of any one period, e.g., avoiding every December issue of journals or Monday issue of newspapers. From the selected issue only the lead article, the first signed article, was coded. (In newspapers the lead article is the first signed article in the upper left hand corner of page two.)

II. The unit of enumeration, what is being coded and counted, is the major theme of a paragraph. When clearly articulating one position in one category, the major theme could be coded once and only once.

III. The size of the sample is equal for each elite each year, 600 paragraphs per elite for each of the eight sampled years—1952, 1953, 1955, 1957, 1959, 1961, 1963, and 1965—a yearly sample of 3,000 paragraphs (600 paragraphs $\times$ 5 elites) for a total study sample of 24,000 paragraphs (3,000 paragraphs per year $\times$ 8 years).

Categories and Hypotheses. The categories, or value dimensions, are designed to generate data on Soviet elite attitudes toward the policy-making and decision-making process. Policy-making is operationally distinguished from decision-making in terms of the policy decision's impact on society. Policy-making entails decisions which affect a) the entire USSR, or b) one or more republics. Decision-making refers to policies affecting any one administrative unit below the republic level, e.g., a region, territory, district, factory or farm. Thus a decision affecting all collective farms in a republic is operationally defined as policy-making, while a decision affecting a specific collective is defined as decision-making.

Reliability. Reliability tests were administered to establish a presumption of objectivity. Twenty-five percent of all sampled articles were recoded by a second coder working independently of the first. The articles included in the reliability test were selected by means of an "accidental sample," i.e., chosen randomly for each journal each year. The formula for testing reliability is:

$$\frac{\text{Total number of agreements}}{\text{Total number of paragraphs in the article}} = \text{percentage of reliability}$$

The total study reliability is statistically significant at 89.4 percent.

TABLE 1. ELITE PERCEPTIONS OF THE POLICY-MAKING ARENA, 1952-1965

Elites	Policy-Making is the Responsibility of								
	1.0 the Party leadership solely	2.0 the Party leadership primarily	3.0 both the Party and specialist participating	4.0 the specialists primarily	5.0 the specialists solely ^a				
	1952	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	All Years
Party	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.4	2.9	2.7	1.7	2.3	2.1
Economic	.000	2.5	2.3	1.5	3.2	3.0	2.8	3.6	2.5
Legal	.000	1.3	2.3	2.9	1.7	4.0	2.5	3.8	2.7
Military	(1.8) ^b	(1.6)	1.6	1.3	.000	2.2	3.3	2.7	2.1
Literary	1.8	1.0	1.8	2.9	2.4	2.0	2.5	3.1	2.3
All Elites	1.8	1.6	1.9	2.1	2.5	2.6	2.7	3.2	2.4
Specialists	1.8	1.6	1.9	2.1	2.4	2.8	2.8	3.3	2.4

F(33,106) = 3.089, significant at .001

^a An example of position 5.0, taken from the illustrative material used in training the coders, is: The formation of our military world view has taken place in a creative atmosphere . . . and is the result of the common effort of military theorists and practical military people. Thanks to this, we have developed a body of unified theory on the basis of which a broad state program has been carried out to prepare the country and armed forces for the defense of the Fatherland. *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 10 (May 1962), p. 12.

^b Data for the military were unavailable for 1952 and 1953. The mean score for all elites was assigned the military for these years and noted within the brackets.

II. ELITE PARTICIPATORY ATTITUDES IN THE POST-STALIN POLITICAL SYSTEM

The Soviet political system—when conceived as an ideological system—is characterized by central Party apparat dominance in the political arena.

I. ON POLICY MAKING

Hypothesis I: Over time the specialist elites increasingly describe themselves as participants in the policy-making process.

In operational terms Party primacy will be reflected in mean scores of 1.0-2.9 on Category I—Who is Responsible for Policy-Making?—while higher, participatory scores of 3.0-5.0 in the later years would support the hypothesis that the policy-making process is becoming less ideological over time (Table 1).

The general trend is toward increased specialist elite participation in the policy-making arena. Note, for example, the gradual, rather steady increase in Specialist scores from 1953 onward, culminating in 1965 with an instrumental score of 3.3. While the thrust toward greater specialist elite participation is significant, the trend is uneven for each of the individual elites. A zig-zag course is the character-

istic pattern, perhaps best described by the un-Leninist notion of *two steps forward one step back*. For the specialist elites, reversals are typically followed by a resurgence which marks an advance beyond the previous low. This dysrhythmic process is a common phenomenon on all the categories and, as will be shown, is a function of Party-specialist elite conflict.

By dividing the eight sampled years into two equal periods, 1952-57 and 1959-65 overall participatory trends are more readily illustrated (Table 2).

TABLE 2. ELITE PERCEPTIONS OF THE POLICY-MAKING ARENA, 1952-57 to 1959-65

Elites	1952-57	1959-65	% Change
Party	1.8	2.4	+33%
Economic	1.9	3.3	+74%
Legal	2.4	2.9	+21%
Military	1.6	2.3	+44%
Literary	1.9	2.7	+42%
All Elites	1.9	2.7	+42%
Specialists	1.9	2.8	+47%

With a 47% Specialist increase in 1959-65 over the earlier period, hypothesis I is supported—

TABLE 3. ELITE VALUES TOWARD PARTICIPATION IN THE POLICY-MAKING ARENA, 1952-1965

Elites	Policy-Making <i>Should</i> Be The Responsibility Of								
	1.0 the Party leadership solely	2.0 the Party leadership primarily	3.0 both the Party and specialists participating*	4.0 the specialists primarily	5.0 the specialists solely				
	1952	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	All Years
Party	1.9	1.4	1.5	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.0	2.4	1.9
Economic	1.0	1.2	3.0	1.6	2.9	3.4	2.7	3.1	2.2
Legal	1.2	1.4	1.9	2.9	2.7	3.2	3.7	3.3	2.5
Military	(1.3)	(1.3)	1.4	2.8	2.3	2.4	3.2	3.4	2.3
Literary	1.4	1.3	2.9	2.7	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.6	2.6
All Elites	1.3	1.3	2.1	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.9	3.2	2.4
Specialist	1.2	1.3	2.3	2.5	2.7	3.0	3.2	3.4	2.4

F(38,177) = 7.246, significant at .001

* An example of position 3.0 is contained in a speech by Khrushchev at a meeting of agronomists: You say "Comrade Khrushchev said thus and so." Am I the highest authority in agricultural science? You are President of the Ukraine Republic Academy of Sciences and I am the Secretary of the Party Central Committee. You must help me in these matters, and not I you. I might be wrong, and if I am, you, as an honest scientist, should say: "Comrade Khrushchev, you do not quite understand the matter." If you explain things to me correctly, I will thank you for it. Let us say I was wrong. But you will say, "Comrade Khrushchev said this and I supported him." What sort of scientist is this comrade? This is toadyism and timeserving.

Pravda, December 25, 1961.

the perceived boundaries of the political arena are expanding over time. As specialist elite participation increases, Party dominance decreases: all the elites recognize greater specialist elite participation, although in 1959-65 the Party at 2.4 defines the parameters of the policy-making arena in more restrictive terms than do the Specialists.

Juxtaposed to the belief category—who *is* described as actually making policy—is its counterpart, a value category on who *should* make policy.

Hypothesis 2: The Specialist elites are pressing the Party for greater influence in the policy-making arena.

To show the extent of specialist elite pressure on the Party for a larger role in policy-making, three operational prerequisites need be met: 1) Specialist scores on the value category (who should participate?) must increase over time, 2) must be demonstrably higher than Party scores, and 3) be appreciably higher, more participatory, than perceptions of actual participation (Table 3).

Again the trend is toward greater specialist elite participation. In 1963 and 1965 the Spe-

cialists are in the participatory range, and in 1965 only the Party opts for Party dominance. The general trend for Specialists is continuous and marks a steady increase from 1952 through 1965. Developments over time are more clearly demonstrated by comparing the 1952-57 period with 1959-65 (Table 4).

TABLE 4. ELITE VALUES TOWARD POLICY-MAKING 1952-57 to 1959-65

Elites	1952-57	1959-65	% Change
Party	1.7	2.2	+29%
Economic	1.5	2.9	+93%
Legal	2.0	3.1	+55%
Military	1.7	2.9	+71%
Literary	1.9	3.2	+68%
All Elites	1.8	2.9	+61%
Specialists	1.8	3.1	+72%

In support of the hypothesis that the specialist elites are pressing the Party for greater participation in the policy-making arena, the three requisite conditions are met:

1) Specialist scores increase over time. The

TABLE 5. COMPARISON OF SPECIALIST ELITE PERCEPTIONS AND VALUES OF THE POLICY-MAKING ARENA

Is-Should Categories	1959	1961	1963	1965	1959-1965
Specialist beliefs (who makes policy?)	2.4	2.8	2.8	3.3	2.8
Specialist values (who should make policy?)	2.7	3.0	3.2	3.4	3.1
% should > is	13%	7%	14%	3%	11%

instrumental average of 3.1 in 1959-65 marks a 72% increase over 1952-57.

2) By 1959-65 all the specialist elites opt for a more participatory role in policy-making than the Party deems desirable. In every year from 1955 through 1965, Specialist scores are higher, i.e., more participatory, than are Party scores. Since increased elite participation directly reduces Party dominance, the Party, as expected, claims that actual elite participation in the later period is greater (2.4) than desirable (2.2).

3) Specialist scores on who should make policy are appreciably higher in the 1959-65 period than on the question who is described as making policy (Table 5).

In sum, on the important question of policy-making, a strong participatory trend is manifested by the specialist elites and recognized by the Party. Not denying the Party's ability to check, at least temporarily, elite participation,⁴

⁴ Note, e.g., the effect of Khrushchev's 1957

a distinct feature of the post-Stalin period is this attitudinal development away from strict Party dominance.

2. ON DECISION-MAKING

In an ideological political system the Party is portrayed as dominant in local as well as policy level decisions, reserving for itself the role of final arbiter in disputes over implementation.

Hypothesis 3: Over time the specialist elites increasingly depict themselves as participants in the decision-making process (Table 6).

The years 1959 and 1961 represent the high tide of decentralization. Participatory Party

victory over Malenkov and Zhukov on the economic and military elites, and the effect of the 1962-63 anti-parasite legislation on the legal elite. The zig-zag course for the individual elites is apparently a result of major policy disputes between the Party and specific elite.

TABLE 6. ELITE PERCEPTIONS OF THE DECISION-MAKING ARENA, 1952-1965^a

Elites	1952	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	All Years
Party	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.6	3.3	4.0	2.1	3.1	2.8
Economic	000	2.5	3.3	2.8	4.2	3.8	2.5	2.2	3.0
Legal	3.0	000	3.1	2.8	2.5	2.8	2.9	2.5	2.8
Military	(2.5)	(2.6)	2.5	2.9	2.2	2.7	3.3	3.0	2.7
Literary	2.1	2.7	4.1	2.9	4.3	2.7	4.0	3.2	3.2
All Elites	2.5	2.6	3.5	2.8	3.1	3.1	2.9	2.8	2.9
Specialists	2.5	2.6	3.2	2.8	3.3	2.9	3.2	2.7	2.9

F(35,154) = 1.166, significant at .001

^a An example of position 5.0 is:

Indeed, if the chief means to be used in war is nuclear missiles, this means that we are obligated to construct both the theory of the art of warfare, the operational tactical training of troops and their indoctrinating with regard for the use, above all, of these weapons. This means that each officer, master sargent, sargent, soldier and sailor must learn to act, to carry out his duties and battle orders, as required by the conditions of nuclear-missile war."

Krasnaya zvezda, May 11, 1962.

scores in these years mirror Party efforts to increase production and efficiency through local initiative. By late 1961, however, the Party line changed as the inevitable consequences—"localism," "family circles," and fraud—threatened economic planning and central Party control.

The third hypothesis—a predicted Specialist increase over time—is tenuously supported with an 8% participatory increase in 1959–65 over the earlier period (Table 7).

TABLE 7. ELITE PERCEPTIONS OF THE DECISION-MAKING ARENA, 1952–57 TO 1959–65

Elites	1952–57	1959–65	% Change
Party	2.5	3.1	+23%
Economic	2.9	3.2	+11%
Legal	2.9	2.6	-12%
Military	2.6	2.8	+ 8%
Literary	3.1	3.6	+18%
All Elites	2.8	2.9	+ 5%
Specialists	2.8	3.0	+ 8%

The level of elite participatory attitudes in both periods is high, significantly higher than on policy-making, and seemingly reflects greater tolerance by the Party of specialist elite participation at the local level. With an instrumental score of 3.0 in 1959–65, the Specialists perceive themselves as relative equals to the Party in decision-making.

Hypothesis 4: The Specialists are pressing the Party for greater influence on the decision-making level (Table 8).

For specialists, instrumental scores on who *should* make decisions are manifested in every

year from the death of Stalin onward, and a 16% overall increase is recorded over time (Table 9).

TABLE 9. ELITE VALUES TOWARD DECISION-MAKING 1952–57 TO 1959–65

Elites	1952–57	1959–65	% Change
Party	2.7	2.9	+ 7%
Economic	3.4	4.1	+21%
Legal	3.0	3.7	+23%
Military	3.0	3.0	000%
Literary	3.3	3.6	+ 9%
All Elites	3.1	3.5	+13%
Specialists	3.1	3.6	+16%

In both periods the Specialists score in the instrumental range, and in 1959–65 all the specialist elites press for greater participation than the Party believes desirable.

When specialist elite perceptions of the decision-making process (who makes decisions?) are compared to elite values (who should make decisions?) two patterns emerge:

1) Despite ups and downs through the years; in each of the sampled years the Specialists opt for greater responsibility in decision-making than they depict themselves as having (Table 10).

2) Of all the elites in the 1959–65 period, only the Party claims that elite participation (perceived by the Party to be 3.1) is greater than desirable (2.9). If it is true that the Party is seeking a formula for balancing a high level of specialist elite participation with Party control, a comparison of Party and Specialist scores on who should make decisions suggests that the specialist elites seek to upset the mini-

TABLE 8. ELITE VALUES TOWARD PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISION-MAKING ARENA, 1952–1965^a

Elites	1952	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	All Years
Party	3.1	2.8	3.4	2.1	3.7	3.6	2.3	2.1	2.9
Economic	3.3	4.0	4.3	2.2	4.5	3.8	4.0	4.2	3.8
Legal	1.7	3.6	3.3	3.3	4.1	4.1	3.2	3.4	3.4
Military	(2.9)	(3.3)	2.3	4.1	3.0	2.9	2.9	3.2	3.1
Literary	3.8	2.6	3.7	3.2	3.9	4.5	3.2	3.4	3.5
All Elites	2.9	3.0	3.3	3.0	3.9	3.7	3.3	3.3	3.3
Specialists	2.9	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.9	3.8	3.4	3.6	3.4

F(37,194) = 1.767, significant at .001

^a An example of position 5.0, taken from Khrushchev's speech at the Moscow Writers' Union:

I do not think I ought to take up an analysis of your works in my address. I am not a literary critic, as you know, and for that reason do not feel called on to analyze your literary works.

Pravda, May 22, 1959.

TABLE 10. COMPARISON OF SPECIALIST PERCEPTIONS OF THE DECISION-MAKING ARENA TO SPECIALIST PARTICIPATORY VALUES, 1952-65

Should-Is Categories	1952	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	1952-57	1959-65	All Years
Who makes decisions	2.5	2.6	3.2	2.8	3.3	2.9	3.2	2.7	2.8	3.0	2.9
Should make decisions	2.9	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.9	3.8	3.4	3.6	3.1	3.6	3.3
% should > is	16%	19%	3%	14%	18%	31%	6%	33%	11%	20%	14%

max formula at the Party's expense (Table 11).

TABLE 11. COMPARISON OF PARTY AND SPECIALIST VALUES TOWARD PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING (WHO SHOULD MAKE DECISIONS?)

Elites	1952-57	1959-65	All Years
Party	2.7	2.9	2.8
Specialists	3.1	3.6	3.4
% Spec. > Party	15%	24%	21%

Scanning the data on the decision-making categories it appears that the military is closest to the Party's position, but this compliance is, as will be demonstrated in the discussion of Party-Specialist conflict, directly traceable to Zhukov's defeat in 1957, and scores in the later years suggest that the military has strengthened its position since the Cuban missile crisis. The economic elite, despite its decline in 1957 following Malenkov's fall and Khrushchev's industrial reorganization, scores in the instrumental range on decision-making, reflecting a degree of success in its drive for greater managerial influence at the factory level. (Scores on the policy level follow a similar course.) The legal elite—the only specialist elite to experience a decline in participation on the decisional level, apparently a result of the Party's post-1958 retreat on socialist legality—topped all elites with a 23% increase over time on who should make decisions, indicating dissatisfaction with Party dominance. (An identical pattern occurred on the policy-making categories.) In both the 1952-57 and 1959-65 periods, the literary elite scored in the participatory range on decision-making and is, predictably, kept from still higher scores by

the more Party-oriented attitudes articulated in the conservative journal *Oktyabr*. All in all, specialist elite participation in the decision-making arena is significant at 2.9 for All Years, and pressure to enhance their participatory role (3.4 for All Years) is growing increasingly strong over time.

3. AUTHORITY SOURCES IN PROBLEM SOLVING

A relationship exists between the form of political system and the type of rationalizations used in initiating, defending, and criticizing policy decisions. Historically, the dominance of the Party in the Soviet political system is linked to its claim of ideological supremacy. Certain sources of authority are supportive of CPSU dominance, e.g., the justification of policy decisions based on an appeal to Leninist historical consciousness, whereas other authority sources, for instance, a policy recommendation based on empirical evidence or expert opinion, are more conducive to specialistelite participation in the political process. In the category tapping the authority sources appealed to by the five elites in justifying their position on policies and decisions, lower scores of 1.0-2.9 reflect a Party dominant ideological system, scores in the 3.0-3.9 range are conducive to joint Party-specialist participation, and the higher scores of 4.0-5.0 support a more instrumental environment for specialist elite participation.

Hypothesis 5: Over time, as elite participation increases, the elites will opt for more instrumental forms of justification (Table 12).

As specialist elite participation increases it is hypothesized that the elites will tend increasingly to justify and criticize policy decisions in more instrumental terms, since appeals to historical consciousness and ideological awareness

TABLE 12. ELITE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 1952-1965

What is the authority source appealed to in policy and decision making? How are policy decisions justified?

- 1.0 recommendations are based on an understanding of the laws of historical development/by analogy to a theory or decision of Marx, Lenin, Stalin *in the past*
- 2.0 recommendation is generally derived from Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism
- 3.0 recommendation is derived from Marxism. Leninism, Stalinism, in conjunction with practice/scientific Marxist-Leninist analysis/Marxism and objective analysis*
- 4.0 recommendation is based on expert opinions/the clash of opinions/discussion
- 5.0 recommendation is derived from objective investigation/by empirical methods/by scientific findings

Elites	1952	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	All Years
Party	2.3	2.5	2.8	3.3	3.9	3.4	3.1	2.5	2.9
Economic	2.1	2.6	3.2	2.8	3.1	3.1	3.8	3.6	3.1
Legal	1.5	2.7	3.2	3.8	3.5	3.7	4.0	3.2	3.1
Military	(2.1)	(2.5)	2.3	2.6	2.3	2.3	2.7	2.9	2.5
Literary	2.2	2.2	2.5	3.4	3.3	2.5	3.2	3.1	2.9
All Elites	2.1	2.5	2.8	3.2	3.4	2.9	3.3	3.1	2.9
Specialists	2.0	2.5	2.8	3.1	3.1	2.9	3.4	3.2	2.9

F(38,209) = 2.661, significant at .001

* An example of position 3.0:

Marxism is not an "universal master key" which can be applied without study practice and without analyzing the data of practice. Authors who construct their conclusions merely on superficial analogies, [position 1.0] or interpretations, comparisons, and "analyses" of quotations [position 2.0] and not on the study of facts—on the study of life—need to be reminded of how the founders of Marxism described the significance of the theory they established.

Kommunist, No. 7, 1955.

are more supportive of Party dominance. Comparing the two periods, the trend over time marks a significant change away from strict ideological appeals (Table 13).

TABLE 13. ELITE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 1952-57 TO 1959-65

Elites	1952-57	1959-65	% Change
Party	2.8	3.2	+14%
Economic	2.6	3.5	+35%
Legal	2.8	3.5	+25%
Military	2.4	2.6	+ 8%
Literary	2.7	3.0	+11%
All Elites	2.6	3.2	+23%
Specialists	2.6	3.2	+23%

With Specialists in the instrumental range in four of the last five years and showing a 23% increase over time, the hypothesis is generally affirmed. In the 1959-65 period all elites but the military tend to evaluate policies in instrumental terms more conducive to specialist

elite participation. Party scores are high; throughout the Khrushchev years from 1957-1963, the Party scored in the instrumental range. This development may qualify as one indicator of what some observers, notably Barrington Moore, foresee as a Soviet potential for "technical-rational" development.⁵

4. PARTICIPATORY VALUES: AN OVERVIEW

Although the hypotheses and categories are analytically distinct, all relate to the basic question of elite participation. By collapsing the categories into one dimension and averaging each elite's score on all five categories, a Grand Mean score is derived which may serve as a general indicator of overall participatory trends in the post-Stalin period (Table 14).

Readily visible at the outset is the year by year instrumental increase for Specialists from 1952 through 1965. Participatory trends are manifested by all the elites (Table 15).

⁵ *Terror and Progress—USSR* (New York, Harpur Torchbooks, 1954), chap. 7.

TABLE 14. ELITE ATTITUDES TOWARD PARTICIPATION: ALL CATEGORIES COMBINED 1952-1965

Elites	1952	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	All Years
Party	2.3	2.2	2.5	2.3	3.2	3.2	2.2	2.5	2.6
Economic	2.2	2.6	3.2	2.2	3.6	3.4	3.1	3.3	2.9
Legal	1.9	2.3	2.8	3.2	2.9	3.6	3.3	3.2	2.9
Military	2.1	2.2	2.0	2.7	2.5	2.5	3.1	3.0	2.5
Literary	2.2	2.0	3.0	3.0	3.4	2.9	3.2	3.3	2.9
All Elites	2.1	2.2	2.5	2.7	3.1	3.0	3.0	3.1	2.8
Specialists	2.1	2.2	2.7	2.8	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.2	2.8

TABLE 15. ELITE ATTITUDES TOWARD PARTICIPATION: ALL CATEGORIES COMBINED, 1952-57 TO 1959-65

Elites	1952-57	1959-65	% Change
Party	2.3	2.8	+22%
Economic	2.5	3.4	+36%
Legal	2.6	3.2	+23%
Military	2.5	2.7	+ 8%
Literary	2.6	3.2	+23%
All Elites	2.5	3.1	+24%
Specialists	2.6	3.1	+19%

A 24% All-Elite increase in the latter period is significant and indicative of the rapidity of change since Stalin. Thru 1959-65 Specialists scores are in the participatory range and in 1963 and 1965 every specialist elite is over 3.0.

The military is perennially low among the specialists and at times below the Party as well. In all probability this reflects Party efforts to exercise exceptionally rigorous political controls over the military. Although not readily apparent from the figures, Marshal Zhukov's removal in 1957 was a crucial development in Party-military relations. By comparing attitudinal scores from an equal sample of articles from *Krasnaya zvezda* for the period immediately preceding and following Zhukov's ouster, the effects of Zhukov's dismissal on the military elite are demonstrated (Table 16).

TABLE 16. MILITARY ATTITUDES SURROUNDING MARSHAL ZHUKOV'S DISMISSAL

Categories	Pre-Zhukov Ouster	Post-Zhukov Ouster	All 1957
Who Makes Policy?	1.7	1.0	1.3
Who Should Make Policy?	3.6	1.5	2.8
Who Makes Decisions?	3.5	2.0	2.9
Who Should Make Decisions?	4.4	2.8	4.1
Authority Source	2.7	1.9	2.6
All Categories Combined	3.3	1.9	2.7

The "price" Khrushchev paid for the military's support against the anti-Party group was for a time exceedingly high. From the data Zhukov's major thrust was for greater autonomy in the decision-making arena: a score of 4.4 represents a virtual denial of Party influence over local level military affairs. Not until 1963—following the Cuban missile crisis—did the military recover from the post-Zhukov crackdown.⁶ The decline in military scores following an open confrontation against the Party is a characteristic pattern for all the specialist elites, again demonstrating the Party's capacity to thwart, temporarily, elite participation in the political process.

While a dysrhythmic pattern of elite behavior is typical for all the categories, 1963 marks a crisis year in Party-elite relations, for contrary to earlier developments the party's retreat in 1963 to a more Party dominant position was *not*, as in the past, accompanied by a general decline for the specialist elites but by an overall Specialist increase to a more instrumental position.⁷ In short, Party-elite relations became significantly more conflictful as both Party and elites denied one another a dominant role in the political arena.

III. PARTY-SPECIALIST ELITE RELATIONS

The Party, confronted with more elite participation than it considers desirable and with

⁶ Secondary support marking the missile crisis as a turning point in military-Party relations is found in Thomas Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), and Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).

⁷ See Carl Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1966), for a discussion of the Cuban missile crisis as a variable in Khrushchev's fall and as a possible cause for the Party's loss of control over the elites in 1963 and 1965, esp. pp. 146-147.

TABLE 17. PARTY-ELITE RELATIONS: ACCOMMODATION OR CONFLICT: ALL CATEGORIES COMBINED, 1952-65*

Elites	1952	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	All Years
Economic	-.17	+.35	+.73	-.12	+.36	+.23	+.91	+.88	+.37
Legal	-.48	+.07	+.29	+.84	-.30	+.37	+.03	+.78	+.34
Military	-(.20)	+(.05)	-.47	+.44	-.74	-.69	+.80	+.56	-.03
Literary	-.13	-.22	+.49	+.69	+.16	-.25	+.97	+.82	+.36
Specialists	-.24	+.02	+.23	+.45	-.12	-.10	+.95	+.77	+.27

* minus scores denote accommodation, plus scores conflict.

still higher elite aspirations, finds it increasingly difficult to enforce mini-max boundaries on the specialist elites. Comparing elite beliefs and values, two types of Party-elite relations may be identified: *accommodation* or *conflict*. Accommodation exists when both the Party and specialist elites substantially agree on the allocation or responsibility in policy and decision making. Conflict—opting for mutually exclusive values—exists when the Party and elites substantially disagree on the allocation or responsibility in the political arena.⁸

Tentatively:

Hypothesis 6: As specialist elite participation increases, Party-elite conflict increases.

And:

Hypothesis 7: As specialist elite participation increases beyond Party dominance, i.e., beyond mini-max boundaries, the intensity of conflict increases.

Focusing on system-wide trends, Party-elite relations may be typed by comparing differential scores on the combined category (Table 17).

All-Year differential scores show that the economic, literary, and legal elites are in conflict with the Party. The military, at $-.03$, is in a

⁸ In operational terms, accommodation exists when the Party's score on the participatory categories is higher than the elite's score, i.e., when the specialist score is within the Party's prescribed boundary of the political arena. (E.g., if the Party score is 2.90 and the specialist score 2.50, the extent of accommodation is $-.40$, the minus sign denoting accommodation.) Conflict exists when the specialist elite score is more participatory than that of the Party. (E.g., if the Party score is 2.50 and the elite score 3.00, the level of conflict is $+.50$, plus signs denoting conflict.) For clarity all mean scores are carried two decimal places in the accommodation conflict tables.

“bare bargain” relationship. The years 1952, 1959, and 1961 are periods of accommodation, 1955, 1957, 1963 and 1965 years of conflict. Since 1959 and 1961 are the only two years in which the party scored in the instrumental range, Party-elite accommodation in these two years is largely due to the Party's permissive definition of the boundaries of the political arena. With $+.27$ the All-Year conflict score, those years above the mean constitute “crisis years”; rank ordered the crisis years in Party-Specialist relations are 1963, 1965, and 1957, notably, all periods related to succession crises, thereby lending support to the notion that when the Party is internally divided elite participation increases.

On scanning the differential scores of the individual elites an interesting pattern emerges: following an open confrontation against the Party, the elite typically moves from conflict to accommodation, then, in the next sampled year back into a conflict relationship with the Party. For example, note the two-steps-forward, one-step-back pattern for the economic elite in the years from 1955 thru 1959, the legal elite's 1959 accommodating position following the Party's 1958 retreat on the Fundamental Laws, and the military's 1959 score following Marshal Zhukov's ouster. Accommodation, it appears, is *enforced* accommodation—is a result of successful Party efforts to thwart elite encroachments in the political arena, rather than a sign of a consensual definition of the boundaries of the political system. Within this framework, conflict signifies the Party's inability to control the participatory beliefs and aspirations of the specialist elites.

As predicted in hypothesis 6, Party-elite conflict increases over time (Table 18).

A threefold increase in conflict is significant, especially so when it is recalled that All-Elite participation scores on the combined category increased by 24%, and the Party moved from 2.3 in the early period to a mini-max score of

TABLE 18. PARTY-ELITE RELATIONS:
ACCOMMODATION OR CONFLICT ALL
CATEGORIES COMBINED, 1952-57
TO 1959-65

Elites	1952-57	1959-62
Economic	+ .20	+ .60
Legal	+ .18	+ .47
Military	- .05	- .02
Literary	+ .21	+ .43
Specialists	+ .12	+ .37

2.8 in 1959-65. In the later period, then, Party-elite conflict increases at a sharper rate than does elite participation, thereby supporting the predicted increase in intensity of conflict as Party dominance is threatened by the Specialist elites.

Conflict characterizes Party-elite relations in the post-Stalin period and in particular in the later years. This conflict is becoming generalized throughout the system. All the dimensions are in conflict (Table 19).

Two inferences may be drawn from this comparison of conflict scores. First, the focus of Party-specialist elite conflict is changing over time: in 1952-57 the question of elite participation on the decision-making level was most in conflict, while in 1959-65 participation in the policy-making arena ranks as the major source of Party-elite conflict. Since specialist elite participation in the policy-making arena threatens the Party's integrative role, this development constitutes a most serious challenge to the Party's position in the Soviet political system.

Secondly, while all dimensions but the perceived boundaries of the decision-making arena are in conflict in 1959-65, this one instance of accommodation is a result of the Party exceeding its mini-max boundaries with a participatory score of 3.1. That responsibility for decision-making is in contention is apparent

from the +.73 1959-65 conflict score on who should participate—the Party opting for 2.9 (the absolute maximum level for maintaining dominance in the decision-making arena), the Specialists denying Party dominance with a 3.6 average in 1959-65. Thus, by the later period the 2.5-2.9 mini-max range no longer represents the boundaries of compromise but a *field of conflict*.

IV. CONCLUSION

Three systemic trends emerge from a review of the data:

1. *Elite participatory attitudes show a marked increase over time, reaching the instrumental level in 1959-1965.* By plotting All-Elite grand mean scores on the ideological-instrumental continuum this trend is graphically depicted in Figure 2.

With 3.0 corresponding to joint Party-elite participation, the trend is away from Party dominance toward what appears to be a "poly-archival" system,⁹ toward what H. Gordon Skilling calls a "pluralism of elites."¹⁰

2. *Conflict characterizes Party-specialist elite relations in the post-Stalin period.* Party-elite conflict exists in both periods. In 1952-1957, with a Specialist participation score of 2.5, the extent of Party-elite conflict is +.12, while in 1959-65 the level of Specialist participation climbs to 3.1 and the level of conflict to +.37. In short, as specialist elite participatory attitudes increased by one-quarter, Party-elite conflict showed a threefold increase, despite the Party's move from 2.3 to a mini-max position of 2.8.

3. Concomitant with the attitudinal development toward elite participation and the intensification of Party-elite conflict is the trend

⁹ Robert A. Dahl, *Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), chap. 3.

¹⁰ "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," *World Politics*, 18 (June, 1966), p. 449.

TABLE 19. PARTY-SPECIALISTS RELATIONS: ACCOMMODATION OR CONFLICT, 1952-65

Categories	1952	1953	1955	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	All Years
who makes policy?	-.14	-.26	-.08	+.71	-.47	+.14	+1.13	+1.05	+.26
who should make policy?	-.69	-.06	+.82	-.43	+.49	+.75	+1.15	+.93	+.48
who makes decisions?	+.10	+.23	+.63	+.21	-.01	-1.13	+1.10	-.32	+.10
who should make decisions?	-.11	+.25	-.17	+1.08	+.15	+.24	+1.02	+1.50	+.50
authority sources	-.36	-.04	-.04	-.18	-.78	+.50	+.32	+.71	+.02
All Categories	-.24	+.02	-.23	+.45	-.12	+.10	+.95	+.77	+.27




FIG. 2. The Ideological-Instrumental Continuum All-Elite Scores on All Categories

toward an erosion of the ideological foundations of Party dominance—toward what Almond and Powell call the “secularization of values.”¹¹ *Over the years all the elites, the Party included, increasingly come to rely on scientific knowledge and expert skills as crucial resources in the decision-making process.*

In sum, the Soviet political system is com-

¹¹ Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967), pp. 24–25; the secularization of culture is described as:

the process whereby traditional orientations and attitudes give way to more dynamic decision-making processes involving the gathering of information, the evaluation of information, the laying out of alternative courses of action, the selection of a course of action from among these possible courses, and the means whereby one tests whether or not a given course of action is producing the consequences which were intended.

petitive. By 1959–1965 participatory elite attitudes and Party-elite conflict reach levels which are incompatible with the totalitarian model. The Party’s capacity to dominate what Stalin fondly called the “commanding heights” is an empirical question, not an absolute given in the post-Stalin period. This is not to deny that the Party is more powerful than the elites, but rather that the Party is not omnipotent. Party-specialist elite interdependence, not Party dominance, characterizes Party-elite relations. New models of Soviet politics are obviously needed.¹² The conception of the Soviet political system as a monolith is a myth.

¹² See H. Gordon Skilling, *op. cit.*, pp. 449–551; Alex Inkeles, “Models in the Analysis of Soviet Society, *Survey*, No. 60 (July, 1966), pp. 3–12; Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech, “Group Influence on the Policy Process in the Soviet Union,” this REVIEW, 840–851.

GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE POLICY PROCESS IN THE SOVIET UNION*

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It has become widely recognized that Soviet officials do not formulate public policy in a vacuum, and that, indeed, their deliberations take into account in some fashion the needs and demands of various elements of the society. Further, it has been observed that social groups of various types play a noticeable, if only rudimentary role in articulating interests to the top of the hierarchy. In fact one author has gone so far as to assert that communist policy-making results from a "parallelogram of conflicting forces and interests."¹ While such viewpoints are now far more widely accepted than in the early fifties, relatively little effort has been devoted to illustrating or illuminating how Soviet public policy in general or even a given Soviet policy can be importantly affected by group activity.

We propose here to make a contribution in that direction. Using the Educational Reform Act of 1958 as an exemplary case, we intend to show how and through what process groups can affect policy outcomes, and by identifying circumstances under which this takes place to generate some hypotheses about when such influence is most likely to recur. In their excellent analysis of Soviet policy formation, Professors Brzezinski and Huntington identify what they call "policy groups," which come closest of any nongovernmental groups to participating in policy formation. These groups, such as the military, industrial managers, agricultural experts and state bureaucrats.

whose scope of activity is directly dependent on the allocation of national resources and which are directly affected by any shift in the institutional distribution of power, . . . advocate to the political leadership certain courses of action; they have their own professional or specialized newspapers which, at times and subject to over-all Party control, can become important vehicles for expressing specific points of view.²

* The authors wish to express their appreciation to the University of North Carolina Research Council for supporting the research on this subject.

¹ H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," *World Politics*, 18 (April, 1966), p. 449.

² Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: U.S.A./U.S.S.R.* (New York, 1963), p. 196.

In this article we will investigate an instance wherein such groups seemed to influence policy with the result of virtually scuttling one of Khrushchev's own major proposals.

We do not mean to challenge the view that ultimate power in the U.S.S.R. resides at the top of the Communist Party hierarchy. Neither do we mean to infer that the top party leadership was forced by a "policy group" to act against its will. We do not suggest that the instance we cite is modal. Indeed it is the best example we are aware of. We hope that the major payoff in this paper will be in showing why things happened as they did. This is the first step in finding out whether and how often to expect them again.

The first major section of the paper will describe the situation we use as a basis for our speculative analysis about the Soviet decision making process. The second will attempt to explain why things happened as they did, and the third will report some hypotheses about when such phenomena are likely to recur.

I. DEBATE OVER THE 1958 ACT

A prominent feature of post-Stalin Russia has been the nationwide discussion of certain legislative proposals. This does not constitute a totally new innovation in the Soviet Union. During the preceding period such important laws as the constitution of 1936 received nationwide discussion before enactment. A few differences, however, deserve mention. First, the frequency of these discussions has substantially increased. Second and more important, the impact of these discussions on the proposed legislation has in some instances been far more than peripheral. This especially applies to the debate which surrounded the Educational Reform Act of 1958. A closer look at this debate will afford us an opportunity to consider how the opinion of various "publics" can influence the policy process.

There can be little doubt about whose initiative lay behind the proposed reform. At the thirteenth Komsomol Congress in April of 1958, First Party Secretary Khrushchev severely criticized the existing school system and demanded fundamental changes.³ This attack seems to have been motivated by three prob-

³ Khrushchev's statement can be found in XIII *S'ezd vsesoiuznogo leninskogo kommunisticheskogo*

lems facing Soviet society in the mid-fifties, the cause of which Khrushchev linked to the existing school system.

First, the Soviet press had unceasingly criticized the denigrative attitudes of the younger generation toward physical labor.⁴ In the opinion of the First Secretary, the undue emphasis upon classical academic training and the neglect of the polytechnical side of education were largely responsible for this attitude.

Second, competition for admission to higher education had reached an excessive degree and this likewise had caused great concern among political leaders.⁵ The competition itself has largely been a by-product of changes in the economic and educational systems.

Prior to 1950 the rapid growth of the economy and the underdeveloped secondary educational facilities maintained the demand for skilled technical cadres at a higher level than the supply. Throughout this period the number of available places in higher education exceeded the number of secondary school graduates. The post war years, however, witnessed a remarkable acceleration of secondary school facilities and enrollment. In 1949, out of a total enrollment of thirty-three million pupils only about one million were in grades eight to ten. Four years later the number of pupils in secondary education had risen to four and one half million.⁶ Now the annual supply of secondary school graduates greatly exceeded the number of vacancies in higher education. Since the Soviet regime, for reasons of its own, was unwilling to widen the availability of higher education, the gates of universities were closed to millions of youth regardless of their educational attainment.

An inevitable consequence has been the intensification of competition for the available number of places.⁷ The pressures for admission

became abnormally high because of the widespread notion that a college degree represents the key to individual advancement and entrance into the new class of Soviet intelligentsia. Consequently, those high school graduates initially denied admission refused to accept their fate. Instead of entering the labor force, many of them became perennial college candidates. Very often they applied to schools whose area of specialization was of no genuine interest to them. But in the absence of alternatives they would often enter an agricultural institute just to be able "to study somewhere."⁸ Here again Khrushchev charged that the educational system had bred such attitudes. By allowing students to continue their education uninterrupted and by stressing almost exclusively academic material, the schools naturally generated the expectation that the path to life lay solely through higher education.

The third problem involved the increasing stratification of Soviet society. The notion that higher education was the key to membership in the "new class" had a firm basis in fact. Yet these educational channels for upward social and political mobility were being drastically constricted as a consequence of their preemption by the incumbent political and bureaucratic elites. Khrushchev himself admitted that in the competition for admission to college the influence of parents often proved more important than the merit of the candidates. He further stated that only thirty to forty per cent of the enrolled students in higher education institutions came from worker and peasant backgrounds.⁹ The differential access to a prime source of mobility gravely concerned the First Secretary. Both the content and tenor of his statements clearly indicate that Khrushchev sought to eliminate privilege and inequality from the Soviet educational system.¹⁰

Finally we should mention an additional factor which may have influenced the reform movement. At the time of the debate some western scholars argued that the specifics of Khrushchev's proposals owed much to the serious labor shortage the Soviet economy was about to experience.¹¹ The argument may be

souiza molodezhi: stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow 1959), pp. 278-282.

⁴ See, for example, L. Bueva, "Tvorcheskii trud- osnova kommunisticheskogo vospitaniia molodezhi," *Kommunist*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Feb., 1961), p. 53; and also *Komsomol' skaia pravda*, March 2, 1956; February 10, 1957.

⁵ See XIII *S'ezd. op. cit.*, p. 280. See also S. Pavlov, "Sovetskaia molodezh' v bor'be za kommunizm," *Kommunist*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (March, 1960), p. 63.

⁶ Nicholas DeWitt, *Education and Professional Employment in the USSR* (Washington, 1961), p. 140.

⁷ In his speech to the XIII Komsomol Congress, Khrushchev noted that "last year higher educational institutions were able to accept

400 000 new students, half of them for full time study.—. However, at least 700,000 secondary school graduates failed to gain admission last year to higher or technical schools and between 1953-1956 about 2,200,000 failed to gain admission" XIII *S'ezd. op. cit.*, p. 278.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

⁹ *Pravda*, September 21, 1958.

¹⁰ XIII *S'ezd. op. cit.*, p. 280.

¹¹ See, for example, DeWitt, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

briefly summarized as follows. Because of severe war losses and a declining birth rate in the post war period the Soviet Union would have one-third fewer people entering the labor force during the late fifties and early sixties than normally would have been the case. Consequently the ambitious economic growth program could be achieved only if the vast majority of young people were channelled into the active labor force instead of higher education. It is important to note, however, that the Soviet press never cited a labor deficit as cause for the reform. Other evidence also casts doubt upon the validity of this thesis.¹²

While there is room for disagreement as to what problems motivated the reform, there is no ambiguity regarding Khrushchev's proposals for dealing with them. In September of 1958, the party secretary published his "thesis" on school reorganization.¹³ He suggested that continuous academic education be abolished and that all students be required to combine work with study. In effect this meant phasing out the ten year school which at that time constituted a completed secondary education. After finishing a seven or eight year primary school, said Khrushchev, every young person should enter the labor force. Those who wished to prepare themselves for higher education could continue their studies in evening and correspondence schools. Successful students would receive two or three days released time from work to facilitate studying.

The substitution of part time work and study for full time education in secondary day schools had, from Khrushchev's point of view, two advantages. First, it would instill in the younger generation a respectful attitude toward physical labor. Second, it would equalize access to higher education. The secondary day schools had become the province of children from the urban intelligentsia. Evening and correspondence schools, on the other hand, recruited most of their students from worker and peasant families. The difference in the quality of education offered by these two divisions gave the day school graduate an obvious advantage. By fusing the two channels into one undifferentiated system, Khrushchev hoped to eliminate the class bias in Soviet education. The road to a higher education would be the same for all irrespective of the positions or jobs which the parents held in society.

Study in higher educational institutions was

also to be put on a part time basis. The student would acquire the first two or three years of his college education through evening or correspondence courses. Thereafter he could complete his training on a full time schedule. Moreover, no individual was to be granted admission to higher education unless he had already worked full time after completing secondary school. Once again we see Khrushchev's determination to deemphasize the purely academic side of education and to enhance the importance of work experience.

If we compare Khrushchev's September Memorandum with the actual law adopted in December 1958 we find that the two differ not only in detail but in basic principle.¹⁴ To begin with, the old secondary day school was preserved more or less intact both in form and content. Khrushchev's demand that work be combined with study had received token satisfaction by increasing the number of hours devoted to polytechnical training *within* the schools. But the quantity and quality of academic subjects had in no way been sacrificed. The law established an eleven year day school to replace the old ten year day school system. The addition of another year permitted greater emphasis upon labor training without simultaneously diluting the quality of academic education. Indeed, the number of hours devoted to purely academic subjects proved to be *exactly the same* under the new system as it had been under the old.¹⁵

The maintenance of continuous secondary full time education must be seen as a rebuff to Khrushchev's demands. When the new law went into effect, it became apparent that nearly all the former ten year schools would continue to operate as part of the new eleven year system. Some figures also suggest that the number of students enrolled in the new system was comparable in size to the two senior grades of the old ten year school.¹⁶ It is true that Khrushchev recognized in his memorandum the need for *some* full time day schools. But he envisaged

¹⁴ For a text of the law see *Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika* (Moscow, 1959), pp. 517-533.

¹⁵ For an analysis of this point see an article by Klaus Mehnert in *Die Welt*, July 18, 1959.

¹⁶ The actual law left this point unclear but later developments indicated that just as many children—about a third of the total—would attend full time high schools as had been the case before the reform. See Thomas Bernstein "Soviet Educational Reform," (M. A. Thesis, Columbia University, 1962), p. 111, and articles in *The New York Times*, September 2, 1959; *Wall Street Journal*, June 29, 1960.

¹² For a refutation of the labor deficit thesis see "Facts and Figures," *Bulletin of Radio Free Europe*, September 22, 1958.

¹³ See *Pravda*, September 21, 1958.

that they would operate only during a transitional period and he expected their number to be sharply reduced right from the beginning of the reform.

While the eleven year system might have satisfied the demand that work be combined with study, it could not possibly have achieved Khrushchev's other expressed purpose—the elimination of privilege and inequality. The perpetuation of a bifurcated full time and part time school system insured that inequality would persist. Nevertheless the disadvantages faced by the evening and correspondence student might have significantly diminished had the law incorporated Khrushchev's suggestion regarding released time for study. Yet in this area as well important modifications were made. The reorganization decree left this question open and subsequent legislation resulted in a far less liberal policy.¹⁷ Under these circumstances the vast majority of college students would continue to come from the full time secondary schools and an inevitable by-product would be the continuation of class bias in higher education.

The provision for admission to and study in higher educational institutions likewise markedly deviated from Khrushchev's suggestions. Instead of *absolutely* requiring full time work before admission, the law merely stipulated that *priority* would be granted those with the record of employment or military service. But precedence for people with production experience already existed before the reorganization of the school system. Thus the wording of the law gave only formal recognition to an on-going practice. It cannot be interpreted as a "concession" to the demands made by Khrushchev in his memorandum.

His insistence upon part time study during the first few college years appears to have been more successfully realized. At least the law accepted it in principle. However, even here some important alterations occurred. The law explicitly exempted from this requirement all students in difficult theoretical disciplines. Similarly, the requirement would be inoperative in both non-technical higher educational institutions and in arts faculties at universities since "factory work for students cannot in these cases be connected with their future

job."¹⁸

Generally speaking, the education reform failed to implement the most important goals and purposes which Khrushchev had articulated in his memorandum. What factors can account for the observable disparity between the September proposal and the December law? To answer that question we must look briefly at the discussion which ensued during this period of time. The content of that debate clearly revealed that different societal groups, or at least some members of them, opposed Khrushchev's reform.

Teachers and administrators identified with the ten year school obviously wished to preserve and protect their institutional bailiwicks. But a frontal assault on the First Secretary's ideas would not have been good politics. Instead they opposed the reform more deviously. Essentially they argued that to prepare youth for manual labor it was not necessary to send them after the eighth grade to factories or farms. A much better way would be to bring the factories and farms into the schools by setting up first class workshops. Under these conditions it would be possible to teach pupils the same skills they could learn by entering the labor force. To substantiate their case the proponents of this approach assumed the initiative even *before* the appearance of Khrushchev's September memorandum. Prior to the opening of the school year in 1958, Y. I. Afanasev, Minister of Education for the Russian Republic, announced that the number of schools giving training in industrial and agricultural skills would double. He further announced that the Russian Republic had begun to experiment with extending secondary schools from ten to eleven years. Under the extended program students would spend half of their time at school and the other half at jobs on farms, in factories, or at construction sites. He mentioned that fifty schools with this program had operated the last year and this number would increase to two hundred this year. Here, in embryonic form, was the eleven year school system that became law in December of 1958. Thus, through word and deed, those occupational groups associated with full time secondary education sought to protect the organization they had built with effort and care.¹⁹

¹⁷ Instead of the two to three days released time from work as suggested by Khrushchev, students in evening schools received only one additional free day for study. See A. I. Shebanova, "O p'gotakh dlia lits sovmeshchaiushchikh rabotu s obucheniem," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* Vol. 30 (November, 1960), pp. 99-102.

¹⁸ This point was made by the Soviet Minister of higher education and was reflected in the final law. See V. P. Eliutin, "Soveshechanie rabotnikov vysshei shkoly," *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, Vol. 16, No. 10 (October, 1958), p. 9.

¹⁹ *Literaturnaia gazeta*, August 30, 1958.

Other groups opposed to the reform included higher educational and scientific personnel. Their arguments were perhaps more telling. They warned that it would be impossible under the new system to ensure the supply of highly qualified cadres for economic and societal growth. How can we, they asked, perfect and advance scientific knowledge when new entrants to higher educational schools would have only eight years of regular schooling behind them and who, in the following years, would have forgotten the little they had once learned. Several prominent educators and scientists went so far as to assert that a hiatus between incomplete and complete secondary school as well as between complete secondary school and higher education would result in irreparable damage to the state. For creative work in scientific research often manifests itself when the individual has reached his mid-twenties and the acquisition of theoretical knowledge on a large scale demands uninterrupted study.²⁰

The warning of experts reinforced grave doubts raised by many parents. The basic argument of the latter was that a shortened basic school program would adversely affect the physical and intellectual maturation of adolescents. Furthermore, it was said that channeling young people into production at an early age does not give them a chance to adequately choose a skill which best suits them.²¹ While both of these points had merit, parental views were somewhat suspect because other motives could be readily discerned. As Khrushchev himself pointed out, many parents were determined that their children receive opportunities for maximum education. They saw his plans as a threat to that opportunity and responded by attacking it. To the extent that pedagogical experts echoed parental concerns, as some did, they served as a linkage between public opinion and political decision makers. By articulating the interests of an amorphous group in technical terms, the experts transformed their claims into a politically relevant issue.

A few words must also be said about the attitudes of factory managers. Although their

opposition did not find explicit expression in the debate, their behavior left few doubts as to where they stood on the issue. Long before the question of reform had arisen, managers had displayed a reluctance to hire and train juvenile workers. Under the new arrangements they would become responsible for all sorts of educational functions for which the factory was ill prepared. Moreover, the large influx of school children and the necessity to train them would inevitably divert managers from their own duties of production and plan fulfillment. In light of this fact it is not surprising that the reform act failed to implement Khrushchev's suggestions regarding released time from work. That would have greatly complicated the managers' tasks and we can assume that their views were transmitted to the proper authorities.²²

At this point, our task is to account for the role of groups in forming educational policy in this instance by interpreting a number of facts. The objective facts we must work from are, in summary, that Khrushchev made a far-reaching proposal to deal with a number of educational problems facing the regime, and that the substance of the proposal was radically modified. The major proponent of the reform was obviously Khrushchev himself. The most important—indeed the only—opponents of the changes we can identify are the social groups cited above.

Here we should note that if one quantifies the number of articles which appeared during the debate, the oppositional point of view is clearly a minority. It is quite possible that a "war of memoranda" may have been raging behind the scenes and that during this exchange the minority position was in fact the majority point of view.²³ Whatever may have been the case, it is undeniable that the opposi-

²² For a scathing criticism of managerial attitudes toward juvenile workers see the lead editorial in *Pravda*, September 25, 1957.

²³ There is some evidence that the opposition was far greater than one would gather from simply reading the official press. For example, relatively few parental criticisms found their way into print. But during 1963-64 when the first author of this paper was conducting interviews in the Soviet Union, it was learned that a very large number of urban middle class parents had strongly criticized Khrushchev's proposals at "PTA" meetings held during the reform debate period. Similarly, Professor William Johnson of the University of Pittsburgh told the same author that opposition among educational officials was far more widespread than the official press revealed. Professor Johnson was in the Soviet Union at the time of the

²⁰ For examples of such arguments see *Literaturnia gazeta*, June 26, 1958; December 20, 1958; *Pravda*, September 24, 1958; October 17, 1958; November 19, 1958. K. Ia Kondrat'ev and P. A. Shi'lov "O nekotorykh voprosakh universitetskogo obrazovaniia," *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, Vol. 16, No. 10 (October, 1958), pp. 17-23.

²¹ See *Pravda*, November 30, 1958; December 2, 1958; *Literaturnaia gazeta*, December 20, 1958.

tional arguments were closer to the form of the finally enacted law.

There are several possible interpretations which would explain the outcome of the educational reform debate. One might argue, for example, that the disparity between the September memorandum and the December law resulted from Khrushchev changing his mind. Once the technocratic elites had pointed out the potentially dangerous consequences inherent in Khrushchev's proposals, the First Secretary simply revised his original position. There is no way, of course, to verify or falsify this interpretation. Since we have no knowledge of Khrushchev's preference schedule or to whom he would most likely listen, we must allow for the possibility that anyone who had a position and stated it prior to the outcome might have influenced Khrushchev. If we accept this interpretation, however, we must resolve certain questions which detract from its credibility.

When Khrushchev spoke to the Komsomol Congress in April, 1958, he stated that the Party Central Committee had, *for some time*, been discussing the improvement of public education. Presumably, experts had been consulted during the course of such discussions. We might also presume that Khrushchev sounded out experts between April and September when he was preparing a detailed proposal for educational reform. In light of this, it seems unlikely that Khrushchev changed his mind because he heard convincing arguments which had not been made in the far longer period which preceded publication of his memorandum.

It is also important to recall that Khrushchev clearly identified himself personally with the issue of educational reform. He placed his public prestige squarely upon the line. As Richard Neustadt has pointed out, chief executives cannot afford to make indiscriminate public pronouncements. If they are sensitive to the prerequisites of power and influence, they must carefully weigh the consequences which flow from what, when and how they say things.²⁴ All the evidence we have on Khrushchev's career suggests that he was highly sensitive to the requisites of power and influence. Thus not only did the First Secretary have ample opportunity to consult expert opinion on the educational question, but he also had a

vested political interest in doing so before publicly stating his position.

Our own inclination then is to discount, though not categorically reject, the possibility that Khrushchev simply changed his mind between September and December. An alternative interpretation is that bureaucratic groups prevailed over the First Secretary and forced him to act against his will.²⁵ To accept this, however, would demand a rewriting of the literature on political power and resources in the Soviet Union that we think is neither necessary nor appropriate. It is quite easy on the other hand to imagine more important actors prevailing over Khrushchev with the social groups associating themselves spuriously, so to speak, with the stronger actors. In suggesting this interpretation we must argue inferentially because the only direct evidence we have about opposition to the proposal relates to the groups. In the section below we will attempt to account for what happened and to assess the role of the social groups in it.

II. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL GROUPS IN SHAPING THE ACT

Brzezinski and Huntington express the orthodox interpretation in arguing that the key political resource in the Soviet Union is control of the party organization, and that such control can be shared only at the top.

Thus, insofar as there are limits on the power of the top leader in the Soviet Union, they stem from his sharing control of the *apparatus* with a small number of colleagues . . . the principal limits on the power of the Soviet leader are inside the Kremlin.²⁶

We agree, and we feel that those colleagues were crucially important in defeating Khrushchev's proposal. But the opposition of the groups identified above was not coincidental. We submit that the groups were mobilized after the dispute was left unresolved at the top.

Such an argument forces us to take sides in a dispute among Soviet scholars about whether or not there is conflict within the Soviet leadership at times other than succession crises. It is the position of the "conflict" school that policy issues such as those on agriculture, heavy industry, consumer goods, foreign affairs, Stalinism, economic reorganization and education are continuous sources of dispute

debate and is known to have extensive contacts with Soviet educators.

²⁴ Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York, 1964).

²⁵ For an analysis of the reform with this type of implication see David Burg, "Some thoughts on the Soviet educational reform," *Bulletin*, 6 (March, 1959), 32-36.

²⁶ Brzezinski and Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

among the top leadership. When one issue is resolved, another is likely to take its place. We think there is strong evidence for this viewpoint, which became more compelling than ever with Khrushchev's political demise in October, 1964.²⁷

In this specific case, Khrushchev stated in April, 1958, that the Party Central Committee was presently engaged in preparing a resolution on the improvement of public education.²⁸ But the September "theses" proved to be simply a note by Khrushchev with the "approval" of the Central Committee, instead of a formal resolution by that august body. This suggests that Khrushchev's educational reform was a highly personal document which lacked support among a substantial element of the top political leadership. Esoteric evidence to support this thesis is provided by the unusual silence of the top political leadership during the educational reform debate. Khrushchev appears to have been the only Praesidium member to have played a significant role in the reform discussions and to have clearly and publicly expressed his attitudes. Sidney Ploss has argued that in the context of Soviet politics the silence of leaders on a topical issue must be construed as disagreement with the expressed viewpoint of their colleagues.²⁹ It is also significant that major amendments to Khrushchev's plan were reflected in the Central Committee resolution on education reform which was finally issued on November 16, 1958.³⁰

If, as we have argued, the important conflict was on the top leadership level, and if the persons on that level have the power to determine policy outcomes, what role did the social groups play? The answer hangs on the nature of conflict among the leaders. It is well known that such conflict involves elements of power struggle and elements of dispute over policy alternatives.³¹ Sometimes these elements operate independently of one another; more often they intertwine. Since Khrushchev had decisively defeated his rivals for power in 1957, we can assume that in the case of the education

reforms of 1958 the elements of power struggle were less important than at almost any time since Stalin's death, and that the elements of unadulterated policy dispute were correspondingly more important. Indeed, it is unlikely that Khrushchev would have survived such a defeat as this had this policy dispute involved much power struggle.

Insofar as this was really a policy dispute, it involved numerous problem-solving considerations, as we emphasized above. The problems and policy positions associated with them involved a number of questions of judgment about what courses of action would solve the problem, and what the consequences of such action would have for other goals of the regime. It is here that the groups play an important role. Numerous groups have recognized expertise about what problems are in their own area. The ten year school personnel had an authoritative position for a judgment that students could get work experience without radically changing the school organization and curriculum. The scientific community had good claim to special insight into the needs of training scientists. Parents may be viewed as having some legitimate judgment about the needs of adolescents, although this is less apparently expertise. One student of the reform debate has argued that

The most important factors responsible for the change in Khrushchev's original proposals probably were the arguments of experts—the function of expert opinion was to point out to the leadership the possibly harmful consequences to Soviet society of the literal adoption of Khrushchev's original plans.³²

It is hard to identify any concrete resource other than their own recognized expertise which the groups might have used in the dispute. Neither money, votes nor popularity were relevant to its resolution. Only the expert judgment was clearly relevant. The only reasonable alternative would seem to be that the regime may have accorded the positions of these groups a certain legitimacy just because they were group preferences, much as an American public official might yield to a constituent's demand simply because he views it as legitimate and because he may view his job as one of servicing such demands when they are legitimate and do not conflict with other goals. We have no reason to believe that Soviet officials view their jobs this way. Communist ideology, unlike democratic ideology, supplies

²⁷ See for example, Carl A. Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 1957-1964* (Baltimore, 1966).

²⁸ See *XIII S'ezd*, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

²⁹ See *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia* (Princeton, 1965), p. 17-18.

³⁰ For an analysis of these amendments see Rudolph Schlesinger, "The Educational Reform," *Soviet Studies*, 10 (April, 1959), 432-444.

³¹ See Brzezinski and Huntington, *op. cit.*, pp. 267, 269-283, 295-300.

³² Bernstein, *op. cit.*, p. 119. See also Brzezinski and Huntington, p. 214.

its own policy goals, rather than depending on public expressions of preference to define them. Besides, we have already seen that the goals of these groups conflicted with the goals of none other than the First Secretary of the Communist Party. It does seem apparent that insofar as groups influenced the outcome of this issue it was through the communication of their expert judgments to people at the top of the hierarchy who *were* in a position to influence outcomes. The expertise became a resource to be used in making a case that more harm than good would result from the proposed reform.³³ We contend that in the Soviet Union policy issues are often decided on the basis of such debates. If such is the case the arguments of persons who are recognized as being knowledgeable can be an important resource for the proponent or opponent of a policy proposal.³⁴

One can see elements of ambiguity in this interpretation of the role of these groups as articulators of expert judgment. It may appear, for example, that the ten year school personnel are looking out for themselves when they oppose changes in their institution. The position of the parents seems even more transparent. There may even have been some self-interest involved in the position of the scientists. The point is that there is no objective way for either Soviet leaders or American scholars to clearly separate the elements of self-interest from those of expert predictions of dire consequences. We would argue that in western democracies as well there is often an almost indecipherable mixture of preference and prediction in policy debate. For example,

³³ In this instance, many political leaders may have been especially inclined to "believe" these arguments. As primary members of the new class, Communist Party cadres had good reason to support the educational *status quo*. They were among the chief beneficiaries of the existing system. Their children enjoyed advantageous access to full-time secondary and higher education. There is no question that such cadres hoped to perpetuate the provision of such education for their children. Khrushchev's proposals surely must have caused consternation among party cadres which other top party leaders would readily have been conscious of. In this respect the party itself was probably an important constituent pressure group which reinforced the doubts Khrushchev's colleagues had about the wisdom of his proposals.

³⁴ For a view of government as problem solving and adapting to environments in which communications play a crucial role, see Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York, 1963).

social welfare policies in the United States are commonly defended in terms of the prospects of contraction and recession if welfare funds are not fed into the economy. The very ambiguity between preference and prediction may serve to enhance the prospects of group influence through the pressing of interests with the support of expert judgments. The congruence of one's interests with one's predictions is probably less important than the persuasiveness of the predictions and the acknowledged expertness of predictors, no matter whose interests they seem to support.

This almost inevitable mixture of self-interest and expertise provides a channel through which groups in the Soviet Union *may* influence policy when higher powers seek their judgment. We do not know how common this occurrence is, but we are confident that expertise is not used in this way to resolve all policy disputes. We will devote the remainder of this paper to an assessment of conditions leading to such a state, and to hypotheses about when to expect it. Our first set of hypotheses deal with what conditions within the current post-Stalin regime will be associated with such group influence. The second set will attempt to identify what it is about post-Stalinist Russia that makes this possible in contrast with the Stalin era.

III. SOME HYPOTHESES

Leadership conflict has already been cited as an important factor in leading top officials to look to group expertise. It is more than conceivable that monolithic leadership would itself seek expert advice, but we expect that it would do so more surreptitiously than through semi-public debate. More importantly, it could ignore the advice when it chose to rather than in effect being reversed by it. Under conditions of leadership conflict, unresolved disputes may lead some of the participants to broaden the scope of conflict by involving policy groups who might shift the balance. The dynamic involved may be something like the following. There is a split, for example, among the Politbureau, wherein the First Secretary is about to prevail. Holders of the minority position may react to their imminent defeat by contacting their sympathizers among the "policy groups" and urging them to state their position on the issue in their specialized publications, in hopes that the balance of power will shift in their favor when more actors are involved. Broadening the scope of conflict may change the outcome.³⁵

³⁵ See Ploss, *op. cit.*, pp. 61, 84, 286, for other

We hypothesize that the more and greater the disputes on the top policy making level, the more likely it is that policy groups will be involved and listened to.

Brzezinski and Huntington point out that policy-makers are "more responsive to the demands or aspirations of groups" during a struggle for power, which would seem to bear out our point.³⁶ They use Khrushchev's struggle as an example but they themselves point out elsewhere that victors in power, struggles often reverse themselves and adopt the policies advocated by their opponent.³⁷ This pattern would seem to reduce the long term impact of group influence in a power struggle. Our own example is of an unreversed policy decided in a period when the heat of the struggle for power had diminished, whether it had completely died or not. Indeed the absence of a threat to his power may well have made Khrushchev more willing to yield. Brzezinski and Huntington say that while policy is the means to power in succession struggles,

In stable dictatorial conditions, however, the leader may sometimes exercise power in matters that do not affect the security of his position. Then, as with the education reform of 1958, he can tolerate substantial amendments to his original proposal.³⁸

It may be, then, that conditions of tranquility lend themselves more effectively to more or less permanent and far-reaching group influence than do power struggles. Leaders are probably more eager to solicit the support of groups when they are trying to secure power or ward off threats to their position, but group influence may be more permanent and real outside of power struggles. We are not prepared to predict that group influence over policy will be greater under power struggles or more ordinary policy conflicts, but we are prepared to argue that under either of these conditions of leadership conflict group influence will be greater than when leadership is relatively monolithic. Such an hypothesis is at the core of our whole argument.

examples and a discussion of changes in the scope of conflict in the Soviet Union. See also E. E. Scattschneider, *The Semisovereign People* (New York, 1960), for a discussion of the impact of other kinds of changes in patterns of conflict in the United States.

³⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 198.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 193, 240-252.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

Bauer, Inkeles and Kluckhohn observe that the failure of a policy may lead the Politburo to adopt an approach that they recently opposed.³⁹ Our example does not directly support this observation, although of course it does not conflict with it, but the important point suggested by it is that the nature of the issue may be an important variable. Pursuing the rationale for our argument of group influence in the educational reforms it is apparent that the problematic character of the issue and the fact that the consequences of a shift were not known with certainty made the judgment of policy groups more important than they would have been otherwise. The obvious implication of this is that the more problematic the consequences of a given course of action the more likely it is that groups would be involved.

A related point that is derived from interest groups politics in western democracies is that groups are likely to be more influential in policy outcomes when the issue is narrow and technical than when the issue is broad and general.⁴⁰ In democratic polities, this is partly because other publics are less likely to be paying any attention or to care when the issue is technical. Thus the field is left relatively open for the interested group. A further rationale would be pertinent in the Soviet Union. It is not so much that other actors are or are not concerned; it is rather that technical advice and opinions are at a premium on technical issues.

We hypothesize that the more problematic and technical the issue, the more dependent on expert judgment elites will be. Consequently they will be more likely to consult policy groups, who will thereby be more influential on such issues.

While we hope that the above hypotheses help account for conditions varying *within* the current post-Stalinist regime which we associated with such group influence as we have illustrated, we do not argue that such influence ever occurred in the Stalin era. We know of no such prominent examples. In this final section we will identify several underlying conditions which in part distinguish the two eras and make groups more important in policy formation, or at least potentially so, in the present.

One important change is that the rigid dictatorial one-man rule of the Stalin period has

³⁹ Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles and Clyde Kluckhohn, *How the Soviet System Works* (New York, 1956), p. 98.

⁴⁰ See Harry Eckstein, *Pressure Group Politics* (Stanford, 1960).

given way to collective leadership. While there may be one dominant leader, his power is shared among several key figures at the apex of the political structure. Under conditions of a diffused power structure, group influence is far more likely.⁴¹ When power is exercised in an autocratic manner, groups must gain the ear of the all-powerful leader if they are to influence the policy process. During a period of collective leadership the access routes to points of decision making become more numerous. Indeed, the very nature of collective leadership may make political leaders more responsive to group demands.

Carl Linden has argued that the transition from autocracy to oligarchy brings with it a constant struggle for political primacy at the very top. Since no individual is automatically assured of predominant power he must secure that position by winning and holding the support of a combination of societal groupings. His actual or potential rivals, on the other hand, can build their own constituency coalitions by identifying with those elements discontented with an incumbent leader's policy. The politics of leadership struggle then intertwines with the politics of group conflict. It is this interdependence which facilitates group influence on the policy process.⁴²

We hypothesize that the larger and more collective the top leadership, the greater the prospects for the sort of disputes that can lead to the involvement of social groups in policy formation.

The attitudes of those leaders and their methods of social control will also have an important bearing on the prospects for group influence. Under a system of terror individuals are frightened into silent submissiveness and live in an atomized state. Unaware that others share common attitudes, grievances and interests, the terrorized citizen accepts his lot and does not attempt to influence the behavior of

decision makers.⁴³ Only when terror subsides does this condition of "pluralistic ignorance" end and the opportunity for interest articulation emerge. For now communication, both through the formal mass media and through informal personal interaction, assumes a more candid and realistic nature. Under these new conditions the communication process itself facilitates group influence. It serves to generate widespread awareness of commonly shared attitudes which in turn becomes a powerful factor inducing groups to influence policy outcomes in their favor.

The leashing of terror enhances the prospect for group influence in other ways as well. David Easton points out that not all societal claims and demands are converted into policy outputs. Only those which become public issues have this possibility.⁴⁴ In any polity this requires the patronage and support of some political authority figure. In a system where terror is no longer all-pervasive individuals may be far more likely to risk identification with unresolved issues since the consequences of poor choices are far less serious. At best it may mean that one's power position remains static. At worst it may mean a diminution in political power and perhaps even demotion. But it does not mean internment or execution as it so often did during the Stalinist period. The individual has lost a political battle but not necessarily the war. He remains on the scene with the possibility of recouping his losses and rising once again to top political positions.

We hypothesize that groups will be influential as technocratic spokesmen only when terror subsides and the regime accords them legitimacy of expression of their point of view.

The kind of expert judgment involved in the interest articulation we have described is a function of the nature of the society. Harry Eckstein has noted that modernization increases the significance of groups in the political process.⁴⁵ We suggest that the modernization of Russia positively relates to potential group influence in several ways. First, it in-

⁴¹ Dispersion of decision making can assume a "personalized" as well as an institutional form. Instead of separation of powers between executive, legislative, and judicial groups one may find a separation of powers between leaders at the top of an outwardly monolithic political structure. See Ploss *op. cit.*, p. 286. On the relationship between group influence and a diffusion of power see Harry Eckstein, "Group Theory and the Comparative Study of Pressure Groups," *Comparative Politics* edited by Harry Eckstein and David Apter (New York, 1963), p. 396.

⁴² *Op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

⁴³ This condition of "pluralistic ignorance" is discussed in Bauer and others, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

⁴⁴ David Easton "The Analysis of Political Systems" *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings* edited by Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (Homewood, 1964), pp. 94-95.

⁴⁵ "Group Theory and the Comparative Study of Pressure Groups," *Comparative Politics, op. cit.*, p. 395.

roduces a functional specialization and differentiation into the society which in turn generates a diffusion of interests competing with one another to write the laws of society to their advantage. During the early stages of Soviet rule the party preempts interest articulation not only because it wants to but also, to some degree, because it has to. The society which the Bolsheviks inherited was largely composed of an undifferentiated mass of peasants who had traditionally played a politically passive role. Thus the task of identifying and articulating interests fell to the party by default.

This is not to say that at the time of Bolshevik ascendancy there were no functionally specialized groups with political experience in the protection of their interests. They existed but they were far fewer and far less significant than in the present period. Furthermore, those groups tended to be stigmatized by their identification with the old regime. Thus any demands put forth by them lacked an essential ingredient for success—the presumption of legitimacy. The *a priori* belief of the party that such individuals were disloyal deprived them of any political currency which could be used in the process of trading support for recognition of their demands.

The modernization of Russia has fundamentally altered this situation. Not only has it generated a complex economic and social pluralism but it also has provided new cadres to staff these skilled groups.⁴⁶ Those who possess scarce technical capabilities are far more likely to exert influence today than in the past. Such technocrats are products of the new system (the new Soviet man) and their loyalty is not impugned. Consequently, their attempts to influence the political process is perceived in legitimized rather than counter-revolutionary terms. The arguments of scientific, educational, and managerial experts may have been motivated by selfish concerns. But, as we noted earlier these arguments were made in the context of what would best serve the interests of the Soviet Union. Given the fact that these experts are the products of the Soviet period, their counsel cannot be ignored on the grounds that the purveyors of such ideas are politically suspect. The handicap which afflicted old specialists simply does not operate in the contemporary period.

⁴⁶ For an interesting suggestive article on the growth of pluralism in Russian society see Henry L. Roberts, "The Succession to Khrushchev in Perspective," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, 28 (April, 1965), 2-12.

Stalin's transformation of Russia insured the increased importance of groups in the policy process in yet another way, although the full impact of this development had to await the dictator's death. It was during the thirties and forties that the politicization of society reached totalitarian dimensions. As politics came to predominate in all areas of life individuals realized that the protection of their interests could be achieved only by gaining access to and influencing the political structure. Unlike western political systems where many issues are resolved in the private sector of the society, the struggle over who gets what when and how in the Soviet Union takes place entirely within the public domain.⁴⁷ Thus individuals and groups are perforce compelled to focus their attention and pressure on the decision-making process if they hope to maintain or improve their status.

The fourth contribution of modernization stems from the fact that a complex technological society requires stable occupational group membership. As we have already suggested the behavior of managers, teachers, educators and scientists was motivated in part by their desire to protect interests derived from their occupational roles. Such a phenomenon occurs, however, only when individuals have an opportunity to firmly anchor themselves in one occupational role so that it becomes for them an important reference group. This connotes, in turn, an absence of the recurring purge so characteristic of the Stalinist period. Stalin purposefully removed leading strata of important groups lest they become too closely identified with the interests of those groups and more specifically lest they use the economic, social and political resources inherent in those groups for the purpose of delimiting the decision making power of the leader.

Now this is a very costly procedure and one

⁴⁷ We are identifying here a difference of degree. As Eckstein notes, pressure groups have become very active and significant in the postwar political systems of Britain, France, etc., for similar reasons. "One rather obvious reason for this development is the growth of the social service state—of positive government regulating, planning, directing, or entirely drawing into itself all sorts of social activities. This trend has given social groups a greater stake in politics and therefore mobilized them to a much greater extent while making government increasingly dependent on the collaboration and advice, technical or otherwise, of the groups," *Comparative Politics op. cit.*, p. 395.

that a developed society cannot afford to engage in for very long. Managers, teachers, scientists and other specialists are not created overnight and their summary purge means not only a loss of experienced and skilled personnel but also the forfeiture of scarce economic resources invested in their education and training. As Soviet society has become more complex and sophisticated this type of gross economic waste proved intolerable. We do not imply, of course, that high ranking Soviet personnel are no longer removed from their positions. The official press is full of accounts concerning the removal of such personnel. We do argue, however, that "the purge" today significantly differs from its Stalinist predecessor. At present leading occupational strata are not removed in the wholesale manner reminiscent of the thirties and forties. More importantly their removal is seldom if ever accompanied by internment or execution. Most often they seem to be demoted to a less prestigious and influential job but within the same area of expertise.

We hypothesize that the more modern the society, the more dependent it is on technical expertise,

which in turn improves the prospects that groups may influence policy when higher powers seek their judgment.⁴⁸

We have attempted in this article to illustrate that under some circumstances social groups can influence policy formation in the Soviet Union. We have specified those circumstances as clearly as we could, providing hypotheses according to which we expect group influence to vary. If our analysis is sound and valid, we hope that it may provide some guidelines for further research on group influence in the comparative study of Communist political systems.⁴⁹ Indeed, we hope that some parts of our analysis may be relevant to the study of the role of groups in policy formation in non-communist political systems as well.

⁴⁸ See S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York 1963), for a suggestive analysis of the role of skill groups in historical bureaucratic empires.

⁴⁹ See Robert C. Tucker, "On the Study of Comparative Communism," *World Politics*, 19 (January, 1967), 242-257.

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND THE HIGH SCHOOL CIVICS CURRICULUM IN THE UNITED STATES*

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Attempts to map the political development of individuals inevitably become involved with the relative contribution of different socialization agencies throughout the life cycle. Research has focused to a large extent on the family and to a much lesser degree on other agents such as the educational system. At the secondary school level very little has been done to examine systematically the selected aspects of the total school environment. To gain some insight into the role of the formal school environment, this paper will explore the relationship between the civics curriculum and political attitudes and behavior in American high schools.

A number of studies, recently fortified by data from Gabriel Almond and Sidney's Verba's five-nation study, stress the crucial role played by formal education in the political socialization process.

[None of the other variables] compares with the educational variable in the extent to which it seems to determine political attitudes. The uneducated man or the man with limited education is a different political actor from the man who has achieved a high level of education.¹

Such conclusions would not have greatly surprised the founders of the American republic, for they stressed the importance of education to the success of democratic and republican government. Starting from its early days the educational system incorporated civic training. Textbooks exposing threats to the new republic were being used in American schools by the 1790's. By 1915, the term "civics" became associated with high school courses which emphasized the study of political institutions and citizenship training.²

* Financial support for the study reported here came from the Danforth Foundation and the National Science Foundation. Kenneth Langton also wishes to acknowledge the support of the National Institute of Mental Health. We express our appreciation to Philip Converse for his helpful comments.

¹ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 135-136.

² For a short historical background and bibliography on the civics curriculum in American

Throughout this period to the present, however, there has been controversy over the objectives, content, and impact of government courses. While most educators can agree that the development of good citizenship is important, the "good citizen" is something of an ideal type whose attitudes and behavior vary with the values of those defining the construct. Yet when the literature on the development of civics is examined a few consistent themes appear. The civics course should increase the student's knowledge about political institutions and process, make him a more interested and loyal citizen, and increase his understanding of his own rights and the civil rights of others. The literature also implies that good citizenship does not exist *in vacuo*; it means active political participation as well as loyalty and interest.³

It is apparent that curriculum, teachers, school climate, and peer groups all may contribute to the political socialization process; but the relative contribution of each is unclear.⁴ Attempts to assess the actual impact of the school in general, and the curriculum in particular, have produced controversial and inconsistent results. College studies which have examined general curriculum effects (for ex-

high schools see, *inter alia*: I. James Quillen, "Government Oriented Courses in the Secondary School Curriculum," in Donald H. Riddle and Robert S. Cleary (eds.), *Political Science in the Social Studies* (36 Yearbook, National Council for the Social Studies, 1966), pp. 245-272; and Franklin Patterson, "Citizenship and the High School: Representative Current Practices," in Patterson, et al., *The Adolescent Citizen* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), Chap. 5.

³ See for example: Educational Policies Commission, *Learning the Ways of Democracy: A Case Book in Civic Education* (Washington: National Education Association of the United States, 1940), Chap. 1; and Henry W. Holmes, "The Civic Education Project of Cambridge," *Phi Delta Kappan*, 33 (December, 1951), 168-171.

⁴ For related bibliography and a general discussion of this problem see: James S. Coleman, "Introduction" in James S. Coleman (ed.), *Education and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 18-25.

ample, liberal arts vs natural science programs) upon the political values and beliefs of students have generated differing results.⁵ Because of the lack of comparative research designs and controls for pre-selection as well as the differences in institutional cultures being examined, the impact of college curricula is still an open question.⁶

Other inquiries have been more focused. Arthur Kornhauser⁷ and Albert Somit,⁸ among others, used student panel studies to measure attitude change resulting from exposure to one or more specific courses. While Kornhauser found significant change in attitudes toward liberal economic positions among students in

an economics class, Somit concluded that introductory courses in political science which emphasized personal political participation had no significant impact on the students' own attitudes along that dimension.

At the high school level the outcome of research on the association between curriculum and political socialization has also been mixed. Moreover, the conclusions of these studies are often hampered by their lack of generalizing power to broader universes of students and by the rather restricted nature of the dimensions being studied.

In a quasi-experimental study of three Boston-area high schools, Edgar Litt found that while civics courses had little impact upon students' attitudes toward political participation, these courses did affect students' "political chauvinism" and "support of the democratic creed."⁹ Experimental pedagogical methods have also resulted in some observable short term cognitive and affective changes.¹⁰ However, other studies of the relationship between formal courses in social studies and politically relevant attitudes report either inconclusive or negative results. The early New York Regent's Inquiry on Citizenship Education, which found that the quantity of work done in social studies was not reflected in changed "citizenship" attitudes, was later echoed by the Syracuse and Kansas studies of citizenship¹¹ and data from the Purdue Opinion Panel.¹²

Almond and Verba asked adult respondents in their comparative study to recall if any time was spent in their school teaching about politics and government. They compared the level

⁹ Edgar Litt, "Civic Education Norms and Political Indoctrination," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (February, 1963), 69-75.

¹⁰ See, e.g., C. Benjamin Cox and Jack E. Cousins, "Teaching Social Studies in Secondary Schools and Colleges," in Byron Massialas and Frederick R. Smith (eds.), *New Challenges in the Social Studies* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1965), Chap. 4; and Robert E. Mainer, "Attitude Change in Inter-group Programs," in H. H. Remmers (ed.), *Anti-Democratic Attitudes in American Schools* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1963), pp. 122-154.

¹¹ Franklin Patterson, et al., *op. cit.*, pp. 71-73; Roy A. Price, "Citizenship Studies in Syracuse," *Phi Delta Kappan*, 33 (December, 1951), 179-181; and Earl E. Edgar, "Kansas Study of Education for Citizenship," *ibid.*, 175-178.

¹² H. H. Remmers and D. H. Radler, *The American Teenager* (New York: Charter, 1962), p. 195.

⁵ C. Robert Pace, "What Kind of Citizens Do College Graduates Become," *Journal of General Education*, 3 (April, 1949), 197-202; W. H. Holtzman, "Attitudes of College Men Toward Non-Segregation in Texas Schools," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 20 (1956), 559-569; Theodore Newcomb, *Personality and Social Change* (New York: Dryden, 1943); Rose Goldsen, et al., *What College Students Think* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1960); A. J. Drucker and H. H. Remmers, "Citizenship Attitudes of Graduated Seniors at Purdue University," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 42 (1951), 231-235; and Irvin Lehman, "Changes In Attitudes And Values Associated With College Attendance," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 57 (April, 1966), 89-98.

⁶ Allen H. Barton, *Studying the Effects of College Education* (New Haven: Edward Hazen Foundation, 1959), p. 76; Charles G. McClintock and Henry A. Turner, "The Impact of College upon Political Knowledge, Participation, and Values," *Human Relations*, 15 (May, 1962), 163-176; and Theodore M. Newcomb, "The General Nature of Peer Group Influence," in Theodore M. Newcomb and Everett K. Wilson, *College Peer Groups* (Chicago: Aldine, 1966), p. 2.

⁷ Arthur Kornhauser, "Changes in the Information and Attitudes of Students in an Economics Class," *Journal of Educational Research*, 22 (1930), 288-308.

⁸ Albert Somit, et al., "The Effect of the Introductory Political Science Course on Student Attitudes Toward Political Participation," this REVIEW, 52 (December, 1958), 1129-1132; Marvin Schick and Albert Somit, "The Failure to Teach Political Activity," *The American Behavioral Scientist*, 6 (January, 1963), 5-8; James A. Robinson, et al., "Teaching with Inter-Nation Simulation and Case Studies," this REVIEW, 60 (March, 1966), 53-65; and Charles Garrison, "The Introductory Political Science Course As An Agent of Political Socialization" (Unpublished Dissertation, University of Oregon, 1966).

of subjective political competence of individuals who reported that time was spent in their school teaching about politics with those who reported that it was not. The authors indicate that the data show "a relatively clear connection between manifest political teaching and political competence in the United States, Britain, and Mexico."¹³ They conclude that manifest teaching about politics can increase an individual's sense of political competence, but this is less likely to happen in nations (like Germany and Italy) whose educational systems have been dominated for much of the life span of the respondents by anti-democratic philosophies.

In addition to the mixed findings of various studies, there is also some question as to the potential of the secondary school for political socialization. It is possible that by the time students reach high school many of their political orientations have crystallized or have reached a temporary plateau. Recent research¹⁴ on the political socialization of American preadults argues that the elementary school years are the most important for the formation of basic political orientations.¹⁵ It is also possible that the high school civics courses to which students are exposed offer little that is new to them, that they simply provide another layer of information which is essentially redundant.

Granting either or both of these points one should, perhaps, not expect dramatic movements simply on the basis of one or two courses. However, some incremental changes should be visible. One might also hypothesize differential incremental effects according to some central characteristics of the students, their families, the school, the curriculum, or the political orientations themselves. It is to an

examination of such possibilities that we now turn.

I. STUDY DESIGN

The data to be employed come from a study conducted by the Survey Research Center of The University of Michigan in the spring of 1965. Interviews were held with a national probability sample of 1669 high school seniors distributed among 97 secondary schools (public and non-public). An important feature of the student sample is that it was drawn from a universe of 12th graders; school dropouts in that age cohort are therefore automatically eliminated. For all but 6% of the sample each student's mother or father, designated randomly, was interviewed. Additional interviews were conducted with 317 of the students' most relevant social studies teachers. Finally, in order to determine some general academic and structural characteristics of each school, interviews and questionnaires were administered to school officials.

The particular social studies courses taken by each student were determined in the following way. In each school a list was made of the social studies courses offered during grades 10-12. As each individual course offered in a school was read to the respondent, he indicated if and when he had taken it during the past three years—that is during the 10th, 11th and 12th grades.

We were particularly interested in those courses which are commonly referred to as high school government or civics courses. A broad array of courses were included under this rubric. They ranged from the usual American Government and Problems of Democracy courses, through Political Science, Americanism, Communism and Democracy, to International Relations, World Citizenship, and Comparative Politics. Contemporary History courses which were essentially studies of current events were also included in this dimension. Normally, however, we distinguished between history and civics courses. While both types of courses (as well as other social studies) may have an impact on students' political orientations, in this paper we shall generally limit our focus to the civics curriculum.

Each student in the sample was scored according to the number of government courses he had taken during his three years of high school. About one-third of the students had not taken such a course, and of those who had the great majority had taken no more than one (Table 1). Therefore in the following analysis when we talk about the direct impact of the

¹³ Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 361.

¹⁴ Robert D. Hess and David Easton, "The Role of the Elementary School in Political Socialization," *The School Review*, 70 (1962), 257-265; David Easton and Robert Hess, "The Child's Political World," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 6 (August, 1962), 229-246; Robert Hess and Judith Torney, *The Development of Political Attitudes In Children* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967); and Fred Greenstein, *Children And Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

¹⁵ On the other hand, Adelson and O'Neil find important political cognitive development taking place during the adolescent years. See Joseph Adelson and Robert O'Neil, "The Growth of Political Ideas in Adolescence: The Sense of Community," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 4 (September, 1966), 295-306.

TABLE 1. NUMBER AND TYPE OF CIVICS COURSES
TAKEN BY AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS
IN GRADES 10-12

Number of Courses	Percent	Type of Course Among Those Taking A Course	Percent
0	32	American Government	67
1	59	American Problems	37
2+	9	Other	10
100%			114%
N = (2060) ^b			N = (1401)

^a Percentages exceed 100 because some students have taken more than one course.
^b This is a weighted N resulting from a factor applied to correct for unavoidably imprecise estimates made at the time the sampling frame was constructed. All results reported here are based on weighted N's. In the case of multivariate analysis using data from the parents as well as students, the base weighted N will be 1927, a reduction occasioned by the fact that interviews were not held with 6% of the students' parents.

civics curriculum upon political orientations it will mean for most students the difference between no civics course and one civics course. Since a civics course is usually taken by requirement, we may assume that there is little self-selection bias at work.¹⁶

Table 1 also shows a breakdown of the *type* of course experienced. The division is between the more frequently-taken American Government course, the less popular American Problems course, and a sprinkling of more esoteric titles. The "Problems" course is commonly called Problems of Democracy, Contemporary Problems, Problems of American Life, and so forth. Schools typically offer either American Government or American Problems although they are occasionally found together, and infrequently—in nonpublic or especially small schools—neither course may be offered.¹⁷ Whereas the American Government courses focus heavily on the forms, structures, backgrounds, and traditions of American political

life, the Problems courses are more eclectic in terms of the disciplines utilized, emphasize a wider scope of socio-political activities, are more contemporary in nature, and are typically organized around major problems in American public life. Because of the different emphases and formats of the two types of courses, educators have suggested that they will have differential effects.

In selecting the dependent variables for this analysis, we attempted to touch on many of the consistent themes in the "civics" literature which are germane for political science. Rather than examine only one or two variables, we have elected to pursue a wide variety so that the possible variations in effects may be uncovered.

1. *Political knowledge and sophistication.*—For better or worse, performance on factual examinations is a prime way in which the success of a course and teacher is evaluated. Students were asked six questions dealing with recent and contemporary political events and personalities. The pattern of responses formed a Guttman-type political knowledge scale.¹⁸ Another measure (explained below), touching more directly on political sophistication, ascertained the students' perception of ideological differences between political parties.

2. *Political interest.*—A hallmark of the "shoulds" of political education in the United States is the shaping of citizens to take an active interest in political affairs. Although numerous studies of adults suggest that the schools and other socializing agents fall short of the goals envisioned by the authors of civics textbooks, it is nevertheless possible that these achievements would be even less impressive in the absence of intensive inculcation in the civics courses. Among many alternative measures of interest available in the interview protocols, we shall rely on the answers to a straightforward inquiry.¹⁹

¹⁶ A regional pattern is present. Appreciably more students in the West and Midwest had taken such courses than was true in the South and, especially, in the Northeast. It appears that this variation did not influence the findings reported below. Other personal and school characteristics did not discriminate among takers and nontakers of civics courses.

¹⁷ For a more detailed account of social studies curriculum offerings see M. Kent Jennings, "Correlates of the Social Studies Curriculum: Grades 10-12," in Benjamin Cox and Byron Massialas (eds.), *Social Studies in the United States* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1967).

¹⁸ Respondents were asked to identify (1) the number of years a U.S. Senator serves; (2) the country Marshall Tito leads; (3) the number of members on the U.S. Supreme Court; (4) the name of the Governor of their state; (5) the nation that during WWII "had a great many concentration camps for Jews"; and (5) whether President Franklin Roosevelt was a Republican or a Democrat.

The six items formed a Guttman scale with a coefficient of reproducibility (CR) of .92.

¹⁹ "Some people seem to think about what's going on in government and public affairs most of

3. *Spectator politicization*.—A more direct measure of interest in political matters is the degree to which students consume political content in the mass media. If the civics curriculum spurs an interest in politics, it should be reflected in greater media consumption. Separate soundings were taken of the students' behavior *vis-a-vis* television, newspapers, and magazines.²⁰

4. *Political discourse*.—Even more dramatic evidence of the success of the civics experience would be an upsurge in the pre-adult's level of politically-tinged dialogue. In view of the fact that there are relatively few ways in which the high school senior can (or does) assume active political roles, the frequency of political conversations is not an improbable surrogate for forms of adult-level political activity. For present purposes the student's report of the frequency with which he discusses politics with his peers will be used.²¹

5. *Political efficacy*.—The belief that one can affect political outcomes is a vital element of political behavior, and Easton and Dennis have demonstrated the rising sense of efficacy as the child progresses through elementary school.²² Much of civic education's thrust is toward developing a sense of civic competence. Efficacy was measured by the students' responses to two items.²³

the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then or hardly at all?"

²⁰ Students were asked how often they "read about public affairs and politics" in newspapers or magazines and how often they watched "any programs about public affairs, politics, and the news on television."

²¹ "Do you talk about public affairs and politics with your friends outside of classes?" (If yes) "How often would you say that is?"

²² David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," this REVIEW, 61 (March, 1967), 25-38; Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, Chap. 12; and Angus Campbell, et al., *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960), pp. 103-105, 480-481.

²³ The following two items were used to construct a three point political efficacy scale with a CR of .94.

- (1) Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.
- (2) Voting is the only way that people like my mother and father can have any say about how the government runs things.

6. *Political cynicism*.—While trying to create interest in politics and a sense of efficacy, the civics curriculum almost inevitably tries to discourage feelings of mistrust and cynicism toward the government. Indeed, cynicism seems in part to be antithetical to a feeling of civic competence.²⁴ A six-item scale was used to arrange the students on a political cynicism dimension.²⁵

7. *Civic tolerance*.—Considerable discussion exists in the citizenship literature on the necessity for inculcating norms of civic tolerance. Even though the curriculum materials and the teachers often fail to grapple with the complexities of these norms, a proper and necessary role of civics courses is seen as creating support for the "Bill of Rights," due process, freedom of speech, recognition of legitimate diversity, and so forth.²⁶ In order to probe the effect of exposure to civics courses on these types of beliefs, a three-item civic tolerance scale was devised.²⁷

²⁴ Robert E. Agger, Marshall Goldstein, and Stanley Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," *The Journal of Politics*, 23 (August, 1961) 477-506.

²⁵ The following six items formed a political cynicism scale which had a CR of .92.

- (1) Over the years, how much attention do you feel the government pays to what the people think when it decides what to do. . . ?
- (2) Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are a little crooked not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are?
- (3) Do you think that people in government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?
- (4) How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right?
- (5) Do you feel that almost all of the people running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing, or do you think that quite a few of them don't seem to know what they are doing?
- (6) Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?

²⁶ See Byron Massialas, "Teaching American Government in High School," in Cox and Massialas, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-195.

²⁷ The following three agree-disagree questions formed a Guttman scale with a CR of .95.

- (1) If a person wanted to make a speech in this

8. *Participative orientation.*—Instilling a propensity toward participation in public life becomes especially evident as a civic education goal as the adolescent approaches legal age. In particular, one might hypothesize that the participation ethic would displace a more basic and early-formed orientation such as loyalty to country. Responses to an open-ended question tapping the students' view of the "good citizen" form the basis of the participative-orientation measure.²⁸

Before turning to the findings it will be instructive to consider some of the factors which could affect the relationship between exposure to civics and the dependent variables. For example, one could argue that a positive association between exposure and political knowledge may only be found among students from less educated and less politicized families. This "sponge" theory maintains that children from more culturally deprived families are less likely to be saturated with political knowledge and interest in the family environment; therefore they are more likely to be affected by the civics curriculum when they enter high school. Conversely, one might hypothesize that it is the child from the more highly educated family who is most likely to have developed the minimal learning skills and sensitivity to politics which would allow him to respond to civics instruction.

The academic quality of the high school could also affect the efficacy of the civics curriculum. A school that sends 75% of its seniors on to a four year college might be presumed to have a significantly different and better academic program than a school that sends only 15% of its students.

Since we are focusing on civics courses rather than history courses—taken in moderate to heavy amounts by virtually all high school students—we also want to be sure that we are measuring the independent effect of the civics curriculum and not the interactive effect of the history courses. One can easily think of other possible predictor variables: grade average, sex, political interest, and so forth.

The problem of multiple predictors clearly calls for a form of multivariate analysis. We chose the Multiple Classification Analysis

Program (MCA).²⁹ This program is useful for examining the relationship of each of several predictors to a dependent variable at a zero order level and while the other predictors are held constant. Eta coefficients and partial beta coefficients indicate the magnitudes of the relationships for zero order and partial correlations, respectively. The program assumes additive effects and combines some features of both multiple regression and analysis of variance techniques. Unlike conventional regression procedures the program allows predictor variables in the form of nominal as well as higher order scales and it does not require or assume linearity of regression.

In the subsequent multivariate analysis seven variables were held constant while the independent effect of the civics curriculum was examined: 1) quality of the school;³⁰ 2) grade average; 3) sex; 4) student's political interest;³¹ 5) the number of history courses taken; 6) parental education; and 7) parental politicization (discussion of politics within the family). Information on the latter two variables was based on interviews held with the students' parents, not from students' reports, as is commonly the case.

II. FINDINGS FOR THE WHOLE SAMPLE

One of the first points to be established here is that scant differences emerge in the dependent variables as a consequence of whether the student had taken a more traditional American Government course or the more topically-oriented, wider ranging American Problems course. There is a consistent, though quite small tendency for students taking the former course to consume more political content in newspapers, magazines, and on television, and to discuss politics with peers more frequently. But compared with students taking the American Problems course they more often stress the loyalty (48% versus 37%) rather than the participation aspect of good citizenship behavior. Aside from these rather meager differences, students taking the two major types of courses are virtually indistinguishable in terms

²⁹ Frank Andrews, James Morgan, and John Sonquist, *Multiple Classification Analysis* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1967).

³⁰ School academic quality is based on the percent of seniors going on to four year colleges or universities in each school. This information was obtained from school sources.

³¹ When political interest was examined as a dependent variable in the MCA analysis it was, of course, dropped as a control variable.

community against religion, he should be allowed to speak.

- (2) If a Communist were legally elected to some public office around here, the people should allow him to take office.
- (3) The American system of government is one that all nations should have.

²⁸ The question wording is found on page 27.

of their political orientations. Knowing this, we may proceed with some confidence to treat them (and those taking a sprinkling of other courses) together and to focus our analysis primarily on the amount of exposure, *viz.*, none, one, or two courses during grades 10–12.

An overview of the results offers strikingly little support for the impact of the curriculum. It is true that the direction of the findings is generally consonant with the predictions advanced above. That is, the more civics courses the student has had the more likely he is to be knowledgeable, to be interested in politics, to expose himself to the political content of the mass media, to have more political discourse, to feel more efficacious, to espouse a participative (versus loyalty) orientation, and to show more civic tolerance. The possible exception to the pattern is the curvilinear relationship between course-taking and political cynicism. Thus, the claims made for the importance of the civic education courses in the senior high school are vindicated if one only considers the direction of the results.

However, it is perfectly obvious from the size of the correlations that the magnitude of the relationships are extremely weak, in most instances bordering on the trivial. The highest positive eta coefficient is .06, and the highest partial beta is but .11 (for political knowledge).³² Our earlier anticipation that course-taking among older adolescents might result in only incremental changes is borne out with a vengeance. Indeed, the increments are so miniscule as to raise serious questions about the

utility of investing in government courses in the senior high school, at least as these courses are presently constituted. Furthermore, when we tested the impact of the history curriculum under the same control conditions it was as low or lower than the civics curriculum.³³

It could be argued that the inclusion of a key variable, *viz.*, the quality and type of teaching, would produce differential effects among those students who have taken one or more courses. This may be true, and in another place this possibility will be examined in detail. However, given the meager zero-order correlations, it is doubtful if that impact will be particularly large.³⁴ Another factor which might elicit differential patterns among students taking such courses is the content of the materials used and the nature of the classroom discourse. This contingency, too, will be dealt with elsewhere, but it faces in large part the same difficulty as does the teacher contingency. It also confronts the reality of considerable uniformity in curriculum materials and the domination of the textbook market by a few leading books.³⁵

Do these findings mean that the political orientations of pre-adults are essentially refractory to change during the senior high school years? This possibility cannot be easily dismissed. Certainly the pre-high schooler has already undergone, especially in the American

³³ In a preliminary analysis the impact of taking social studies courses as a whole was examined. The number of social studies courses taken accounted for little difference in the students' orientations.

³⁴ We were interested in what effect the students' perceptions of the quality of their civics teachers and courses as well as the sex of the teacher might have on the relationships. Students were asked to rank each of the courses they had taken from extremely good to extremely poor. They also ranked the quality of their teachers in the same way. Prior to the MCA analysis the relationship between the civics curriculum and the dependent variables was examined within contingency tables controlled for course and teacher ratings. Course and teacher ratings had no consistent, significant effect upon the relationships. Controls for the sex of the student's teacher also produced no significant differences.

³⁵ See James P. Shaver, "Reflective Thinking, Values, and Social Studies Textbooks," *School Review*, 73 (1965), 226–257; Frederick R. Smith and John J. Patrick, "Civics: Relating Social Study to Social Reality," and Byron Massialas, "Teaching American Government in High School," both in Cox and Massialas (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 105–127, 167–195.

³² For convenience partial beta coefficients will be referred to as betas or beta coefficients. The beta coefficient is directly analogous to the eta, but is based on the adjusted rather than the raw mean. It provides a measure of the ability of the predictor to explain variation in the dependent variable after adjusting for the effects of all other predictors. This is not in terms of percent of variance explained. The term beta is used because "the measure is analogous to the standardized regression coefficient, i.e., the regression coefficient multiplied by the standard deviation of the predictor and divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable, so that the result is a measure of the number of standard deviation units the dependent variable moves when the explanatory variable changes by one standard deviation." Andrews, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

As mentioned earlier, the MCA program assumes additive effects. While some interaction may be present, a close scrutiny of the statistical analysis makes it doubtful if the impact is particularly large.

context, several years of intensive formal and informal political socialization. He may have developed, by the time he reaches secondary school, a resistance to further formal socialization at this stage in his life cycle. But there is also an alternative or additional explanation. If the course work represents information redundancy, there is little reason to expect even modest alterations. By redundancy we mean not only repetition of previous instruction, though there is surely a surfeit of that. We mean also redundancy in the sense of duplicating cues from other information sources, particularly the mass media, formal organizations, and primary groups. Students not taking civics courses are probably exposed to these other sources in approximately the same doses as those enrolled in the courses. Assuming that this is the case, and that the courses provide relatively few new inputs, the consequence would be lack of differentiation between course takers and non-course takers.

For these reasons it would be well to look at courses and teachers which do not generate information redundancy. That is the virtue of examining the finer grain of teacher performance and course content, as proposed above. Another strategy, and one to be adopted in the remainder of this paper, would be to look at subpopulations of pre-adults where redundancy might be less frequent than for pre-adults in general. Less redundancy could be occasioned either by infusion of new information where relatively little existed before, or by information which conflicts with information coming from other sources.

Among the universe of subpopulations one could utilize, perhaps none is as distinctive as that of the Negro minority. The unique situation of Negroes in American social and political life and the dynamics now at work have been well-documented.³⁶ Because of cultural differ-

ences between the White majority and the Negro minority, the frequent exclusion of Negroes from socio-political life, the contemporary civil rights ferment, and the less privileged position of Negroes in our society, it seems likely that information redundancy would occur less often among the Negro pre-adults. Therefore, the student sample was divided along racial lines.

III. FINDINGS FOR THE NEGRO SUBSAMPLE

Although the Negro portion of the sample is not as large as one might desire for extensive analysis (raw $N=186$, weighted $N=208$), it is sufficiently large to permit gross comparisons with White students of similar social characteristics and also permits some analysis within the Negro subpopulation. The subsample size and the fact that the dropout rate is appreciably higher among Negroes than Whites underscores the admonition that this subsample should not be extrapolated to the Negro age cohort in general. It should also be noted that the subsample contains twelve respondents classified as non-Whites other than Negro.

Demographically, the Negro students are located disproportionately in the South (55% versus 25% for Whites) and come from more disadvantaged backgrounds than do the Whites. The latter is true despite the fact that the backgrounds of Negro students who have persevered through high school are undoubtedly less deprived than are those of their cohort who dropped out. Social status differences between Negroes and Whites are more pronounced in the South than in the North.

Negro and White students have taken civics courses in approximately the same proportions (Negroes 63%, Whites 68%). When the association between the civics curriculum and the dependent variables discussed above was re-examined within both racial groups, some intriguing differences appeared. These caused us to reassess the place of the civics curriculum in the political socialization of American youth.

Political Knowledge. White students score more highly on the knowledge scale than do Negroes; and when parents' education is controlled the differences persist at all levels. Civics courses have little effect on the absolute political knowledge level of whites ($\beta=.08$). The number of courses taken by Negroes, on the other hand, is significantly associated with their political knowledge score ($\beta=.30$).

³⁶ In addition to such classics as Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1944), see more recent works: Thomas F. Pettigrew, *A Profile of the American Negro* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1964); William Brink and Louis Harris, *The Negro Revolution in America* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1964); Kenneth B. Clark, *Dark Ghetto* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); Lewis Killian and Charles Grigg, *Racial Crises in America* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964); Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, *Negroes and the New Southern Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1966); Dwaine Marvick, "The Political Socialization of the American Negro," *The Annals*, 361 (September, 1965), 112-127; and

William C. Kvaraceus, et al., *Negro Self Concept: Implication for School and Citizenship* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965).

The civics curriculum is an important source of political knowledge for Negroes and, as we shall see later, appears in some cases to substitute for political information gathering in the media.

Although the complex multivariate analysis holds parental education constant, it does not allow us to observe easily the singular role of this crucial socialization factor upon the relationship between curriculum and political orientations. Therefore, contingency tables were constructed with parental education controlled for all relationships between the number of government courses taken on the one hand, and each political orientation on the other. All instances in which education makes a distinctive imprint are reported.³⁷ For the case at hand—political knowledge—controls for parental education did not alter the effects of the curriculum among either Whites or Negroes.

In another attempt to measure political knowledge as well as ideological sophistication, students were asked which political party they thought was most conservative or liberal. Each party has its "liberal" and "conservative" elements, but studies of roll call voting in Congress as well as the commentary of the politically aware places the Republican party somewhat to the right of the Democrats. Forty-five percent of the students said that the Republicans were more conservative than the Democrats. Thirty-eight percent confessed to not knowing the answer.

In answering this question the student was faced with a problem not of his own making. It can be presumed that some respondents made a random choice (i.e., guessed) to extricate themselves. One gauge of the frequency of guessing is how often the Democrats were assigned a conservative position (17%). If we make the reasonable assumption that this form of random guess is symmetric around the midpoint of the response dimension, we can say that an additional 17% of the students guessed "correctly" by putting the Republicans in the conservative column. Accordingly, we may deduct 17% from the 45% who said Republicans were more conservative, leaving 28% who are able to connect the conservative label to the Republican party.³⁸

³⁷ Parental education was used as a summary control variable because we felt that it best captures the tone of the whole family environment as well as other sources of socialization.

³⁸ We have borrowed this method of adjusting "correct" answers from Donald E. Stokes, "Ideological Competition of British Parties," paper

TABLE 2. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE CIVICS CURRICULUM AND KNOWING THE IDEOLOGICAL POSITION OF THE REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRAT PARTIES AMONG NEGRO AND WHITE STUDENTS

Number of Civics Courses	Adjusted Percentage of Correct Responses			
	Negro		White	
	%	N	%	N
0	0	(72)	29	(543)
1+	19	(122)	31	(1184)

We are less interested in the absolute number of students who are able to connect symbol with party than with the role the civics curriculum plays in this process. Again we see that course work has little impact on White students while the percent of Negroes who "know" the parties' ideological position increases as they take more civics courses (Table 2).

These findings using both measures of political knowledge offer an excellent example of redundancy in operation. The clear inference as to why the Negro students' responses are "improved" by taking the courses is that new information is being added where relatively less existed before. White students enrolled in the courses appear to receive nothing beyond that to which their non-enrolled cohorts are being exposed. This, coupled with the great lead which Whites in general already have over the Negro students, makes for greater redundancy among Whites than Negroes.

One should not deduce from these results that the white students have a firm grasp on political knowledge; as Table 2 and other data indicate, they clearly do not. Rather, White students have reached a saturation or quota level which is impervious to change by the civics curriculum. From their relatively lower start the Negro students' knowledge level can be increased by exposure to the civics curriculum.

Political Efficacy and Political Cynicism. Almost twice as many Negro students as White scored low on the political efficacy scale. When the effect of parental education is partialled out the racial differences remain at each educational level, although they are somewhat diminished. Interestingly enough, the difference in the percentage of those who scored low is

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TABLE 3. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF CIVICS COURSES TAKEN AND POLITICAL EFFICACY AMONG NEGRO STUDENTS, BY PARENTAL EDUCATION

Number of Civics Courses ^a	Elementary Political Efficacy			N	Gamma
	Low	Medium	High		
	%	%	%		
0	64	20	16	(18)	
1+	30	27	43	(39)	.56
	High School Political Efficacy				
	Low	Medium	High		
	%	%	%		
0	56	20	24	(41)	
1+	34	27	39	(62)	.36
	College Political Efficacy				
	Low	Medium	High		
	%	%	%		
0	32	32	36	(15)	
1+	37	19	44	(24)	.02

^a Parental education was set by the highest level achieved by either parent. "Elementary" means neither parent exceeded an eighth grade education; "high school" that at least one parent had one or more years of high school training; and "college" that at least one parent had one or more years of collegiate experience.

less between Negro and White students whose parents have had only an elementary school education (13%) than between Negro and White students whose parents have had a college education (24%).

The number of civics courses taken by White students has little perceptible effect on their sense of political efficacy (beta=.05). Among Negroes, though, course exposure is moderately related to a sense of efficacy (beta=.18). As can be seen in Table 3, this is particularly true for Negroes from less educated families. The strength of the relationship decreases significantly among higher status students. Course-taking among the lower-status Negroes acts to bring their scores into line with their higher status cohorts. There is but a faint trace of this pattern among White students.

Although Negro students at all levels of parental education feel less efficacious than their White counterparts, it must be concluded that without the civics curriculum the gap would be even greater. As in the case of political knowledge, we have another illustration of less redundancy at work among the Negro subsample. For a variety of reasons the American political culture produces a lower sense of efficacy among Negro youths compared with Whites. But by heavily emphasizing the legitimacy, desirability, and feasibility of citizen participation and control, the civics course

adds a new element in the socialization of low and middle status Negro students. Since those from the less educated families are more likely to be surrounded by agents with generally low efficacy levels, the curriculum has considerably more effect on them than on their peers from higher-status environments. Leaving aside the possible later disappointments in testing the reality of their new-found efficacy, the Negro students from less privileged backgrounds are for the moment visibly moved by course exposure.

While Negroes as a whole are less politically efficacious than Whites, they are not at the same time more politically cynical. The proportion of twelfth graders falling into the three most cynical categories of a six point political cynicism scale includes 21% of the White and 23% of the Negro students. This relatively low level of political cynicism among Negroes may seem ironic, but it is consistent with their view of the "good citizen" role (discussed later). The high school civics curriculum has only a slight effect upon the cynicism level of Whites (beta=.11) and none among Negroes (beta=.01). However, this difference suggests that the cynicism of the latter may be somewhat less moveable than that for Whites.

Civic Tolerance. One of the abiding goals of civic education is the encouragement and development of civic toleration. Negroes as a whole score lower on the civic tolerance scale than do Whites. When parental education is controlled the racial differences remain at each education level, although they are moderately attenuated. Again, as with political efficacy, the differences in the percentage of those scoring low is less between Negro and White students whose parents have had only an elementary school education (18%) than between Negro and White students whose parents have had a college education (28%). What we may be witnessing is the result of Negro compensation for the White bias in American society—a bias to which higher status Negroes may prove most sensitive.

The number of civics courses taken has little effect on White students' civic tolerance scores (beta=.06), with somewhat greater impact being observed on those from homes of lower parental education. There is, however, a moderate association between exposure and Negro students' sense of civic tolerance (beta=.22). The more courses they take, the higher their level of tolerance. Negroes are more intolerant even when educational controls are introduced, but the civics curriculum appears to overcome in part the environmental factors which may contribute to their relatively lower

TABLE 4. GAMMA CORRELATION BETWEEN NUMBER OF CIVICS COURSES TAKEN AND POLITICAL INTEREST AND DISCUSSION WITH PEERS AMONG NEGRO STUDENTS, BY PARENTAL EDUCATION

Parental Education	Political Interest	Political Discussion
Elementary	+ .31	+ .20
High School	- .18	- .31
College	- .21	- .36

tolerance. The items on which the civic tolerance measure is based all have to do with the acceptance of diversity. Aggregate student and parent data suggest that these items tap a dimension of political sophistication less likely to be operative in the Negro-subculture. To the extent that the civics courses preach more tolerance, the message is less likely to be redundant among the Negroes than the Whites. Unlike political knowledge and efficacy, though, course-taking exerts its main effect on Negro twelfth graders from better-educated families, thereby suggesting that a threshold of receptivity may be lacking among those from lower-status families.

Politicization—Interest, Discussion, and Media Usage. Students were asked about their interest in public affairs and how often they discussed politics with their friends outside class. There is little difference between racial groups among those who expressed high interest in politics or said they discussed politics weekly or more often with their friends. Nor did controls for parental education uncover aggregate racial distinctions. Moreover, the civics curriculum appears at first glance to have little impact upon these two indicators of politicization among Negroes ($\beta = .15$ and $-.07$, respectively) or Whites ($\beta = .06$ and $.04$). Yet an examination of Table 4 indicates that curriculum effect is differentially determined by the educational level of the Negro students' parents (in contrast to a lack of variation among Whites). The differential effect may account for the low beta coefficient in the multivariate analysis.

As Negroes from less educated families take more civics courses their political interest and frequency of political discussion with peers increases. Since less educated parents ordinarily evince lower states of politicization, one could explain this in terms of nonredundant information spurring an upsurge in student politicization. Students from higher status families, however, actually appear to undergo depoliticization as they move through the civics curriculum.

zation as they move through the civics curriculum.

In their excellent social and psychological inquiry into the personality of the American Negro, Abram Kardiner and Lionel Ovesey observed that it is the higher status Negro who is most likely to identify and have contact with Whites and their culture.³⁹ But due to their race, the disappointments are more frequent and their aspirations more likely to founder on the rock of unattainable ideals.

Because of his parents' experiences, the higher status Negro student may have received a more "realistic" appraisal of the institutional and social restrictions placed upon Negro participation in the United States. Upon enrolling in the civics course he finds at least two good-citizen roles being emphasized. The first stresses a politicized-participation dimension. The second emphasizes a more passive role: loyalty and obedience to authority and nation. If he has absorbed from his parents the probability of restrictions, the participation-politicization emphasis in the curriculum may have little impact upon the higher status Negro student. Redundancy is low because the information conflicts with previous learning. The "reality factor" causes him to select out of the curriculum only those role characteristics which appear to be more congruent with a preconceived notion of his political life chances. As we shall see later, higher status Negro students' perception of the good citizen role is compatible with the above interpretation.

Students were also asked how often they read articles in newspapers or magazines or watched programs on television that dealt with public affairs, news, or politics. In the aggregate, students from each racial grouping employ newspapers and magazines at about the same rates; but Negro students use television more often than do Whites, and at all levels of parental education. The civics curriculum has a different impact upon political media usage among Whites and Negroes. Table 5 shows that for White students there is a consistent—but very weak—association between taking civics courses and use of the media as an access point to political information. Among Negroes there is a consistently negative but somewhat stronger association between the civics curriculum and political media usage.

Observing the same relationship within contingency tables under less severe control conditions, the civics curriculum continues to have

³⁹ Abram Kardiner and Lionel Ovesey, *The Mark of Oppression* (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co. [a Meridian book], 1962).

a negative—although fluctuating—impact upon political media usage among Negroes at all levels of parental education (Table 6).

Negative correlations among Negroes might be explained on at least two dimensions: substitution and depoliticization. A civics course may increase a student's political interest while at the same time acting as a substitute for political information gathering in the media. This is what appears to be happening among Negroes from less educated families. Negative associations between course work and media usage suggest that the former may be substituting for political information gathering in the media. But as we saw before, there is a significant increase in political interest among lower status Negroes as they take more civics courses. The lack of depoliticization in this group was further confirmed by the positive correlation between the civics curriculum and discussing politics with one's school friends (Table 4).

The case of the higher status Negro seems to be of a different order. Negative correlations between the civics curriculum and media usage may indicate substitution, but what is even more apparent is the general depoliticization of higher status Negroes as they move through the curriculum. The more courses they take the less likely are they to seek political information in newspapers, magazines, and television. In addition there is also a decrease in their political interest and propensity to discuss politics with their friends.

Citizenship Behavior. Interjecting race adds a special complexity to the relationship between the civics curriculum and the student's belief about the role of a good citizen in this country. Students were asked:

People have different ideas about what being a good citizen means. We're interested in what you think. Tell me how you would describe a good citizen in this country—that is, what things about a person are most important in showing that he is a good citizen.

Taking only their first responses, 70% of the

TABLE 5. PARTIAL BETA COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN NUMBER OF CIVICS COURSES TAKEN AND POLITICAL MEDIA USAGE AMONG NEGRO AND WHITE STUDENTS

Media	Negro	White
Newspapers	-.17	+.07
Television	-.21	+.04
Magazines	-.10	+.10

TABLE 6. GAMMA CORRELATIONS BETWEEN NUMBER OF CIVICS COURSES TAKEN AND POLITICAL MEDIA USAGE AMONG NEGRO STUDENTS, BY PARENTAL EDUCATION

Media	Parental Education		
	Primary	Secondary	College
Newspapers	-.07	-.36	-.28
Television	-.39	-.42	-.17
Magazines	-.27	-.07	-.42

Whites and 63% of the Negroes fell along two general dimensions: loyalty and political participation. Within these two response dimensions there are distinct racial differences. Sixty-one percent of the Negro responses focus on loyalty rather than participation. Only 41% of the White students, on the other hand, see the "good citizen" role as being one of loyalty rather than political participation. When we probe the relationship between taking civics courses and citizenship orientation some interesting differences are revealed. More civics courses mean more loyalty and less participation orientation for Negroes. In Table 7 there is a 24% difference in loyalty orientation between those Negroes who have taken no civic courses and those who have taken one or more. Civics course work has a slightly opposite effect among White students.

TABLE 7. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVICS CURRICULUM AND GOOD CITIZENSHIP ATTITUDES AMONG NEGRO AND WHITE STUDENTS

Number of Civics Courses	Negroes Stressing:		
	Loyalty	Participation	
	%	%	N*
0	51	49	(41)
1+	75	25	(85)
Whites Stressing:			
	Loyalty	Participation	
0	46	54	(395)
1+	39	61	(803)

* These N's run lower than corresponding N's in other tables because those respondents not mentioning either loyalty or participation in their first response are excluded from the base.

TABLE 8. THE RELATION BETWEEN CIVICS CURRICULUM AND CITIZENSHIP ATTITUDES AMONG NEGRO STUDENTS, BY PARENTAL EDUCATION

Number of Civics Courses	Elementary		N
	Loyalty	Participation	
	%	%	
0	83	17	(6)
1+	63	37	(28)
High School			
	Loyalty	Participation	
0	54	46	(24)
1+	90	10	(41)
College			
	Loyalty	Participation	
0	32	68	(11)
1+	60	40	(17)

In other words, while the civics curriculum has little impact upon the White student's view of the good citizen role, it appears to inculcate in Negroes the role expectation that a good citizen is above all a loyal citizen rather than an active one. Yet looking at this same relationship among Negroes under the more severe multivariate control conditions the size of the beta coefficient ($-.10$) is not large.⁴⁰ While it is predictably negative (i.e., loyalty orientation increases with course work), the magnitude of the coefficients reduces our confidence in the earlier contingency table.

The difference in findings may be the result of moving from a relatively simple bivariate analysis with no controls for other possible intervening variables to a more sophisticated mode of multivariate analysis under more rigorously controlled conditions. This undoubtedly accounts for part of the difference, but we also found, as before, that the civics curriculum has a differential effect upon Negroes depending on the educational level of their parents.

Negro students whose parents have some secondary school or college education increase their loyalty orientation by 36% and 28%, respectively, as they take more civics courses (Table 8). Negroes from less educated families, however, increase their participation orienta-

tion much like White students. Due to the small N for Negro students who have taken no courses and whose parents have an elementary school education or less this relationship should be treated quite cautiously. Although differences between Negroes from different levels of parental education have been mentioned before, the most one would want to say here is that the civics curriculum seems to increase the loyalty orientations of higher status Negroes while having a slightly opposite effect among lower status Negro students.

A number of interpretations can be placed on these findings. Both loyalty and participation are emphasized in the civics curriculum, and for White and lower status Negro students the dual emphasis has about equal effect. But as we noted earlier, the higher status Negro may have received from his more active parents a "realistic" appraisal of the institutional and social restrictions placed upon Negro participation in American politics. Consequently, the participation emphasis in the curriculum has little impact. The reality factor may cause the higher status Negro to select out of the curriculum only those role characteristics which appear to be most congruent with a preconceived notion of his political life chances.

Another rationale for the findings might be found in the relative fulfillment of White and Negro needs to belong, to be accepted in this society. If we assume that the Negro is cut off from many of the associational memberships and status advantages that most Whites take for granted, then his unfulfilled need to belong and to be accepted is probably greater than that of his white counterparts. This may be particularly true of the higher status Negro and his parents. Because of their relatively higher education in the Negro community, they have had more contacts with Whites—contacts which, because of their race, have led to more frequent rebuffs. The one association not explicitly denied Negroes is that of being a loyal American. It is entirely possible that the psychic relief a higher status Negro receives in "establishing" his American good-citizenship is greater than that of his White counterpart or his lower status racial peer. As a consequence, the loyalty emphasis in the curriculum may have the most impact on the higher status Negro.⁴¹

⁴¹ In 1942 Gunnar Myrdal completed a comprehensive codification of the Negro culture and circumstances in America. He maintained that Negroes in this country were "exaggerated Americans," who believed in the American Creed more strongly than Whites. Gunnar Myrdal, *op. cit.*

⁴⁰ The beta coefficient for White students is $+.07$.

Regional Effects. The Negro students are located disproportionately in the southern part of the United States. Because of possible cultural differences we thought it advisable to control for region as well as parental education. Therefore the Negro subsample was divided into South and non-South with controls for high and low parental education employed in each region.⁴²

When controlled for region as well as parental education, the effects of the civics curriculum upon political knowledge, interest, discussion, television-newspaper-magazine usage, and loyalty-participation orientations were consistent with the results for the Negro subsample as a whole in all except two cases. Among the seven variables discussed above there are 28 cases (two for each region because of the education control or four for each variable) in which a possible deviation from the Negro subsample as a whole could occur. Due to the small marginals and the fact that there were 26 consistent findings, we attach little conceptual significance to these two exceptions.

In both regions the civics curriculum continued to be negatively associated with political media usage at all educational levels except for newspaper reading among higher status students outside the South. The relationships are slightly stronger in the South than in the non-South. The differential consequences of

⁴² The Negro subsample was not large to begin with, and a regional control in addition to the control for parental education reduced cell frequencies even further. Because the differential effects of parental education were found primarily between students whose parents had only an elementary school education versus those with high school or college education, we combined students from the latter two categories into one category. This retained the substance of the original education break in the South, but it still left only a small number of students outside the South whose parents had an elementary school education or less. In order to enlarge this latter group the parental education cutting point in the non-South was moved to a point between those parents who were at least high school graduates and those who had only some high school or less. If there are important regional differences in curriculum effect they should be apparent under these control conditions.

The respective raw and weighted N's for the four groupings are as follows: southern low educated—33, 44; southern high educated—48, 64; non-southern low educated—45, 42; non-southern high educated—53, 50.

parental education were remarkably consistent across both regions. As before, civics courses had a negative effect upon the political discussion (and political interest in the South) of higher status Negroes while having a positive impact upon lower status Negroes. Finally, in both regions the civics curriculum continued to have its greatest negative effect on the participatory orientations of Negro students from the more educated families.

There appeared to be different regional effects on only three of the dependent variables. The first of these was political cynicism. In the South course work increases cynicism slightly among high and low status Negroes while in the North political cynicism decreased as the student was exposed to the civics curriculum. However, in both regions the outcome of taking a civics course is to make the student from the higher educated family relatively more cynical than his lower status peer. As with cynicism, exposure to civics means a slight decrease in civic tolerance among high and low status southern Negroes. This is also true of lower status Negroes outside the South. For all three cases the magnitude of the relationships are quite small, the highest being a gamma of $-.14$. It is only among higher status non-southern Negroes that a stronger, positive relationship develops— $+.39$.

The political efficacy of lower status students in the South was increased much more by the civics curriculum (.64) than was the efficacy of their higher status peers (.32). This is consistent with the picture for the entire subsample. However, while there was a positive relationship between exposure and increased efficacy among higher status students in the non-South there was a negative relationship among lower status students. We are at a loss to explain this negative sign other than point to the small frequencies which may account for this departure.

IV. CONCLUSION

A number of studies in the United States and other countries have stressed the importance of education in determining political attitudes and behavior. The man with only a primary school education is a different political actor from the man who has gone to high school or college. Yet direct evidence demonstrating the effect of college and high school curriculum upon political beliefs and behavior of students is scarce and generally inconclusive.

Our findings certainly do not support the thinking of those who look to the civics curriculum in American high schools as even a minor source of political socialization. When

we investigated the student sample as a whole we found not one single case out of the ten examined in which the civics curriculum was significantly associated with students' political orientations.

The lack of positive results raised many questions in our minds concerning the simple correlations between years of education and political orientations which are so prevalent in the literature, particularly the differences between people with high school versus college education. Of course, high schools and colleges are complex institutions. While the formal curriculum may have little effect, there is still the acquisition of conceptual skills, the social climate of the school, and the presence of peer groups, all of which may play a significant role in the political socialization process.⁴³ These caveats still overlook one of the chief difficulties in studying the influence of higher education: the danger of confounding the effect of selection with that of socialization. For example, do the highly educated feel more politically competent because of their college socialization experiences or were they significantly different in this respect from their non-college bound peers before they ever entered college?

College bound students do differ significantly from those who are not planning to obtain a higher education. They tend to come from families with above average income and education and have all the cultural benefits of their higher status.⁴⁴ We found among the high school seniors a strong positive correlation between parents' education and students' intention to attend a four year college or university ($\gamma = .52$). Because there was also a strong correlation between high school grades ($\gamma = .53$) and college intentions, we feel confident that stated intention to attend college is a fairly good predictor of future attendance.

The fact that college bound students enjoy higher social status than those not planning to pursue a higher education suggests that there also may be important political differences between the two groups. Indeed, students who plan to attend college are more likely to be knowledgeable about politics ($\gamma = .39$); to express greater political interest (.32) and efficacy

(.37); to support religious dissenters' rights of free speech (.37) and an elected communist's right to take public office (.44); to read about politics in newspapers (.18) and magazines (.34); to discuss politics with their peers (.26); and they are three times as likely to place the correct liberal-conservative label on the Democratic and Republican parties as are those students who are not planning to pursue a college education.

To summarize, there is a lack of evidence that the civics curriculum has a significant effect on the political orientations of the great majority of American high school students. Moreover, those who are college bound already have different political orientations than those who do not plan to attend college. These two conclusions suggest that an important part of the difference in political orientations between those from different levels of education, which is frequently cited in the literature and is usually explicitly or implicitly ascribed to the "education process," may actually represent a serious confounding of the effect of selection with that of political socialization.

Although the overall findings are unambiguous, there is reason to believe that under special conditions exposure to government and politics courses does have an impact at the secondary school level. When White and Negro students were observed separately, it became clear that the curriculum exerted considerably more influence on the latter. On several measures the effect was to move the Negro youths—especially those from less-educated families—to a position more congruent with the White youths and more in consonance with the usual goals of civic education in the United States. Among White students from less educated families this pattern was barely visible. With respect to some quasi-participative measures, taking a civics course served to depress Negro performance, especially among those from better-educated families. In virtually all instances the Negro students were much more affected by taking such courses than were the whites, regardless of whether the results were positive or negative.

We argued that one explanation of the singular consequence of the curriculum upon Negro students is that information redundancy is lower for them than for White students. Because of cultural and social status differences, the Negro students are more likely to encounter new or conflicting perspectives and content. The more usual case for Whites is a further layering of familiar materials which, by and large, repeat the message from other past and contemporary sources.

⁴³ See Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, Chap. 12; Kenneth P. Langton, "Peer Group and School and the Political Socialization Process," this REVIEW 61 (September, 1967), 751-758; and M. L. Levin, "Social Climates and Political Socialization," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (Winter, 1961), 596-606.

⁴⁴ Ernest Haveman and Patricia West, *They Went to College* (New York: Harcourt, 1952).

It is conceivable that other subpopulations of students are differentially affected by the curriculum; that variations in content and pedagogy lead to varying outcomes; or that there will be delayed consequences from course exposure. In the main, however, one is hard pressed to find evidence of any immediate course impact on the bulk of the students. The programmatic implications of this conclusion are forceful. If the educational system continues to invest sizable resources in govern-

ment and civics courses at the secondary level—as seems most probable—there must be a radical restructuring of these courses in order for them to have any appreciable pay-off. Changes in goals, course content, pedagogical methods, timing of exposure, teacher training, and school environmental factors are all points of leverage. Until such changes come about, one must continue to expect little contribution from the formal civics curriculum in the political socialization of American pre-adults.

CONSERVATISM, PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL EXTREMISM*

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I. INTRODUCTION

The empirical study of political ideology in mass publics must ultimately be related to political behavior; otherwise, the ideological description of such publics exists in an action vacuum. Yet, the most detailed and sophisticated descriptions and analyses of American conservatives and their characteristics are those which have most notably failed to connect their findings (about opinions, attitudes and ideologies) with consistent or predictable political activity of any kind.¹

This absence of systematic linkage between belief and behavior is primarily a consequence of the general absence of ideological structure in the political orientation of the broad American electorate.² But it is also a consequence of the researchers' reliance on a *a priori* ideological measures of doubtful validity.³

Hence, when the student of politics is informed that reputed conservatives are, or tend to be, authoritarian, anti-Semitic and ethno-

centric,⁴ or imbued with "... feelings of worthlessness, submissiveness, inferiority, timidity . . . , . . . hostile and suspicious, . . . rigid and compulsive, . . . inflexible and unyielding . . . ,"⁵ he must question the adequacy of the political designation "conservative" both on descriptive and predictive grounds.

Because of these methodological and empirical problems, I suggest that the findings of prior research and hypotheses related to them, be tested in a different manner. For example, if one examines the membership and/or known supporters of organizations which exist to aggregate and channel conservative political demands, the analysis of political ideology and its correlates can be conducted in a definitively political context, with the labels being supplied (or implied) by the actors themselves.⁶

Such an approach, using a criterion of *active* self-definition, avoids the ambiguities both in abstract, *a priori* definitions of ideological propensity and in the passive self-definition occasionally employed by pollsters ("Do you consider yourself a conservative, a liberal or a middle-of-the-roader?").

By shifting the focus to the level of conscious, deliberate and specific supportive behavior, comparisons are facilitated both among ideologically-based groups and between aggregates who "know" what they are, ideologically, and those who, operationally, must be told.⁷

* I am grateful to Donald Stokes, Dale Neuman and William Riker for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper.

¹ T. W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswick, D. J. Levinson and N. Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950); H. McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," this REVIEW 52 (1958), 27-45, esp. 44-45. See also M. Rokeach, *The Open and the Closed Mind*, (New York, 1960); and B. Anderson *et al.*, "On Conservative Attitudes," *Acta Sociologica*, 8 (1965), 189-204.

² A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller and D. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), p. 249; P. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in D. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York, 1965), pp. 206-261.

³ See, e.g., The critiques by R. Christie, H. H. Hyman and P. Sheatsley in R. Christie and M. Jahoda (eds.), *Studies in the Scope and Method of 'The Authoritarian Personality'* (Glencoe, Ill., 1954); M. Rokeach, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-30; R. Brown, *Social Psychology* (New York, 1965), pp. 526-546. Campbell *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-214, 512-515; W. Kendall, "Comment on McClosky's 'Conservatism and Personality,'" this REVIEW 52 (1959), 1111-1112; M. J. Rosenberg, "Images in Relation to the Policy Process: American Public Opinion on Cold-War Issues," in H. Kelman (ed.), *International Behavior* (New York, 1965), ch. 8.

⁴ Adorno, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 265, 179.

⁵ McClosky, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

⁶ S. H. Barnes, "Ideology and the Organization of Conflict: On the Relationship Between Political Thought and Behavior," *Journal of Politics*, 28 (1966), 513-530, esp. 521-524. For relevant, not necessarily deliberate, examples of this approach, see M. Chesler and R. Schmuck, "Participant Observation in a Super-Patriot Discussion Group," *Journal of Social Issues*, 19 (1963), 18-30; R. Wolfinger *et al.*, "American's Radical Right: Politics and Ideology," in Apter (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 262-293; F. Grupp, Jr., "Political Activists: The John Birch Society and the ADA," a paper delivered at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City.

⁷ The mere act of joining an ideologically-oriented group or party does not guarantee either

II. SETTING

One major effort to mobilize conservatives for political action has been made in New York state. There in 1961 a group of intellectuals, journalists, business and professional men founded the Conservative Party of New York, with the stated aim of (1) offering a conservative alternative to the relatively liberal programs and candidates of the two major parties and the seemingly influential Liberal Party, and (2) eventually pressuring the state Republican (and conceivably, the Democratic) party to move to a suitably conservative posture.⁸

The Party, a segment of whose membership will be discussed herein, has experienced slow but steady growth since 1962. Its gubernatorial poll increased from 141,877 (2.4%) in 1962 to 510,023 (8.4%) in 1966. Three Conservative Congressional candidates (in 1966) and the Party's candidate for Mayor of New York City (in 1965) have received more than 10% of the total vote in their constituencies. The Party's mean vote percentage in 16 New York State Congressional Districts was 6.4% in 1966.

The core of the Conservative Party's supporters can be readily located from public registration lists. This analysis is based upon the interview responses of a random sample of male Conservative Party members in Munroe County, New York, which comprises the City of Rochester and its suburbs.⁹ Interviews (each

ideological support or even interest. A discussion and justification of certain analytical exclusions can be found in R. A. Schoenberger, *Conservatives and Conservatism* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester, 1966; University Microfilm No. 67-8986), pp 40-44.

⁸ The key points of the Conservative Party Platform, derived from "... the American tradition of individual liberty, limited constitutional government, and defense of the Republic against its enemies," include belief in balanced budgets, opposition to or curbing of "... centralization of governmental power, monopoly union power, deficit spending and oppressive taxation. . .", the wish for the confinement of "... the Supreme Court . . . to its proper judicial functions," support for the "Neighborhood School" principle, opposition to state legislative reapportionment, public housing and foreign aid (except for "our friends"), See "Introducing: The Conservative Party of New York State" (New York, 1965), un-paged pamphlet. Available from Conservative Party State Headquarters, 141 E. 44 St., New York, New York 10017.

⁹ Females were excluded primarily because of the need to economize resources. Informal in-

TABLE 1. MISANTHROPY

Per cent who agree that	Conserva- tives (N = 45)	Repub- licans (N = 48)
1. "Most people can be trusted."	91%	92%
2. "People are more inclined to look out for themselves than to help others."	(89)	(75)
3. "Human Nature is fundamentally co-operative."	78	92
4. "No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it."	(40)	(35)
5. "If you don't watch yourself, people will take advantage of you."	(58)	(71)

Proportions in parentheses are those giving the misanthropic response.

lasting about 90 minutes) were completed with 45 Conservatives,¹⁰ in a universe of 325, and with a control sample of 48 Republicans, the latter intended to provide a contrast between Conservatives (all but one of whom had been a Republican) and their unchanged, generally less ideological, former fellow partisans.

III. FINDINGS

A. Personality. Conservatives do not appear to differ substantially from Republicans on either of the two psychological measures employed. On specific assertions of social trust and distrust (Morris Rosenberg's "misanthropy" scale¹¹), the results are, at best, ambiguous. Comparing total male sample re-

quiries discovered, as one would suspect, that numerous Conservative females registered as they did only at their husband's request.

The 1966 Conservative Congressional candidate in the district dominated by the eastern, and most populous, half of Monroe County polled 6.4% of the vote.

¹⁰ The upper case "C" is used only when referring to registered Conservative Party members or to the Party itself.

¹¹ M. Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," *American Sociological Review*, 21 (1956), 690-695; and "Misanthropy and Attitudes Toward International Affairs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1 (1957), 34-45.

TABLE 2. MISANTHROPY, BY RESPONDENTS
WITH AT LEAST SOME COLLEGE

Per cent who agree that	Conserva- tives (N = 40)	Repub- licans (N = 20)
1. "Most people can be trusted."	93%	95%
2. "People are more inclined to look out for themselves than to help others."	85	80
3. "Human Nature is fundamentally co-operative."	78	90
4. "No one is going to care much what happens to when you get right down to it."	37	50
5. "If you don't watch yourself, people will take advantage of you."	58	60

sponses to each of the items (Table 1), it is apparent that the dominant direction of Conservative response is the same as that of the Republican sample. Moreover, the inter-sample differences are not consistent in direction, Conservatives appearing to be more trusting than the Republicans on item five and notably less so on two and three.

Since there is a long-recognized tendency for poorly educated people to respond uncritically to assertions like these and because of the disproportionate number of Conservatives with relatively high educational achievement,¹² I have isolated this segment of the samples (Table 2). Here, the distances between the resulting sub-samples diminish, with notable but non-significant differences occurring only on two of the five items (3 and 4). Again, the differences are not consistent in direction.¹³

This absence of significant¹⁴ differences between samples recurs in an "authoritarian-equalitarian" scale, borrowed from a larger battery employed by the Survey Research Center in 1952 (Table 3). Here, however, Con-

¹² Eighty-nine per cent had attended college, 62% received the bachelor's degree and 31% had started or completed graduate or professional school requirements.

¹³ The average item-percentage difference between Conservatives and Republicans in Table 2 is -0.8 (sign indicates normative evaluation). The range is +13 to -12 across items.

TABLE 3. AUTHORITARIANISM-EQUALITARIANISM

Per cent who agree that	Conserva- tives (N = 45)	Repub- licans (N = 48)
1. "Human Nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict."	73%	77%
2. "Most people who don't get ahead, just don't have enough will power."	51	52
3. "A few strong leaders could make this country better than all the laws and talk."	22	38
4. "An insult to your honor should not be forgotten."	22	33

servatives tend to be less authoritarian on each of the four items, with the largest difference appearing on the sole assertion with overt political content ("a few strong leaders . . . better than all the laws and talk.").

Comparing the college-educated sub-samples (Table 4), the gaps between samples increase; Conservatives continue to respond in a less authoritarian pattern. The normative differences¹⁵ between Conservatives and Republicans consistently favor the former.¹⁶

B. Civil Liberties. The major politically relevant characteristic imputed to the mal-adjusted American conservative is his willingness to suppress, or to tolerate the suppression, of the civil liberties of his fellow-citizens.¹⁷ The

¹⁴ $x^2, p < .05, df = 1$. All subsequent references to significance refer to this statistical measure and convention.

¹⁵ The average item-percentage difference between Conservatives and Republicans in Table 4 is +10.75. The range is +5 to +20.

¹⁶ Where sample responses are scored and indexed, with education controlled, the number of Conservatives in the high (normatively negative) range does not differ importantly or significantly from the Republicans. The per cent "highly misanthropic" are: Conservatives—12; Republicans—15. The per cent "highly authoritarian" are: Conservatives—17; Republicans—15. The scoring procedure is that used by G. Almond and S. Verba, *The Civic Culture* (New York, 1963), pp. 262-263.

¹⁷ The concept of authoritarianism is politically empty unless those persons it purports to de-

TABLE 4. AUTHORITARIANISM-EQUALITARIANISM,
BY RESPONDENTS WITH AT
LEAST SOME COLLEGE

Per cent who agree that	Conserva- tives (N = 40)	Repub- licans (N = 20)
1. "Human Nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict."	72%	80%
2. "Most people who don't get ahead, just don't have enough will power."	50	60
3. "A few strong leaders could make this country better than all the laws and talk."	20	40
4. "An insult to your honor should not be forgotten."	20	25

discovery or expectation of such behavior underlies and justifies most analyses of radical right organizations and joins the authoritarian personality to right-extremist, anti-libertarian perspectives.¹⁸

To explore the possibility that Conservatives may not be attached to the standards of American civil liberties, I employed a ten-item measure covering key features of the Bill of Rights, a measure primarily derived from one applied to a 1957 sample of Berkeley college students.¹⁹

Comparison of the responses (Table 5) indicates that Conservatives offer predominant and broad support to libertarian assertions and comparable opposition to anti-libertarian ones. Where this finding does not obtain—on assertions supporting "double jeopardy" (item 8) and opposing academic freedom of belief (item 9)—it is notable that the reservations of

Conservatives are largely shared by Berkeley respondents.

On nine of the ten items, Conservative responses are more libertarian than those of the Republican sample, usually by significant margins.²⁰ Even when only the highly educated respondents are considered, large inter-sample differences remain, with Conservatives demonstrating greater support for civil liberties than Republicans.²¹

Beyond the item analysis, a summary table of libertarianism (Table 6) indicates that a large majority of Conservatives favor most of the libertarian assertions, with an overwhelming difference between Conservatives and Republicans. Moreover, 92% of the Conservatives and only 58% of the Republicans offered more pro-libertarian than anti-libertarian responses.²²

Although the measure is admittedly crude, weighing each item equally, one is able to clearly differentiate Conservatives from Republicans along lines of commitment to or at least acceptance of libertarian assertions. Of most obvious importance is the consistently libertarian attitude complex of both Conservatives and, to a slightly lesser degree, the small group of Goldwater Republicans.

These findings do not permit the inference that Conservatives will be in the forefront of any movement to expand or even protect the generality of civil liberties. Robert Lane has suggested that this fight is usually led by a triumvirate composed of the legal, clerical and teaching professions,²³ none of which is represented among the Conservatives. The latter

²⁰ The average item-percentage difference between Conservatives and Republicans is +17.1; between Conservatives and Goldwater-voting Republicans, +8.4. If any inference is to be drawn, it is that Goldwater Republicans are less anti-libertarian than Johnson-voting Republicans.

²¹ The average distance between college-educated Conservatives and Republicans diminishes to +11.6.

²² The mean Conservative score (defined as the number of prolibertarian responses) is 7.8 of a possible 10; for Republicans it is 6.0. College-educated Republicans have a mean of 6.75 and Goldwater-voting Republicans (8 of whom have not attended college) a mean of 7.1 (!). College-attending Conservatives achieve a score of 7.9.

²³ R. E. Lane, "The Fear of Equality," this REVIEW, 53 (1959), 35-51. See also, S. A. Stouffer, *op. cit.*, J. W. Prothro and C. M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," *Journal of Politics*, 22 (1961) 276-294.

scribe are anti-libertarian. See Peter Viereck's phrase "... authoritarian reactionaries . . . , hypocritically pretending to be devoted to civil liberties," in D. Bell (ed.), *The Radical Right* (Garden City, N. Y., 1964), p. 196.

¹⁸ See, e.g., S. A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (Garden City, N. Y., 1955), pp. 94-97; D. Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 88, 358; R. Wolfinger *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 270-273.

¹⁹ H. C. Selvin and W. O. Hagstrom, "Determinants of Support for Civil Liberties," *British Journal of Sociology*, 11 (1960) 51-73.

TABLE 5. ATTITUDES TOWARD CIVIL LIBERTIES BY ALL RESPONDENTS AND BY RESPONDENTS WITH AT LEAST SOME COLLEGE EDUCATION

Per cent who agree that	All Conserva- tives (N = 45)	All Re- publicans (N = 48)	Berkeley Students ^a (N = 894)	College Republicans (N = 20)	College Conserva- tives (N = 40)
1. "There should be a law to prevent people from making speeches against our form of government."	2 ^d	27	— ^c	20	2
2. "Books which oppose churches and religion should be removed from local public libraries."	4 ^d	27	— ^b	15	5
3. "A high school teacher whose loyalty has been questioned before a committee of Congress should be fired, even if he swears under oath that he isn't a Communist."	7	8	— ^c	10	5
4. "State governments should have power to pass laws making public speeches against racial and religious groups illegal."	7 ^d	31	10	25	2
5. "When the police are looking for evidence against a suspected criminal, they should not have to have a warrant to search a house."	13 ^d	33	11	30	13
6. "Large-scale roundups of 'undesirables' are proper as long as they are restricted to people with known criminal records."	22 ^d	58	19	45	20
7. "The government is acting properly when it refuses a passport to a Socialist."	27	44	10	40	22
8. "If a man accused of a major crime is acquitted, and apparently incriminating evidence is later discovered, he should be retried."	53 ^d	79	53	70	50
9. "Legislative committees should not investigate the political beliefs of university faculty members."	(44)	(35)	(61)	(40)	(55)
10. "It is not reasonable to suspect the loyalty of a lawyer who represents accused Communists before a Congressional Committee."	(67)	(77)	(79)	(90)	(65)

^a The proportion giving the libertarian response is parenthesized. Data from H. C. Selvin and W. Hagstrom, "Determinants of Support for Civil Liberties," *British Journal of Sociology*, 11 (1960), pp. 52-53. I have reversed one and slightly altered four of their items. Responses are not controlled by sex.

^b Question not used by Selvin and Hagstrom.

^c Phrasing employed by Selvin and Hagstrom or Stouffer unsuitable for comparison.

^d Differences between Conservatives and Republicans are X^2 significant, $p < .05$ $df = 1$.

TABLE 6. RELATIVE SUPPORT FOR
CIVIL LIBERTIES*

	Conservatives (N = 45)	Republicans (N = 48)
Stronger	69%	21%
Weaker	31%	79%
	100%	100%

* The cut is made at the place where the frequency distributions for the two groups of respondents intersect, i.e., at eight pro-libertarian responses.

are nearly all corporation employees working in executive, engineering, accounting, statistical or technical capacities.

C. Extremism. The relationship between conservatism and rightist extremism (or radicalism) has never been clear. It has not been possible to estimate the ratios of conservatives willing and desiring to effectuate policy changes through traditional democratic procedures, including third parties, to those who prefer or abide techniques of personal and group harassment, slanderous or libelous allegations and put forward or support wild—and probably unattainable—policy objectives (e.g. “impeach Earl Warren,” “get the U.S. out of the U.N. . . .,” “abolish the 16th Amendment”).

In the current context, the extremist style is principally manifested by a perception (presumably common to Birchers, Christian Crusaders—both Hargis and Schwarz versions—, Minutemen, etc.) that the group’s enemies are engaged in a generally successful conspiracy against its continued well-being or even survival, having infiltrated and gained significant control over major decision-making and communications centers of American society.²⁴ Specifically, it is charged that the United Nations, the executive and judicial branches of the federal government, the major political parties, the schools, the press, unions, and financiers are all subject to control or major influence by the conspirators (i.e., Communists) or their “pseudo-liberal,” “Fabian socialist,” fellow-travelling associates.²⁵

²⁴ R. Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays* (New York, 1965), Ch. 1. See also J. Higham, *Strangers in the Land* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1955), pp. 81, 85, 180; E. Shils, *The Torment of Secrecy* (Glencoe, Ill., 1952), ch. 1.

²⁵ J. Stormer, *None Dare Call it Treason* (Florissant, Mo., 1964); P. Schlafly, *A Choice Not an*

Regardless of whether such beliefs are pervasive among members and supporters of “radical right” organizations they do not, with rare exceptions, appear to dominate the *Weltanschauung* of Conservatives. Whatever their various perceptions of the influence of domestic Communism, the subject seldom appears anywhere on their lists of problems confronting the political system. Only two Conservatives mentioned domestic Communism in any form. (One, also a member of the John Birch Society, complained that the government was riddled with “. . . Reds and security risks”; the other—who claimed that the John Birch Society was “. . . a collection of neurotics and buffoons”—complained about “. . . the increase of leftist subversion in education . . . and in civil rights groups.”)

Conservatives do not rationalize their act of joining the new party as an anti-Communist step. Rather, they view it as either a protest against the liberal policies and leadership of the state Republican Party or a positive identification with the conservative movement or philosophy or both.

When asked if they could think of any organization hurting the conservative cause (only 7 of 45 thought *any* was helping), 71% named the John Birch Society, with 60% including the members as well as the leadership in their indictments. Their comments were dotted with such epithets as “kooks,” “radicals,” “bigots,” “a WASP front,” and other barely printable phrases. Among the far-right groups, only the John Birch Society and the American Council of Christian Churches (led by C. C. McIntyre) received any praise, each from one respondent. Sixteen percent could think of no organization either to praise or to damn.

It would appear, based on their responses to the questions discussed above, that the large majority of Conservatives consciously avoid adopting both the presumed perspective and the group identification of right-wing extremists. A final check on the accuracy of this finding is contained in an analysis of their responses to the items on a “domestic Communist threat” scale (Table 7). Conservative responses to each assertion, covering American society in general, college faculties and each of the

Echo (Alton, Ill., 1964); C. Manly, *The Twenty Year Revolution* (Chicago, 1954). See esp., A. G. Heinsohn (ed.), *Anthology of Conservative Writings in the United States: 1932-1960* (Chicago, 1962) and any publication of the John Birch Society or its Western Islands Press.

TABLE 7. PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNIST DANGER OR INFLUENCE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

Per cent who agree that	Conservatives ^a (N = 45)	Republicans (N = 48)	College Republicans (N = 20)
1. "Communist professors do <i>not</i> have very much influence in American colleges and universities."	42	48	45
2. "The danger to the United States from Communists living here is <i>not</i> as great as the danger from Russia or China."	56	73	75
3. "Communists do <i>not</i> have very much influence in the Democratic Party."	67	81	75
4. "Communists do <i>not</i> have very much influence in the Republican Party."	84	85	90

^a Within arithmetic limitations, the five non-college educated Conservatives, responded exactly as did their colleagues to each of the items.

major political parties, were, in the aggregate, similar to the Republicans but consistently, though not significantly, more threat-perceiving. Only once, with regard to Communist influence in colleges and universities, did even a bare majority of Conservatives reject one of the assertions.

Although the data do not support any inference that most Conservatives are totally devoid of a belief in serious Communist influence in major domestic institutions, only a minority (26%) accepted at least three of these extremist assertions.²⁶ If the extremist criteria are tightened somewhat, to include either a desire to see the U. S. withdraw from the U.N. or to impeach Earl Warren, the percentage in this category drops to 17 (8 respondents). (Only one, the Bircher, responded negatively to all six items.) No Republicans were found in the latter group of extremists.

IV. THE POLITICS OF CONSERVATIVES

As most Conservatives are quick to acknowledge, it is their political views which separate them importantly from other segments of the population.

In their responses to a series of general open-ended and specific closed-ended questions, both the most salient political interests of Conserva-

tives and those dimensions on which they stand farthest apart from the sampled Republicans coincide.

Analysis of the verbal responses indicates clearly that the major political interest of Conservatives is in the role, direction and/or activities of the federal government in domestic economic affairs, with a concomitant fear for the present and future freedom of the individual in a "government dominated" society. A substantial majority of Conservatives (60%) commented at some length about their dislike of (1) government intervention into the affairs of business and businessmen, (2) the "socialistic" direction in which the nation's economy is moving, or (3) the size and power of the government in general.²⁷

An additional 25% focussed upon the individual rather than the government acting upon him. They expressed the belief that people were becoming dependent upon "gov-

²⁷ The segregation of responses into these, and allied, categories is for the purpose of expository convenience. There is evidence that respondents falling into only one would quickly endorse the remarks of their colleagues in the others. For example, 80% of the Conservatives (36 of 45) agreed that "it seems clear that the United States is on the way to becoming a Socialist country," although only ten mentioned the word "socialism" during the interviews. Seventy-four per cent (34 of 48) of the Republicans disagreed with the assertion.

²⁶ Fifty-eight per cent accepted no more than one; 31% accepted none. Comparable figures for college-educated Republicans were 65% and 30%; for all Republicans, 72% and 29%.

TABLE 8. ATTITUDES TOWARD FEDERAL
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ROLES*

Per cent <i>opposed to any</i> federal role in	Conserva- tives (N = 45)	Repub- licans (N = 48)
1. Financing Education (building and operating costs)	91	54
2. Financing Public Housing	78	25
3. War on Poverty	80	31
4. Medical Care for the Aged	60	6
5. a. Combatting Depres- sions	24	—
b. Combatting Depres- sions through public expenditures	58	19
6. Setting Minimum Wage Rates	62	33

* All inter-sample differences in Table 8 are significant, $p < .01$.

ernment hand-outs," distracted by "bread and circuses," and bewailed the prospective "disappearance" of the individual and "subjugation of his rights."

This general antipathy to the activities, or "consequences" of the activities, of the federal government is illustrated in Table 8. When asked specifically, Conservatives reject every listed federal welfare program enacted since 1932, usually by overwhelming majorities. Only when it comes to combatting depressions do Conservatives indicate a slackening of hostility to a federal economic or welfare role. Yet, even on this issue, no longer a subject of major party controversy in principle, the Conservative majority endorses either a summary statement of the Hooverian approach ("balance the budget, increase tariffs and lower interest rates") or absolute non-interference with the business cycle (the federal government "should not interfere at all except, possibly, to stop regulating business").

While most Conservatives (78%) disagree with the assertion that "this country would be better off if the federal income tax were abolished" (as do 94% of the Republicans), nearly half (47%) would prefer a flat-rate to a graduated structure. Only 15% of the Republicans accept this view.

Conservative opposition to governmental economic and welfare activity is not restricted to the federal branches. Given the choice of a variety of governmental programs which in-

TABLE 9. ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENTAL
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ROLES*

Per cent <i>opposed to any</i> governmental role in	Conserva- tives (N = 45)	Repub- licans (N = 48)
1. Financing Public Housing	29	4
2. War on Poverty	38	13
3. Medical Care for the Aged	58	6
4. Combatting Depres- sions	24	—
5. Regulating Public Utilities	49	17

* All inter-sample differences in Table IX are significant, $p < .01$.

cluded state or national and state participation, substantial numbers of Conservatives opted for neither (Table 9). Whereas no Republican respondent could accept a policy of total government inaction during a depression, one-quarter of the Conservatives had no such inhibition. An equal number were at most localists on all three specific social welfare items, relating to public housing, the anti-poverty program and medical care for the aged. Only one respondent, a follower of Ayn Rand, denied any government any role in any endeavor (except defense of life and property).

Allied to the Conservatives' general probusiness, anti-governmental attitudes is a widespread antipathy toward labor unions. Eighty per cent believed that they "... do more harm than good," compared with 40% of the Republicans.²⁸ No other political dimension, including civil rights and foreign policy, ranked so high on their lists of interests or elicited such near-uniformity of response as did the areas of economic regulation and welfare.

V. DISCUSSION

Monroe County Conservatives differ substantially, on the measures employed, in their psychological make-up, attitudes toward civil liberties and in their susceptibility to the doctrines and admiration for the behavior of the "radical right," from other conservatives and rightists examined by social scientists. The large majority of them cannot be classified as authoritarian or misanthropic, anti-civil-libertarian or currently vulnerable to the obsessive anti-Communism of right-wing fringe groups.

²⁸ Forty-five per cent of the Conservatives volunteered anti-union comments.

But there are common political and social denominators by which Conservatives can be distinguished from other political aggregates. The Conservatives examined here are mostly well-educated, well-paid family men, with upper-status occupations and suburban residences.²⁹ They are bound together politically by a consistent and highly salient opposition to the modern welfare and regulatory role of the federal government, combined with a solid hostility to the perceived power and influence of labor unions. While other political dimensions attract their interest and concern they rarely rank as high, occur as frequently or elicit such near-uniformity of attitude.³⁰

In short, Monroe County Conservatives can be characterized by their relatively high average socio-economic position and by their possession of a distinct and coherent ideology which, while limited in breadth, is appropriate (within the American political tradition) to their socio-economic position.

These findings seriously contradict the conclusions of McClosky and the Berkeley group. Most Conservatives do not fit the mold of psychic maladjustment, anomy, alienation and outgroup hostility found jointly or separately by these scholars. There are two possibilities which may account for the strong psychological-political correlations heretofore discovered and their general absence from my sample. One is that the kind of conservatism represented by the New York Conservatives is crucially different, in terms of key issues and social and demographic sources, from the variant(s) manifested by the radical right. Recent research into the background and attitudes of radical right activists suggests that this is likely.

A large segment of Ira Rohter's sample of Oregon rightists is disproportionately older, rural-born, less well educated, lower in income and occupational status and likely to belong to fundamentalist religious denominations than is my sample.³¹ His respondents are found to be comparatively maladjusted on eleven of twelve psychological measures.³² (They were politically

efficacious.) Mark Chesler and Richard Schmuck have found similar, though fewer, such associations in their midwestern samples, but suggest that a political "value strain"—the unhappy perception of the difference between what *is* (or will be) and what *should be*—underlie adoption or acceptance of radical right perspectives.³³ It must be noted that heavy concentrations of older, less well-trained and economically successful, fundamentalist and rural-born individuals have been found by all students of the subject except Wolfinger, who believes that San Francisco area Christian Anti-Communist Crusaders, at least, "... are not social and psychological cripples."³⁴

Despite some elements of overlap, it may be in order to hypothesize that two major strains of right-wing attitudes and behavior are distinguishable on the basis of 1) political grounds—one concerned primarily with questions of economic and social policy, the other with a powerful and conspiratorial domestic Communist threat; 2) social differences—one a segment of the young, educated, technologically competent and economically successful middle to upper-middle class, the other older, less competent and less "successful" on these dimensions; and 3) psychological differences—one reasonably well adjusted to their environment and able to cope with, though dissenting from, the major political tendencies of their time, the other hostile toward many of the social forces of the era and less able to keep their social-psychological balance when confronting them.

It is urgent to separate analytically the type of conservatism displayed by the New York State Conservative Party and the radical variant(s) which provide support for the John Birch Society. The persistent political warfare between William Buckley's *National Review* (the major journalistic supporter of New York Conservatives) and the John Birch Society, *inter alia*, indicate that those differences are strongly reflected in the political arena. The distinction seems to me to be that between reasonable political intelligence and its ab-

²⁹ The median family income for Conservatives in 1964 was nearly \$12,000; 85% earned more than \$8,000. Ninety-six per cent were employed in white-collar jobs, 84% in business, managerial, professional or technical capacities.

³⁰ The Party platform, summarized in note 8, is an accurate, if too short and general, summary of the views of the majority of the sample.

³¹ I. S. Rohter, *Radical Rightists: An Empirical Study* (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Michigan State University, 1967), pp. 124-144.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 154-265, *passim*.

³³ M. Chesler and R. Schmuck, "Social Psychological Characteristics of Super-Patriots" in R. A. Schoenberger (ed.), *The American Right Wing* (New York, forthcoming, 1969).

³⁴ R. Wolfinger, *et. al.*, "The Radical Right . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 285. Another recent study, of Dallas rightists, concludes that the availability of rightist organizations may better account for rightist behavior than psychological predispositions. See A. C. Elms, "Psychological Factors in Right-Wing Extremism," in Schoenberger, *op. cit.*, ch. 6.

sence, with their associated causes and correlations.

The second explanation of the discrepancy between my findings and those of McClosky and the Berkeley group is that "conservatives" attitudinally defined and derived from a population cross-section and those surveyed on the basis of overt, politically relevant behavior are actually two distinct empirical universes sharing the same label. The former group of inactive, ineffectual, alienated and largely ill-educated individuals may be *psychologically* conservative but no evidence has been offered to demonstrate a consistent relationship to any broad variant of *political* conservatism. (That many radical rightists are recruited from McClosky's universe of "extreme conservatives" appears probable, however.)

McClosky himself found that the correlations "... between classical conservatism ... and ... party affiliation, attitude on economic issues and liberal-conservative self-designation ... tend to be fairly low. ..."³⁵

It is clear, on the evidence presented here, that some people who identify, register and vote as Conservatives do not possess the personality attributes assigned to "conservatives" selected on other bases. For this group, at least, politics is primarily a legitimate means to express political and economic dissatisfactions and desires, one which dominates, if not supercedes, its utility as a political outlet for clinical and social psychological maladjustments.

³⁵ H. McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45.

A SALIENCE DIMENSION OF POLITICS FOR THE STUDY OF POLITICAL CULTURE

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The present trend in the comparative study of politics is a departure from the country-by-country approach and a search for analytical models based on dimensions common to all political systems. This trend is in part based on the assumption that the construction of new concepts and conceptual frameworks for comparative politics would provide the starting point for a general empirical theory of political systems.¹ One of the new concepts which has become common currency is "political culture." Originally proposed by Almond in 1956² and developed by Almond and Verba in *The Civic Culture*,³ the concept of political culture

refers to patterns of politically relevant orientations of a cognitive, evaluative and expressive sort. It is intended to provide a researchable connecting link between the psychological tendencies of individuals and groups and the structural-functional characteristics of political systems, and to translate such concepts as "historical heritage" or "national character" into sets of cultural components more amenable to measurement and comparison across nations.

The study of political culture thus involves comparisons between the orientations of social groups towards specific political objects, between those of particular groups towards different objects, and between patterns of orientations and patterns of behavior. From a methodological viewpoint, all empirical political research is comparative research; we must therefore expect to encounter the problem of the comparability of political data, and in particular, the problem of equivalence of meaning, in all areas of political study. In the comparison of cultural data across nations the requirements of equivalence of meaning are probably more difficult to meet than in any other area. Generally speaking, there are two possible sources of differences in meaning in cross-cultural data: (a) cultural differences of a non-political nature, such as language, education or the degree of frankness or "openness" of personal opinions, and (b) cultural differences of a political nature.

The problems involved in the interpretation of these differences have been encountered in political survey research; some of their implications for the study of political cultures have been discussed in *The Civic Culture* and elsewhere.⁴ The present paper deals with one

¹ For a discussion of the problems and trends in the comparative study of politics see Roy C. Macridis, *The Study of Comparative Government* (New York: Random House Inc., 1955); Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (eds.), *Comparative Politics* (Rev. ed.; Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1964), pp. 1-11; Harry Eckstein, "A Perspective on Comparative Politics, Past and Present," in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter (eds.), *Comparative Politics* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 3-33. Models for the comparative study of political systems have been proposed in David E. Apter, "A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 64 (1958), 221-237; David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), esp. pp. 1-42 and 223-265; Gabriel A. Almond, Introduction to G. Almond and J. Coleman, *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960); Gabriel A. Almond, "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," *World Politics*, 17 (1965), 183-214; G. A. Almond and B. G. Powell, *Comparative Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966). A model for the comparative study of political participation has been proposed by Stein Rokkan in "The Comparative Study of Political Participation: Notes towards a Perspective on Current Research," in Austin Ranney (ed.), *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 47-80.

² Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, 18 (1956), 391-409.

³ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).

⁴ Some of the major problem-areas in cross-national political survey research have been examined in: Sidney Verba, "Survey Research and the Study of Comparative Politics," (Center for Advanced Study in The Behavioral Sciences, 1963); and Erwin Scheuch, "Progress in The Cross-Cultural Use of Surveys," (Paper submitted to the International Social Science Council, Round Table on Comparative Research, 1965). For a review of current efforts in cross-national research, including survey research, see Stein Rokkan, "Comparative Cross-National Research:

of the problems of cultural differences of a political nature. It suggests that one of the significant variables in political cultures is the *salience* of politics in social action, attitudes and behavior, and that it is possible to measure the magnitude of salience for different individuals, groups or nations. The resulting scores on this dimension may be used as a filter variable capable of increasing the equivalence of meaning of cross-cultural data. The concept of salience is also proposed as an element for a general theory of political behavior.

I. "OBJECTIVE" AND "SUBJECTIVE" POLITICAL RELEVANCE

Most contemporary definitions of politics in some fashion associate the political system with legitimate coercion or with the authoritative allocation of values. Although the emphasis has shifted from the legal and institutional aspects of government towards a more comprehensive view including all politically-oriented social action, the "political nature" of an act is considered as determined by its relationship to the process of authoritative rule-making and enforcement. This definition centers on the authoritative facet of political decision-making, and not on the contents of decisions. It implies that whatever the goals of human behavior, such behavior becomes politically relevant if it affects the use of authority. The term "affects," however ambiguous, can be interpreted as referring to those components of authoritative decisions, allocations, etc., which an observer would impute to social action preceding the decision, on the basis of his "objective" interpretation of observable data.

The cultural dimension in political analysis, however, refers to the personal, subjective meaning ascribed by individuals and groups to behavior which has been "objectively" defined as politically relevant. It is concerned

with orientations towards political actors or roles, towards political actions or structures. Such orientations are unlikely to be directed towards an abstract concept of authority; most will be directed towards the "who" and "what" of politics, associating authority—rightly or wrongly—with a particular actor, policy-goal or decision. In the evaluation of cultural data one is therefore confronted with the interpretation of the private, subjective meanings attributed by different individuals to given political objects. These cognitive orientations, and the evaluations associated with them, may differ because of differences in the psychological attributes of individuals, or because of differences in socio-cultural characteristics of a non-political nature, such as language,⁵ education, religion or ethnic origin.⁶ They may also vary because of differences in the way in which even individuals with similar socio-cultural characteristics perceive the *relevance* of a given political object to their goals and goal-oriented action.⁷ It has been shown

⁵ With respect to semantic differences, see, for example, C. E. Osgood, G. J. Suci and P. H. Tannenbaum, *The Measurement of Meaning* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957); C. E. Osgood, "Cross-cultural comparability in attitude measurement via multilingual semantic differentials" in I. D. Steiner and M. Fishbein (eds.), *Current Studies in Social Psychology* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1965), p. 95.

⁶ The most comprehensive presentation and analysis of the psychological and social factors affecting political involvement is Robert E. Lane's *Political Life* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959). Since this study is based almost exclusively on data from the United States, where the politicization of life is relatively low, the salience of politics is not treated as a separate dimension. Its expression in political life is discussed as an aspect of ethnic—or economic—group politics, or in terms of the "conscious needs served by participation in political life."

⁷ Attitude research has shown that attitudes vary as a function of the perceived importance of the attitude-object in leading to or blocking the attainment of values, and as a function of the rated importance of the values associated with that object; see Milton J. Rosenberg, "Cognitive Structure and Attitudinal Affect," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 53 (1956), 367–372. See also S. M. Lipset's distinction between social "characteristics" and social "factors" affecting the rates of voting turnout. Among the "factors" Lipset includes "the relevance of government policies to the individual": Seymour

The Context of Current Efforts," in Merritt and Rokkan (eds.), *Comparing Nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). The problems of equivalence of meaning encountered in intra-national survey research also apply to cross-national research; they are discussed in the literature on methods in survey research. For recent contributions in this area see Philip E. Converse, "New dimensions of meaning for cross-section sample surveys in politics," *International Social Science Journal*, 16 (1964), 19–34; Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, "Equivalence in Cross-National Research," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 30 (1966), 551–568.

recently that opinions and non-verbal behavior are based on attitudes towards objects and attitudes towards *situations*.⁸ Hence, the subjective relevance of a political object to the goal-oriented action of an individual can be seen as such a situational component of political behavior.

In cross-cultural, in contradistinction to intra-cultural, comparisons, one evaluates orientations towards *different* political objects. It is assumed that the objects are equivalent, but this assumption rests on the researcher's "objective" evaluation of the objects' structural and functional characteristics in the political systems concerned, whereas orientations towards these objects are based on the *subjective* perceptions of the respective populations. Since, by definition, one is dealing with different objects, indicators of their equivalence of meaning for the populations concerned are required. One such indicator is the equivalence in the subjective relevance of these objects to the goal-oriented action of the individuals or groups concerned, i.e., an indicator of an equivalent perception of the "object-in-situation," according to some common criterion of measurement.

Subjective relevance may or may not coincide with the objective relevance of a political object to an individual; it is the relevance as the individual perceives it. The concept of relevance, however, must be operationalized if one wishes to assign to a given political object different magnitudes of relevance for various individuals or groups. For this purpose it is useful to inquire into the way in which the political system is articulated with the goal-oriented actions of individuals and groups, and with the values attached to these goals.

II. GOAL-ORIENTED ACTIONS AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

One may conceive of all social action as directed towards the attainment of goals. Some goals are shared by groups, or even by the

entire community, others are personal goals. The attainment of community goals may be sought by a great number of the community's members, or by a smaller number on their behalf. It is assumed that the individual participating in action oriented towards community goals is aware of the fact that he cannot attain these goals by himself. From the viewpoint of his own goal-orientation (i.e., motivation), his action is expressive: the act of participating in the attainment of community goals is considered as a goal *per se*. Goals not shared with others may also lead to expressive action, although most personal goals lead to an instrumental orientation towards action.

The attainment of community goals is generally sought through action channelled into the political system; group goals and personal goals may or may not be sought through political action. Some areas of social life are regulated by authoritative decisions; in those which are not, individuals and groups seek to attain some of their goals without having recourse to the political system, while seeking other goals by addressing demands (and providing supports) to governmental structures, or to political parties and other political elites. This distinction between goal-oriented action channelled through the political system and action which takes place within and between the various sub-systems of society but does not affect the process of authoritative decision-making, can serve as a starting point for the construction of an operational concept of the relevance of politics. It is perhaps necessary to add that the validity of this distinction is not impaired by the fact that even social action which does not affect the political system may be affected by political decisions. One may argue that a good deal of our roles in social subsystems are structured by the expectations of other actors and that these expectations are partly based on legal norms. The consequences of a contract, the requirements of corporation law, motor traffic regulations and innumerable other norms are part of the web of "complementary expectations" that impose limitations on the actor, and such legal norms are, of course, a regulatory output of the political system. Nevertheless, most of these norms do not prescribe any action, but merely define the conditions regulating certain types of behavior, if and when it occurs. Such rules must be considered as parts of the systems within and between which social action is taking place. This is implied in Parsons' definition of a social system as a system of interaction, oriented by complexes of complementary expectations concerning roles and sanctions.

Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1960), pp. 186-190. On the relevance of government policies to business and industry, as a factor affecting the political interest and involvement of members of these sectors of the economy, see Lane, *op. cit.*, pp. 321-326.

⁸ Milton Rokeach, "Attitude Change and Behavioral Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 30 (1966), 529-550. "Attitude" is defined by Rokeach as "a relatively enduring organization of beliefs about an object or situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner."

It is now possible to return to the concept of the personal relevance of politics. Let us suppose that citizens A and B have expressed equal support for candidate X or have been equally involved in the election campaign supporting him; but whereas A seeks to attain some of his personal goals through political action, B does not have recourse to the political system in his endeavours to attain equivalent goals. If A expects to attain his goals with the help of the office for which X is competing, the relevance of the success or defeat of X is much higher for A than for B. It appears, therefore, that without knowing the subjective personal relevance of the political object "electoral success of candidate X" to A and to B, one would ascribe equivalent scores of partisanship or participation to their opinions or behavior. But if the differences in relevance are known, the apparent equivalence in partisanship, participation, etc., is no equivalence at all. Without the expectation of personal goal-attainment, A would not support X, or would not support him to the same extent. Assuming that B does not expect equivalent "rewards" from the electoral success of X, the difference between input and expected reward, i.e., the net propensity to support X, is—*ceteris paribus*—greater for B than for A.

This hypothetical example suggests that "objective" differences in political opinions and behavior must be interpreted in terms of subjective personal relevance in order to assess net differences in partisanship, participation, etc. The importance of an indicator of equivalent perceptions of the "object-in-situation" in cross-cultural comparisons, where not only the situations, but also the objects of orientation are different, has already been mentioned.

Although the comparison of political orientations or behavior is a step preceding theory building,⁹ the heuristic value of comparative analysis lies precisely in the use of a conceptual framework for identifying and classifying data which lends itself to the formulation of statements about the relationship between variables. Political opinions and voting behavior have often been analyzed in terms of socio-cultural variables, but, as Bendix and Lipset pointed out some time ago,¹⁰ social attributes are merely shorthand indicators of group-

determined interests, and "the effort to relate voting trends to various sub-groups of the population has a rationale only if it is assumed that these groupings are also interest constellations of a certain if varying cohesiveness." Without subscribing to a monistic "self-interest theory" of political behavior,¹¹ the present analysis suggests a "personal relevance" dimension for the interpretation of data in the comparative study of political culture and as an element for a conceptual framework of a theory of political behavior.

III. MEASURING MAGNITUDES OF RELEVANCE

Assuming that orientations towards political objects can be viewed as structured by particular situations in which the political object is perceived as more or less relevant in terms of goal-oriented social action, the next problem is to find a unit capable of measuring magnitudes of relevance in different situations. Confronted with the problem of evaluating attitudes towards the output of local government in different countries, the authors of *The Civic Culture* admit that they "shall have to keep in mind . . . that the structure of government and community organization changes from one nation to another." They claim, however, that this does not make the attitudinal data any less significant, because "the norms to which an individual adheres are largely determined by the role that the system allows him to play . . . [and] these norms in turn have a feedback effect on the structure"; furthermore, attitudes towards government depend also on certain social and attitudinal characteristics of individuals.¹² Without questioning the validity of these assumptions, it seems that rather than drawing conclusions about the impact of structural differences on cultural patterns from

⁹ See Arthur L. Kalleberg, "The Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of Political Systems," *World Politics*, 19 (1966), 69–82.

¹⁰ Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset, "Political Sociology," *Current Sociology*, 6 (1957), 79–99.

¹¹ On the "self-interest axiom" in social action see Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), pp. 27ff. According to Bendix and Lipset, "cultural, socio-psychological and situational determinants . . . intervene between the economic position of individuals and their collective actions, . . . these intervening conditions modify—though they do not nullify—the impact of economic self-interest on conduct . . ." ("Political Sociology," *op. cit.* p. 88). On economic interest and political involvement see Lane, *op. cit.* pp. 102–108, 321–334; an example of a recent study is Frank Lindenfeld, "Economic Interest and Political Involvement," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 28 (1964), 104–111.

¹² Almond and Verba, *op. cit.* p. 168.

structure-bound orientations. one ought to interpret such orientations by means of comparable indicators of the relevant aspects of structural differences.

One way of overcoming this difficulty is to compute an index reflecting the ratio between social action addressed to the political system and other goal-oriented action, in terms of the preference rank-order assigned by individuals, groups or nations to their goals of social action. I propose to call this index the *salience of politics*. The concept of salience is based on the assumption that at any given time, individuals and groups view the goals towards which their action is oriented as ranking in a certain order of preference, in terms of the values attached to these goals. Goals in different areas of life may be assigned to the same rank, and ranks may be classified as broader or narrower in range; but it is assumed that there is always a certain order of preference, however limited the number of goals.

The salience of politics can be measured at the orientational and at the non-verbal behavioral level. At the orientational level, the salience will be lowest when an individual sees no relationship whatsoever between a given political object and his goal-oriented behavior, which is channelled entirely towards non-political objects. And salience will be highest when he expects to attain the goals he values most through the given political object rather than through non-political action. Between these points of minimum and maximum salience, the magnitude of salience is computed from the ratio between the rank-order of goals which are sought through the given political object and that of goals sought through non-political channels.

A distinction can be made between the salience of a given political object and the salience of "politics in general." An individual may expect goal-attainment with the help of a candidate for the state legislature without relating this expectation to his orientations towards the party's candidate for the mayoralty. Demands addressed at one level of the political system are not necessarily related to demands at other levels; it is even likely that at any given time, demands will not be expressed at more than one level. Yet, on the support side of the "interaction of expectations," there can be—and seems to be in many political systems—some degree of coordination between orientations (and behavior) at different levels of the political system, due mainly to the organizational efforts of activists, factions or parties. These efforts are probably more suc-

cessful at any particular level when there is some expectation of "rewards" at any other level of the system. It is therefore possible to conceive of a salience of "politics in general." For the study of orientations towards a given political object, the salience of "politics in general" can be regarded as indirect salience, the magnitude of which can be assessed from the preference rank-order of the goals associated with demands at other levels of the political system.

At the level of non-verbal behavior, the salience of politics is the relative *frequency* of action aimed at the attainment of highly valued goals and directed at the political system, as compared to non-political action for the attainment of equivalent goals. At the micro-political level, the magnitude of "behavioral" salience can be computed only from past behavior. At the macro-level of analysis, the relative frequency of political action for the attainment of highly valued goals can be measured either at any given moment or for a given period of time. In the first instance, frequency refers to the number of cases in specific groups or in the total population; in the second, to the number of cases at successive times of measurement. The latter type of measurement can also be used to indicate successive stages of a process through which the attainment of highly valued goals by political action has become—or has ceased to be—a component of the political culture of specific groups of society.¹³

By measuring the salience of politics it is possible to determine the preference-level of goals at which the political system is articulated with social action. Anchored in value-orientations towards goals as well as in externalized social action, the salience of politics is a dimension of the "bridge" linking macro- and micro-political analysis, which Almond and Verba set out to construct in their operational concept of political culture.

Used as a filter variable, the salience dimension is capable of increasing the equivalence of

¹³ The correlation between salience at the orientational and at the behavioral level is a researchable variable. One may assume that for any given individual the present perception and evaluation of politics in terms of goal-attainment will be related to his past experience with goal-seeking through political action. At the macro-level of analysis, one would expect a high positive correlation between the orientational and the behavioral magnitude of salience, except in periods of rapid change.

meaning in the evaluation of cultural data. This refers to the procedure which consists in calculating relationships within nations and comparing them across nations. It is used, for example, in the comparison of income groups across nations, when respondents are matched according to their position on the scale of income-distribution (e.g., the top X per cent of earners in each nation), rather than according to the equivalence of their incomes in each other's currency. One could add that—*mutatis mutandis*—the salience dimension of politics also attempts to equalize differences in the purchasing power of the respective currencies and differences in culturally-determined consumer habits or saving propensities.

Political orientations do not refer to objects in their objective structural setting, but to subjectively perceived "objects-in-situations." To increase cross-national (or cross-cultural) equivalence of meaning, one has to evaluate differences in the meanings ascribed to "objects-in-situations," rather than objective structural differences. It has been suggested that this can be done through the use of the relational concept of relevance. Objects $O_1, O_2, \dots O_n$ will have equivalent meanings for actors $A_1, A_2, \dots A_n$, if their salience for these actors is of the same magnitude. Obviously, this equivalence of meaning is expressed only in terms of the preference-level of goals, for the attainment of which the given political object is perceived as instrumental. This does not imply, however, that the equivalence of meaning refers only to cases of an instrumental orientation towards politics. Goals have been defined so as to include expressive orientations, both towards unshared personal goals and towards participation in the attainment of group or community goals. Furthermore, equivalence of meaning is also obtained in cases where the given political object is not perceived as relevant to the attainment of any goal. Classification of data according to the magnitude of salience is not necessarily the only procedure through which equivalent subjective meanings can be assigned to political objects,¹⁴ but it is a procedure consistent with the assumption that all social action, including political action, is goal-oriented, and that at any given time goals can be considered as ranking in a specific order of preference. The

operational advantage of the concept of salience consists in its ability to translate objective structural differences into a dimension on which comparable scores can be plotted.

IV. POLITICAL "SALIENCE" AND RELATED CONCEPTS

However, the measurement of the personal relevance of politics is not merely a device for increasing the equivalence of data in comparative analysis. The magnitude of the salience of politics is a characteristic of the political cultures of groups or nations. It is also associated with specific structural and functional characteristics of both the political and the social systems, or of important sub-systems of each. One cannot expect a high frequency of personal goal-seeking through political action unless political groups, parties or office-holders can command sufficient resources (including material resources, as well as positions of power or prestige) to meet a substantial part of the demand; and citizens will not seek highly-valued goals through political action if such goals can be attained at lesser cost through non-political channels. These structural and functional characteristics are reflected at the cultural level of politics. If highly-valued goals are sought more frequently through political action in nation *A* than in nation *B*, one may expect the stakes of politics to be higher in *A* than in *B*, and this difference to be expressed in the intensity of political competition and conflict and in the patterns of political conflict resolution. Where the salience of politics is highest, as, for example, in totalitarian dictatorships in which most areas of social life are subjected to governmental or political decision-making, no overt competition and conflict can be tolerated, and conflict resolution is authoritarian and repressive. Examples of a high salience of politics, for specific political sub-cultures, can also be found in non-totalitarian systems.¹⁵

The concept of salience is related to La Palombara's "magnitude" of politics, which he proposes as a dimension of political change.¹⁶ Magnitude is "the ratio of political activity, however institutionalized, to all of the other activity that takes place in society." This formulation seems to imply the possibility of quantifying the total function performance of

¹⁴ A method for the measurement of the cross-national validity of political concepts through a differentiation between identical and equivalent indicators has been proposed by Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *op. cit.*

¹⁵ See *infra*.

¹⁶ J. La Palombara, "Notes, Queries, and Dilemmas," in J. La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 42-43.

the political system and assumes all social goals to be of equal or equivalent value. The concept of salience is based on the very assumption that goals are given different values, and relates the performance of political and government functions to the value-orientations towards the goals that are sought by means of political action. It thereby circumvents the difficulty of quantification at the total-performance level and plots relative frequencies of performance on a scale of value-orientations towards goals.

In considering the salience of politics as a dimension of political culture, I use the term "political culture" in a sense which goes beyond the meaning Almond originally ascribed to it. Almond has consistently defined political culture as a pattern of orientations—cognitive, affective and evaluative—and Verba has adopted the same definition.¹⁷ Yet, the salience of politics also refers to a particular type of non-verbal behavior: social action addressed to the political system for the attainment of highly-valued goals. This implies a concept of political culture which includes both orientations and non-verbal behavior. This interpretation rests on the assumption that the interest in political culture centers on the impact of beliefs and values on political behavior, and not on belief-systems or value-systems as such. Furthermore, the extent to which beliefs, affects and values are externalized in political behavior is in itself a very relevant dimension of political culture. This was recognized by the authors of *The Civic Culture* when they emphasized the importance of the divergence between orientations and actual behavior in a civic culture: "A citizen within the civic culture has . . . a reserve of influence . . . he is not the active citizen; he is the potentially active citizen . . . the inconsistencies within attitudes and inconsistencies between attitudes and behavior . . . can maintain the tension between citizen activity and citizen passivity."¹⁸

This interpretation of culture is not restricted to political culture alone. We have the support of two leading anthropologists for a "behavioral concept" of culture. According to Kroeber, "everyone is agreed that culture at least contains channelled or selected forms, norms and values, a stream of related ideas and expressible patterns. Some would stop

there; but most anthropologists would include in culture also human behavior—at any rate such human behavior as is influenced or conditioned by ideas or forms and in turn is engaged in producing, maintaining or modifying them";¹⁹ and Kluckhohn adds that most social scientists would agree that "culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior . . ."²⁰ "The explicit culture consists in those regularities in word and deed which may be generalized straight from the evidence of the ear and eye."²¹ No less significant is the fact that Parsons has found it necessary to revise his original position on the status of cultural systems, which he has come to consider as "systems of action in the direct sense."²²

The origins of the micro-analytical concept of salience can be found in attitude research, though without special reference to politics. Duijker, quoting Chein, includes the "degree of salience of object in personal life space" as one of ten dimensions of all attitudes.²³ Rosenberg has shown that attitudes vary as a function of the perceived importance of the object in leading to or blocking the attainment of values.²⁴ Himmelstrand defines salience "in terms of the kind of stimuli required to call into action the dispositions which make up the attitude" and constructs a salience scale for the measurement of attitude salience which he applies to a study of political knowledge.²⁵ An earlier application of the concept in the study of political attitudes is reported by Rokkan and his associates in the study of

¹⁹ A. Kroeber, *The Nature of Culture* (Chicago, 1952), p. 107.

²⁰ C. Kluckhohn, "Culture and Behavior" in G. Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), II, pp. 923–924. The emphasis is mine.

²¹ C. Kluckhohn, "The Study of Culture," in D. Lerner and H. D. Laswell (eds.), *The Policy Sciences* (Stanford, 1951), p. 88. The emphasis is mine.

²² Talcott Parsons, "Culture and the Social System," Introduction to Part IV of Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, Kaspar Naegle and Jesse Pitts (eds.), *Theories of Society* (Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1961), p. 964.

²³ H. C. J. Duijker, "Comparative Research in Social Science with special reference to Attitude Research," *International Social Science Bulletin*, 4 (1955), p. 560.

²⁴ See note 7.

²⁵ Ulf Himmelstrand, *Social Pressures, Attitudes and Democratic Processes* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1960), pp. 157, 166, 181.

¹⁷ Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in L. Pye and S. Verba (eds.), *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 549.

¹⁸ Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, pp. 481–482.

teachers' attitudes.²⁶ By correlating attitudes with elements of the social and political structural setting and with political issues, a number of theoretical propositions have emerged from the growing body of voting studies and the comparative studies of citizen participation in which the micro-analytical concept of salience must be considered as implicitly assumed. The elementary finding that the ratio of party members to party supporters (voters) in Western Europe is relatively higher in the Labor parties than in other political parties implies that politics has a higher degree of salience for wage-earners and other Labor voters than for the supporters of other parties, even if party membership cannot be considered a reliable indicator of salience. In voting studies, the salience of political issues is assumed to be one of the determinants of voting decisions. Thus, according to *The American Voter*, which is probably, so far, the voting study with the most sophisticated theoretical orientation, issue familiarity is defined in terms of awareness of the issue and awareness of its political relevance, and one of the determinants of the intensity of issue opinion is the relevance of the issue to the values of the opinion holder.²⁷ This, however, refers only to the salience of political issues: i.e., it is assumed that the issue has already been channelled into the political process and is recognized as such by the opinion holder. Furthermore, the political issue is assumed to be related to the values of the opinion holder without inquiring into goal attainment through non-political action. When the nature of the issue excludes non-political goal attainment, the perceived salience of politics in terms of issues is in fact merely the perceived salience of the issue. It is possible that for the study of voting decisions one need not go beyond the salience of the issue, but for the study of political culture it seems necessary to measure frequencies of political and non-political goal-seeking.

Studies of political interest and apathy

come somewhat closer to a micro-analytical conceptualization of salience. An interesting typology of attitudes towards politics in terms of salience, constructed from a survey of attitudes of a sample of students at the University of Frankfurt, has been proposed by Habermas and his associates in *Student und Politik*.²⁸ Campbell, in discussing the determinants of political interest,²⁹ introduces the concept of the "expected differential" likely to result from the choice of one rather than another of the available alternatives, and the concept of the "relative psychological cost" which the electorate must pay for participation in the electoral process. Transcending electoral behavior, Almond and Verba have inquired into "subjective competence" as an orientation towards political action in the area of feedback to government performance.³⁰ Furthermore, they consider salience as determining the balance between activity and passivity, but it is not clear whether salience refers to affective, to instrumental or to both affective and instrumental orientations towards politics.³¹ In his discussion of the aspects of "political style," Verba mentions "the extent to which a differentiation is made between the political and other spheres of life," i.e., "the degree of politicization of private life."³² This is precisely the area in which the operational concept of salience proposed in this paper is capable of making some useful distinctions between the "levels" at which the political is articulated with the non-political sphere of life. The use of structural criteria and of the concept of "cumulateness of social activity" enables Allardt to construct a typology of political activity in terms of cumulateness with other social activity and of expressive or instrumental goal-orientation.³³ This combination of goal orientation and structural approaches should be conducive to a more elaborate framework for a theory of political action, of which the "interest theory" pro-

²⁶ Aubert, Fisher, Rokkan, "A Comparative Study of Teachers' Attitudes to International Problems and Policies," *Journal of Social Issues*, 4 (1954), 25-39; S. Rokkan, "Party Preference and Opinion Patterns in Western Europe," *International Social Science Bulletin*, 4. (1956), 587-588. See also S. Rokkan, "Citizen Participation in Political Life," *International Social Science Journal*, 12 (1960), pp. 12-13.

²⁷ A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller, D. Stokes, *The American Voter* (N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), pp. 177-178.

²⁸ Habermas, Friedeburg, Oehler, Weltz, *Student und Politik* (Frankfurt: Neuwied, 1961), pp. 71-123.

²⁹ A. Campbell, "The Passive Citizen," *Acta Sociologica*, 6, (1962), 9-21.

³⁰ Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-261.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 481-482.

³² S. Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," *op. cit.*, pp. 544-550.

³³ E. Allardt, "Community Activity, Leisure and Social Structure," *Acta Sociologica*, 6 (1962), 67-82.

pounded by Bendix and Lipset is an example.³⁴

It is not unlikely that the earlier over-concentration of empirical studies on voting behavior and political socialization in terms of attitude formation is partly responsible for the fact that few political scientists have so far attempted to construct a framework for a theory of political action. Electoral behavior sheds little light on the components of political action, because in the act of voting there is no interaction. Voting may be the outcome of previous interactions, but the act of voting is a terminal point, and whatever its relevance at the macro-political level, there is no political action of other actors than can be considered as complementary to any specific individual act of voting (wherever the vote is secret). Furthermore, voting sometimes reflects group conformity rather than orientations towards specific political issues, candidates or parties. In Parsons' typology voting is either an expressive or a responsible action,³⁵ since the expected goal-attainment is "shared" with many other actors, it could be, at best, an imperfect instrumental action. Many political actions, however, are predominantly instrumental.

In Downs' "Economic Theory of Democracy"³⁶ an attempt has been made to view voting as a quasi-instrumental action. In this "economic" model of political action, voting is the link between two sets of goal-pursuing processes: voters seek to maximize their "utility income" from government action by electing the party most responsive to their wants, and party leaders seek the rewards of office (power, prestige or income) by strategies devised to maximize voting support on election day. This is a model of rational decision making but rationality is defined as action efficiently designed to achieve consciously selected *political* ends. Hence only "political rationality" is considered, and it is admitted that *individually rational but politically irrational* mechanisms can be employed to decide for whom to vote (party loyalty, family socialization, the attractive personality of a leader, etc.). Thus, "personal rationality" in voting decisions may

contradict the assumptions of the model. Yet, even the politically rational voter cannot vote rationally, because he lacks the necessary information about the voting intentions of other voters. Furthermore, in a two-party system rationality leads parties to becloud their policies in a fog of ambiguity, thus discouraging rational behavior by voters; and in a multi-party system, where there is uncertainty about the composition of the government coalition, voting is, at best, a preference poll. Whatever the other merits of "An Economic Theory of Democracy," it has provided an excellent demonstration of the fact that voting behavior is not a useful starting point for a micro-analytical conceptualization of political action.

V. THE UTILITY OF THE SALIENCE CONCEPT

The operational concept of the salience of politics has been presented in this paper within the framework of comparative cultural analysis and no assumptions have been made about the relationship between magnitudes of salience and specific types of orientations of forms of behavior. And yet, if the usefulness of the concept in comparative analysis can be demonstrated, it should find its place in the conceptual framework for an empirical theory of political behavior.

For the purpose of increasing the comparability of different situations in the interpretation of cultural data, attention has been focused on the magnitude of salience in terms of goal preference. For a theory of political behavior, however, it is necessary to consider not only the preference level of expected goal attainment, but also the costs involved in seeking these goals through political rather than non-political channels. Furthermore, it may be necessary to inquire into what Parsons has called the "cathectic meaning" of an object, "in respect of which its significance in terms of goal-attainment or of blockage of such attainment is paramount."³⁷ This will be referred to here as the "role" of the political object in the perceived or actual process of goal-attainment.

There are four possible "roles" in which a political object can be perceived in this process:

(a) It may be a *goal*, as in the expressive type of political action, either in the "consummatory" or in the "inclusion-membership" sense of the term.³⁸

³⁷ Talcott Parsons, "Culture and the Social System," *op. cit.*, p. 967.

³⁸ *Ibid.* Parsons admits that "in one sense inclusion is also a category of reward, the reward of

³⁴ Bendix and Lipset, *op. cit.* Neil J. Smelser has used these elements for his macro-political theory of collective behavior: see his *Theory of Collective Behavior* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962).

³⁵ This refers to the typology in T. Parsons and E. Shils (eds.), *Towards a General Theory of Action* (New York: Harper and Row, 1951, 1962), p. 75.

³⁶ Anthony Downs, *op. cit.*

(b) It may be a *means*, (i.e., a sufficient condition) towards achieving political or non-political goals; in this sense most political actions are instrumental.

(c) It may be a necessary *condition*: when political or non-political goals cannot be achieved unless the actor acts in a specific way towards a given political object.

(d) It may be an *obstacle*: when action directed at a given political object prevents the attainment of a goal.

A theory of political behavior would have to consider the structural conditions, both psychological and environmental (social and cultural), which are likely to be conducive to one rather than another of these four possible ways of perceiving the role of politics in the process of goal attainment.

The concept of salience does not imply that all political actions are instrumental, or are perceived to be instrumental, for the achievement of non-political goals. Expressive action, in which a political object is highly valued as a goal *per se*, or action in which a political object is instrumental for the attainment of another political goal, can also be assessed according to the rank-order of the value attached to the goal. The concept of salience is also useful for the distinction between mere instrumentality (type (b)) and "politics as a condition" (type (c)).

Examples of political action as a (necessary) condition for the attainment of non-political goals can be found in totalitarian systems, where certain educational or occupational goals cannot be attained without membership in one of the organizations of the ruling party or clique. In these cases the salience of politics is very high, but this condition need not necessarily apply—to the same extent—to all groups of a given society. An example of "politics as a condition" in a non-totalitarian system is party patronage in societies open to rapid and large-scale immigration, where important sectors of the economy are highly politicized. In Israel, a country of mass immigration, all political parties have performed, or are still performing, distributive and allocating functions. When immigrants have no financial means of their own, the supply of services, credit and occupational opportunities by political parties becomes an important factor in political mobilization among immigrants. Other groups, such as the more firmly established or wealth-

ier veteran settlers, can attain their highly valued goals without channeling their action through the political process, although the pattern of what had previously been "politics as a condition" and has now become an instrumental orientation towards political parties, has survived among many veteran settler groups. An instrumental orientation towards politics can come very close to "politics as a condition" even in democratic systems which do not face problems similar to that of immigrant absorption. This happens when one political party has a quasi-monopoly of influence in a particular geographic area, causing the development of special relationships such as the *parentela* between certain associational groups and the politically dominant Christian-Democratic party in the traditional South of Italy.³⁹

In a different perspective, it may prove useful to inquire into the correlation between the magnitude of salience and the stage of economic, social and political development. Is what one may assume to be the relatively low salience of politics in the United States determined by the homogeneity of the political culture or by factors pertaining to the economic system? Furthermore, is a low salience of politics in terms of goal attainment a prerequisite of stable democracy?

Is it possible to measure political development—in terms of integration and mobilization or distribution and regulation—through measurements of changes in the magnitude of salience? Presumably, in developing countries the salience of politics will increase up to a certain stage in the processes of development; thereafter, however, the different patterns of adaptation and integration through which the political system meets the impact of change along different and sometimes contrasting dimensions, may accelerate or slow down the further increase of salience; and we know that at a relatively late stage in the development of the Western political systems there was a clear tendency for a decrease in the salience of politics, particularly in the area of economic activity.⁴⁰

³⁹ J. La Palombara, *Interest Groups in Italian Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 306–348.

⁴⁰ Peter Nettl has recently discussed the status of the political "subsystem" within society in terms of two variables: (a) the *range* of the political subsystem, which refers to the area of goals drawn into the process of collective goal-attainment; and (b) the *salience* of the political subsystem.

"acceptance" (p. 968). The distinction between rewards and facilities is parallel to that between consummatory and instrumental action.

The use of the proposed operational concept of salience in empirical research may suggest the need for modifications or additional refinements of the concept. There is little doubt, however, that empirical political theory re-

quires operational concepts capable of comparing the "functional quality"⁴¹ of politics in different cultures and subcultures and of measuring the politicization of social life.

tem, which is its weight relative to other subsystems, i.e., the relative priority assigned to politics. The historical examples of shifts in range and salience cited by this author (Guizot's "enrichissez-vous!", the shift towards the welfare-state in the last fifty years, the depoliticization in Sweden, America and other countries, and Nkrumah's "Seek ye first the Kingdom of Politics") point towards a macro-political concept of salience similar to that presented in this paper, particularly with reference to the problems of devel-

opment or change. See Peter Nettl, *Political Mobilization* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1967), pp. 56-102. Although it is possible to distinguish analytically between "range" and "weight," it seems that the priorities implied in the concept of "weight" are a function of the specific range of goals sought through political action and of the priorities assigned to these goals.

⁴¹ This term has been proposed in Heinz Eulau and David Koff, "Occupational Mobility and Political Career," *Western Political Quarterly*, 11 (1962), p. 508.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF LATIN AMERICA*

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One way of acquiring insight into the processes of political development in Latin America is to compare the countries of the area systematically in terms of the "degree of development" which each can be said to have attained. Ideally, such an enterprise can lead to the understanding of the past history of the "more developed" countries by reference to the present problems of the "less developed" while an understanding of the problems confronting the more developed countries can make possible a glimpse into the future of those now less developed. Isolation of the factors responsible for a state's being more or less developed can moreover prove instructive for the understanding of the relations between political and socioeconomic phenomena.

Perhaps most important, such comparisons provide the means for holding constant effects attributable to characteristics shared by all, or nearly all, of the Latin American countries. Thus it can be argued with much plausibility that military intervention in politics, say, derives from elements in the Hispanic tradition. Yet it is clear that the frequency of military intervention varies from country to country, even where they share equally in that tradition. Thus one is forced to go beyond the "Hispanic tradition" thesis with which the investigation might otherwise have come to rest.

In the present article I will be concerned with the problem of the relation of political development to socio-economic development in the Latin American context. For reasons that will become apparent below, I will not at this point attempt a rigorous analysis of the concept of political development, which has already been the subject of a large and rapidly growing literature.

* The author wishes to thank the Harvard Center for International Affairs and the University of Michigan Faculty Research Fellowship Committee for providing him with the necessary time free of other duties. He also wishes to thank Walter C. Soderlund, a doctoral candidate at the University of Michigan, whose research is reflected in the data on constitutional stability, and Richard Loebl of Harvard College, who performed the statistical calculations.

I. MEASURING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The most common assumption about the relation of political development—typically understood as "stable democracy"—and socioeconomic development is that the two are positively correlated. The most notable early attempts to demonstrate this relation were those of Seymour Martin Lipset and Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman: Lipset showed that in indices of wealth, the countries of Latin America he classified as "democracies and unstable dictatorships" ranked higher on the whole than those he called "stable dictatorships;"¹ Almond and Coleman demonstrated a similar correlation between indices of wealth and the degree of "competitiveness" of the countries of the area.² Unfortunately, in both cases the assignment of countries to the different political categories was quite subjective, and borderline cases appear to have been handled so as to strengthen the perceived relationship, which thus becomes questionable.

Russell Fitzgibbon has attempted to eliminate at least individual subjectivity in his periodic pollings of his colleagues on their judgment of how democratic the countries of Latin America are in relation to each other.³ A great many difficulties of definition and weighting limit the value of the Fitzgibbon rankings, however. For our present purpose they cannot be used in any case since Professor Fitzgibbon defines democracy so as to include several social and economic variables; his rankings, accordingly, do not represent a purely political dimension and cannot be used as a basis of comparison with rankings on an independent socioeconomic dimension.⁴ This same criticism vitiates the otherwise well-conceived attempt in this direction by Charles Wolf, Jr.⁵ The prob-

¹ *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics* (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1963), pp. 27-63.

² Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 541.

³ See Russell H. Fitzgibbon and Kenneth F. Johnson, "Measurement of Latin American Political Change," this REVIEW, 55 (September, 1961), 515-526.

⁴ As Lipset points out, *op. cit.*, p. 31n.

⁵ "The Political Effects of Economic Programs:

lem thus remains one of finding a "hard" measure of political development to match against measurements of social and economic development.

Several scholars have attempted to develop such indices, but all too often have failed to ensure that the data used, especially given Latin American circumstances, actually relate to the dimension in question; alternatively, they have tried to combine several sets of data into composite indices but have assigned relative weight to the different sets arbitrarily.⁶

Some Indications from Latin America," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, (October, 1965).

⁶ A good example of the distortions introduced by these two failings is provided in the otherwise interesting and provocative article by Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Its Measurement and Social Correlates," *American Sociological Review* (April, 1963), reprinted in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, and Paul A. Smith (eds.), *Politics and Social Life: An Introduction to Political Behavior* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963). Cutright constructed an index of political development, understood in a democratic sense, based on such acknowledged criteria of democracy as freedom of elections and respect for their results, and the existence and size of opposition representation in the legislature. The index was formed by assigning to each country one point for every year in which it was ruled by a chief executive chosen in free elections, one point for every year in which more than one party was represented in the legislature, and one point for every year a minority party held more than thirty per cent of the legislative seats. This represents a substantial contribution in several respects. Using number of years as a criterion creates the possibility of plotting positions along a dimension which has a more than purely notional meaning. Moreover, assigning one point for each year in which a chief executive chosen in free elections actually remained in office reflects not only the number of free elections that were held, a la Lipset, but also the degree of respect for their results which existed; this is an important variable in the Latin American context. However, taking the existence of a legislative opposition into account in constructing the index drastically distorts the results obtained. This is so, among other reasons, because of the common practice in Latin America of providing for the mandatory representation of opposition parties in the legislature. During the period since the end of World War I used by Cutright, at least six Latin American countries operated under constitutional or legal provisions ear-

The present writer has attempted to avoid at least the grossest errors of this type by mea-

marking legislative seats for an opposition party. The irony of the situation, and the reason why use of this criterion distorts Cutright's index so greatly, is that the provision for guaranteed opposition representation is particularly favored by the dictatorships, since it serves to take in foreign democrats with the illusion of a tolerated opposition. The opposition members, however, even holding the up to thirty-three per cent of the legislative seats legally guaranteed them, are of course powerless to oppose legislation passed by a disciplined majority loyal to the president. It is generally recognized, accordingly, that provisions for guaranteed legislative seats for the opposition frequently met with in the more dictatorial countries constitute no more than democratic window-dressing, and legitimate democratic opposition parties normally boycott elections that they feel will be conducted so as to favor the president's party. At the same time, however, there is never a lack of opportunists, sometimes renegades from the democratic opposition, who will organize a spurious opposition party to contest the elections in order to enjoy the privileges and emoluments of the opposition legislative seats, which are really sinecures.

The distortion introduced by considering the existence of a formal legislative opposition as a factor in determining a country's political development can clearly be seen in the case of Nicaragua. During most of the period covered by Cutright's article, Nicaragua was a notorious dictatorship under the Somoza family, easily one of the two or three most stable dictatorships in Latin America. And yet on Cutright's scale of political development, which embraces all the independent countries in the world, Nicaragua scores the same number of points as the Netherlands, substantially more than Israel or Austria, and enjoys the fifth highest place among the Latin American countries.

Deane Neubauer has recently devoted an article to a critique of Cutright, along rather similar lines. "Some Conditions of Democracy," this *REVIEW*, 61 (December, 1967), 1002-1009. Unfortunately, he then goes on to construct his own index, which is liable to some of the criticisms applied to Cutright. Neubauer implicitly acknowledges this, explaining that he constructed his index "in a manner analogous to that used by Cutright . . . to enhance overall comparability between the two studies . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 1006, footnote 8. This means that the value of Neubauer's index is limited to its use in criticizing Cutright. It cannot validly be used to draw con-

suring political development by means of a radically simplified non-composite index, based on the number of years during a given period in which a country has been ruled constitutionally.

A "constitutional" year has been defined operationally as one in at least six months of which the country was ruled by a government chosen in (more or less) free elections, and in which that government on the whole respected constitutional procedures and individual civil liberties, and in which no extra-constitutional changes of government took place. This captures the two aspects of a government's democratic legitimacy, its origin and its performance. It should be noted that this index is designed to discriminate among the Latin American countries, for which it provides an appropriate degree of "spread." It would probably not be usable in the same form in other contexts.

Table 1 gives, in Column I, the number of years over the period from 1935 to 1964 inclusive (approximately the length of time in which democratic practices have begun to take hold widely in Latin America) which qualified as "constitutional and democratic" on the basis of the criteria stipulated above. Clearly, coding problems arise here, and there are a great many borderline cases. To take this into account, Column II gives the number of years not spent under governments which were unequivocally dictatorial; that is, it includes, in addition to the years totalled in Column I, years spent under provisional governments and under other governments not democratically elected which nevertheless ruled constitutionally. Column I thus reflects exacting, Column II permissive, criteria of constitutionality. Column III gives the means between the two sets of figures, thus providing a rather rough index of constitutionality, but one which is probably as authentic as any that can be devised. The rank ordering in Column IV is based on the mean figures of Column III.

If we return to the question of the correlation of degree of stable democracy with level of economic wellbeing, now on the basis of rather "harder" data, some relation, but a rather weak one, is found to exist. The coefficient of correlation between the constitutionality index figures of Column III and life expectancy at birth (which, following Russett,⁷

clusions about the process of political development, which Neubauer then attempts to do.

⁷ Bruce M. Russett, *et al.*, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 320-321.

TABLE 1. YEARS OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, 1935-1964*

	I	II	III	IV
	Strictly defined	Loosely defined	Mean of I and II	Rank order based on III
Chile	30	30	30	1
Uruguay	27	27	27	2
Costa Rica	24	30	27	2
Mexico	24	30	27	2
Panama	20	29	24.5	5
Colombia	20	22	21	6
Brazil	16	19	17.5	7
Ecuador	13	22	17.5	7
Bolivia	11	18	14.5	9
Peru	9	18	13.5	10
Guatemala	10	14	12	11
Cuba	8	15	11.5	12
Honduras	5	14	9.5	13
Argentina	4	13	8.5	14
Venezuela	6	9	7.5	15
El Salvador	0	13	6.5	16
Nicaragua	1	9	5	17
Paraguay	1	4	2.5	18
Dominican Republic	0	4	2	19
Haiti	0	1	.5	20


* The data were compiled, from a variety of sources, by Walter C. Soderlund, and classified by Mr. Soderlund and the author.

can be regarded as a "naturally composite" index of socioeconomic wellbeing) is .37.

Figure 1, which is a "scattergram" plotting rank order on the constitutionality index against that on GNP per capita,⁸ indicates these relations graphically. The hypothesis that political development correlates with economic development can be regarded as being weakly confirmed, in the sense that the top right and bottom left quadrants are fuller than those at top left and bottom right. Deviations from the center line appear greater than would be expected in terms of the Lipset or Almond and Coleman theses, however. If one thinks in terms of an undifferentiated process of socio-

⁸ Using figures from P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "International Aid for Underdeveloped Countries," *The Review of Economics and Statistics* (May, 1961). Figures are estimates for 1961 in real terms. Slight changes in rank-orderings, but not differing consistently in any one direction, are obtained by using other sets of GNP figures or other economic development indices.

FIG. 1. Wealth and stable democracy



Note: Broken line indicates positions that would be occupied if the two characteristics were perfectly correlated. See text for sources of rankings.

economic development, or "social mobilization," of which GNP per capita is simply one indicator,⁹ then clearly social mobilization stands in some causal relation to political development defined as the attainment of stable constitutional functioning, but is modified by, or mediated through, other social-sys-

tem characteristics which make its effects not wholly determining.

II. THE PARTICIPATION DIMENSION

But this result was only to be expected; the attainment of stable constitutional functioning is, after all, only one dimension in which political development takes place. To specify adequately the concept of political development for our era, one has surely also to stipulate another dimension, which is that of the extent

⁹ See Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," this REVIEW, 55 (September, 1961), 493-514.

of participation in the polity on terms of equality.¹⁰ Otherwise one would run the risk of accepting as authentic a constitutional facade masking an undemocratic reality. Many commentators have fallen into this trap, which Latin American circumstances bait rather well.

That is, the attainment of constitutional stability can be regarded as only one aspect of political development, the other being extent of participation on terms of equality. If one wishes, accordingly, to perform a more adequate test of the proposition that stable democracy is correlated with wealth—or, in more general terms, that political development in a democratic era accompanies economic development—it is necessary to take into account not only the formal following of constitutional procedures, but also a measure of participation that can reflect the substantive as well as the purely formal nature of a country's pretensions to democracy.

If political development has two aspects, one the maintenance of constitutional integrity, the other the extent of participation, then a country's degree of political development could in principle be represented by a single score which combined its separate scores on constitutionality and on participation. The political development score would then be a middle term between the scores on constitutionality and on participation.

Now if political development and economic development are closely correlated, then a country's economic development score should, likewise, represent a mean between its constitutionality and its participation scores. This proposition may be subjected to a rough test. As a rather crude index of political participation, we use the percentage of the population voting in general elections around 1960, using figures referring to relatively fair elections where available. These electoral participation figures are of course not wholly satisfactory for several reasons. Apart from the point that electoral participation is after all only approximately related to political participation in general, it is clear that electoral participation may be affected by transitory circumstances peculiar only to the election in question and not reflecting long-term regularities. It is also true that the freest elections for which figures

¹⁰ This appears to be essentially the same dimension referred to by Frederick Frey as the "distribution and reciprocity of power." "Political Development, Power, and Communications in Turkey," in Lucian W. Pye (ed.), *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 301

TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF RANK ORDERINGS
ON CONSTITUTIONALITY, ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, AND
PARTICIPATION

	Constitu- tionality	Life Ex- pectancy	Electoral Participa- tion
Argentina	14	2	1
Bolivia	9	20	8
Brazil	7	8	14
Chile	1	7	15
Colombia	6	13	17
Costa Rica	2	3	6
Cuba	12	3	10
Dominican Republic	19	16	4
Ecuador	7	17	18
El Salvador	16	14	16
Guatemala	11	18	19
Haiti	20	19	7
Honduras	13	15	13
Mexico	2	10	11
Nicaragua	17	11	5
Panama	5	5	11
Paraguay	18	8	10
Peru	10	12	20
Uruguay	2	1	3
Venezuela	15	6	2

Sources: Constitutionality index, see Table I; life expectancy, Russett, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-198; electoral participation, Yvan Labelle and Adriana Estrada, *Latin America in Maps, Charts, Tables*, CIF Study 1 (Cuernavaca: Center of Inter-Cultural Formation, 1963), except for figures on Cuba, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic, which are calculated by the author from population figures given by Russett, *op. cit.*, p. 18-20, and election results given in the *Hispanic American Report* for February 1963 (Dominican Republic) and April 1963 (Nicaragua and Paraguay). The figure for Cuba is from the *Statistical Abstract for Latin America, 1956* (University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957).

are available were sometimes not very free. The figure for Cuba is especially unsatisfactory on this score; Cuba has not had a free election for over twenty years, and a good case could be made for leaving Cuba out of the reckoning entirely; but instead the figure for the less-than-free presidential election of 1954 has been used.

If the hypothesis we are testing is correct, then the indicator of economic development

(again, life expectancy) should appear as a mean term between the constitutionality indicator and the participation indicator. If the hypothesis is incorrect, then the economic development indicator should appear as a mean term in slightly less than one-third of the cases, that is, about six times out of twenty. Table 2 gives the rank orders for the twenty Latin American countries with respect to the three indicators.

As can be seen from the table, the hypothesis is confirmed in 13 of the 20 cases, or about twice the frequency that one could expect if the relationship hypothesized did not hold.¹¹

¹¹ It is worthy of note that of the seven cases in which the economic development index, that is, the rank ordering on life expectancy, falls outside the range between the constitutionality and the participation rank orderings in Table 2, only one of these cases, that of Bolivia, seems to constitute a genuine exception to the hypothesis posited. The seven cases will be examined in turn.

One of them is, of course, Cuba, where the rank orderings on constitutionality, economic development, and participation respectively are 12-3-10. Here the participation ranking is much lower than the hypothesis would predict; however, this is only to be expected, since the ranking given, in the absence of a free election having been held, is that of the most recent election, that of 1954, which was notoriously rigged and the outcome (that of the "election" of the incumbent Batista) was known beforehand. If Fidel Castro were overthrown tomorrow and free elections held, I would anticipate a high turnout figure comparable to those shown in Venezuela or the Dominican Republic.

In the case of Paraguay, where the rank orderings run 18-8-10, it is clearly the middle figure, that for life expectancy, which must be suspect. Paraguayan statistics may be the worst in Latin America, but in any case if Paraguay is indeed eighth in life expectancy among the Latin American countries, that is the only social or economic indicator on which it reaches eighth place; on other economic indicators, Paraguay ranges between 12th and 18th place.

In four of the remaining five cases the economic development indicator falls only slightly outside of the predicted range: on Panama the rank orderings are 5-5-11; on Honduras 13-15-13; on El Salvador 16-14-16; and on Uruguay 2-1-3.

Only the case of Bolivia, with rank orderings of 9-20-8, constitutes an unequivocal exception to the hypothesis postulated. The problem can be stated clearly: the participation and constitutionality indices indicate that Bolivia is politically a relatively developed country, yet at the same

In order to make sure that this result was not an accident due to some peculiar property of one of the indices used, I checked the test several times, substituting rank ordering on other indices which also could be regarded as representative of the dimension in question. Thus when the 1960 Fitzgibbon and Johnson rank orderings on constitutional democracy were substituted for my constitutionality index, the relationship hypothesized again held good in thirteen cases. When GNP figures were substituted for life expectancy as an index of economic development, the relationship held in twelve cases.

It proved more difficult to find an index of participation that could be regarded as an alternative to the electoral participation figures used here. An index of equality in income distribution might be used as a rough reflector of the same dimension, but such an index is not available for all the twenty countries or anything close to that. Other sets of figures on electoral participation are available than the one given by Labelle and Estrada on which my rankings are based, but these have been peculiarly susceptible to computation errors and acceptance of propagandistic figures.¹²

time it remains economically extremely backward. Clearly Bolivia has been mobilized politically by some means other than economic change. The explanation for this is presumably that in Bolivia the Indians were mobilized, and were given a sense of personal efficacy usually found among occupants of higher-status positions in more developed societies, by having been enlisted into combat during the Chaco War. It is thus likely that 30 years ago, before the Mexican economy had developed to its present point, the rank orderings for Mexico would have shown a similar inconsistency, since the processes of change at work in Mexico resemble those operating more recently in Bolivia.

¹² Thus the table given in the *Statistical Abstract of Latin America* for 1964 (Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), on electoral participation is incomplete; I have not checked all of the figures which it gives, and many agree with those given by Labelle and Estrada and used here, but two of them are patently false: the Nicaraguan figure of an electoral participation of 80% of the population is surely extraordinary in that only some 50% of the population are of voting age; and, apparently due to an error in computation, the Chilean turnout was reported as 55%, when the correct figure should have been about one-third of that. Russett's electoral participation table gives turnout as a percentage of voting age population, rather than

Strong confirmation of the hypothesis is provided, however, by computation of coefficients of correlation among the three sets of raw scores. The correlation between the economic development indicator (life expectancy) on the one hand, and the political development indicators (the constitutionality index and electoral participation) on the other, is .69, which is significant at the .01 level. If per capita GNP (Russett's figures) is substituted for life expectancy as the indicator of economic level, the correlation actually rises to .72.

The necessity of taking both aspects of political development into account is demonstrated by the smaller size of the correlation of the economic development indicator with the indicators of either aspect of political development alone. The correlation of life expectancy with the constitutionality score is .37, significant at the .1 level, and with the electoral participation figure is .49, significant at the .05 level.

It can be stated with a considerable degree of assurance, therefore, that political development, conceived of as the heightening of both observance of constitutional norms and popular participation in politics, is indeed commensurate with economic development.¹³ This has not appeared clearly from the literature so far because, among other things, authors have relied on conceptions of political development which stress either the constitutional stability factor or the participation factor but not both.

III. RELATIONS BETWEEN STABILITY AND PARTICIPATION

Yet one interesting aspect of the relationships described above is that—for the intermediate stages of political development, at least; that is, before the attainment of completely stable functioning and maximum participation—there is a partially *inverse* relation between stability and participation.¹⁴ In other

the whole population; the raw figures are not given, so the computations cannot be checked, but at least one figure, that given for Paraguay, is patently false, and other computation errors may have crept in, as they have in other of the tables Russett gives.

¹³ This may also be formulated as the principle that political development and economic development are aspects of a single process, the position taken by Hélio Jaguaribe in his *Desenvolvimento Econômico e Desenvolvimento Político* (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Fundo de Cultura, 1962).

¹⁴ This conclusion appears to be confirmed by attitude survey data from Chile and Argentina turned up by the project headed by Alex Inkeles

words, a country developing economically develops politically, but this heightened level of political development can appear either as a greater fidelity to constitutional norms or as a higher degree of participation in political processes; whether one or the other direction is taken depends in large part (as the author hopes to demonstrate elsewhere) on the degree of egalitarianism in the social structure.

This formulation appears to confirm the scattered impressionistic insights of previous observers; for example, it can be regarded as an alternative formulation of Bagehot's principle, re-emphasized in recent years by Harry Eckstein, that the stability of the British constitutional order has been due to the deference showed by the British lower class to its social superiors. The deference premise is equivalent to saying that constitutional stability increases in proportion to social inequality, or in proportion as possible participants refrain from active political participation.¹⁵

One might also transpose the argument into the following terms: any stable political order needs to embody the principle of authority and, to some extent, that of hierarchy. In a democratic political order, however, these principles necessarily conflict with the principle of equality. As one reaches higher levels of economic and social development, however, the resources are created which enable a society embodying both types of principle to survive—resources, that is, of private satisfactions, of governmental budgetary capability, and of education and political sophistication.

Conclusions of interest can be drawn by contemplating the implications of change in the various components of this set of relationships. If participation is treated as the independent variable, then if participation increases greatly, constitutional integrity will tend to deteriorate unless the country's economy develops at the same time, providing a higher level of welfare to match the higher level of participation.

Chile provides a recent case of the working out of this set of relationships in Latin America. Constitutional stability has always been high—in the Latin American context—except for an interlude during the Depression. Chile's eco-

and still in progress at the time of writing: that as the propensity to participate in politics increases, support for the existing political order tends to decrease. See also the very interesting formulation of the problem in Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

¹⁵ The conclusion of Claude Ake on this point appears similar. See *A Theory of Political Integration* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1967), p. 15.

monic level has been relatively rather low, however, and, as the theory outlined here would predict, participation has also been extremely low, the turnout of 17.9% of the population in the Presidential election of 1958 representing the high point reached by electoral participation to that time. Politicization advanced, however, as Christian Democrats and the Socialist-Communist alliance, FRAP, competed in organizing the masses, even including the hitherto neglected rural population, and as secrecy of the ballot became guaranteed. Thus electoral participation rose to 26.76% of the population for the 1963 municipal elections and finally to 31.83% for the climactic Presidential election of 1964.¹⁶ It was generally thought by observers that this election was crucial for deciding whether Chile's future path would be democratic or not. With the victory of the Christian Democratic candidate, the probability grew that Chile could make the "breakthrough" into a political order that would allow for both constitutional stability and high participation, on the Uruguayan pattern—that is, in which democracy could be strong both formally and substantively.¹⁷ The Christian Democratic government moved in the direction of fulfilling its historical task in this sense by attempting to remove the last barriers to total participation by abolishing the literacy requirement for voting, and organizing peasant unions. At the time of writing the voting reform had not been consummated, although the odds were in its favor. Clearly, however, the new political order could only persist if it were underpinned by the higher level of economic well-being that would be demanded by the newly participant groups, who would be likely otherwise to reject the established system and turn to anti-constitutional alternatives. This was clearly understood by the Christian Democratic administration, whose "Revolution in Liberty" aimed at the maintenance of constitutional norms while reaching new heights not only of participation and equality, but also of production and welfare.

On the other hand, a high order of constitu-

tional integrity can be maintained while economic conditions are deteriorating only by politically restrictive policies which lead to a reduction in participation. This is demonstrated by developments in Colombia under the presidency of Guillermo León Valencia (1962–1966); constitutional stability was guaranteed by the bi-partisan National Front agreement, the economy stagnated, and the already low electoral participation showed a drop. If participation in Colombia increases substantially, therefore, constitutional stability can only be maintained by a resumption of economic growth.

Some superficially paradoxical but extremely interesting conclusions for the understanding of dictatorship also follow. A low order of constitutional integrity, that is, a state of anarchy or dictatorship, is compatible with a low order of political participation only where the degree of social and economic development is also low. For higher levels of economic development, however, the imposition of dictatorship should tend to increase participation. This apparent paradox can be understood in the sense that under a dictatorship aspects of life which were formerly not politicized become so, and individuals apathetic towards politics need to start paying attention to political factors.

The politicization of the population of an economically developing country by a dictatorship has effects which surprise outside observers. One of these is the "unexpectedly" high electoral participation in the free elections held after the overthrow of the dictator: the extremely high turnout figures in Venezuela after Pérez Jiménez and in the Dominican Republic after Trujillo are well known. Thus also parties whose success depends on the politicization of marginal members of the society, such as the Communists and other extremist parties, typically do much better after the overthrow of the dictator than they did before his assumption of power. It hardly needs to be mentioned that this point has policy implications for the United States. It should also be pointed out that in a fairly well-developed society the dictatorship itself finds that it has to encourage mass participation in its own subsidiary organs in order to maintain itself in power.¹⁸

We are now in a position to see what was wrong with the standard formulations, of which Lipset's is the best known, which corre-

¹⁶ These figures are given on page 2 of *The Chilean Presidential Election of September 4, 1964*, Part II (Washington: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1965).

¹⁷ The author does not mean to imply that "nothing is wrong" in Uruguayan politics. The point is that no extra-constitutional changes in the holders of power have taken place, at the same time as there is mass participation in politics and respect for civil liberties.

¹⁸ This point is discussed in my *Latin American Politics in Perspective* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1963), p. 18.

late "stable democracy" and "wealth." Stable democracy, or "political development," is usually defined solely in terms of the observance of constitutional norms—but this is a purely formal criterion which does not take into account the difference between countries where constitutional forms are a façade masking an undemocratic reality and those in which observance of constitutional forms is accompanied by general political participation and a democratic spirit.

It is understandable that those especially concerned with social justice in Latin America should become impatient with traditional formulations of this type and, conscious of the realities of social inequality that lie behind the constitutional façade, become cynical about constitutional forms and espouse revolutionary ideology.

The problem is genuine. At any level of development between those of the completely undeveloped and the completely developed societies¹⁹ (the latter represented in Latin America, if at all, only by Uruguay) there is an inverse relationship between mass participation and constitutional stability. One is thus presented with a dialectical tension: if mass participation rises faster than the level of economic development, then constitutional functioning breaks down, usually with the imposition of a military regime, as conservative forces in the society react against the attempts of constitutional governments to gratify desires of the newly participant masses through drastic social change.²⁰

It is thus possible to explain on the basis of the foregoing principles some of the major apparent failures of the hypothesis that stable democracy and wealth are correlated. Three of the wealthiest countries in Latin America by

GNP per capita figures—Argentina, Cuba, and Venezuela—have at the same time extremely poor records of constitutional integrity (these are the countries in the top left quadrant of Figure 1). This, however, is not surprising in view of the formulation developed here that for any intermediate level of development there is an inverse relation between mass participation and constitutional stability, in that these are three countries with extremely high orders of mass participation. This cannot be shown in terms of electoral participation for Cuba since there have been no free Cuban elections recently, but Argentina and Venezuela rank first and second respectively in electoral turnout, as Table 2 shows. The high order of participation in all three is suggested by the figures on the proportion of the population unionized; in 1955 over 25% of the population was unionized in each of these three countries, while in no other Latin American country for which figures were available was the proportion higher than 10%.²¹

IV. CONCLUSION

A series of cautionary points should be made. In the first place, the correlations observed should be taken only as more or less approximate pointers to the underlying social processes, not as a complete summary of those processes, which are doubtless too complex to be exhaustively described by a statement about the relationship among three variables. At the same time, there are clearly important aspects of politics altogether outside the processes to which these data relate. Finally, it is altogether likely that the most satisfactory summary of the relations involved would take account not only of states of the key variables at a given moment of time but also of rates of change, "thresholds," and "breakthroughs." Such a more complete formulation ought then to be comprehensive enough to be applicable to Africa and Asia, to Western Europe and North America, and I hope that other scholars will make attempts in this direction.

¹⁹ In other words, one should not expect that the relationships discussed here will be of help in comparing countries like Britain and the United States, for example, in which mass participation and constitutional stability can be taken for granted.

²⁰ This was demonstrated empirically in my article "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," this REVIEW, 60 (September, 1966), 616-626.

²¹ Calculated from data given in Harold E. Davis (ed.), *Government and Politics in Latin America* (New York: Ronald Press, 1958), pp. 68-69.

LOCKE'S STATE OF NATURE: HISTORICAL FACT OR MORAL FICTION?

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For nearly two centuries, the mere mention of the "state of nature" was sufficient to provoke a controversy. Did the writer intend an historical reference or was he employing a fictional concept as a means of presenting an *a priori* ethical argument? The question, at least in so far as it applies to John Locke, has never been satisfactorily answered—although it has frequently been brushed aside as unimportant. Yet, many of the "contradictions" which seem to characterize Locke's political thought might be resolved if only we could be certain of the meaning he attributed to the state of nature.

Lacking that certainty, we are left to choose from among the various meanings others have associated with Locke's use of the concept. First, it is charged that, if Locke did intend his portrait of the state of nature to serve as an historical account of the origins of government, it is bad history. Most political societies did not begin as Locke suggests. As one writer puts it, "history and sociology lend but little support to this theory of free men entering into a compact and so creating a political group."¹ Secondly, if the state of nature is but a fiction abstracted from history, that in itself may be grounds for rejecting its usefulness as a concept. Marx, for example, is critical of the 'state of nature' approach to politics because it assumes in an abstract fashion precisely what must be proven by reference to concrete historical facts.² Thirdly, in addition to these general methodological objections raised against the state of nature concept, there are special defects charged to Locke's use of that concept. Assuming that Locke means to present us with a logical construct, what initially appears to be the peaceful, idyllic natural condition of man is quickly transformed into a hostile, war-like state as the argument proceeds in the *Second Treatise*. Thus, in supplying two different descriptions of the state of nature, Locke is censured for involving himself in a logical contradiction which renders useless the key to understanding the framework of his political thought. Alternatively, supposing the

Lockean state of nature to be a description of the historical existence of men, it is difficult to see how their actions in that state can be meaningfully related to the Law of Nature, as Locke contends, since a rational understanding of the precepts of natural law is not likely to be the possession of individuals living in a rude and primitive state. Without such an understanding, what reasons have we for imagining that their relations with each other are not as Hobbes describes them? In short, we are led to believe that Locke is either a superficial, inconsistent thinker or a recondite Hobbesian.³

According to the critics, therefore, (1) Locke is a poor historian and sociologist; (2) Locke is neither an historian nor a sociologist, though he should be; (3) Locke is an illogical and contradictory theorist; and (4) Locke is a deceptive thinker concealing his true moral beliefs behind the facade of history. Before defending Locke against these criticisms, let me state positively the thesis of this essay. It is that Locke regards the state of nature as both an historical and a moral description of human existence. Obviously, this proposition will prove a helpful tool of analysis only if we are able to demonstrate when, in a specific instance, Locke is referring to one or the other condition. In order to make that determination, it is necessary to understand some of the reasons for the two-sided nature of this Lockean concept.

Politics—and hence, a political theory—is for Locke comprised of two parts, "very different the one from the other." The primary objective of a political theory is to explain the origin of political society, "and the rise and extent of political power."⁴ That is, the "foundation" of politics is laid in an "inquiry into the ground and nature of civil society, and how it is formed into different models of government." In considering these matters, which constitute "a part of moral philosophy," one's aim is to discover "the natural rights of men, the origins and foundations of society, and the

¹ Richard Aaron, *John Locke* (Oxford, 1955), p. 273.

² Karl Marx, *The German Ideology* (International Publishers, 1960), p. 17.

³ Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago, 1952), pp. 203-214.

⁴ *The Works of John Locke* (12th edition, London, 1824), vol. II, p. 408. (Hereafter cited as *Works*.)

duties resulting from thence."⁵ The second ingredient of politics is prudence, by which Locke usually means the art of governing men within an already established political society.

It is worth noting that Locke clearly commits himself to the genetic approach to politics. A political theory is a theory of origins.⁶ Now, an historical account of the beginnings of government is one possible genetic explanation. However, this approach can be rejected for purely technical reasons since, Locke observes, "government is everywhere antecedent to records."⁷ Moreover, history records that governments have diverse origins, and so provides us with no unequivocal guidance for assessing the 'lawfulness' of political power.⁸ Even if this were not the case, Locke is prepared to argue that history is not merely an inadequate but also an improper source for supplying the foundations of a political theory. Historical precedents are not "sufficient to establish a rule." For, "at best, an argument from what has been to what should of right be

has no great force."⁹ It is true that history is the chief source of man's prudential information, but this information is secondary and supplemental to a clear understanding of true moral principles.¹⁰ The "great question" of government, as it is phrased by Locke, is not "whether there be power in the world, nor whence it came, but who should have it."¹¹ Consequently, the study of history is useful only "to one who hath well settled in his mind the principles of morality and knows how to make a judgment on the actions of men."¹² Or, conversely, the "doubts" arising from a study of

⁵ *First Treatise*, pars. 58, 59; *Second Treatise*, par. 103. The point is also stated in an unpublished manuscript: "For that which was very fit and reasonable to be done at one time may be very unfit and unreasonable at another." MS c. 34, f. 89.

¹⁰ In matters of prudence, "a man is principally helped" by "the history of matter of fact." *Journal*, June 26, 1681, MS f.5. From history "one may learn great and useful instructions of prudence." *Ibid*, April 6-10, 1677, MS f.2. In fact, "history teaches this (prudence) best, next to experience." Locke to Reverend King, August 25, 1703, *Works*, vol. IX, pp. 305-306; cf. *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (ed.) Alexander Fraser (Dover, 1959), Bk. 4, ch. 16, #11. (Hereafter cited by Book, chapter, and article numbers.) The study of history, however, is only instrumentally important to an understanding of morality. Locke writes: "I do not deny but history is very useful and very instructive of human life, but if it be studied only for the reputation of being an historian, it is a very empty thing." *Journal*, March 29, 1677, MS f.2. Thus, while the "great end" of history "is to give an account of the actions of men as embodied in society . . . with the reading of history, I think the study of morality should be joined. I mean not the ethics of the Schools . . . but such as . . . above all the New Testament teaches, wherein a man may learn how to live, which is the business of ethics." Locke to Cary Mordaunt, 1697, MS c.24, ff. 196-7; cf. note 12 below.

¹¹ *First Treatise*, par. 106 (italics added); cf. par. 122. In light of this, the question of origins should be rephrased. The purpose of political theory is not really to provide a narrative account of the origins of government, but rather, to relate the *proper* origins of government. Obviously, Filmer's *Patriarcha* did offer a genetic explanation of political society; in that sense it was a political theory. But Locke refutes it because it is a "false" political theory. And, being false, it is more like a "fiction" than a political theory. *First Treatise*, pars. 34, 147. See notes 74 and 105 below.

¹² *Journal*, April 6-10, 1677, MS f.2.

⁶ *Thoughts on Education* (*Works*, vol. VIII), sec. 186; Locke to Reverend King, August 25, 1703, *Works*, Vol. IX, pp. 305-306; Locke to Cary Mordaunt, 1697, MS c. 24, ff. 196-197. (Manuscript references are cited according to their shelf mark in the Bodleian Library, Oxford University, where they are housed.)

⁷ The *Second Treatise* is described on the title page as "An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government." In the *First Treatise*, Locke writes: "We must know how the first ruler, from whom any one claims, came by his authority, upon what ground any one has empire, what his title is to it, before we can know who has a right to succeed him in it. . ." par. 94. cf. par. 83. *Two Treatises of Government* (ed.), Peter Laslett (second edition, Cambridge, 1967). (Spelling and punctuation have been modernized.)

⁸ *Second Treatise*, par. 101.

⁹ The first argument does not quite apply to Filmer, however, since he does attempt to support his position with citations from an historical record that antedates government, i.e., the Bible. Locke himself refers to Filmer's "History out of Scripture on which he pretends wholly to build his government." *First Treatise*, par. 128; cf. par. 154. The statement does make sense, though, assuming, as Locke did, that this so-called historical argument had been refuted in the *First Treatise* and that once divine history was discounted, no reference to human history could possibly take its place. The second argument is used against Filmer by showing that even Scripture records that men lived under different forms of government.

history can be resolved only through a reference to "the Law of Nature, or the revealed Law of God."¹³

A proper political theory, then, should present a moral position relatable to the record of human history without blurring the distinction between the two "very different" kinds of statements incorporated into the general argument. I suggest that Locke's political thought, as it is expressed in the *Two Treatises on Government*, attempts precisely this, and that, in light of what Locke conceives a political theory to be, the traditional interpretations of Locke's particular substantive recommendations are either erroneous or seriously inadequate accounts of his political theory. I am also hopeful that an exploration of the manner in which Locke is able to bring together the two components of politics, the moral and the prudential, will provide some illumination for the student interested in the techniques and the pitfalls of constructing a theory of political action.

If, as Locke did, one regards the Bible as an historical document, the *First Treatise* represents an effort by Locke to meet Filmer on his own ground, and to refute the latter's principles using the very historical record offered in support of them. Yet, having shown that history will not support "the false principles and foundation of Sir Robert Filmer," Locke immediately shifts the ground of his argument. He does not attempt, as he might have, to provide another historical description of the origins of government to stand alongside Filmer's account. Rather, he offers a definition of political power, and asserts that "to understand political power right, and derive it from its original," one must consider what is meant by the state of nature. Only after one has clearly in his mind the meaning of this moral 'fiction' is he free to consult history for supporting evi-

dence.¹⁴ Locke, therefore, begins the *Second Treatise* with a legal-moral definition of the state of nature.¹⁵

I. THE MORAL STATE OF MAN

What is that "state all men are naturally in?" Until recently, it was assumed that Lockean man resided in a tranquil community of friends, living together under the "law of reason." According to this view, Locke's description of the state of nature is appealing, but one can discover no satisfactory reason for man's abandonment of that state for political society.¹⁶

¹⁴ To avoid any confusion, I would like to make it clear that I accept Laslett's evidence that the *Second Treatise* was written, or at least begun, before the *First Treatise*. Cf. Laslett, *op. cit.*, Introduction, pp. 45-66. Indeed, given Locke's belief that one's moral principles should be "well settled" in his mind prior to consulting history, we should expect this to be the case. Nevertheless, the sequential remarks in the text above are appropriate, referring to the order of the two treatises as the work was published.

In a way, the use of the term 'fiction' here and in the title of this article is somewhat misleading, since it would not have been acceptable to Locke. For him, a 'fiction' was a creation of one's "fancy," a poetic construction bearing no relationship to reality. For that reason, he was prepared to label it "false." *First Treatise*, par. 147. Filmer maintained that *any* theory which presupposed a state of nature was just such a "fiction." *Ibid*, par. 34. Locke, of course, did not agree. Or, to put it another way, Locke believed it possible to use the state of nature as a 'truth-concept,' not only because it referred to actual human history, but also because, properly stated, it set forth the logical and moral conditions of human existence. And, because it described the "nature of things," it was true. Having said this for Locke's benefit, I retain the word 'fiction,' to be understood as most contemporary readers would understand it: namely, as a logical construct independent of but relatable to a body of factual information. In this sense, it is very close to Locke's own understanding of the 'state of nature.'

¹⁵ "since a definition is the only way whereby the precise meaning of moral words can be known." Bk. 3, ch. 11, #17.

¹⁶ William A. Dunning, *A History of Political Theories* (New York, 1921), p. 345; Alfred Cobban, *In Search of Humanity* (New York, 1960), p. 93; Basil Wiley, *The Seventeenth Century Background* (New York, 1955), p. 265; Richard Goldwin, "Locke," in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey

¹³ *First Treatise*, par. 124; cf. par. 153. Hence, the telling argument against Filmer's theory is that for all of its reliance upon "Scripture history," it cannot "be accommodated to the nature of things" nor can it "be made to agree with that constitution and order which God had settled in the world." *Ibid*, par. 137. And, in the opening sentences of the *Second Treatise*, Locke repeats the point, "it having been shown in the foregoing discourse" that "there being no Law of Nature nor positive Law of God" to support Filmer's arguments, we "must of necessity find out another use of government, another original of political power," e.g., one which *does* conform to the Law of Nature. *Second Treatise*, par. 1; cf. par. 143.

An alternative interpretation, responding to this point, suggests that while Locke does begin with a description of a peaceful state of nature, his argument in the *Second Treatise* gradually moves away from that description and toward a replica of the Hobbesian state of war. Since political society actually emerges from the latter state, reasons for its origins are plentiful and clear. But this answer begets another question: why did Locke begin his work with an account of man's natural state which he rejected but a few pages later? The answer is a paradox advanced with firm conviction. Once the shadow of doubt has been cast upon Locke's character and his essential honesty, all other doubts resolve themselves. All queries and contradictions may be put to rest, we are assured, by reading the *Two Treatises on Government* as a superb exercise in deception. Locke is really Hobbes in disguise.¹⁷

A variation of this theory is advanced by Sheldon Wolin, who does not, however, subscribe to the notion that Locke's real intentions and beliefs are purposely masked from the reader. Rather, he maintains that after positing a peaceful state of nature, Locke places man in a "fallen state of nature." Political society arises out of the latter, and represents, in intent at least, a restoration of the ideal state of nature.¹⁸

Now, all three theories share the assumption that Locke begins the *Second Treatise* with an idealistic portrayal of the natural condition of man. However, a careful examination of Locke's words will not support this assumption. More important, a denial of this commonly-held belief will lead us to the formulation of another interpretation of the Lockean state of nature. We will begin by delineating and considering in order the three possible states of nature, i.e., as seen from the legal, moral, and historical perspectives.

What "puts men out of a state of nature," Locke explains, is their agreement to establish "a judge on earth, with authority to determine all the controversies" between them. Locke adds a further qualification, that for the maintenance of a legal order, the judge must be "indifferent" and he must execute the law

"impartially."¹⁹ Whenever these conditions are not met, men exist in a state of nature. But while the legal statement of the state of nature may be viewed as independent of the other two definitions—for important reasons to be mentioned later—it should be noted that Locke frequently merges 'legal' with 'moral.' This is hardly surprising, since he grants the status of law to his standard of morality, the will of God. Special care, therefore, must be taken to distinguish between these two uses of a term so crucial to Locke's argument. As a negative example of the importance of noting this distinction, we may cite Richard Cox's treatment of Locke.

In his portrayal of Locke as a Hobbesian, Cox equates the former's legalistic characterization of the state of nature as a state of "anarchy," with the latter's description of the "nasty" and "brutish" struggle among men. Cox does this by insisting that Locke means by anarchy not merely "the absence of government in a formal or technical sense, but literally a condition of chaos, enmity, confusion, misery, and destruction."²⁰ When the passages in the *Second Treatise* cited to support this assertion are consulted, it will be discovered that only "confusion" actually appears in the text.²¹ The other terms are Cox's. The reader will easily perceive the difference in meaning when words like "misery, enmity, and destruction" are omitted from the argument. Those are precisely the words which do characterize Hobbes' state of nature.²² It is not surprising, therefore, that they are offered to us by Cox, and not by Locke.

All that Locke says concerning anarchy is that it is "to have no form of government at all." It is a state "where laws cannot be executed," and where, as a consequence, there is no government. "Instead of government and

¹⁹ *Second Treatise*, pars. 89 (italics added), 125, 131; *First Letter on Toleration* (*Works*, vol. V), p. 10.

²⁰ Cox, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-76.

²¹ The citations by Cox from the *Second Treatise* are pars. 94, 198, 203, 219, 225.

²² Because of the "general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceases only in death," men, according to Hobbes, are naturally 'inclined' to "contention, enmity, and war." *Leviathan*, Library of Liberal Arts, New York, 1958, Part I, chapters 11, 13, 15; Part II, chapter 17. Locke agrees that "the state of war is a state of enmity and destruction," but he nowhere describes the state of nature in those terms. *Second Treatise*, par. 16. Also, see note 49 below.

(eds.), *History of Political Philosophy* (Chicago, 1963).

¹⁷ Richard Cox, *Locke on War and Peace* (Oxford, 1960); Leo Strauss, *op. cit.*, p. 224; William T. Bluhm, *Theories of the Political System* (Englewood Cliffs, 1965), pp. 303ff.; Richard Goldwin, in Strauss and Cropsey, *op. cit.*, pp. 435ff.

¹⁸ Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision*, (Boston, 1960), p. 307.

order," there is "anarchy and confusion."²³ This is simply Locke's technical, legal way of defining the state of nature, and nothing more. It does not differ from his initial declaration that where "there is no common superior on earth" to act as judge, men are in a state of nature.

Cox compounds the confusion of his interpretation when, in order to bolster his thesis that the state of nature and the state of war are identical, he asserts that "Locke says that the dissolution of government will always 'bring back again the state of war.'"²⁴ But Locke makes no such statement. What he says is that "those who set up force again in opposition to the laws do *rebellare*—that is, bring back again the state of war."²⁵ Because Locke means to state this as a special condition attached to the dissolution of government, "always" is the key word missing from Locke's argument, a word conveniently supplied by Cox. The dissolution of government returns men to a state of anarchy in the legalistic sense. Whether or not a state of war then ensues, depends upon whether or not men resort to force. Even the dissolution of society only returns the individual "to the state he was in before, with a liberty to shift for himself and provide for his own safety, as he thinks fit."²⁶ There is no assertion that with the collapse of society itself men are necessarily returned to a state of war. The fact is, for Locke, the natural condition of man is one of uncertain peace.

Cox's objective is to identify Locke with Hobbes, and consequently he ignored the three categorical descriptions of the state of nature. Locke's aim, however, is to demonstrate that although "some men have confounded" the two states, there are important differences between the state of nature and the state of war. These differences relate almost entirely to a

single issue, namely, the extent to which men in the state of nature are able to obey the commands of natural law. In other words, if the state of nature is identical to the state of war, it must follow that men in their natural state are necessarily unable to prove themselves obedient to the Law of Nature. That is precisely the point Locke is unwilling to concede.

Without a "law truly governing nature," Locke argues, "there would be no religion, no fellowship among men, no fidelity, and countless other such things." If, instead of a 'law,' men depended upon prudential maxims to direct their social relations, the "common life of man" would be marked by "fraud, violence, hatred, robbery, murder, and such like."²⁷ These transparent paraphrases of the Hobbesian description of the state of nature reveal the extent to which, in Locke's view, Hobbes had denied the natural ability of men to obey the will of God. He knows, of course, that Hobbes speaks of natural laws. But the real question for Locke was, "what does it mean to speak of a 'natural' law when the 'nature' of man makes it impossible for a rule to function as a 'law' until civil society is established?"

What is really at issue is a matter which we cannot enter into here; viz., what kind of being is the Author of the Law of Nature? Since Hobbes denies to man any knowledge of the moral character of the Deity, it suffices for his notion of natural law that we know God to be the possessor of "irresistible power."²⁸ In refusing to accept this position, Locke is drawn into asserting that God is both reasonable and good, and hence men are able to adhere to the precepts of natural law not only as respectors of power but also as moral agents. Locke's account of the state of nature and his differences with Hobbes on this point are thus grounded in the theological conviction that God cannot have issued rules for men to obey and then have created beings who, in their most

²³ *Second Treatise*, pars. 198, 219, 203. (Where there are multiple references in a note, they will be listed according to the order in which they appear in the text of the article rather than by the chronological numbering of the paragraphs.)

²⁴ Cox, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

²⁵ *Second Treatise*, par. 226.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, par. 211. The point is that there are circumstances not dependent upon the use of force by some men—which does institute the state of war—whereby men are returned to the state of nature. See Locke's statement that when a government is "dissolved" by a "calamity" men are returned to the state of nature. *Ibid.*, par. 121. This return may also be the result of a neglect of duty or an abdication by the executive. *Ibid.*, par. 219.

²⁷ *Essays on the Law of Nature*, (ed.) W. Von Leyden (Oxford, 1958), Essay VII, p. 201; Essay I, p. 119; Essay VI, p. 189. To claim absolute liberty, as Locke believed that Hobbesian man did, is to "negate the law of nature." Essay II, p. 123. Locke specifically rejects this claim in Essay VIII, pp. 207, 211, 213. (Hereafter this work will be cited as *Essays*.) Also, Locke argues, "were there no law (of nature), there would be no moral good or evil, but man would be left to a most entire liberty in all his actions." *First Tract on Government in Two Tracts on Government*, (ed.) Philip Abrams (Cambridge, 1967), p. 124.

²⁸ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Part II, chapter 31.

natural state, are necessarily unable to follow those rules.²⁹ Therefore, it must be *possible* for men in the state of nature to obey natural law.

Now, it cannot be stressed too much that Locke, in developing this position, does not have to prove that the state of nature is at every moment either peaceful or warlike. All that he feels compelled to demonstrate is that, Hobbes to the contrary notwithstanding, the state of nature need not be warlike, and that, in following the command of natural law which urges us to preserve ourselves and to do "all reasonable things" we can to preserve mankind, we are not *automatically* brought into conflict with others. Indeed, it is only because some men, in exercising their freedom, "mis-cite" the law that we are faced with violent conflict. What draws Locke's censure is not so much his disagreement with Hobbes about the actions of specific men as it is his unwillingness to accept the latter's denial of man's free will.³⁰ In the state of nature, a state of freedom, it is possible for men to behave both well and

badly. As a state extended over a period of time, the state of nature will be both tranquil and violent, though at any given moment, and always because of specific social circumstances, it will be either one or the other.

Locke develops this argument in two ways, through the use of definitions by which he sets his position apart from the theories of Filmer and Hobbes, and through the citation of historical examples to support his assertions, again as an implicit refutation of those two theorists. Having attacked throughout the *First Treatise* Filmer's contention that men are not by nature free, Locke turns in the *Second Treatise* to a defense of his conception of man's natural freedom. But Hobbes, too, granted men perfect freedom in the state of nature. Locke therefore must advance an argument which refutes Filmer's position without, at the same time, accepting the Hobbesian alternative, if, as we have suggested, he intends to distinguish his viewpoint from that of his two adversaries.³¹

The "natural liberty of man," according to Locke, "is to be free from any superior power on earth" and "to have only the law of nature for his rule." It is "a liberty to follow my own will in all things where the rule prescribes not." Locke makes it perfectly clear that he is not speaking of "a liberty for every man to do what he lists." Rather, freedom exists only when the individual's actions are "within the allowance of those laws under which he is." The "end of law," Locke maintains, is to "preserve and enlarge freedom." For, "where there is no law, there is no freedom."³² Thus, in Locke's view, no man could be called "free" in the state of nature who was not, on most occasions, an obedient subject of natural law. In other words, Locke defines freedom in such a way as to deny that Hobbesian man is "free."

Men cannot be free in the state of war, Locke argues, because the relations between them are governed by force, not by law. "There are two sorts of contests amongst men, the one managed by law, the other by force." The former men share with God, the latter with the beasts. Hence, in making force his guide, a man declares himself to live "by another rule"

²⁹ In fact, God "cannot choose what is not good." Bk. 2, ch. 21, #50, 51 (italics given). "Wisdom and goodness *must* be ingredients of that perfect or super excellent being which we call God." *Journal*, August 1, 1680, MS f.4 (italics added). Also, see *Essays*, Essay VI, p. 183ff. Locke recognized, however, that he had not actually resolved the controversy over man's free will versus God's omnipotence. He confesses in a letter to a friend: "I own freely to you the weakness of my understanding—that though it be unquestionable that there is omnipotence and omniscience in God our Maker, yet I cannot make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence or omniscience in God; though I am as fully persuaded of both as of any truths I must freely assent to." Locke to William Molyneux, January 20, 1693, *Some Familiar Letters Between Mr. Locke and Several of his Friends* (London, 1708), pp. 26–27. In the *First Treatise*, Locke argues that God cannot be supposed to have created man and placed him in a natural condition where he would "perish again, presently after a few moments continuance." par. 86. cf. *Second Treatise*, par. 6.

³⁰ Referring to those who view the universe in mechanistic terms, as Hobbes certainly did, Locke declares that "by denying freedom to mankind, and thereby making men no other than bare machines, they take away not only innate, but all moral rules whatsoever, and leave not a possibility to believe any such, to those who cannot conceive how anything can be capable of a law that is not a free agent." Hence, "morality and mechanism . . . are not very easy to be reconciled or made consistent." Bk. 1, ch. 2, #14 (italics added).

³¹ These, of course, were not Locke's only adversaries. From letters to his father and friends, Locke seems very early in life to have staked out a position for himself somewhere between the "glorious Oceana" of Harrington and the "goblins of war and blood" of Hobbes. MS c.24, ff.49, 173–4.

³² *Second Treatise*, pars. 22, 57.

than the one established by God.³³ He becomes "degenerate," and, in fact, shows that he has "quit the principles of human nature." Such an individual must be looked upon as a "noxious creature" or a "wild savage beast," and may be treated accordingly by other men.³⁴ This is precisely the 'brutish' state of Hobbesian man. It is a state of "unrestrained liberty" which Locke explicitly equates with the natural condition of the "brutes," and not with that of man.³⁵ And since he further describes this departure from the human condition as a state of "declared war against all mankind," there can be little doubt that Locke read the Hobbesian state of nature as a description of unrestrained liberty and brute violence, and, consequently, as a "lawless" condition of human existence.³⁶

Perhaps at this point I should introduce the paragraph in the *Second Treatise* which has been responsible for considerable confusion, and especially for the assumption that Locke initially presents an idyllic portrait of the state of nature. Locke writes:

And *here* we have the plain difference between the state of nature and the state of war which, however some men have confounded, are as far distant as a state of peace, good-will, mutual assistance, and preservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence, and mutual destruction are one from another.³⁷

Most commentators have concentrated upon the comparison contained in the last part of the sentence, but a careful reading indicates that Locke places his emphasis upon the opening part of the statement. Since it is the initial sentence of section nineteen of the *Second Treatise*, the "here" is obviously intended to link the discussion just concluded in the previous sections with what follows. A knowledge of the context in which the above statement is made is therefore crucial to any interpretation of its meaning.

The sentence cited appears midway in the chapter entitled, "Of the State of War." The general topic discussed in that chapter is the use of force by one man against another, and

the conditions under which force may or may not be "lawfully" employed. The point that Locke is trying to make is that while it may be necessary to resort to the use of force in the state of nature, this does not necessarily convert that state into a state of war, because of certain limitations placed upon the use of force by the Law of Nature. Or, to put it another way, he insists that there is a distinction between the lawful and "unlawful" exercise of force even in the state of nature. According to Locke, it is unlawful for one man to employ force as a means of enslaving another, while it is lawful to resist with force such an attempted encroachment upon one's liberty. It is the immediately following sentence which begins, "And here we have the plain difference" between the state of nature and the state of war. If the latter were accepted as a general description of man's natural state, it would mean that every man employed "force without authority," i.e., without a notion of limitations derived from natural law. Whereas, in the former state, force is generally employed only in self-defense.

Admittedly, most men cannot act in self-defense unless there are some men who use force aggressively. Yet, Locke feels that the distinction he accepts is important because it indicates that most men are willing to keep their actions within the bounds of natural law. There is, he suggests, a "natural community" of men in the state of nature to which a-social individuals, following the "brutes" in relying upon the principle of force to direct their social relations, constitute the exceptions.³⁸ In other words, for Locke, the state of war describes a particular incident between an "aggressor" and an "innocent party" occurring within the context of a relatively peaceful state of nature. Since it is not a generalized condition of man, Locke cannot accept the Hobbesian meaning of the term, viz., "a general war and a perpetual and deadly hatred among men."³⁹

This point is restated in several ways by Locke throughout the chapter on the state of war. In the opening sentence of that chapter the circumstances under which men encounter the use of force are listed. A particular action may be the result of "a passionate and hasty" use of force. Or, force may be the means of expressing a "sedate, settled design upon another man's life." Only in the latter instance can the term "state of war" properly be applied.⁴⁰ Why should Locke bother to make this

³³ *First Letter on Toleration*, p. 45; *Second Treatise*, par. 8.

³⁴ *Second Treatise*, pars. 10, 11, 16, 172, 181.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, par. 63.

³⁶ *Essays*, Essay V, p. 163; *Second Treatise*, par. 11. For a more extensive discussion of Locke and Hobbes on natural law, see my paper, "Natural Law and Political Obligation," presented to a Conference on the Thought of John Locke, York University, Toronto, December 2-3, 1966.

³⁷ *Second Treatise*, par. 19 (italics added).

³⁸ *Ibid.*, par. 128.

³⁹ *Essays*, Essay V, p. 163.

⁴⁰ *Second Treatise*, par. 16. "Every imprudent action does not make a man culpable *in foro con-*

point? Hobbes, for example, makes no such distinction. Because every action of the individual is traceable to his passions, the Hobbesian state of war is always the expression of a passionate design upon another man's life. Locke rejects this view, contending that while it may be true that men sometimes allow themselves to be guided by their passions, and, as a consequence, resort to force, this in itself is not sufficient to place one man in a state of war with all others. Mistakes in judgment are allowable.⁴¹ It is only when the individual "declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity" that he places himself in a state of war with other men. In consciously employing force against others, he indicates that he has "revolted" from the level of "his own kind to that of beasts by making force, which is theirs, to be his rule of right."⁴² That is, an individual must adopt, in principle, the rule of force as an alternative to the principles dictated by natural law. Locke maintains that one cannot assume *a priori* that men are in a state of war with each other, as Hobbes does. Rather, an incident of war is an expressly "declared" action. It must be the result of "a declaration of a design" to commit injury, because men are presumed by Locke not to harbor attitudes of "enmity and destruc-

tion" toward each other.⁴³

Moreover, each person must decide, according to his own "conscience," whether "another hath put himself into a state of war" with him, and what course of action he should then take to defend himself. Locke warns that the individual must answer to God for the correctness of this judgment.⁴⁴ If every man is *naturally* in a state of war, what do "conscience" and "judgment" have to do with the matter? Such a stipulation makes sense only if one knows that there is a difference between the "hasty" use of force by an otherwise reasonable man and the "declared" use of force by one who has in some fashion renounced the rules of "common equity."

Since, in Hobbes' view, everyone is engaged in the state of war, there can be no grounds for moral distinctions between individuals existing in that state. Yet, this is obviously not true for Locke. Throughout his chapter on the state of war, he is careful to draw a distinction between the "aggressor" and the "innocent party" whose grievances ought to be redressed. Men may be foolish in the Hobbesian state of nature if they do not contest with others, but who is "innocent?" In sum, if all men are naturally in a state of war, there can be no "lawful" and "unlawful" use of force, no important distinction between a "hasty" and a "sedate" resort to violence, no appeal to "conscience" or "judgment" to decide something which could not be otherwise, and no moral separation between the "innocent" and the "aggressor."

Suppose we approach this conclusion from another direction. Both the state of nature and the state of war are without a "common superior" to act as judge, and thus, according to Locke's legalistic definition, both are states of "anarchy." In each state one may expect controversies between individuals to occur.⁴⁵ These contests may assume two forms, "one managed by law, the other by force." Keeping in mind Locke's intention and his view of the structure of a political theory—i.e., one begins with a clear statement of moral principles—the difference between the state of nature and the state of war must be a moral difference. Yet, the morality of the comparison cannot turn upon the absence of a common judge, the existence of conflict, or specific incidents of force,

scientiae," Locke to Reverend King, August 25, 1703, *Works*, vol. IX, pp. 305-306.

⁴¹ Not surprisingly, Locke's argument regarding revolution, which is a state of war between the ruler and the people, restates the same limitations. Thus, he maintains, "revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in public affairs." Mistakes are permitted the ruler, so long as "the main of (his) conduct" is directed toward "nothing but the care of the public." Locke is willing to go even further. "Great mistakes" and "many wrong and inconvenient laws" will be tolerated by the people "without mutiny or murmur." In other words, a state of war must be a "declaration of a design" revealing moral corruption, and not simply human fallibility. Consequently, the "ill designs of the rulers" must be easily visible to members of society. The people must hold "strong suspicions of the *evil* intentions of their governors," suspicions based upon "manifest evidence" and "the general course and tendency of things." There must be, Locke concludes, "a long train of abuses, prevarications, and artifices, all tending the same way" as a prelude to a state of war. *Second Treatise*, pars. 20, 165, 205, 210, 225, 230 (italics added).

⁴² *Ibid.* pars. 8, 172, 181. The individual must separate himself from "the ties of the common law of reason." par. 16.

⁴³ *Ibid.* pars. 16, 17; *Thoughts on Education*, sec. 143.

⁴⁴ *Second Treatise*, pars. 21, 241, 242.

⁴⁵ For, "in all collections of men," there are bound to be a "variety of opinions, and contrariety of interests." *Ibid.*, par. 98; *First Letter on Toleration*, p. 53.

for all of these are common to both states. What, then, is the distinguishing factor?

To answer that question, let us recall the manner by which moral evaluations are made, outlined in Book Two, chapter twenty-eight of the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. There Locke explains that moral judgments are premised upon "the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law."⁴⁶ Methodologically speaking, all that is necessary is a comparison of a particular voluntary action with a general rule, "whether the rule be true or false." This neutral definition will not do, however, since in "measuring an action" by a wrong rule, we may be led into "judging amiss of its moral rectitude."⁴⁷ One is therefore obliged to determine what is the "true" rule of morality. For Locke, the Law of Nature is that "rule prescribed by God, which is the true and only measure of virtue."⁴⁸ The state of nature, in so far as it is Locke's picture of the moral state of man, is one "truly governed" by natural law. The state of war is governed "by another rule" (force) which men have voluntarily adopted as the standard for "measuring" their actions. It is the "plain difference" between these two laws, one premised upon "peace, goodwill, mutual assistance, and preservation," and the other upon "enmity, malice, violence, and mutual destruction" that permits us the moral separation of the state of nature from the state of war. The state of nature "governed" by the Law of Nature is the only acceptable moral description of man, regardless of whether or not, in any particular instance, he succeeds in living in perfect obedience to the commands of that law. "Men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them, is *properly* the state of nature." But the "declared design of force upon the person of another, where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war." What is decisive is that in one state there is a "law of reason" which men make an effort to obey—and they are generally successful in that effort—while in the other state, the effort is not made because of a predisposition of hostility toward others.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Bk. 2, ch. 28, #5.

⁴⁷ Bk. 2, ch. 28, #20.

⁴⁸ Bk. 1, ch. 2, #6, 18; Bk. 2, ch. 28, #8; Bk. 4, ch. 3, #18; Bk. 4, ch. 10, #7; Epistle to the Reader, pp. 18–19.

⁴⁹ *Second Treatise*, par. 19 (italics given). Thus, Locke argues, "the state of war (does not consist) in the number of partisans, but the enmity of the parties." *First Treatise*, par. 131. See note 22 above.

So it would require an unusual employment of language to say that the latter state was 'governed' by the Law of Nature. What actually governs men in their relations with each other is the alternative rule of force.

If the purely ideal state of nature (i.e., the perfect fulfillment of natural law commands) is the expression of God's vision, the validity of the Law of Nature cannot be challenged on the basis of what men do.⁵⁰ At the same time, Locke insists that natural law is "a fixed and permanent rule of morals" which is "firmly rooted in the soil of human nature." Hence, "a manner of acting" has been prescribed for man "that is suitable to his nature." Natural law not only discloses "the eternal order of things" it also establishes "immutable" duties for men, duties which "cannot be other than they are."⁵¹ Locke asserts that it is "every man's duty to be just, whether there be any such thing as a just man in the world or not."⁵²

The framework of the universe, being the workmanship of God, is indeed of an ideal nature, one expressing reason, harmony, and peace. When Locke makes reference to these qualities in his discussion of the state of nature, he does so in the context of qualifying language which reveals that he is speaking of what conditions *would* be like if men lived "according to the law of nature"—because, it is *under* that law that "all men alike are friends of one another and are bound together by common interests."⁵³ Locke is offering us a definitional statement characterizing the law "whereby" men are "united into one fellowship and society."⁵⁴ His supposed description of the peaceful state of nature refers not to the *state* but to the *law* of nature, to that which ought to exist, according to God's will. It is the law that "teaches" that "no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions." Or, it is the law "which wills the peace and preservation of all mankind." The "peace and safety" of men are "provided for by the law of nature."⁵⁵ In short, Locke is not de-

⁵⁰ The Law of Nature cannot be "altered to comply with (man's) ill-ordered choice." Bk. 2, ch. 21, #57. "The nature of good and evil is eternal and certain, and their value cannot be determined either by the public ordinances of men or by any private opinion." *Essays*, Essay I, p. 121; Essay VII, p. 199.

⁵¹ *Essays*, Essay VII, pp. 199, 201; cf. Essay I, p. 117.

⁵² *Journal*, June 26, 1681, MS f. 5.

⁵³ *Essays*, Essay V, p. 163; *Second Treatise*, par. 19.

⁵⁴ *Second Treatise*, pars. 128, 172.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pars. 6, 7, 8.

scribing the "peace and safety" of the state of nature, but rather the purpose of natural law.

From the outset, Locke is fully cognizant of the violence and conflict present in the state of nature. How else could one explain the fact that a major portion of his discussion in the chapter, "Of the State of Nature," is concerned with the "punishment" of "transgressors" and "criminals" in that natural state? Locke mentions the "offenses" committed against natural law. He grants to every man the power to kill a "murderer" or to punish the "criminal" for the "unjust violence and slaughter he has committed." Locke concedes that there are "inconveniences" attached to man's natural condition which "must certainly be great."⁵⁶ Whence arise these criminals, transgressors, murderers, offenses, unjust violence and slaughter, and great inconveniences if the state of nature is so peaceful?

The fact is, Locke is a great deal more subtle than he has been portrayed by most of his interpreters. He is aware that if men could live in an ideal state of nature, they would cease to be men and become gods. But if, on the other hand, men could not live according to the Law of Nature in their natural condition, they could not distinguish themselves from the beasts. Locke's objective is limited: to prove that it is *possible* for men to live in obedience to natural law, and, on that basis, to show that they are moral beings.⁵⁷

It is in support of this assertion that Locke is led to consult history. He raises the question, "where are or ever were there any men in such a state of nature?" near the end of his chapter on the subject. First, he observes that "princes and rulers. . . all through the world are in a state of nature."⁵⁸ The example is instructive for the confirmation it provides of the interpretation of the Lockean state of nature I have presented. For, while it is true that the history of any country would disclose its engagement in a state of war with other countries, such incidents have been the exceptions to the rule of an uncertain peace. There are periods during which most nations do not

openly violate the precepts enjoined by natural law. Thus, from a panoramic historical perspective, one would conclude that the state of nature (between princes and rulers) is generally peaceful, though at times there are outbreaks of violence. Does Locke intend this example to serve as a macrocosmic description of individual relationships in the state of nature? His second example, stated in the same passage, indicates that he does.

Locke alludes to "the promises and bargains for truck, etc., between the two men in the desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega in his history of Peru" as transactions conducted between men "in a state of nature in reference to one another." The example concerns two shipwrecked sailors who discover each other in Robinson Crusoe fashion and who, for a period of three or four years, live together, parting now and then in disagreement, until they are finally rescued. These men do not live in perfect tranquility, anymore than do states with respect to each other; but most of the time they do live reasonably well together. And, in their existence, a state of war is a particular exception to the general rule. That, it must be stressed, is all that Locke has to demonstrate in order to establish his point. The Lockean state of nature is one in which men can, but sometimes do not, live according to the rules of "common equity."

Locke illustrates the positive aspects of his position, pointing out that "not every compact" between men in the state of nature leads to the creation of political society. "Other promises and compacts men may make with one another and yet still be in the state of nature." Such agreements are binding because "truth and keeping of faith belongs to men as men, and not as members of society." Locke speaks of "men living in neighborhood without the bounds of a commonwealth."⁵⁹ And, he adds, those who "liked one another so well" as to constitute themselves into a body politic must "be supposed to have some acquaintance and friendship together and *some trust* in one another."⁶⁰

We might summarize Locke's position by citing an observation recorded in his *Journal*. "Our state here in this world," he wrote, "is a state of mediocrity." It is a state wherein "we are not capable of living together *exactly* by a rule, not altogether without it."⁶¹ That is Locke's picture of life in the state of nature.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, par. 14; *Third Letter on Toleration* (*Works*, vol. V), p. 212.

⁶⁰ *Second Treatise*, par. 107 (italics added).

⁶¹ *Journal*, March 20, 1678, MS f.3 (italics added).

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pars. 6-13.

⁵⁷ In the context of speaking of the inhabitants of the West Indies, who reside under state of nature conditions, Locke records in his *Journal* that the individual can improve his lot if he cultivates that knowledge which will "shorten or ease" his labor and increase his "stock of riches." And, he adds, "another use of his knowledge is to live in peace with his fellow men, and *this also he is capable of.*" *Journal*, February 8, 1677, MSf. 2 (italics added).

⁵⁸ *Second Treatise*, pars. 14, 145, 183, 184.

The natural human condition is one in which agreements are both kept and violated, where peace and violence intermingle, where men good and bad, and in varying degrees, reside. The moral state of Lockean man is one of capabilities. It is not necessary that an individual be "actually endowed with" certain general qualities or abstract characteristics, only that he be "at least susceptible of these specific qualities."⁶² Thus, men are "equipped" with the "faculties" for reasoning. Every man is born "with a *tillie* to perfect freedom."⁶³ It is in this sense that all men are by nature rational and free, in that they possess the capacity to be so. "Thus we are born free as we are born rational, not that we have actually the exercise of either."⁶⁴ Similarly, Locke speaks of men as "beings *capable* of laws." And a few sentences later, he asks, "is a man under the law of nature?" His reply is that men in the state of nature are under the law because they are "supposed *capable* to know that law." Not that the individual actually does know it in every instance, but only that "he is *presumed* to know how far that law is to be his guide."⁶⁵ Therefore, Locke concludes men possess "the same relative capacity of being ranked among moral, social creatures, and of being treated accordingly."⁶⁶ These assumptions and conclusions about men are necessary to a moral perspective. As a view of human nature, they are meant to provide the individual with the proper guidelines for his relationships with others, although particular persons may in fact "declare" themselves by a consistency in their actions to be of another nature. The Lockean state of nature thus serves as a useful illustration of this moral "fiction."

II. THE HISTORICAL STATE OF MAN

Since Locke's references to man as a rational and moral being refer to his capacities, it is possible that those capacities may not be fulfilled. Specifically, this means that historical and social conditions now enter into the argument, as aids or hindrances to man's development. So, for example, explaining why some men may not possess a knowledge of natural law, Locke cites the "barbarous habits" or "evil customs" under which they might have been raised. He observes that men may be

"brought up in vice" in some societies, indicating the extent to which social conditions can prevent the realization of a natural capacity.⁶⁷ The question is, under what kinds of social conditions can men gain a knowledge of their moral duties? It is a commonly accepted notion that the primitive conditions of life in the state of nature could not have been conducive to an awareness of natural law. The fault in this critique lies in its failure to appreciate that Locke's conception of the state of nature is not static, but developmental. Men may reside in different social surroundings and still be in the state of nature. Hence, we cannot omit the historical dimensions of the concept from a discussion of its place in Locke's political theory.

At first glance, it is surprising how much Locke is willing to concede to Filmer's argument. He grants that the first form of government was the political projection of the father's authority over the family. Nevertheless, Locke insists, the "foundations" and "ends" of paternal and political power "are so perfectly distinct and separate" that "there is no way to identify them"—though, of course, that is exactly what Filmer does.⁶⁸ There is no way to identify them, that is, if the moral "foundations" and "ends" of political power are kept separate from the historical fact of patriarchal authority and government.

Having made this point, Locke then proceeds to employ the paternal metaphor throughout his discussion of history and the first form of government. He observes:

It is with commonwealths as with particular persons, they are commonly ignorant of their own births and infancies.

⁶⁷ *Essays*, Essay I, p. 115, *First Treatise*, par 58. Men may be "cooped in close by the laws of their countries," and so prevented from acting in accordance with the precepts of natural law. Bk. 4, ch. 20, #4. "Fashion, discipline, and education have put eminent differences in the ages of several countries and made one generation much different from another in arts and sciences." *Conduct of the Understanding* (*Works*, vol. II) sec. 24; Bk. 2, ch. 21, #71. Locke observes that "men's tempers commonly [grow] good or bad with the conditions and circumstances they are in." MS c.34, f.25; Bk. 1, ch. 3, #12. More specifically, the "great difference and contrariety of opinions" amongst men are generally traceable to their "worldly interests" and the inequalities arising from certain "temporal advantages." *Journal*, April 6-10, 1677, MS f.2.

⁶⁸ *Second Treatise*, pars. 71, 173, 174.

⁶² *Works*, vol. II, p. 309.

⁶³ *Second Treatise*, par. 87 (italics added).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, par. 61, "We are born with faculties and powers capable of almost anything." *Works*, vol. II, p. 331.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pars. 57, 59, 60 (italics added).

⁶⁶ *Works*, vol II, p. 312.

And a few paragraphs later, Locke refers to "the infancies of commonwealths," and to "young societies" which require "nursing fathers" to guide them through "the weakness and infirmities of their infancy." Still later in the *Second Treatise*, he returns to his characterization of "the infancy of governments" and the consequent need for governors to act "as the fathers of them, watching over them for their good."⁶⁹

"Perhaps at first," Locke admits, "some one good and excellent man" had a certain "deference paid to his goodness" by being granted "a kind of natural authority" over other men. Even this conjectural language is all but abandoned a few paragraphs later when Locke declares:

I will not deny that, if we look back as far as history will direct us toward the original of commonwealths, we shall generally find them under the government and administration of one man.⁷⁰

There is no mistaking the portrait we are offered of the ruler as a father-figure, since, "as it often happens where there is much land and few people, the government commonly began in the father." He "in effect" became "the lawmaker and governor" because of the childlike trust men in the early state of nature evinced for the father's ability to govern wisely.⁷¹ Moreover, the institution of monarchy appeared "simple" and "obvious" to individuals without a knowledge of the various "forms of government" men might devise. They were ignorant of the "inconveniences of absolute power." Besides, monarchy was "best suited" to the conditions of men in the earliest historical state of nature since what they most needed was protection against foreign invasion. Monarchy provides men with such protection, and therefore, Locke concludes it was "natural" for men "to put themselves under a frame of government which might best serve to that end."⁷²

It is true that a consultation of history lends considerable support to the argument that the earliest form of government was a patriarchal monarchy. But, Locke insists, this admission "destroys not that which I affirm," although some men have made the mistake of concluding from their reading of history that all govern-

ment is "by nature" patriarchal or monarchical. Rejecting that viewpoint, Locke states that "it may not be amiss here to consider *why* people in the beginning generally pitched upon this form" of government.⁷³ The explanation offered for their action must be placed within the context of an historical reading of the state of nature. One must visualize men passing through several stages of economic and social development. Also, what Locke says retains the status of an explanation; it is not a justification of the historical origins of government. The political society envisioned by Locke is justified on grounds other than those supplied by history.⁷⁴

Locke refuses to grant that any inevitability is attached to the origins of government. He takes pains to point out that even the institution of a monarchy is the result of man's exercising his "natural freedom." And, he adds, there are some historical examples of men using their freedom to institute a different form of government.⁷⁵ It is not necessary to deny that monarchy was the earliest form of government; Locke simply wants to show that men might have acted otherwise. Hence, an admission that monarchy was a "likely," "easier," or "natural" solution to the problems faced by men in "the first ages" should not be taken to mean that monarchy was the only possible solution to those problems, a viewpoint he probably—but inaccurately—attributed to both Hobbes and Filmer. History tells us the prudential reasons why men established governments; we have yet to learn from Locke the proper moral foundations of the political order.

Monarchy arose, Locke suggests, because men were "accustomed" by experience "to the rule of one man." Individuals "grew up" within a family, "acquiescing" by degrees to the exercise of authority by a single person.⁷⁶ However, this reliance upon custom, tradition, and utility proved in time to be a poor foundation for government. At some definite point in history, men were forced "to examine more carefully the original and rights of government,

⁷³ *Ibid.*, par. 106 (italics added).

⁷⁴ The dichotomy is not as sharp as this sentence implies, because Locke merges several propositions together. Thus, all 'governments' are the products of consent, and consent is a necessary—though not a sufficient—prerequisite of the proper political society. Given this view, the historical origins of government does supply at least a part of the justification for the "true extent and end of government." See note 98 below.

⁷⁵ *Second Treatise*, pars. 105, 112; cf. par. 103.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pars. 107, 110, 112.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pars. 101, 110, 162.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pars. 94, 105, 110.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pars. 74, 75, 76, 94, 107, 110, 111, 117. Locke also reverses the metaphor, labelling the natural relationship of the father to the child "a temporary government," par. 67.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pars. 107, 110.

and to find out ways to restrain the exorbitancies and prevent the abuses of that power" which the people had "intrusted in another's hands only for their own good."⁷⁷ Why should Locke suppose that such an examination, in fact, ever occurred? The answer to that question is to be found in Locke's discussion of the various forms of property associated with certain historical stages of the state of nature.

Although history may be divided into an infinite number of chronological periods, Locke stresses the importance of dividing history into two periods according to the specific stage of development of property within a society. The earliest phase of history he names "the first ages of the world." It is a time of "innocence," a "poor but virtuous" period in history.⁷⁸ It is "innocent" and "virtuous," be it noted, not because men are at one point in history innately different in character from men in some other age. Rather, Locke makes it clear that men are shaped by their social circumstances, and especially by their attitudes toward and their possession of property. Locke is well aware of the ability of political and social institutions to restrict or develop men's capacities to be rational, moral beings.

In the earliest stage of the state of nature, there were "few trespasses" against the Law of Nature because men had "no reason" to invade the rights of others or engage in quarrels.⁷⁹ The lack of "reasons" refers to the fact that men's "possessions" were not very large.⁸⁰ The "first age" is a time "before the appropriation of land," when men merely "gathered" such goods as were supplied by nature. Locke tells

us that "men, at first, for the most part contented themselves with what unassisted nature offered to their necessities." In general, the population was nomadic; men "wandered" freely "up and down"; consequently, land as such was not of real value to them. What we are presented with, then, is a picture of "the equality of a simple, poor way of living" where men are able to confine "their desires within the narrow bounds of each man's small property."⁸¹

Concomitant with this economic description, Locke observes that during this first period, men had need of few laws and few "officers" to "look after the execution of justice." Since they "stood more in need of defense against foreign invasions and injuries than of multiplicity of laws," Locke remarks that "a few established laws served the turn." In short, men resided in a society with a subsistence standard of living where the form of government was simple, and the laws were few. It was a "golden age" before "vain ambition . . . corrupted men's minds into a mistake of true power and honor." At this time, there were "no contests betwixt rulers and people about governors or government."⁸²

This situation changed dramatically "when ambition and luxury in future ages" succeeded in corrupting men. These vices "taught princes to have distinct and separate interests from their people," leading to the aforementioned re-examination of the foundations of government. Locke observes that "a long continuation" of society develops those "necessary arts" by which individuals are able to provide "for their safety, ease, and plenty." In effect, the institution of monarchy at an early age in history produced the conditions which led to its downfall by introducing men to "ambition and luxury."⁸³

Locke provides a rather clear account of the social and economic factors responsible for the changes in the life of man during what we have labelled the "second phase" of history. The most important of the events which brought to an end the first era of man's existence was the invention of money. But why was money invented? Although it may, in fact, have been true that in some parts of the world land was scarce, Locke refuses to accept this as an explanation.⁸⁴ Instead, he suggests that the appearance of money is traceable to "the desire

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, pars. 111, 162.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, pars. 110.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, pars. 31, 51, 75, 108, 109.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, pars. 36, 37, 38. Beneath this veil of "history," of course, is the Christian view of man's fall from grace. Elsewhere, Locke writes that when man was created by God, he was "put into a possession of the whole world" in a state where "there was scarce room for any irregular desires. But instinct and reason carried him the same way, and being neither capable of covetousness or ambition when he had already the free use of all things . . . [the fall of Adam is then explicitly mentioned] and when private possessions and labor which now the curse on the earth had made necessary, by degrees made a definition of conditions, it gave room for covetousness, pride, and ambition, which by fashion and example spread the corruption which has so prevailed over mankind." A note entitled, "Homo Ante Et Post Lapsum," 1693, MS c. 28, f. 113 v. See also *Second Treatise*, pars. 56, 57.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, pars. 45, 36, 38, 107; cf. Bk. 2, ch. 16, #6.

⁸² *Ibid*, pars. 107, 111, 162.

⁸³ *Ibid*, par. 101.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, par. 45; cf. par. 36.

of having more than man needed." With its introduction into the world, "the intrinsic value of things which depends only on their usefulness to the life of man," was transformed.⁸⁵ Objects now took on an "imaginary value," fed by the appetites of men's imagination in pursuit of luxury and power. The love of power and property, Locke argues, are the "two roots of almost all the injustice and contention that so disturb human life."⁸⁶

In conjunction with this psychological explanation for the changed form of property, Locke offers a sociological account of the transformation. "Fixed property in the ground," he maintains, is associated with the founding of cities. "Families increased and industry enlarged their stocks" until they "incorporated" themselves and "built cities."⁸⁷ It is only at this point that money makes its appearance. For, once men settled in cities, they began to engage in commercial trade with each other in order to increase their wealth. Trade, Locke notes, is "the foundation of riches." And, money is "necessary to the carrying on the trade."⁸⁸ It is "commerce with other parts of the world" that "draws money" to the individual.⁸⁹ Moreover, the "want of people and money" go together as do "riches and multitudes."⁹⁰

We have already hinted at what happened when men began to "enlarge" their possessions, engage in trade, and by tacit consent accept money as a universal commodity of exchange. These complicated economic transactions gave rise to disputes and controversies among men. Now laws were needed to "settle the properties of those of the same society."⁹¹ "In all collections of men," Locke observes, a "variety of opinions and contrariety of inter-

ests" emerge.⁹² The need for some "common superior" to act as "judge" in deciding these "controversies" obviously grew in proportion to the frequency with which men interacted with each other within the same city and between cities.

With the accrual of material wealth, the Lockean state emerges, with its division of political power, its impartial judges, and a multiplicity of laws. For, within civil society, "the laws regulate the right of property, and the possession of land is determined by positive constitutions." The "great art of government," according to Locke, is manifest in "the increase of lands and the right employing of them." The Lockean state is an institution designed to secure "protection and encouragement to the honest industry of mankind."⁹³ That the creation of political society is responsive to the new economic needs of men living under the 'second phase' of monarchy is evident. We cannot suppose, Locke argues, that "anyone entered into civil society for the procuring, securing, or advancing the salvation of his soul, when he, for that end, needed not the force of civil society." But the individual does enter political society "for the procuring, preserving, and advancing" of his "civil interests." These include "life, liberty, health, and indolence of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like." Locke goes so far as to assert that "the temporal good and outward prosperity of the society" is "the sole reason of men's entering into [civil] society."⁹⁴

In a state of nature in which the exchange of commodities is simple, where peoples are nomadic, where there is no "fixed property," a simple form of government will suffice to preserve the minimum of order that enables men, generally speaking, to obey the precepts of natural law. However, in a state of nature in which complicated economic transactions take place within and between groups of men, where land is valuable, where the economy has developed beyond the subsistence level, and where quarrels and contentions among men over property rights are frequent, it becomes necessary "to examine more carefully the original and rights of government, and to find out ways to restrain the exorbitancies and prevent the abuses" of the power granted the monarch.

⁹² *Ibid*, par. 98; cf. *First Letter on Toleration*, p. 53.

⁹³ *Ibid*, pars. 50, 120, 42 (italics added).

⁹⁴ *Second Letter on Toleration*, p. 119; *First Letter on Toleration*, pp. 10, 43.

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, par. 37. Money is "little useful to the life of man in proportion to food, raiment, and carriage," par. 50. The "intrinsic value" of money is not "natural," but is, rather, "a barren thing and produces nothing." MS e. 8, ff. 11, 20.

⁸⁶ *Thoughts on Education*, secs. 105, 110.

⁸⁷ *Second Treatise*, par. 38.

⁸⁸ *Works*, vol. IV, pp. 5, 7, 12-14, 16, 148; MS e. 8, ff. 7, 10.

⁸⁹ *Second Treatise*, par. 48.

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, par. 108; cf. pars. 74, 162; *First Letter on Toleration*, p. 42. "A multitude of strong, healthy people being the riches of every country and that which makes it flourish." *Journal*, July 15, 1678, MS f. 3. In the *First Treatise*, Locke argues that absolute monarchy is a barrier to and is incompatible with the growth of population and riches. pars. 33, 41.

⁹¹ *Second Treatise*, pars. 38, 45.

It may be objected that what we have labeled the "second phase" of the state of nature is not that "natural condition" of man, but the "early stages" of civil society.⁹⁵ But Locke is quite explicit regarding the conditions under which *political* society comes into being. It is precisely at this point that his argument shifts from historical description to moral prescription.⁹⁶ And, in order to make clear the full

⁹⁵ This is the view of Sterling Lamprecht, *The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Locke* (New York, 1962), p. 127, and Peter Laslett. See Laslett's note to par. 111, *op. cit.* p. 360. Sheldon Wolin's distinction between the "ideal" and the "fallen" states of nature parallels in many respects the argument offered here. Wolin, *op. cit.*, pp. 306-309. However, there is no attempt by Wolin to portray the two different stages of the state of nature as descriptions of man's actual historical development. Also, I cannot accept Wolin's conclusion that the effect of Locke's dichotomous view of the state of nature "was to obscure the political character of civil society." On the contrary, Locke's separation of the early from the later stage of man's development in his natural condition provides us with precisely the information and rationale we need in order to understand Locke's commitment to political institutions of a particular form.

⁹⁶ The shift occurs at this point in Locke's argument as we have presented it. The actual order of discussion in the *Second Treatise* employs several such shifts and is considerably more difficult for the reader to follow. This is due less to Locke's devious nature or to his indifference as to the distinctive nature of the arguments themselves than it is to the fact the *Second Treatise* was pieced together and revised over a ten year period, as Laslett has shown. The breakdown of the chapters of most interest to us seems to be as follows: The first four chapters of the *Second Treatise* essentially set down the moral framework for the discussion of government. Chapter five, "Of Property," is much more historically-oriented. Chapter six, "Of Paternal Power," is a rather balanced mixture of historical and moral arguments. Chapter seven, "Of Political or Civil Society," returns to the level of ethics, laying down the criteria for distinguishing between the various forms of government. This discussion is summarized and carried over into the first part of Chapter eight, "Of the Beginning of Political Societies." But, beginning with paragraph 100 of that chapter, Locke returns to history to account for the origins of government. It will be seen, therefore, that in our presentation of Locke's historical view of the state of nature, we have cited almost exclusively from Chapters five and eight, while the shift to which reference is made in the text above returns

force of Locke's meaning of political society, it will be helpful to comment briefly on a notion which has become the subject of the most confused and tortuous reasoning practiced upon Lockean political theory by two centuries of scholars. I refer to the idea of consent. As this subject has recently been re-examined elsewhere,⁹⁷ I will limit my remarks to those aspects of Locke's discussion of consent which bear directly on the argument of this essay.

Very early in his life, Locke came to the conclusion that any justification for political authority had to be traceable to one of two sources: the direct appointment of God, or the consent of the people. Throughout the *First Treatise*, he insists that if Filmer's view of divine appointment is rejected, we must fall back upon the notion of consent. However, unlike his critics, Locke does not stop there. In fact, that is merely the beginning point of his argument. For, in Locke's view, *all* governments are the product of consent.⁹⁸ Yet, an indiscriminate acceptance of consent as the source of legitimacy of political power would hardly provide him with any grounds for distinguishing his position from that of Hobbes. Thus, against Filmer, Locke argues that consent is a *necessary* condition of political society, but, against Hobbes, he maintains that *it is not a sufficient condition*.

In developing the latter point, Locke refuses to follow Hobbes in equating consent with coercion. He therefore denies that a legitimate government can be the product of conquest.⁹⁹ In addition, there are certain things to which an individual cannot freely consent and still retain his standing as a "rational" being. He cannot, for instance, consent to his own slavery, i.e., put himself under

us to the arguments Locke advances in Chapter seven.

⁹⁷ See Hanna Pitkin, "Obligation and Consent," this REVIEW, 59 (Dec. 1965), 990-999; and John Dunn, "Consent in the Political Theory of John Locke," *The Historical Journal*, 10 (1967), 153-182.

⁹⁸ "All government, whether monarchical or other, is only from the consent of the people." Notes on Samuel Parker's *Discourse of Ecclesiastical Polity*, MS c. 39. Governments cannot "be founded on anything but the consent of the people." *Second Treatise*, par. 175; cf. pars. 102, 104, 105, 106, 112, 119, 198. Also, there is a relevant historical note by Locke ("Politia," 1682, MS c. 42) cited by Laslett in his note to par. 106, *op. cit.*, p. 356.

⁹⁹ *Second Treatise*, pars. 175, 176, 186.

the arbitrary will of another.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, "no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse."¹⁰¹ And since individuals living under an absolute monarchy are in a "far worse condition" than those living in the state of nature, no reasonable person could give his consent to such a government.¹⁰² Clearly, Locke is not making descriptive statements about reality. He was well aware of the existence of absolute governments, past and present, and of the theoretical defense provided for them by Hobbes.¹⁰³ Rather, he is proscribing a particular form of government, and he does so, not by denying that it is a government and hence the product of men's consent, but by denying that it is a legitimate or "lawful" government. In a purely *de facto* sense, a government or a "commonwealth" is "*any* independent community," regardless of its particular form.¹⁰⁴ Even a tyranny is a "form of government," although the tyrant "has no right to be obeyed" since his subjects owe their allegiance not to individual rulers but to lawful forms of government.¹⁰⁵ Political society refers to the latter,

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, pars. 23, 135, 137, 149, 164, 171, 172.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, par. 131.

¹⁰² *Ibid*, pars. 137, 91, 93, 135, 163, 164.

¹⁰³ The Turkish government is specifically mentioned as an absolutist state. *Ibid*, par. 192; *First Treatise*, par. 33. Also, there seems to be an obvious reference to Russia ('Czar') in the *Second Treatise*, par. 91. Explicit mention is made of Ceylon in par. 92.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, par. 133.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, par. 201; cf. pars. 93, 192, 198, 202. Hence, Locke is not entirely clear in his argument. He wants to maintain that, as an historical description, all government—even Filmer's patriarchal and absolute monarchy—is the product of consent (see note 98 above). At the same time, he wants to argue, against both Hobbes and Filmer, that no "rational" man could consent to live under an absolute monarchy as a part of his moral conception of human nature (see notes 100–103 above). And, finally, he grants that tyranny—even without consent—is a *de facto*, though not a *de jure*, form of government. Either consent is an inherent part of the meaning of "government," and history records the actions of irrational men in consenting to a tyranny, or consent is only a necessary ingredient of "lawful" governments, and his statement about the origins of government is a case of history ideologized. The latter seems to be the most accurate reading of Locke's view. In the *First Treatise*, he contrasts "lawful government" with "tyranny" or "usurpation": pars. 72, 81. Later, he contrasts "tyranny and usurpation" with "elections and consent": *ibid*,

and therefore there is a specific distinction to be made between "government" in general based upon consent, and the additional special features Locke incorporates into his concept of a legitimate political order. "The *only* way," he declares, "whereby any one . . . puts on the bonds of civil society is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community."¹⁰⁶ "There *only* is political society where everyone of the members has quitted his natural power" and "resigned it up into the hands of the *community*." Thus, whenever "any number of men" give up their natural power and "resign it to the *public*, there and there *only* is a political or civil society."¹⁰⁷ In other words, the terms laid down by Locke for the creation of political society do not correspond with his description of absolute monarchy; for individuals did not resign their power to the "public" or the "community," but placed it in the hands of one man. Yet, "that which begins and actually constitutes *any* political society is *nothing but* the consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society."¹⁰⁸ Locke could hardly be more emphatic in his choice of words. The "only" way that political society can be created is in the manner outlined in the *Second Treatise*. Locke's meaning becomes perfectly clear once we realize that absolute monarchy does not qualify as a "political" society, and that those who live under such a government are still residents of the state of nature. Mere consent to absolute monarchy or a general submission to a conqueror, does not remove men from the state of nature.¹⁰⁹ What does put men into a "political" society is the consent of the majority establishing a law-making authority which acts for the common good, and which, in particular, does not "raise taxes on the property of the people without the consent of the people . . . or their deputies."¹¹⁰

In stating that men give up their political

par. 148. Thus, Locke's point is that even if tyranny is the product of consent, it is not legitimate, although, as a matter of historical fact, it is usually not instituted by consent but by force.

¹⁰⁶ *Second Treatise*, par. 95 (italics added).

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, pars. 87, 89 (italics added).

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*, par. 99 (italics added).

¹⁰⁹ Moreover, "general submission" and "general consent" are not the same. The latter seems to be tied to some system of elections, whereas the former is merely the product of force. Notes on William Sherlock's *The Case of the Allegiance due to Sovereign Powers Stated and Resolved*. . . , MS c. 28, f. 96.

¹¹⁰ *Second Treatise*, pars. 142, 87, 89, 141.

power to the community, Locke explains that "in all cases" the individual "has given up to the legislative" the power to punish offenses against the Law of Nature. After repeating that this authorization is a definitional component of political society, Locke declares:

and *this* puts men out of a state of into that of a commonwealth by setting up a judge on earth . . . which judge is the legislative, or magistrates appointed by it.¹¹¹

Thus, "whenever there are any number of men, *however associated*, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, they are still in the state of nature." It is the immediately following sentence that begins:

Hence it is evident that absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil government at all.

Those living under the rule of an absolute monarch "are still in the state of nature." For, the monarch having "both legislative and executive power in himself alone," the people can have no "judge" who can render "fair" and "indifferent" decisions. The ruler "is as much in the state of nature with all under his dominion as he is with the rest of mankind." This means that the people are also in the state of nature.

Now one understands the importance of Locke's legalistic definition of the state of nature, which he repeats at this point in his argument.

Wherever any *two* men are who have no standing rule and common judge to appeal to on earth for the determination of controversies of right betwixt them, there they are still in the state of nature.¹¹²

That is precisely the relationship between the absolute monarch and any individual member of society, since they have no common judge to decide controversies between them. Consequently, men in such a society "are apt to think themselves in the state of nature in respect of him (absolute monarch) who they find to be so." In any event, they could never "think themselves *in civil society till the legislature was placed in collective bodies of men.*"¹¹³ For,

in well-ordered commonwealths . . . the legislative power is put into the hands of diverse persons

who, duly assembled, have by themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws; which . . . they are themselves subject to. . .¹¹⁴

Clearly, Locke is replying to the Hobbesian contention that the ruler is not a party to the formation of civil society, but remains in the state of nature. According to Locke, however, if the ruler remains in the state of nature vis-à-vis the people, they likewise stand in the same relationship to him. The result is that no political society has been constituted at all. Because, "no man in civil society can be exempted from the laws of it." To say otherwise, Locke argues, is to claim that "the state of nature and civil society are one and the same thing." The conclusion forced upon us is that there is only one way for men to leave the state of nature, and that is by ceding their power to the community, with the assurance that some form of legislative body will be established to act as judge, deciding issues on behalf of the common good. In all other instances, and especially in the case of absolute monarchy, men are still in the state of nature.

III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Beginning with a conception of human nature, and drawing upon history, Locke uses both moral criteria and historical information to formulate his conception of political society. If, as Locke suggests, a knowledge of our "rights" and "duties" follows from a knowledge of the "foundations" and "original" of political society, then a proper understanding of what Locke means by the state of nature, from which political society emerges, is crucial to any explication of other Lockean notions, e.g., "property," "natural rights," political obligation, etc. Moreover, since the state of nature functions as a critique of existing society by indicating the legal and moral boundaries of political relationships, a clear idea of when men are or are not returned to their natural state 'with a liberty to shift for themselves as they see fit,' is essential to an appreciation of the *Two Treatises* as a practical, revolutionary document. Finally, Locke was writing within a particular intellectual climate, one in which a portrayal of "natural man" was certain to draw theological and political criticism. Earlier, we mentioned Locke's efforts to separate his political theory from that of Filmer and Hobbes, in order to indicate the intellectual context of his argument. Locke's interpretation of the state-of-nature concept discloses some of the reasons for and the de-

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, pars. 88, 89 (italics added).

¹¹² *Ibid.*, pars. 90, 91, 174 (italics added).

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, par. 94 (italics added).

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, par. 143.

tails of that separation. In short, the state of nature is the cornerstone of Lockean political thought; it is important for its political implications; and it was a focal point of intellectual controversy in the seventeenth century.

What all these comments share in common is their prefatory importance. I began this essay with a statement of the standard intellectual accusations made against Locke, viz., that he is a superficial, abstract, inconsistent, and deceptive thinker. And, with an allowance for his human failings, I have attempted, using his discussion of the state of nature as an illustration of his general approach to political problems, to indicate my reasons for rejecting these characterizations of Locke. Yet, there is another set of charges laid to Lockean political thought, to which I have not explicitly responded. These are more distinctly political and ideological criticisms. It is said, for example, that Locke is the progenitor of liberalism, that he is the apologist for the rising bourgeois class, that he is the father of the empiricist attack on religion and traditional philosophy, and so forth. It is never an easy matter to deal with such ideological charges, but one thing does seem certain; there is a question as to *what Locke did say* which must be answered before all the innuendoes of meaning can be extracted from his words in order to support one of the ideological positions cited above. For reasons of priority and space, I have considered here only the intellectual, not the political, accusations against Locke. It is in this sense that the explication of Locke's thought in this essay is prefatory to a more general and political assessment of Lockean political theory.¹¹⁵

Aside from the ideological implications and uses of historical scholarship, there is, it seems to me, another reason for rereading Locke in light of what has been said generally about 'classic' political theorists, and about Locke in particular. One of the criticisms frequently advanced by contemporary political scientists, including historians of political thought, is that traditional political thinkers did not understand the is/ought dichotomy, or the difference between an analytic and an historical argument.¹¹⁶ The effect of this criticism is

to question the relevance of studying the classic writers in light of the preoccupations of modern political thought. Although it must be admitted that Locke does not make it especially easy for the reader to follow these distinctions, because he is not so painfully self-conscious of them as modern writers are, nevertheless such a simple criticism of his political thought will not do. Locke does attempt to blend together deductive hypotheses, historical evidence, and ethical assumptions, keeping in mind the 'very different' foundations of the various statements. If, as I believe, the problems and objectives of combining these various elements are generic to the creative activity of formulating a theory about politics, something may be learned concerning theory construction from reading a theorist such as Aristotle or Locke. In the opinion of a contemporary political scientist who shares this conviction, and who also selects Locke as the example illustrative of his point, "there are insights in the work (*Two Treatises*) that could be tapped as an aid to inquiry into systematic theory." And, he continues:

The thoughtful, so-called political theorists were in fact total social scientists who . . . felt free to explore every aspect of political life. In narrowing the study of the political thoughts of these earlier social philosophers to a reporting of their moral wisdom, contemporary political theory has helped to conceal from the rest of political science valuable resources for an understanding of causal theory, particularly of alternative conceptual frameworks. Clearly, the wisdom of the great social theorists needs to be scrutinized for its insights about general political theories.¹¹⁷

This is not to suggest, by way of analogy, that a study of Beethoven's techniques of composition, harmonic structure, or orchestration, should result in the student's composition of music which sounds like that of Beethoven. Indeed, the greater fault in this regard is chargeable to political science, which is still echoing worn-out dogmas, while contemporary music has advanced a considerable distance from its old masters. Hopefully, with an appreciation of what a thinker like Locke was asserting, we shall be in a better position not only to learn from but also to transcend the political thought of the past.

¹¹⁵ The ideological aspects of liberalism as they are related to Locke's political theory and the intellectual and historical events of seventeenth century England provide the primary focus for my longer—but yet uncompleted—work, *The Roots of Liberalism*.

¹¹⁶ See, for example, George Sabine, *A History of*

Political Theory (Third Edition, New York, 1961), pp. 523–540.

¹¹⁷ David Easton, *The Political System* (New York, 1943), p. 313.

NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AS PREDICTORS OF DELEGATE ATTITUDES AT THE UNITED NATIONS¹

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The purpose of this paper is to explore United Nations delegate attitudes toward the major organs of the United Nations, i.e., the Security Council, General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, Secretariat, International Court of Justice, and the General and Main Committees of the General Assembly. In respect to these organs, the study probes "delegate satisfactions" concerning voting procedures, membership arrangements, and general role and past performance; "delegate perceptions" in respect to present and future importance and the probability of changes occurring in respect to membership arrangements; and "delegate desires" in respect to modifying roles and powers. The study also attempts to ascertain if delegate attitude patterns can be related to "predictors" generated from attributes of the delegates' home states. That is, is it possible to predict delegate attitudes from information about their home states?

The potential importance of delegate attitudes in respect to the United Nations will be treated in detail later in the paper. Here, suffice it to say that delegates make decisions, relay information, give advice, and engage in other types of activities which allow them to help shape the institutions in which they operate. Because this is the case, it is assumed that the discovery of attitudinal patterns and the relationship of these patterns to various other indices is a potentially fruitful line of inquiry, which may facilitate an understanding of, and provide a basis for predictions about, the political processes of the United Nations.

It is apparent that a host of variables *might* "account" for United Nations delegate atti-

tudes. Such variables could be categorized in a variety of ways, such as: (1) genetic, (2) past experience, (3) environmental, etc. However, to attempt to organize all relevant factors into a coherent theory of delegate attitudes at this time is probably premature; to accomplish this, more needs to be known about the formulation and pattern of attitudes of actors at the international level (and national level). In view of this, the objectives of this study are very modest. Basically, the study aims to answer a kind of pre-theory question—what kinds of national attributes appear to be related to delegate attitudes? Further, if certain national attributes are found to be related to delegate attitudes, how may this be interpreted and what does it suggest, if anything, about possible tendencies and developments at the United Nations? National attributes are selected as a starting point because of their "accessibility" compared to other potentially relevant indices, such as those relating to the personality of the delegates.

The present study, then, is offered as a modest first step in the problem of attempting to account for the orientations and predilections of delegates of the United Nations. Like many pilot studies, it is deficient in, but a struggle toward, theory.

I. DATA COLLECTION

Data used in the study were collected from March to December, 1965. All United Nations delegations were contacted² and 68 cooperated with the project.

Questionnaires were initially sent to Ambassadors in Permanent Missions. The Ambassadors were told, "If you choose, you may have anyone in your delegation who is competent complete the questionnaire." Although each respondent was told that his personal identity was not important, personal identification cards enclosed with some of the questionnaires indicate that at least 15 of the respondents were actually Ambassadors.³

² See: *Permanent Missions to the United Nations*, United Nations Document, ST/SG/SER.A/186, January, 1966.

³ It is possible that many more of the responding delegates were also Ambassadors. It is probably desirable to have as many Ambassadors as possible within the group of responding delegates,

¹ I would like to thank the Research Advisory Committee of Central Michigan University for its financial support of the data gathering phase of the project; the Political Science Department of Florida Atlantic University for financial support of the data analysis phase; and, the vote of the Florida Atlantic University Research Committee to support the project out of NSF Institutional Grant monies. The generous counsel of Dean J. Clyde, Allan Nash, and Andrew Baggeley and the assistance of Daniel Cousens, David Joslyn, Derold Clement, Michael Novak and James Turner are greatly appreciated.

All respondents were also told: (1) All replies would be held in the strictest confidence. (No one but the research staff would be allowed to see the completed questionnaires); (2) The results of the study would be used solely for academic purposes. (In any published results, it would not be possible to identify those that helped us, either by person or nation); and (3) the respondent was contributing to a carefully planned and important scientific endeavor.

The collected sample tended to distribute well across many ways of classifying the respondents' states. For example, using cut-off points established by Banks and Textor in their *A Cross Polity Survey*,⁴ the sample may be compared, in terms of national attributes, with the "ascertainable" universe of states.

The sample tended to cut through other ways of classifying the respondents' states as well. In these terms, then, the sample may be viewed as fairly "representative" of all possible respondents' states even though it is not random. Also, "factors" which emerge from factor analysis of the respondents' states correspond well with factors which emerge from factor analysis of all or most states (i.e., economic development, density, size, etc.).⁵

In connection with working with biased samples, Zetterberg has argued:

The relationships expressed in the theoretical propositions, in other words, claim to be universally present. They are, accordingly, present both in representative and non-representative samples. To disprove or demonstrate their existence is, hence, possible in any kind of sample—biased or unbiased. This important, and perhaps surprising, consideration, however, should immediately be qualified. When using a biased sample for a verification, we must have assurance that the relationship we want to prove is not introduced into our data by selective sampling. This possibility, however, is in most cases rather un-

but, as the project has been set up, this is not necessary. That is, as explained above, the major purpose of the project is to relate non-personal data to delegate response patterns. A delegate's "rank," then, is considered to fall in the same analytical category (personal) as "age," "education," etc. These are potentially fruitful lines of inquiry, but are not pursued here for reasons explained above.

⁴ Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross Polity Survey* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1953) pp. 54-117.

⁵ Phillip K. Gregg and Arthur S. Banks, "Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of *A Cross Polity Survey*," this REVIEW, 59 (1965), p. 607.

likely. . . . On balance, it appears that non-representative samples are not much inferior to representative samples when we want to disprove a theoretical hypothesis.⁶

If it is assumed that the propensity of delegates to cooperate is unrelated to their questionnaire responses, the tests of significance employed in this study can be viewed as applying as if the sample were random. If this assumption is deemed unwarranted, the tests of significance can be ignored and the correlations given later in the study can be seen as descriptive of the cooperative universe. In this case, it is assumed that the cooperative universe is large enough to make assertions about it meaningful.

II. QUESTIONNAIRE CONSTRUCTION

To probe delegate attitudes toward the major organs of the United Nations, the organs were listed with "answer lines" which the respondents marked to estimate their feelings in various matters. For example, in the case of certain questions concerning delegate "satisfaction," the delegates were asked to "Please indicate your degree of satisfaction (Sat) or dissatisfaction (Dis) with the following area: Voting Procedures." Beside each listed organ, such as the Security Council, an "answer line" was placed, i.e., Sat _____ 0 _____ Dis. The delegates were told to mark the answer lines according to the following instructions:

Please place one mark on each answer line according to the following scheme:

To mark here means that you are neither really satisfied nor dissatisfied with the situation.			
Highly	Moderately	Slightly	Moderately
	Slightly	↓	Highly
Satisfied	_____	0	_____
			Dissatisfied

Naturally, you can mark anywhere on the answer line. The major idea is that satisfaction, or dissatisfaction, *increases* as you move away from the "0" on the answer line. We understand that you may hold certain reservations or qualifications in mind in marking a particular answer line. What we want is your *general impression* of the situation.

Similar instructions and appropriate answer lines were employed in connection with other questions probing additional "satisfaction"

⁶ Hans L. Zetterberg, *On Theory and Verification in Sociology* (Totowa, New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1963), pp. 54-55.

TABLE 1. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENT'S STATES

Size					Population				
Sample					Universe				
		N		%			N		%
Very Large	5	7.3	6	5.2	Very Large	3	4.4	4	3.4
Large	12	17.7	26	22.6	Large	12	17.7	23	20.0
Medium	24	35.3	36	31.4	Medium	24	35.3	34	29.6
Small	27	39.7	47	40.8	Small	29	42.6	54	47.0
	68	100%	115	100%		68	100%	115	100%

Agricultural Population					Literacy Rate				
Sample					Universe				
		N		%			N		%
High	24	35.2	56	49.5	High	19	27.9	25	23.8
Medium	28	41.2	33	29.2	Medium	20	29.5	30	28.6
Low	13	19.2	17	15.1	Low	14	20.5	24	22.8
Very Low	3	4.4	7	6.2	Very Low	15	22.1	26	24.8
	68	100%	113	100%		68	100%	105	100%

Freedom of the Press				
		Sample		Universe
		N	%	N
Complete Freedom		26	38.3	43
Intermittent Freedom		17	25.0	17
Freedom Internally Absent		17	25.0	21
Freedom Internally & Externally Absent		8	11.7	16
		68	100%	97

Status of Legislature				
		Sample		Universe
		N	%	N
Fully Effective		19	28.0	28
Partially Effective		18	26.4	23
Largely Ineffective		13	19.2	21
Wholly Ineffective		18	26.4	28
		68	100%	100

Geographic Location				
		Sample		Universe
		N	%	N
Africa (includes N. Africa)		17	25.1	33
Americas		10	14.7	24
Asia (includes Australia)		11	16.2	20
Eastern Europe		6	8.8	9
Middle East		10	14.7	11
Western Europe		14	20.5	18
		68	100%	115

matters and in respect to the organ's "increasing or decreasing importance," delegate desires to "increase or decrease importance" and the "probability or improbability" of certain changes occurring.

The problem of questionnaire validity was approached by having 51 non-delegate judges⁷ "answer" the questionnaire. They were asked to "assume you are a UN delegate with positive feelings, perceptions, desires about the United Nations, who sees things in dynamic terms. Which ends of the following answer lines would you choose?" (The questionnaire was then administered). At least 95% of the judges agreed on each of the terms selected and how they should be labeled, i.e., as expressing either "positive feeling," a "positive perception," a "positive desire," or a "dynamic perception."

It was decided to label delegate responses that "deviate toward" (using the mean value on the answer line as the zero point) the end of the answer lines predicted by the judges as "positive" or "dynamic" delegate reactions, and those that "deviate away" as "negative" or "static" delegate reactions.⁸ Thus, each deviation toward "satisfied" is viewed as an indication of a "positive feeling," each deviation toward "dissatisfied" a "negative feeling," each deviation toward "increase" a "positive desire," each deviation toward "decrease" a "negative desire," each deviation toward "increasing" a "positive perception," each deviation toward "decreasing" a "negative perception," each deviation toward "probable" a "dynamic perception" and each deviation toward "improbable" a "static perception."


Reliability of the questionnaire was estimated at .93 by the "Kuder-Richardson formula 20." Scores were generated for the formula by treating each "positive" and "dynamic" delegate deviation as "correct" and each "negative" and "static" deviation as "incorrect."⁹

⁷ A panel of 51 upper division international relations students at Florida Atlantic University were asked to judge the statements.

⁸ Technically, then, it is movement away from the mean value, not actual agreement or disagreement with the judges, which defines "positive," "dynamic," "negative" and "static" attitudes. Thus, whenever a subject deviates from the central tendency, he is viewed as evincing one of these kinds of attitudes. "Attitude" is employed here in a broad sense to include "feelings," "perceptions," and "desires." A respondent having a score exactly equal to the mean value, of course, does not evidence either a "negative," "static," "positive," or "dynamic" attitude.

⁹ Reliability, of course, refers to the character-

Scores for the remaining data analysis were generated by dividing each answer line into 21 parts, with magnitude increasing moving from left to right and with "O" scored as 11. The following example gives some possible marks and the scores that would result:



The actual delegate responses tended to range across the answer lines, i.e., in 39 questions they range from 1 to 21, in nine from 1 to 20, in one from 1 to 19, in two from 1 to 17, in one from 1 to 16, in one from 1 to 14, and in two from 1 to 13.

III. FINDINGS

Overall. The overall results in terms of means and standard deviations may be summarized in the following table:

TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF RESPONSES

Questions	Organs	Mean	Standard Deviation
Degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with voting procedures	SC	10.4	7.0
	GA	4.7	4.5
	ECOSOC	5.2	5.6
	ICJ	4.4	4.1
	MC	4.4	4.2
Degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with charter membership arrangements	SC	9.9	7.6
	GA	3.6	3.9
	ECOSOC	9.0	7.3
	ICJ	5.9	5.3
	SEC	7.3	6.3
Degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with understandings and agreements to allocate seats	SC	7.9	6.7
	ECOSOC	8.4	6.8
	ICJ	7.0	6.1
	SEC	7.6	6.3
	GC	6.5	5.4
	MC	5.9	5.0
Degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with general rule and past performance of organs	SC	9.6	5.8
	GA	6.3	4.5
	ECOSOC	5.6	4.7
	ICJ	5.6	4.5
	SEC	5.4	3.8
	GC	5.7	3.7
	MC	5.3	3.8

Where SC = Security Council
GA = General Assembly
ECOSOC = Economic and Social Council
ICJ = International Court of Justice
SEC = Secretariat
GC = General Committee of the General Assembly
MC = Main Committee of the General Assembly

istics of an entire test instrument and not its individual items. Because of the decision to work with individual items and not an aggregate score in this study, the above estimate is given simply for informational purposes.

TABLE 2—(Continued)

Questions	Organs	Mean	Standard Deviation
Present increasing or decreasing importance of organs	SC	7.7	5.5
	GA	6.3	5.6
	ECOSOC	9.1	6.4
	ICJ	8.3	3.8
	SEC	7.5	4.7
	GC	7.5	4.7
	MC	7.0	4.6
Future increasing or decreasing importance of organs	SC	6.1	5.1
	GA	6.9	5.5
	ECOSOC	8.9	6.4
	ICJ	7.8	4.6
	SEC	6.8	5.0
	GC	7.2	4.3
	MC	6.9	4.5
Desire to increase or decrease the role and power of organs	SC	6.6	5.3
	GA	5.2	4.9
	ECOSOC	6.4	5.2
	ICJ	6.2	4.8
	SEC	5.9	4.5
	GC	6.6	4.4
	MC	6.5	4.7
Probability of changes in charter memberships arrangements	SC	4.9	5.4
	GA	8.6	7.3
	ECOSOC	6.6	6.2
	ICJ	10.4	6.5
	SEC	9.6	6.2
Probability of changes in understandings and agreements to allocate seats	SC	6.6	6.1
	ECOSOC	6.3	5.8
	ICJ	9.8	6.5
	SEC	8.5	6.6
	GC	7.8	6.0
	MC	8.7	6.2

Table 2 shows that, generally speaking, (viewing the mean as the central tendency) delegates tend to be satisfied, expect and wish organs to increase in importance, and expect changes to take place. That is, the means of the answer marks tend to lie between "O" and the satisfied, increasing, increase, and probable sides of the answer lines. The table indicates variation, however, moving from organ to organ in the analytical categories. For example, generally speaking, United Nations delegates seem less satisfied with the voting procedures of the Security Council than with those of the General Assembly. Also, they seem to feel that it is less probable that changes will occur in respect to the Charter membership arrangements for the International Court of Justice than for the Security Council.

The standard deviations show the dispersion of the answer marks on the answer lines. For example, delegates seem to be closer together in respect to their evaluation of the general role and past performance of the

Secretariat than on the question of the voting procedures of the Security Council. It has already been pointed out, however, that delegate answer marks tend to range, for the most part, completely across the answer lines. The question can then be asked, "What kinds of delegates, in terms of their home states' characteristics, mark the "negative" and "static" sides of the answer lines and what kinds of delegates mark the "positive" and "dynamic" sides?"

Predicting Delegate Attitudes. To answer the above question, it was decided to employ a "scattergun" approach and consider a large number of variables relating to national attributes. Thirty-four of the independent variables considered were taken from Banks and Textors' *Cross Polity Survey*.¹⁰ These were: Size of

¹⁰ Banks and Textor, *op. cit.* Selection of the 34 variables from the total of 57 treated by Banks and Textor was based upon the possibility of constructing a scale with direction for each variable, although in some cases, it is a nominal one, i.e., religious homogeneity (two categories). Also considered was the relative absence of ambiguous codings for the responding delegations. Although many of the Banks and Textor variables are soft, i.e., partially or completely subjective, nevertheless it has been successfully demonstrated that they are amenable to factor analysis and the factors tend to agree, in some respects, with other analysis of state social, economic, and political variables. See Gregg and Banks, "Dimensions of Political Systems . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 607. The preference for the Banks and Textor variables over "hard" data collections, particularly over the excellent data in Bruce Russett, *et al.* *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), lies in the fact, as explained by Arthur S. Banks and Phillip M. Gregg, that, "Despite the focus implied by the title, [World Handbook] most of the data series in this collection are of limited political significance." Arthur S. Banks and Phillip M. Gregg, "Grouping Political Systems, Q Factor Analysis of A Cross Polity Survey," *The American Behavioral Scientist*, 9 (1965), p. 6. In addition, the *World Handbook's* value was limited simply because data was not included for many of the responding delegations. For example, the *World Handbook* only covers 41 cases in respect to the expenditure of central governments as a ratio to gross national product; 18 cases in respect to employment by the general government and public enterprises; 44 cases in respect to votes for the Communist Party as percentage of total votes; 74 cases in respect to death by domestic violence per one million, through the years 1950-1962; and, 88

Country, Population of Country, Population Density, Population Growth Rate, Agricultural Population, Gross National Product, Per Capita Gross National Product, International Financial Status, Economic Development Status, Literacy Rate, Freedom of the Press, Newspaper Circulation, Religious Homogeneity, Racial Heterogeneity, Linguistic Homogeneity, Date of Independence, Westernization, Political Modernization, Systems Style, Constitutional Status, Representative Character, Freedom of Group Opposition, Political Inculturation, Interest Articulation by Associational Groups, Interest Articulation by Institutional Groups, Interest Articulation by Non-Associational Groups, Interest Articulation by Parties, Party System, Political Leadership, Status of Legislature, Status of Executive, Character of Bureaucracy, Participation by Military, Communist Bloc.

Fourteen additional variables derived from other resources¹¹ were: United Nations Dele-

gations Size, Time in the United Nations, IGO Memberships, Alliance, Size of Military, Distance from U.S., Distance from U.S.S.R., Distance from China, Percent of Urbanization, Ratio of People Per School, United Nations Emergency Force Pay, United Nations Pay, Import from U.S., Export to U.S.

cases in respect to military personnel as a percentage of the total population. The N's for the Banks and Textor variables are, in most cases, considerably larger than this.

¹¹ United Nations delegate size was taken from *Permanent Missions to the United Nations*, op. cit. Time in the United Nations was scored by the number of years a respondent's state had been in the United Nations by December, 1965. Intergovernmental memberships were taken from Mosche Y. Sachs, ed., *Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations*, Vol. I (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 247-265. Alliance scores are explained above. Military size (total men under arms) was taken from *Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations*, op. cit., Vol. 2-5, and supplemented by 1966 *Reader's Digest Almanac and Yearbook* (New York: Reader's Digest Association, 1965). Distances from the US, USSR, and China were based on the great circle distances to closest possible points between states (states with mutual borders with the US, USSR, and China were coded 0). Percent urbanization was taken from *Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations* op. cit., Vol. 2-5. Ratio of people to schools was found by dividing a state's total number of schools into its total population. The number of schools was taken from UNESCO, *Survey of World Education*, Vol. 3 (New York: International Document Service, Columbia University Press, 1961) and total population was taken from *International Yearbook and Statesmen's Who's Who*, 1966 (London: Burkes Peerage). United Nations Emergency Force Pay and United Nations Pay were taken from *House of Representatives Report*, No. 1564, 89th Congress. Import and Export Figures to the

After data collection was complete and the cooperative delegations had been identified, each participating delegation state was coded on the first thirty-four variables by ranks suggested by the *Cross Polity Survey*. For example, in respect to the variable of size, Banks and Textor give four gradations: "Very Large" (two million square miles and above), "Large" (300,000-1.9 million square miles), "Medium" (75,000-299,000 square miles), and "Small" (below 75,000 square miles). Thus, countries falling in the "Very Large" category were coded 1, those in the "Large" category 2, etc. Rank numbers were then assigned to each state on each variable following procedures similar to those outlined by Alker and Russett in *World Politics in the General Assembly*.¹² The rank numbers for the remaining variables were calculated from cardinal magnitude (i.e., the number of IGO memberships) except for "Alliance" which was originally coded 1 = U.S. Ally, 2 = Neutral, 3 = U.S.S.R. ally. Thus, the rank numbers on all variables ranged from 1 to 68 with average rank scores assigned in cases of ties.

Because of their large number and possible confusing interrelationships between them, it was decided to factor analyze the independent indices.¹³

United States were taken from 1965-66 issues of *Overseas Business Reports* (Washington: U.S. Printing Office).

¹² Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 30-31.

¹³ The principal component solution was employed. Unities were placed in the principal diagonal of the correlation matrix and the factor matrix was rotated using Kaiser's varimax criterion. The minimum eigenvalue for which a factor was rotated was 1.0. See Harry H. Harmon, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1960), Chapter 9; Henry F. Kaiser, "The Varimax Criterion for Analytical Rotation in Factor Analysis" *Psychometrika*, 23 (1958), 187-200; Henry F. Kaiser "Computer Program for Varimax Rotation in Factor Analysis" *Educational and Psychological Measurement* 19 (1959), 413-420; Dean J. Clyde, Elliott M. Cramer,

Factor analysis is generally considered a useful research tool because it can reduce a large number of variables to a smaller number with little loss of information.¹⁴ Factor analysis dispenses with *a priori* assumptions about what should be related to what and, instead, demonstrates what kinds of relationships are present in the data. Each factor, using methods explained below, has the desirable characteristic of being orthogonal to every other factor in the analysis. This means that "factor

scores"¹⁵ calculated from factor loadings on one factor have zero correlations with factor scores calculated from all other factors. Thus, confusing interrelationships between original variables are eliminated through the technique of factor analysis, and, when a particular factor dimension is being discussed, we know that it is a "unique dimension" which does not overlap with other dimensions. In short, factor analysis shows how variables are related to orthogonal linear dimensions cutting through the data and how many such dimensions are needed to account for the bulk of the original variance.

The 48 original variables under consideration reduced to 11 factors. The amount of variance explained by each factor and the variables loading above .30 are given in the following table.

TABLE 3. RESULTS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS

*Factor I (Variance accounted for = 21.6%)
(Development)*

High Newspaper Circulation (.88) High Literacy Rate (.86) High Per Capita Gross National Product (.86) High Economic Development Status (.83) High Percent Urban (.83) Westernized (.83) Low Agricultural Population (.79)

Richard J. Sharin, *Multivariate Statistical Programs* (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami, 1966), pp. 15-19.

¹⁴ For applications of factor analysis in connection with United Nations voting see: Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); Bruce M. Russett, "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations," this REVIEW 60 (1966), 327-339; Hayward R. Alker, "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," this REVIEW, 58 (1964), 632-658. For other applications of factor analysis of interest, see: Bruce M. Russett, "Delineating International Regions," Carnegie-IDRC Joint Study Group on Measurement Problems, Paper No. G60, Indiana University, February, 1965; Bruce M. Russett, *International Regions and International Integration* (Chicago: Rand-McNally, forthcoming); Raymond D. Cattell, "The Dimensions of Cultural Patterns of Factorization of National Characters," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 44 (1959), 215-253; Raymond D. Cattell, H. Breul, and H. Parker Hartman, "An Attempt at a More Refined Definition of Cultural Dimensions of Syntality of Modern Nations," *American Sociological Review*, 17 (1951), 408-21; Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," *General Systems*, Yearbook of the Society for the Advancement of General Systems Theory, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1963; Brian J. L. Berry, "Basic Patterns of Economic Development," in *Atlas of Economic Development* (by Norton Ginsberg, Chicago, 1961) pp. 110-119; Arthur S. Banks and Phillip M. Gregg, "Grouping Political Systems, Q Factor Analysis of A Cross Polity Survey," *The American Behavioral Scientist*, 9 (1965), 3-6; Phillip M. Gregg and Arthur S. Banks, "Dimensions of Political Systems: Factorial Analysis of A Cross Polity Survey," this REVIEW, 59 (1965), 602-614; Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1958-1960," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10 (1966), 41-64; and R. J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations, 1946-1959," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10 (1966), 65-73.

¹⁵ Factor scores were calculated using the formula: $F = ZA (A'A)^{-1}$ where F is an $N \times m$ matrix of factor scores, Z is an $N \times n$ matrix of scores on the original variables in standard score form, A is an $n \times m$ matrix of factor coefficients (loadings) and N=subjects, n=variables and m=factors. See John L. Horn and Wilbur C. Miller, "Evidence on Problems in Estimating Common Factor Scores," *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 26 (1966), 617-622, for the advantages of this formula over other possible formulas, such as: $F = ZA$ (defined above) or $F = ZB$ where B is an $n \times m$ matrix in which unity is substituted for each "salient" coefficient and zero is substituted for every other loading. The most obvious advantage of the formula employed in this study is that it produces truly orthogonal factor scores, whereas the other formulas may not. In this connection, a check correlating each set of factor scores with every other set of factor scores showed them to be truly orthogonal with correlations of .0. See also John L. Horn, "An Empirical Comparison of Methods for Estimating Factor Scores," *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 25 (1965), 313-321, and Gene B. Glass and Thomas O. Maguire, "Abuses of Factor Scores," *American Educational Research Journal*, 3 (1966), 297-304.

TABLE 3 (Continued)

Negligible Interest Articulation by Non-Associational Groups (.78) Modern Bureaucracy (.77) Significant Interest Articulation by Associational Groups (.70) Politically Modern (.60) High Gross National Product (.55) High International Financial Status (.54) Old (.43) High Political Inculturation (.43) Large Military (.43) High United Nations Pay (.43) Low Ratio of People per School (.42) Linguistic Homogeneity (.40) Representative System (.40) Effective Legislature (.39) Many IGO Memberships (.38) Long Time in UN (.38) Significant Interest Articulation by Parties (.37) Low Distance from US (.34) Non-Communist (.30) Religious Homogeneity (.30) High United Nations Emergency Force Pay (.30)

*Factor II (Variance accounted for = 16.7%)
(Authoritarianism)*

No Effective Constitution Limitations (.87) High Censorship (.87) Ineffective Legislature (.83) Opposition Groups Not Tolerated (.82) Not Representative System (.81) Strong Executive (.79) Elitist Political Leadership (.77) Participation by Military (.72) Significant Interest Articulation by Institutional Groups (.64) Negligible Interest Articulation by Associational Groups (.47) Mobilized System Style (.47) Communist Bloc (.41) Traditional Bureaucracy (.37) Communist Alliance (.31)

*Factor III (Variance accounted for = 7.8%)
(US Relations)*

Large Import from US (.86) Large Export to US (.77) Allied With West (.72) Linguistic Homogeneity (.55) Religious Homogeneity (.43) Non-Communist (.42) Long Distance from USSR (.40) Long Time in UN (.32) High Population Growth Rate (.30)

*Factor IV (Variance accounted for = 9.3%)
(Bigness)*

Big Population (.87) High International Financial Status (.73) Big Gross National Product (.72) Big Country (.67) Large Military (.66) Large United Nations Delegation Size (.59) High United Nations Pay (.53) Long Time in UN (.33) Significant Interest Articulation by Institutional Groups (.31) Politically Modern (.31) High Economic Development Status (.30) Many IGO Memberships (.30)

*Factor V (Variance accounted for = 4.4%)
(Party-Mobilization)*

One Party System (.76) Mobilized System Style (.65) High Political Inculturation (.54) Negligible Interest Articulation by Parties (.35) Communist Bloc (.31)

TABLE 3 (Continued)

*Factor VI (Variance accounted for = 3.6%)
(Density)*

Low Population Density (.87) Big Country (.59)

*Factor VII (Variance accounted for = 3.2%)
(Growth Rate)*

High Population Growth Rate (.76) Non-Elitist Political Leadership (.33) Linguistic Heterogeneity (.32) Small IGO Memberships (.30)

*Factor VIII (Variance accounted for = 3%)
(Racial)*

Racial Heterogeneity (.80) Short Time in UN (.43)

*Factor IX (Variance accounted for = 5.2%)
(U.S. Distance)*

Low Distance from U.S. (.75) Low Ratio of People per School (.58) Old (.47) Many IGO Memberships (.44) Politically Modern (.39) Long Time in UN (.44) Religious Homogeneity (.35) Non-Communist (.35)

*Factor X (Variance accounted for = 3%)
(UN Pay)*

High United Nations Emergency Force Payment (.68) High United Nations Payment (.44) Limited Interest Articulation by Institutional Groups (.31)

*Factor XI (Variance accounted for = 4.4%)
(Distance)*

Long Distance from China (.81) Long Distance from USSR (.68) Low Political Inculturation (.37)

Those possessing the highest factor scores tend to possess the characteristics indicated, and those with low factor scores, the opposite characteristics. Thus, concerning the first factor dimension, a state with a high factor score tends¹⁶ to have high newspaper circulation, a high literacy rate, high per capita gross national product, high economic development status, a high degree of urbanization, a high degree of Westernization, a low agricultural

¹⁶ The term "tends" must be emphasized because it is possible that a subject's very high score on one variable can "make up" for a deviation in the wrong direction on another variable. Nevertheless, an extensive visual check failed to reveal a single case where subjects with high factor scores on the factor dimensions did not have deviations on the means in the predicted "direction" on variables loading .30 or above on the factors.

population, and so forth. Variables load differently on the factor dimensions and, therefore, variable scores contribute differently to factor scores. Thus, in respect to "newspaper circulation," a score of 2.0 (standard score) moves a state further up the factor dimension than a score of 2.0 on the "status of legislature" variable. In terms of its overall features, the first factor might be christened "Development Factor,"¹⁷ and the remaining possible names are given in Table 3.

The factor analysis, then, produced eleven predictors, each of which is orthogonal to the others. Any variance explained by one predictor, in a dependent variable, then, will not also be explained by another predictor. For example, if it is found that both the "Development" and "Authoritarianism" dimensions are related to one of the questionnaire variables, we know that both predictors have explanatory power and that the relationships are not the result of an interrelation between the predictors.

It was decided to rank all scores, both independent and dependent, and use the correlational technique of Spearman's *rho* to test for relationships. Ranks for Spearman's *rho* were assigned by treating each original score which is higher to be a higher rank number and by assigning average ranks in cases of ties between original scores. Thus, an original score sequence of 1, 2, 4, 4, 6 became 1, 2, 3.5, 3.5, 5 as rank numbers.¹⁸ Table 4 shows the relationship between the predictors and the questionnaire data.

In Table 4 the characteristics of high scores have been indicated. Thus, in respect to the

¹⁷ The naming of factors is always arbitrary. Alker and Russett have argued, "Factors are not born with names but must be christened by their parents who may not be able to agree on what they should be called." Alker and Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly*, *op. cit.*, p. 36. In fact, "factor names" may fall short of describing all of the variables loading most heavily on the factor. A listing of the heaviest loadings, then, makes it clear which are the important tests involved in producing factor scores. Simply referring to factor dimensions by their "name," then, may not do complete justice to the actual loadings.

¹⁸ See Andrew R. Baggaley, *Intermediate Correlational Methods* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), pp. 21-23. Once rank numbers were assigned, the Spearman correlational formula was employed for convenience. As Baggaley points out, the results of applying the Spearman formula to rank numbers is exactly the same as applying the Pearson formula to such numbers.

questionnaire, high scores in the first part of the table indicate dissatisfaction with the voting procedures of the listed organs and, in respect to the predictors, high scores indicate high development, highly authoritarian, and so forth.

Interpreting the correlations in these terms, the findings may be summarized as follows:

The higher a respondent's home state's score is on the "Development Factor," the stronger the respondent's:¹⁹

- (1) satisfaction with the voting procedures of the Security Council;
- (2) dissatisfaction with the voting procedures of the General Assembly;
- (3) satisfaction with the Charter membership arrangements of the Security Council, Economic and Social Council, and Secretariat;
- (4) dissatisfaction with the general role and past performance of the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, Secretariat, and General Committee;
- (5) view that the General Assembly, International Court of Justice, General Committee, and Main Committees are decreasing in importance at present;
- (6) view that the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, International Court of Justice, Secretariat, General Committee, and Main Committees will decrease in importance in the future;
- (7) wish to decrease the role and powers of the General Assembly, General Committee, and Main Committees;
- (8) view that changes are improbable in the Charter membership arrangements of the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, International Court of Justice, and Secretariat;
- (9) view that changes are improbable in the understandings and agreements to allocate seats and positions on the Economic and

¹⁹ The opposite relationships are, of course, also true. That is, the lower a respondent's home state score is on the "Development Factor," the stronger the respondent's dissatisfaction with the voting procedures of the Security Council. These generalizations may be stated in these terms because in almost all cases the answer marks ranged across the entire answer line. In those few cases where they did not, a statement such as "less satisfied," instead of "dissatisfied," is, of course, more technically true. In all cases, however, at least some of the respondents marked the "negative" or "static" sides of the answer lines (as indicated above).

TABLE 4. RELATION BETWEEN PREDICTORS AND QUESTIONNAIRE DATA.²⁰

		Factor I High Develop- ment	Factor II Author- itarian	Factor III Close U.S. Rela- tions	Factor IV Is Big	Factor V One Party Mobi- lized	Factor VI Low Den- sity	Factor VII High Growth Rate	Factor VIII Racial Hetero- gen- eity	Factor IX Low Dis- tance from U.S.	Factor X U.N. Pay	Factor XI High Dis- tance U.S.S.R. and China
Voting dissatis- faction	SC	-.34	-.28	.29	-.21	.14	.02	-.10	.15	-.03	-.27	.28
	GA	.25	-.06	.14	.16	-.18	-.04	-.16	.02	-.52	-.14	-.04
	Ecosoc	-.21	-.10	.02	-.25	.22	-.14	-.11	.09	-.26	-.03	.15
	ICJ	.06	.05	.09	.09	.10	.02	.05	.10	-.35	-.05	-.05
	MC	.07	-.18	.11	-.02	.14	-.06	-.09	.05	-.33	.03	-.07
Character membership dissatis- faction	SC	-.31	-.29	-.14	-.16	.27	.06	.03	-.07	-.08	-.12	-.02
	GA	.14	-.17	.07	-.08	-.07	-.34	-.03	.20	-.18	-.07	-.38
	Ecosoc	-.27	-.14	.04	-.10	.32	.06	.18	-.04	.05	-.11	.02
	ICJ	-.07	-.15	-.07	-.11	.39	.20	.33	.03	.10	-.07	-.16
	Sec	-.36	.03	.15	-.02	.18	.09	.33	.13	.25	.04	-.22
Under- standings dissatis- faction	SC	-.02	-.07	-.04	-.09	.45	-.17	.11	.14	.13	-.21	-.08
	Ecosoc	.04	.03	-.11	.04	.49	-.17	.14	.13	.20	-.22	-.12
	ICJ	-.05	-.13	.10	.04	.34	.02	.27	.14	.22	-.10	-.05
	Sec	.07	-.07	.15	.13	.14	-.17	.40	.17	.19	-.04	-.06
	GC	.11	.12	-.17	-.02	.24	-.06	.13	.09	.09	-.26	-.23
	MC	.21	.17	-.23	.21	.22	-.16	.18	.10	.08	-.30	-.29
General role and performance dissatisfac- tion	SC	.20	-.25	.08	-.05	.22	-.04	.13	.04	.32	-.08	.06
	GA	.42	-.07	-.09	.02	.09	-.34	-.15	-.15	-.09	.12	-.07
	Ecosoc	.36	-.12	-.14	-.08	.21	-.14	.05	-.04	-.07	.04	-.18
	ICJ	.22	-.02	-.29	.12	.08	.02	.13	-.12	.05	-.08	-.29
	Sec	.26	.23	-.19	.16	.33	-.09	.09	-.15	.13	-.05	-.16
	GC	.32	.04	.02	-.07	.16	-.38	-.11	-.12	.07	-.10	-.12
	MC	.24	-.04	.06	-.12	.06	-.30	-.04	-.02	-.12	-.18	-.15
Organs decreas- ing in importance at present	SC	-.09	-.11	.16	-.31	.18	-.07	.22	.07	.28	.14	-.21
	GA	.42	-.05	-.04	.10	-.34	-.40	.06	-.06	.10	.15	.03
	Ecosoc	.22	-.13	.14	-.05	-.02	.03	.03	-.11	.03	-.02	.12
	ICJ	.42	-.07	-.03	.17	.12	-.21	.09	-.05	-.12	.09	-.25
	Sec	.19	.03	.10	-.05	-.15	-.34	-.02	.08	-.03	.07	-.21
	GC	.34	-.25	.10	.08	-.15	-.38	.14	-.14	.25	.08	-.07
	MC	.30	-.22	.07	-.07	-.21	-.39	-.03	-.12	.22	.11	.08
Organs decreasing in impor- tance in the future	SC	-.14	-.16	.14	.05	-.07	.05	.14	.15	.16	-.02	-.14
	GA	.59	-.13	.02	.16	-.22	-.20	-.24	-.07	-.11	.02	.02
	Ecosoc	.31	.02	-.07	.15	-.15	.09	-.16	.21	-.04	.04	.10
	ICJ	.29	-.12	-.16	.15	.11	-.12	-.09	.13	-.15	-.06	-.25
	Sec	.35	.11	.15	.08	-.26	-.25	-.10	.14	-.06	-.17	-.25
	GC	.44	-.17	.02	.19	-.11	-.17	-.10	-.18	.07	-.05	.12
	MC	.48	-.15	.03	.14	-.20	-.22	-.15	-.11	.06	-.07	.15
Desire to decrease importance	SC	-.14	-.25	.11	-.04	.02	-.06	-.14	.17	-.05	-.03	.05
	GA	.45	-.04	-.11	.11	-.03	-.17	-.13	.12	-.15	-.08	-.04
	Ecosoc	.21	.14	-.12	.19	-.08	-.09	-.11	.36	-.19	-.21	-.11
	ICJ	-.07	.14	-.08	.15	.03	.16	-.18	.23	-.15	.04	-.16
	Sec	.15	.23	.07	.28	-.17	-.20	-.10	.18	-.06	-.04	-.14
	GC	.33	-.09	-.09	.21	.03	-.13	-.21	.03	-.03	.03	-.03
	MC	.33	-.05	-.08	.18	-.05	-.17	-.21	.11	-.03	.03	-.04
Improbable to change the member- ship ar- rangements	SC	.12	-.11	.18	.27	-.30	.04	-.16	.26	.12	-.03	-.07
	GA	.32	-.20	-.04	.14	-.19	-.09	-.05	-.05	-.11	.07	.08
	Ecosoc	.27	.14	.04	.31	-.12	.14	-.11	.07	-.05	-.04	-.19
	ICJ	.41	-.12	-.15	.17	.12	-.09	-.07	-.18	-.06	.02	-.09
	Sec	.35	-.04	-.20	.27	.08	-.09	-.08	-.11	-.19	.05	-.11
Improbable to change under- standings	SC	.21	-.02	.32	-.20	-.26	.02	-.14	-.03	-.10	.11	-.23
	Ecosoc	.34	.08	.25	.03	-.16	-.07	-.18	-.03	-.23	.22	-.41
	ICJ	.30	-.13	-.08	.12	.03	-.02	-.13	-.24	-.17	.16	-.42
	SEC	.25	-.10	.06	.06	.05	-.08	-.24	-.27	-.10	.13	-.42
	GC	.18	-.07	.06	.10	.02	-.09	-.03	-.17	-.04	.13	-.31
	MC	.27	-.09	.06	.05	-.06	-.04	-.04	-.24	-.06	.20	-.34

Social Council, International Court of Justice, Secretariat, and Main Committees.

The higher a respondent's home state score is on the "Authoritarianism Factor," the stronger the respondent's:

- (1) satisfaction with the voting system of the Security Council;
- (2) satisfaction with the Charter membership arrangements of the Security Council;
- (3) satisfaction with the general role and past performance of the Security Council;
- (4) view that the General Committee is increasing in importance at present;
- (5) desire to increase the role and performance of the Security Council;
- (6) desire to decrease the role and importance of the Secretariat.

The higher a respondent's home state score is on the "U.S. Relations Factor," the stronger the respondent's:

- (1) dissatisfaction with the voting procedures of the Security Council;
- (2) satisfaction with the role and performance of the International Court of Justice;
- (3) view that changes are improbable in the understandings to allocate seats and positions on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.

The higher a respondent's home state score is on the "Bigness Factor," the stronger the respondent's:

- (1) satisfaction with the voting system of the Economic and Social Council;
- (2) view that the Security Council is increasing in importance at present;
- (3) wish to decrease the importance of the Secretariat;
- (4) view that future changes in the Charter membership arrangements of the Security Council, Economic and Social Council, and Secretariat are improbable.

The higher a respondent's home state score

²⁰ All significant correlations have been underlined. Because *N* is the same in every case, all correlations greater than $\pm .25$ are significant at the .05 level or less, and all correlations $\pm .32$ or above are significant at the .01 level or less. The generalizations that follow, then, are based upon these levels of significance. That is, every relationship is significant either at the .05 level or less. If the exact level is of interest, then it may be ascertained by reference to the table to see whether the correlation lies between $\pm .25$ and $\pm .31$, or is greater than $\pm .32$.

is on the "Party-Mobilization Factor," the stronger the respondent's:

- (1) dissatisfaction with the Charter membership arrangements of the Security Council, Economic and Social Council, and International Court of Justice;
- (2) dissatisfaction with the understandings to allocate seats and positions on the Security Council, Economic and Social Council, and International Court of Justice;
- (3) dissatisfaction with the general role and past performance of the Secretariat;
- (4) view that the General Assembly is increasing in importance at present;
- (5) view that the Secretariat will increase in importance in the future;
- (6) view that changes in the Charter membership arrangements in the Security Council are probable;
- (7) view that changes in the understandings to allocate seats and positions on the Security Council are probable.

The higher a respondent's home state score is on the "Density Factor," the stronger the respondent's:

- (1) satisfaction with the Charter membership arrangements of the General Assembly;
- (2) satisfaction with the general role and performance of the General Assembly, General Committee, and Main Committees;
- (3) view that the General Assembly, Secretariat, General Committee, and Main Committees are increasing in importance at the present;
- (4) view that the Secretariat will be increasing in importance in the future.

The higher a respondent's home state score is on the "Growth Rate Factor," the stronger the respondent's:

- (1) dissatisfaction with the Charter membership arrangements of the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat;
- (2) dissatisfaction with the understandings and arrangements to allocate seats on the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat.

The higher a respondent's state score is on the "Racial Heterogeneity Factor," the stronger the respondent's:

- (1) desire to decrease the importance of the Economic and Social Council;
- (2) view that changes in the Charter membership arrangements of the Security Council are improbable;
- (3) view that changes are probable in the understandings and agreements to allocate seats and positions on the Secretariat.

The higher a respondent's home state score is on the "U.S. Distance Factor," the stronger the respondent's:

- (1) satisfaction with the voting systems of the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, International Court of Justice, and Main Committees;
- (2) dissatisfaction with the Charter membership arrangements of the Secretariat;
- (3) dissatisfaction with the general role and past performance of the Security Council;
- (4) view that the Security Council and General Committee are decreasing in importance at present;
- (5) view that changes are probable in the understandings and agreements to allocate seats and positions on the Economic and Social Council.

The higher a respondent's home state score is on the "UN Pay Factor," the stronger the respondent's:

- (1) satisfaction with the voting system of the Security Council;
- (2) satisfaction with the understandings and agreements to allocate seats and positions on the General Committee and Main Committees.

The higher a respondent's home state score is on the "Distance Factor," the stronger the respondent's:

- (1) dissatisfaction with the voting procedures of the Security Council;
- (2) satisfaction with the Charter membership arrangements of the General Assembly;
- (3) satisfaction with the understandings and agreements to allocate seats and positions on the Main Committees;
- (4) satisfaction with the general role and past performance of the International Court of Justice;
- (5) view that the International Court of Justice is increasing in importance at present;
- (6) view that the International Court of Justice and Secretariat will be increasing in importance in the future;
- (7) view that changes are probable in the understandings and agreements to allocate seats and positions on the Security Council, Economic and Social Council, International Court of Justice, Secretariat, General Committee, and Main Committees.

If the predictors are listed in the order of the number of significant correlations produced and in terms of tendencies of *high* predictor scores to predict either "negative," "static," "positive," or "dynamic," questionnaire scores

TABLE 5. PREDICTORS AND ATTITUDES

Predictor	Negative	Static	Positive	Dynamic	
Development	18	8	4	0	=30
Distance	1	0	6	6	=13
Party-Mobilization	7	0	2	2	=11
U. S. Distance	4	1	4	0	=9
Density	0	0	9	0	=9
Authoritarianism	1	0	5	0	=6
Bigness	1	3	2	0	=6
U. S. Relations	1	2	1	0	=4
Growth Rate	4	0	0	0	=4
UN Pay	0	0	3	0	=3
Racial Heterogeneity	1	1	0	1	=3
	38	15	36	9	98

(see "validity" discussion above) the results may be tabulated as follows as in Table 5.

Table 5 shows that high economic development factor scores were associated 18 times with negative questionnaire scores,²¹ 8 times with static questionnaire scores, 4 times with positive questionnaire scores, and 0 times with dynamic questionnaire scores—for a total of 30 significant associations. Low predictor factor scores, of course, predict the opposite kinds of questionnaire scores. Thus, low economic development scores were associated 18 times with positive questionnaire scores, 8 times with dynamic questionnaire scores, and so forth. If the proportion of correlations between the categories "positive-negative" and "dynamic-static" are considered, then each tends to receive "its share" of significant correlations. Thus, "positive-negative" questions constituted 80% of the total questions and receive 76% of the total correlations, while "dynamic-static" questions constituted 20% of the total questions and receive 24% of the correlations. Altogether, the 11 predictors produced 98 significant correlations. Because the analysis took place at the 5% level and 605 correlations were considered, however, 30 "significant" correlations could have been expected by chance. There are, therefore, 68 more "significant" correlations than expected by chance, if it is assumed that there is no "actual" relationship between the variables in the universe.

The analysis shows that the "Development Factor" is far and away the most important predictor. Trailing considerably behind it are

²¹ Technically, of course, it is more proper to say that economic development scores have a positive correlation with questionnaire scores. However, because high questionnaire scores are assumed to connote negative behavior, the analysis is facilitated by stating the relationships in this way.

dimensions such as "Distance," "Party-Mobilization," "Density," and "U.S. Distance." The analysis also shows that some predictors have hardly any explanatory power, particularly "Racial Heterogeneity" and "United Nations Pay."

In addition to importance, an interesting question arises as to the "purity" of the predictors. To make this analysis, the negative and static categories were lumped together and also the positive and dynamic categories. The "purity" (and importance) of a predictor were estimated by subtracting the number of positive and dynamic associations from the number of negative and static associations and expressing the resulting difference in absolute terms. Thus, if high predictor scores tend to associate fairly equally with both the negative/static category and the positive/dynamic category, the predictors' purity index should fall toward zero. Also, of course, the fewer correlations associated with a predictor, the lower will be its index. The scoring scheme, then, takes into account both purity and importance. That is, the larger the number of significant correlations made by the predictor and the greater the tendency for high predictor scores to be associated with *either* negative/static scores or positive/dynamic scores, the larger will be the predictor's index.

Table 6 shows the results of the analysis.

Again, Table 6 can be understood in terms of the kinds of responses associated with high factor scores. The analysis shows "high development" predicts negative/static questionnaire scores, "high distance" predicts positive/dynamic scores, and so on. The overall results can be expressed even more clearly, if presented in terms of lines symbolizing factor dimensions, and an indication is given of the kind of factor scores (high or low) that predict negative and/or static questionnaire scores. Again, the predictors are listed in order of their purity/importance index.

TABLE 6. "PURITY" OF THE PREDICTORS

Development	(22 Negative and Static)
Distance	(11 Positive and Dynamic)
Density	(9 Positive and Dynamic)
Authoritarianism	(4 Positive and Dynamic)
Growth Rate	(4 Negative and Static)
UN Pay	(3 Positive and Dynamic)
Party-Mobilization	(3 Negative and Static)
U.S. Relations	(2 Negative and Static)
Bigness	(2 Negative and Static)
U.S. Distance	(1 Negative and Static)
Racial Heterogeneity	(1 Negative and Static)

Table 7 may be read as follows: If a respondent's state is high on the "Development Factor" (highly developed) predict negative/static responses; if low on the "Distance Factor" (i.e., close to the USSR and China) predict negative/static responses, etc. It should be remembered, because the predictors are listed in order of their purity index, that the "Development Factor" had more total correlations in one direction than "Distance," "Distance" had more than "Density," "Density" had more than "Authoritarianism," and so forth.

Factor scores opposite those indicated in the table, of course, predict the opposite kinds of questionnaire scores. Thus, if a respondent's state is low on the "Development Factor" (underdeveloped) predict positive/dynamic responses; if high on the "Distance Factor" (i.e., far from the USSR and China) predict positive/dynamic responses, and so on. Table 4, of course, indicates the specific kinds of predictions that can be made in regard to particular areas and is the basis of these generalizations.

If just the three most important predictors are considered, frequent positive/dynamic delegate responses should be predicted for states that are underdeveloped, located away from USSR and China, i.e., in Africa or South America, which have a low population density. On the other hand, delegates from developed states, close to the USSR and China, i.e., in Europe, with a high population density, should tend to frequently give negative/static questionnaire responses. Generalizations beyond these first three predictors should be made with the utmost caution because of the rapid falling off of the purity-importance index and the knowledge that it is possible that a number of the correlations upon which these tables were built were due to random variation.

Literature about the United Nations has frequently indicated a basis for developed-underdeveloped attitudinal differences and also tends to emphasize a more positive outlook by the less developed. For example, A. F. Shihata argues, in connection with the International Court of Justice, that, "... the record shows that some new states have adopted an attitude more favorable to the Court than that adopted by many older nations."²² F. O. Wilcox sees various reasons why the "non-aligned nations" (most of which are underdeveloped) need the United Nations.²³ K. I.

²² Abraham F. I. Shihata, "The Attitude of New States Toward the International Court of Justice," *International Organization*, 14 (1965), p. 222.

²³ Francis O. Wilcox, *UN and the Nonaligned*

TABLE 7. INTERRELATIONS OF PREDICTORS AND ATTITUDES

Developed	Long Distance from USSR and China	Low Density	Authoritarian	High Growth Rate	
High	Low	Low	Low	High	
Underdeveloped	Close to USSR and China	High Density	Non-authoritarian	Low Growth Rate	
High UN Pay	One Party and Mobilized	Close U.S. Relations	Bigness	Close to U.S. and Low Ratio People to School	Racially Heterogeneous
Low	High	High	High	High	High
Low UN Pay	Multiple to No Party and Non- Mobilized	Far U.S. Relations	Smallness	Long Distance from U.S. and High Ratio People to School	Racially Homogeneous

Babaa also sees a number of reasons (i.e., protection, dignity) why the "non-aligned" should view the United Nations in favorable terms.²⁴ J. Karefo-Smart has maintained, "... even though the Charter was written and adopted while most of the African states were still colonial territories, the Africans nonetheless hold the Charter of the United Nations in the highest esteem."²⁵ In regard to the General Assembly in particular, Robert Keohane has pointed out, "Yet it cannot be properly said that the actions of the General Assembly merely reflect the power realities of international politics. On the contrary, the quasi-parliamentary nature of the organization gives the small and poor states, over thirty of which have become independent only since 1960, arithmetical advantage in its internal political

process."²⁶ Related themes are stressed by Catherine Senf Manno:

Here we describe more definitely the nature and extent of imbalance in actual voting results, in order to document the conclusion that 'great powers' of East and West have not succeeded—in terms of voting victories—in offsetting their small share of formal voting strength by informal sources of influence . . . decision power in the General Assembly is inversely related to power in an economic or military sense . . . As between the underdeveloped and the advanced countries, the newly independent countries and those still administering or recently divested of colonial possession, there is not a balance of winnings and losses, but rather a constant pressure through massive majorities of the former for redistribution in their favor.²⁷

Nations, (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1962), p. 54.

²⁴ Khalid I. Babaa, "The 'Third Force' and the United Nations," *The Annals*, 362 (November, 1965), 81-91.

²⁵ John Karefo-Smart, "Africa and the United Nations," *International Organization*, 19 (1965), p. 766.

²⁶ Robert Owens Keohane, "Political Influence in the General Assembly," *International Conciliation*, No. 557 (1966), p. 5.

²⁷ Catherine Senf Manno, "Majority Decisions and Minority Responses in the UN General Assembly," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10 (1966), pp. 7-9.

Thus, underdeveloped states frequently seem to "get more" out of the UN than developed states. In view of this, it may be possible to formulate a theoretical basis for this in a "formal" set of statements. Thus, "causal" reasons for a lack of enthusiasm with the United Nations by delegates from developed states and positive orientation by the underdeveloped states might be postulated as follows:

States differ in their economic development. States with higher economic development generally have high capabilities to supply human needs, regardless of international organizational affiliation, than states with lower economic development. International organizations may be considered devices which augment, in a limited way, the capabilities of states. Because the capabilities of developed states are already high, the contributions of international organizations to their capabilities are generally less significant, as a fraction of total capabilities, than in the case of states with lower development. Because statesmen may value an augmentation of capabilities to the extent that it is a "significant increment" representatives from underdeveloped states may generally value international organizations more than developed states. This may be particularly true if representatives from underdeveloped states are in a position to have a considerable voice in the organization (i.e., have a majority where majority rule is used). Thus, attitudinal differences might be expected among statesmen, toward the United Nations, related to their home states' economic development. One might expect, for example, that representatives from economically underdeveloped states would be more satisfied, see things in more dynamic terms, and be more inclined to bolster the organization than representatives from developed states.

Unfortunately, if high development is causally linked to negative delegate attitudes, the likely permanence of a developed-underdeveloped split in the world may indicate long-run negativism by delegates from developed states. Also, delegates from underdeveloped states, because of their possibly "weaker" position,²⁸ do not seem to possess many levers to bring (if this is possible) their colleagues from more developed states to a more positive and dynamic outlook. Kenneth Boulding has pointed out, "One does not negotiate from strength; one may dictate from strength, but

one does not negotiate."²⁹ Lloyd Jensen comes to a similar conclusion when he argues, "Thus there appears to be considerable evidence to reject the theory that nations [people?] negotiate most seriously from positions of strength."³⁰ Thus, if the present study can be assumed to have tapped some of the attitudinal propensities in the existing situation, regardless of its ultimate basis, possible "position" inflexibilities on the part of the delegates from developed nations, because of their relatively "strong" position, might be suggested.

The relevance and interpretation of other predictors seem somewhat less clear. The importance of "Distance" may indicate a kind of negative/static "attitudinal sphere of influence" emanating from the USSR and China, or it may simply provide a geographic reference that helps "locate" less positive delegate attitudes, the reasons for which are obscure. Generally speaking, this predictor seems to indicate that African and South American delegates are frequently more "positive" and "dynamic" in their outlooks than delegates closer to the USSR and Communist China.

The predictor of "Density" and the remaining predictors appear even harder to grapple with and, at this point, it seems unwise to attempt to formulate possible "causal explanations" without replication and additional evidence.

A question that might arise in connection with these findings is—what possible difference can it make what delegates think about the UN? Are not delegates simply "mouthpieces" of their respective state governments without an important shaping role in the institutions in which they operate?

I do not accept this view of the role of delegates because of the character of the United Nations diplomatic process. The difference between "traditional" diplomacy and United Nations diplomacy, the latter sometimes called "parliamentary diplomacy," has been frequently discussed.³¹ Parliamentary diplomacy,

²⁹ Kenneth Boulding, *Conflict and Defense* (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1963), p. 323.

³⁰ Lloyd Jensen, "Military Capabilities and Bargaining Behavior," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 9 (1965), p. 163.

³¹ See: H. G. Nicholas, *The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method* (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 84; H. G. Nicholas, *The United Nations as a Political Institution* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 88-122; Sydney D. Bailey, *The General Assembly of the United Nations* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), pp. 8-18; Gary Best, *Diplomacy in the United Na-*

²⁸ That is, such delegates have less, in the way of state capabilities, standing "behind" their wishes, desires and demands.

in contrast to traditional diplomacy, is characterized by public debate and voting. Traditional diplomacy, on the other hand, tends to be characterized by secret or semi-secret bargaining. The various activities connected with parliamentary diplomacy, in addition to bargaining, seem to open avenues of possible state agent impact upon the international political process not present in the traditional situation.

It is not enough, then, to understand the formal policy positions of states, interacting in the UN parliamentary situation, although this is important. Attention must also be directed to tendencies and biases of those participating in that process.

To illustrate potential delegate impact, it has been pointed out that former United Nations Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge "frequently got his instructions changed and 'usually wins his point' in differences with the State Department. . . . 'Sometimes the 'instructions' he gets from Washington are verbatim playbacks of what he wrote himself' in part because developments 'happen too fast to rely upon specific instruction.'"³² Richard F. Pederson, in discussing the variegated functions of the United Nations Missions, which include: "(1) negotiation and parliamentary action; (2) the formulation of policy and tactics; (3) influencing opinion; (4) information gathering; (5) representation; and (6) public relations,"³³ has also stressed the freedom of and potential impact of individual delegates:

Other characteristics of the UN which uniquely influence negotiations include the fact that all UN negotiation is, in effect, multilateral as is also the "openness" of UN activity, e.g., the fact that at any moment any one of the negotiators may make a public test of negotiating strengths by taking an

issue out of private talks and into the public forum . . . they [the delegates] have a large measure of discretion in tactics . . . There are exceptional cases when issues must be decided immediately and UN delegations are compelled to vote without instructions from their governments; such votes may establish governmental policy . . . a UN delegation in its advisory capacity may exert significant influence on national policy. . . . Some delegations, in fact, receive only general instructions, allowing them the latitude to make many decisions themselves. . . . Information and the consequent assessment of it by delegations are often crucial elements in final governmental policy decisions.³⁴

This being the case, the delegate orientations implied by the analysis in this study suggest that developed-state representatives may provide a kind of check or "resistance" to developments in the United Nations to augment its role in world affairs. This would be the expected effect of those who appear less satisfied with things, particularly the general role and performance of most of the organs; tend to view many organs decreasing now and in the future; express a desire to decrease the role and powers of certain organs; and do not expect much change in respect to present Charter membership arrangements and gentlemen's agreements.

To summarize, United Nations delegates' responses to a questionnaire were found to be related to eleven predictors generated from a factor analysis of 48 variables relating to the respondents' home states. In all, 98 "significant" correlations were found. Of all of the predictors considered, economic development was the best in the sense of generating numerous correlations. High "Development Factor" scores were found, for the most part, to be related to negative and/or static attitudes. Because of the important organizational role of delegates, attitudinal negativism by delegates from developed states is likely to have considerable relevance for patterns of present and future support, development, and use of the United Nations.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 258-264.

tions (Northwestern University, 1960, unpublished dissertation).

³² Cecil B. Crabb, Jr., *American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age* (Elmsford, N.Y.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1960), p. 442 f.

³³ Richard F. Pederson, "National Representation in the United Nations," *International Organization*, 15 (1961), p. 258.

NATIONAL POLITICAL UNITS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A STANDARDIZED LIST*

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When a field of study begins to develop more rigorous methods, well-defined concepts, and greater emphasis on systematic comparison, it is well on the way to becoming a science. In the past decade or so, these traits have become increasingly evident in the study of comparative politics and international politics. But the development of sharper methodology and conceptual sophistication on the part of individual researchers is not quite sufficient. One of the earmarks of a healthy scientific discipline is the extent to which each set of findings may be compared to and combined with the results of earlier investigations; in short, research must become cumulative. Certain obstacles still inhibit us, among which might be counted: disagreement as to the precise boundaries of comparative and international politics; highly disparate theoretical frameworks; lack of consensus regarding the specification and measurement of key variables; and insufficient data storage and retrieval arrangements. Another difficulty has been in the absence of a generally agreed delineation of our empirical domains: What are the political entities whose attributes and relationships must concern us? More simply, we have not yet defined our population,

and until the population is defined, we know neither the domain about which we seek to generalize, nor the criteria for selecting a sample from that population.

Although this is hardly the *most* pressing issue facing our two fields, and while a successful delineation of our population is far from a sufficient condition for the growth of a scientific discipline, it does strike us as a necessary precondition. In earlier works, each of us has indeed defined his population of political entities, but both of those efforts were of a particular nature, tailored to the needs of rather specific research enterprises.¹ Neither list would suffice for the widely varying research enterprises already under way, or for those that are bound to follow in the years ahead. In the present paper, therefore, we attempt to remedy those shortcomings and propose a list of all those units which might be included in these two closely related fields. More particularly, we offer here a population of those national or quasi-national political entities which should serve the needs of most comparative and/or international politics scholars concerned with such entities, or a sample thereof,

* The early stages of this enterprise occurred while the first author was a visiting scholar at Michigan. We are grateful to Susan Jones, Barbara Milsten, and Wendy Hoag for assistance in the preparation of earlier lists, and to William Foltz, Michael Hudson, and Robert Tilman for their comments on later drafts. This list of national political units has been agreed to by representatives of a group of quantitatively-oriented international politics scholars and the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research in the hope that such standardization will contribute to greater comparability and cumulativeness in international and cross-national research. For specification of sub-national groups or regions, a supplementary two-column code is being worked out and may soon be available through the Consortium.

¹ One is Singer's *Correlates of War Study*, examining a range of systemic and national attributes which are associated with the onset of all international war above a given magnitude since 1815; the population is defined in J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System, 1815-1940," *World Politics*, 18 (January 1966), 236-282, and it includes all independent entities since 1815 with populations exceeding 500,000. The other is Bruce M. Russett, and Hayward R. Alker, Karl W. Deutsch, and Harold D. Lasswell, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), now undergoing substantial expansion and updating at Yale by Michael Hudson, Charles Taylor, and Robert Hefner. The new version deals with U.N. members and all other independent states or colonies with populations exceeding one million.

from 1900 to the present. Despite our belief in their importance, it does not, however, include the infinite number of sub-national and extra-national actors in world politics, territorial or otherwise. The list is so conceived as readily to accommodate most of the modifications in territory or status that can be anticipated in the decades immediately ahead. In addition to delineating such a population, we specify the general political-legal status of each entity, and the time period during which each such status was held. Finally, in order to make more efficient and more accurate the borrowing of data from one research enterprise to another, we propose a simple three-digit coding scheme keyed to the major continental regions, which others might see fit to continue. In short, we offer here what might be called a "prominent solution"; while it may not represent the very peak of refinement, it nevertheless reflects what we consider a reasonable balance among a number of competing requirements, it is convenient for ready reference, and all of the data from both our projects are already stored in accord with this particular scheme. In order to maximize replicability and cumulativeness, we invite others to adopt it for their own investigations, and to advise us as to any errors or inconsistencies which may have escaped our successive and independent scrutinies.

As to the time span covered, we had originally hoped to go as far back as the Congress of Vienna, but soon settled upon 1900 as a reasonable point of origin. First of all, the amount of interest in nineteenth century data is quite limited, especially among those doing quantitative political research. This is, of course, partly due to the lack of much available data during that period, especially if one tries to go beyond the major Western powers. Secondly, the coding problem is markedly eased by the turn of the century, by which time the unification of Germany, Italy, and Russia had been completed, almost all of the Indian subcontinent had come under the British Raj, and Africa had been largely carved up by the colonial powers. An earlier starting date would not only have necessitated a dramatically longer list, but one with a far greater likelihood of error and ambiguity.

Even though we did select a cutting point in time which would ease our task, it should be emphasized that problems of error and ambiguity remain, especially in regard to the date at which a given unit achieved or lost a given political status, or even reached (or fell from) the 10,000 population figure. The termination of a military occupation, a mandate, or other status of dependency is seldom well defined,

and the same holds true for the date of annexation, federation, or disunion. Our general rule was to use the politically effective date rather than that which reflected a declaration of independence or the mere signing of a treaty or convention. Thus, despite careful investigation and our preference for dates which are politically operational, there will certainly be room for disagreement on occasion, and there may even be discrepancies of more than a year or two.

Let us now summarize our selection and classification criteria. In order to compile an exhaustive list of the territorially based political units which are, have been since 1900, or are likely to become national political entities, we began by assembling a thoroughly indiscriminating card file including all units that might possibly qualify. This list (and subsequent information regarding the status of its entities) was based on the examination of nearly one hundred different gazetteers, yearbooks, atlases, diplomatic lists, and the like. (The list is, of course, too numerous and diverse to warrant reproduction here.) We then proceeded to refine the list as follows.

Leaving aside past or present political status for the moment, we first eliminated all entities whose population never exceeded 10,000 people.² This avoided the almost impossible task of identifying the scores of island kingdoms and chiefdoms (most of which are now gone) as well as a number of politically esoteric enclaves. Almost no useful and accurate data could be expected to exist for them, and we assumed furthermore that such entities would be of little interest to most comparative and international politics scholars. At the same time, this relatively low population threshold permitted the inclusion of such modest "postage stamp" entities as Andorra, Monaco, and Liechtenstein; the only entity included whose population never met that figure is Vatican City, whose diplomatic role is sufficiently important to justify this exception. Naturally the user is free to raise the population threshold and thereby reduce the size of his universe.

Before going on to another set of deletions, we proceeded to ascertain the political status of each remaining entity, and the dates during which that status obtained. This was obviously not the place to go into a highly refined

² A useful discussion of the problem of population and wealth thresholds for inclusion of smaller units in the international system or in inter-governmental organizations is Patricia W. Blair, *The Ministate Dilemma* (New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1967).

analysis of the wide range of status conditions that might exist, and we therefore settled on a fairly gross, and only semi-operational, set of distinctions. Furthermore, any change in an entity's status which did not last for one month or more was not included. Thus, British Somaliland's two weeks of independence in 1960 as well as Rumania's brief and admittedly complete occupation in 1944 are not accounted for here. At any given time, an entity was classed as *independent* if it enjoyed some measure of diplomatic recognition as well as effective control over its own foreign affairs and armed forces.

If the entity did not satisfy the territorial and demographic, or diplomatic and political, requirements of "sovereign" independence, it was classified as *dependent*, under one of three relatively general categories. The first group embraces *colonies and dependencies*, characterized by a fairly durable status in which the entity exercised almost no control over its foreign affairs, armed forces, immigration, or trade. Originally, we attempted to differentiate between those entities which exercised no appreciable control over either their foreign affairs or their domestic affairs and those which enjoyed some degree of self-government at home while having no external sovereignty. But when it came to applying these criteria, we found it impossible to identify the cutting point on the domestic autonomy continuum. That is, many entities whose foreign policy was not essentially under their own control also turned out to suffer appreciable legal and political restraints on their domestic policy as well. Even when the colonial power which dominated the entity's foreign policy permitted a wide range of internal self-government, it often turned out that this "self-government" only applied to a small sector of the population, with little or no political power in the hands of the native population and a great deal of it in the hands of the non-indigenous military officer, civil servant, or *colon*. In just about every case, there was some form of visible or invisible veto invested in the foreign power or its local surrogates. Thus, even though one *could* devise a coding scheme which might operationalize the varying degrees of self-government, the effort did not seem justified for the purposes at hand. Some question still remains about Greenland and about the Caribbean territories of France and the Netherlands which might well have been coded as incorporated into the metropolitan country. Data for them still are separately reported in the U.N. Yearbooks, however, as "non-sovereign territories," so we

have resolved ambiguities about their legal status by listing them separately here too.

In a second group we placed those entities whose dependent status was intended by the major powers to be fairly temporary. These are, of course, the *mandate* and *trust* territories whose gradual transition to independence was the moral and legal responsibility of the metropolitan power assigned to it by the League of Nations or the United Nations. Illustrative here are Tanganyika from 1922 to 1961 or Eritrea from 1945 to 1952. The distinctions made within this class by the League Covenant (Article 22) and the U.N. Charter (Article 77) did not seem worth specifying, given the purposes of this particular enterprise. It should also be noted that we have defined this class rather broadly, and include under it a number of other units whose administration was made a matter of international responsibility, such as Danzig and the Saar.

In a third and final group are those entities which had enjoyed independence until overrun and *occupied* by foreign military forces. If the nation at hand suffered only a partial occupation and it retained effective control over a viable (intuitively defined) sector of its population and territory, it was not classed as occupied. Thus, even though the Belgian government and its army was pushed into the relatively small Ypres-Nieuport sector during World War I, it remained in the independent classification. In World War II, on the other hand, the government went into exile and there were no effective Belgian fighting forces remaining on the continent or resisting the Axis overseas. Following this criterion, we also treated a nation as continuing in existence if an effective fighting force of 100,000 or more troops persisted in its struggle against the enemy elsewhere along the front, even if the home territory were completely overrun; Serbia during World War I is an example of such a case. Finally, even if not under the military government of a foreign power, if a nation's legitimate government went into exile, or was replaced by a puppet regime, the entity was treated as experiencing the occupied status.

Beyond these considerations of war-zone occupations, there are certain difficulties in classifying occupations which occurred outside of a major combat theater or in peace-time. It seemed unreasonable, for example, to try to differentiate between those nations whose independence is effectively limited by economic penetration or inclusion within another's

(Text continued on page 950)

NATIONAL POLITICAL UNITS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Code No.	Western Hemisphere (002-199)	Independent		Dependent			Part of Larger Entity	
		from	to	from	to	type	from	to
002	United States of America	—	—					
003	Alaska			—	1959	col	1959	—
004	Hawaii			—	1960	col	1960	—
005	Virgin Islands			—	—	col		
006	Puerto Rico			—	—	col		
010	Greenland			—	—	col		
011	Faeroe Islands			—	—	col		
020	Canada	1920	—	—	1920	col		
021	Newfoundland	1920	1933	— 1933	1920 1949	col col	1949	—
030	Bermuda			—	—	col		
031	Bahamas			—	—	col		
040	Cuba	1902	—	—	1902	col		
041	Haiti	—	—					
042	Dominican Republic	—	—					
050	(West Indies Federation)			1958	1962	col		
051	Jamaica	1962	—	—	1962	col	1958	1962
052	Trinidad and Tobago	1962	—	—	1962	col	1958	1962
053	Barbados	1966	—	—	1966	col	1958	1962
054	Dominica			—	—	col	1958	1962
055	Grenada			—	—	col	1958	1962
056	St. Lucia			—	—	col	1958	1962
057	St. Vincent			—	—	col	1958	1962
058	Antigua			—	—	col	1958	1962
059	Montserrat			—	—	col	1958	1962
060	St. Kitts—Nevis—Anguila			—	—	col	1958	1962

Code No.	Western Hemisphere (002-199)	Independent		Dependent			Part of Larger Entity	
		from	to	from	to	type	from	to
065	Guadeloupe			—	—	col		
066	Martinique			—	—	col		
068	Netherlands Antilles			—	—	col		
070	Mexico	—	—					
080	British Honduras			—	—	col		
090	Guatemala	—	—					
091	Honduras	—	—					
092	El Salvador	—	—					
093	Nicaragua	—	—					
094	Costa Rica	—	—					
095	Panama	1903	—				—	1903
096	Panama Canal Zone			1903	—	col	—	1903
100	Colombia	—	—					
101	Venezuela	—	—					
110	Guyana [British Guiana]	1966	—	—	1966	col		
115	Surinam [Dutch Guiana]			—	—	col		
120	French Guiana			—	—	col		
130	Ecuador	—	—					
135	Peru	—	—					
140	Brazil	—	—					
145	Bolivia	—	—					
150	Paraguay	—	—					
155	Chile	—	—					
160	Argentina	—	—					
165	Uruguay	—	—					

Code No.	Europe (200-399)	Independent		Dependent			Part of Larger Entity	
		from	to	from	to	type	from	to
200	United Kingdom	—	—					
201	Isle of Man			—	—	col		
202	Guernsey and dependencies			—	—	col		
203	Jersey			—	—	col		
205	Eire [Ireland]	1922	—				—	1922
210	Netherlands	— 1945	1940 —	1940	1945	occ		
211	Belgium	— 1945	1940 —	1940	1945	occ		
212	Luxembourg	— 1918 1944	1914 1940 —	1914 1940	1918 1944	occ occ		
220	France	— 1944	1942 —	1942	1944	occ		
221	Monaco	— 1944	1942 —	1942	1944	occ		
223	Liechtenstein	—	—					
225	Switzerland	—	—					
230	Spain	—	—					
231	Gibraltar			—	—	col		
232	Andorra	—	—					
235	Portugal	—	—					
255	West Germany/Germany	— 1949	1945 —	1945	1949	occ		
256	Saar			1920 1945 1947	1935 1947 1957	man occ col	— 1935 1957	1920 1945 —

Code No.	Europe (200-399)	Independent		Dependent			Part of Larger Entity	
		from	to	from	to	type	from	to
265	East Germany	1949	—	1945	1949	occ	—	1945
290	Poland	1919 1945	1939 —	1939	1945	occ	—	1919
291	Danzig			1920 1939	1939 1945	man occ	— 1945	1920 —
300	(Austria-Hungary)	—	1918					
305	Austria	1918 1955	1938 —	1938	1955	occ	—	1918
310	Hungary	1918	—				—	1918
315	Czechoslovakia	1918 1945	1939 —	1939	1945	occ	—	1918
317	Slovakia	1939	1945				— 1945	1939 —
325	Italy	—	—					
326	Trieste			1943 1947	1947 1954	occ man	— 1954	1947 —
328	Vatican City	—	—					
331	San Marino	—	—					
338	Malta	1964	—	—	1964	col		
339	Albania	1912 1921 1944	1914 1939 —	1914 1939	1921 1944	occ occ	—	1912

Code No.	Europe (200-399)	Independent		Dependent			Part of Larger Entity	
		from	to	from	to	type	from	to
345	Yugoslavia/Serbia	— 1944	1941 —	1941	1944	occ		
346	Bosnia			—	1908	occ	1908	—
347	Herzegovina			—	1908	occ	1908	—
348	Montenegro	—	1919				1919	—
350	Greece	— 1944	1941 —	1941	1944	occ		
351	Crete			—	1913	occ	1913	—
352	Cyprus	1960	—	—	1960	col		
355	Bulgaria	1908	—	—	1908	col		
360	Rumania	—	—					
365	U.S.S.R./Russia	—	—					
366	Estonia	1918	1940				— 1940	1918 —
367	Latvia	1918	1940				— 1940	1918 —
368	Lithuania	1918	1940				— 1940	1918 —
369	Ukraine	1918	1920	1941	1943	occ	— 1920	1918 —
370	Byelorussia			1941	1943	occ	—	—
375	Finland	1919	—				—	1919
380	Sweden	—	—					

Code No.	Europe (200-399)	Independent		Dependent			Part of Larger Entity	
		from	to	from	to	type	from	to
385	Norway	1905 1945	1940 —	1940	1945	occ	—	1905
390	Denmark	— 1945	1940 —	1940	1945	occ		
395	Iceland	1944	—	—	1944	col		
	Africa (400-599)							
400	Azores [Western Isles]			—	—	col		
401	Madeira Isles			—	—	col		
402	Cape Verde Islands			—	—	col		
403	Sao Tome and Principe			—	—	col		
404	Portuguese Guinea			—	—	col		
410	Canary Islands			—	—	col		
411	(Spanish Guinea)			—	1960	col		
412	Rio Muni			1960	—	col	—	1960
413	Fernando Po			1960	—	col	—	1960
420	Gambia	1965	—	—	1965	col		
430	(French West Africa)			—	1958	col		
431	(Mali Federation)	6/60	8/60	1959	1960	col		
432	Mali [Sudanese Republic]	1960	—	—	1960	col	1959	1960
433	Senegal	1960	—	—	1960	col	1959	1960
434	Dahomey	1960	—	—	1960	col		

Code No.	Africa (400-599)	Independent		Dependent			Part of Larger Entity	
		from	to	from	to	type	from	to
435	Mauritania	1960	—	—	1960	col		
436	Niger	1960	—	—	1960	col		
437	Ivory Coast	1960	—	—	1960	col		
438	Guinea [French Guinea]	1958	—	—	1958	col		
439	Upper Volta	1960	—	—	1960	col		
450	Liberia	—	—					
451	Sierra Leone	1961	—	—	1961	col		
452	Ghana [Gold Coast]	1957	—	—	1957	col		
460	(German Togoland)			— 1916	1916 1922	col occ		
461	Togo [French Togoland]	1960	—	1922	1960	man	—	1922
462	British Togoland (to Ghana)			1922	1956	man	— 1956	1922 —
470	(Kamerun)			— 1916	1916 1919	col occ		
471	Cameroun [French Cameroons]	1960	—	1919 1922	1922 1960	occ man	—	1919
472	British Cameroons (split between Cameroun & Nigeria)			1919 1922	1922 1961	occ man	— 1961	1919 —
475	Nigeria	1960	—	—	1960	col		
480	(French Equatorial Africa)			—	1958	col		

Code No.	Africa (400-599)	Independent		Dependent			Part of Larger Entity	
		from	to	from	to	type	from	to
481	Gabon	1960	—	—	1960	col	—	1960
482	Central African Republic	1960	—	—	1960	col	—	1960
483	Chad	1960	—	—	1960	col	—	1960
484	Congo (Brazzaville) [French Congo]	1960	—	—	1960	col	—	1960
490	Congo (Kinshasa) [Belgian Congo]	1960	—	—	1960	col		
500	Uganda	1962	—	—	1962	col		
501	Kenya	1963	—	—	1963	col		
510	Tanzania/Tanganyika/German East Africa	1961	—	— 1916 1922	1916 1922 1961	col occ man		
511	Zanzibar	1963	1964	—	1963	col	1964	—
515	(Ruanda-Urundi)			1922	1962	man	—	1922
516	Burundi	1962	—				—	1962
517	Rwanda	1962	—				—	1962
520	Somalia/Italian Somaliland	1960	—	— 1941 1950	1941 1950 1960	col occ man		
521	British Somaliland			—	1960	col	1960	—
522	French Somaliland			—	—	col		
530	Ethiopia [Abyssinia]	— 1941	1936 —	1936	1941	occ		

Code No.	Africa (400-599) Name	Independent		Dependent			Part of Larger Entity	
		from	to	from	to	type	from	to
531	Eritrea			— 1941	1941 1945	col occ	1952	—
540	Angola			—	—	col		
541	Mozambique			—	—	col		
550	(Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland)			1953	1964	col		
551	Zambia [Northern Rhodesia]	1964	—	—	1964	col	1953	1964
552	Rhodesia [Southern Rhodesia]			—	—	col	1953	1964
553	Malawi [Nyasaland]	1964	—	—	1964	col	1953	1964
560	South Africa	1920	—	1903	1920	col		
561	Cape Colony			—	1910	col	1910	—
562	Natal			—	1910	col	1910	—
563	Transvaal	—	1903	1903	1910	col	1910	—
564	Orange Free State/Orange River Col.	—	1900	1900	1910	col	1910	—
565	South West Africa [German West Africa]			— 1915 1922	1915 1922 —	col occ man		
570	Lesotho [Basutoland]	1966	—	—	1966	col		
571	Botswana [Bechuanaland]	1966	—	—	1966	col		
572	Swaziland			—	—	col		
580	Malagasy [Madagascar]	1960	—	—	1960	col		

Code No.	Africa (400-599)	Independent		Dependent			Part of Larger Entity	
		from	to	from	to	type	from	to
581	Comoro Islands			1947	—	col	—	1947
585	Reunion			—	—	col		
590	Mauritius	1968	—	—	1968	col		
591	Seychelles			—	—	col		
	Middle East (600-699)							
600	Morocco	— 1956	1911 —	1911	1956	col		
601	Tangier			1923 1940 1945	1940 1945 1956	man occ man	— 1956	1923 —
602	Spanish Morocco			1912	1956	col	— 1956	1912 —
605	Ifni			1934	—	col	—	1934
606	Spanish North African Presidios (incl.: Alhucemas, Ceuta, Chafarinas, Melilla, and Penon de Velez)			—	—	col		
609	Spanish Sahara			—	—	col		
615	Algeria	1962	—	—	1962	col		
616	Tunisia	1956	—	—	1956	col		
620	Libya/Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Fezzan	1952	—	1912 1942 1946	1942 1946 1952	col occ man	—	1912
625	Sudan [Anglo-Egyptian]	1956	—	—	1956	col		
630	Iran [Persia]	—	—					

Code No.	Middle East (600-699) Name	Independent		Dependent			Part of Larger Entity	
		from	to	from	to	type	from	to
640	Turkey/Ottoman Empire	—	—					
645	Iraq [Mesopotamia]	1932	—	1917 1920	1920 1932	occ man	—	1917
650	(United Arab Republic)	1958	1961					
651	United Arab Republic [Egypt]	1922 1961	1958 —	—	1922	col	1958	1961
652	Syria	1946 1961	1958 —	1918 1923	1923 1946	occ man	— 1958	1918 1961
660	Lebanon	1946	—	1918 1923	1923 1946	occ man	—	1918
663	Jordan [Transjordan]	1946	—	1918 1923	1923 1946	occ man	—	1918
666	Israel [Palestine]	1948	—	1918 1923	1923 1948	occ man	—	1918
670	Saudi Arabia/Nedj	1902	—	—	1902	occ		
671	Hejaz Sultanate	1919	1926				— 1926	1919 —
672	Asir	1914	1926	— 1926	1914 1930	occ col	1930	—
673	Al Hasa			—	1913	occ	1913	—

Code No.	Middle East (600-699)	Independent		Dependent			Part of Larger Entity	
	Name	from	to	from	to	type	from	to
674	Jabal Shammar	—	1921				1921	—
678	Yemen	1918	—				—	1918
680	People's Republic of Southern Yemen [Federation of South Arabia/Aden Colony]	1967	—	—	1967	col		
681	Aden Protectorate			— 1915 1918	1915 1918 1963	col occ col	1963	—
690	Kuwait	1961	—	—	1961	col		
692	Bahrain			—	—	col		
694	Qatar			—	—	col		
696	Trucial Oman States			—	—	col		
698	Muscat and Oman	—	—					
	Asia (700-899)							
700	Afghanistan	—	—					
710	People's Republic of China/China	—	—					
711	Manchukuo	1932	1945				— 1945	1932 —
712	Mongolian People's Republic	1921	—				—	1921
713	Republic of China [Taiwan, Formosa]	1949	—				—	1949
720	Hong Kong			—	—	col		
721	Macao			—	—	col		
730	(Korea) [Chosen]	—	1905	1945	1948	occ	1905	1945
731	North Korea	1948	—					

Code No.	Asia (700-899)	Independent		Dependent			Part of Larger Entity	
		from	to	from	to	type	from	to
732	South Korea	1948	—					
735	Far Eastern Republic (to U.S.S.R.)	1920	1922				— 1922	1920 —
740	Japan	— 1952	1945 —	1945	1952	occ		
741	Ryukyu Islands			1945 1951	1951 —	occ col	—	1945
750	India	1947	—	—	1947	col		
751	French India (incl.: Pondicherry)			—	1954	col	1954	—
752	Portuguese India (incl.: Goa, Diu, and Daman)			— 1961	1961 1962	col occ	1962	—
760	Bhutan			—	—	col		
761	Sikkim			—	—	col		
770	Pakistan	1947	—				—	1947
775	Burma	1948	—	1937 1942 1945	1942 1945 1948	col occ col	—	1937
780	Ceylon	1948	—	—	1948	col		
781	Maldiv Islands	1965	—	—	1965	col		
790	Nepal	—	—					
800	Thailand [Siam]	—	—					
810	(Indochina)			— 1941	1949 1945	col occ		

Code No.	Asia (700-899)	Independent		Dependent			Part of Larger Entity	
		from	to	from	to	type	from	to
811	Cambodia	1953	—	1949	1953	col	—	1949
812	Laos	1954	—	1949	1954	col	—	1949
815	(Vietnam)			1949	1954	col	—	1949
816	North Vietnam	1954	—					
817	South Vietnam	1954	—					
820	Malaysia/Federation of Malaya [Malayan Union]	1957	—	1946	1957	col		
821	Federated Malay States			— 1942 1945	1942 1945 1946	col occ col	1946	—
822	Unfederated Malay States (incl.: Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, Trengganu)			— 1942 1945	1942 1945 1946	col occ col	1946	—
823	Sabah [North Borneo]			— 1942 1945	1942 1945 1963	col occ col	1963	—
824	Sarawak			— 1941 1945	1941 1945 1963	col occ col	1963	—
827	(Straits Settlement) (incl.: Penang and Malacca)			— 1942 1945	1942 1945 1946	col occ col	1946	—
830	Singapore	1965	—	1946	1963	col	— 1963	1946 1965
835	Brunei			— 1941 1945	1941 1945 —	col occ col		

Code No.	Asia (700-899)	Independent		Dependent			Part of Larger Entity	
		from	to	from	to	type	from	to
840	Philippines	1946	—	— 1942 1945	1942 1945 1946	col occ col		
850	Indonesia [Netherlands East Indies]	1949	—	—	1949	col		
851	West Irian [Netherlands New Guinea]			— 1942 1945 1962	1942 1945 1962 —	col occ col man		
860	Portuguese Timor			—	—	col		
	Oceania (900-999)							
900	Australia	1920	—	1901	1920	col		
901	New South Wales			—	1901	col	1901	—
902	Western Australia			—	1901	col	1901	—
903	South Australia			—	1901	col	1901	—
904	Victoria			—	1901	col	1901	—
905	Queensland			—	1901	col	1901	—
906	Tasmania			—	1901	col	1901	—
910	Papua and New Guinea			1946	—	man		
911	Papua			—	—	col	1946	—
912	New Guinea [German New Guinea]			— 1914 1921	1914 1921 —	col occ man	1946	—
920	New Zealand	1920	—	—	1920	col		
925	Cook Islands			—	—	col		

Code No.	Oceania (900-999) Name	Independent		Dependent			Part of Larger Entity	
		from	to	from	to	type	from	to
930	New Caledonia			—	—	col		
935	New Hebrides			—	—	col		
940	Solomon Islands			—	—	col		
945	Gilbert and Ellice Islands			—	—	col		
950	Fiji Islands			—	—	col		
955	Tonga Islands [Friendly Islands]			—	—	col		
960	French Polynesia [Oceania]			—	—	col		
980	U. S. Pacific Trust Territories (incl.: Caroline, Marshall, and Mariana Islands)			— 1914 1920 1944 1947	1914 1920 1944 1947 —	col occ man occ man		
985	Guam			— 1941 1944	1941 1944 —	col occ col		
990	Western Samoa			— 1914 1920	1914 1920 1962	col occ man		
		1962	—					
991	American Samoa			—	—	col		

(Text continued from page. 934)

sphere of influence on the one hand, and those similarly constrained by partial military occupation, on the other. For example, even though U.S. Marines remained in Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic during much of the period between the Spanish-American War and the mid-Thirties in order to establish or buttress friendly regimes, these governments cannot be thought of as fully subjugated and their areas colonized. As a matter of fact, these three nations continued to enjoy diplomatic relations with most of the international system's members. Moreover, the fact that Guatemala and Honduras, for example, were *not* occupied need not suggest that they were any more independent than those Caribbean states which *were* partially occupied. Conceivably, these two nations were sufficiently docile not to

require a military presence. Among other temporary invasions or occupations which were not sufficiently dominant or permanent to justify reclassification of the object nation were those of Iran from 1941 to 1946, Lebanon in 1958, and the Congo from 1960 to 1963.

A special word is also necessary in regard to the status of certain British Commonwealth members. After considerable indecision (associated with our search for a finer discrimination among dependent entities) we settled on 1920 as the date marking the effective independence of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. First of all, they participated in the Versailles Conference in a far from servile role and were subsequently admitted to membership in the League. Second, even though they did not establish normal diplomatic relations with other nations until well after London formally acknowledged their in-

dependence via the 1931 Statute of Westminster, and even though the Crown continued to be represented by Governors-General, the Imperial Conference legitimized, as early as 1926, what had already been the case in fact, and recognized them with England as "autonomous communities . . . equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another . . ." Furthermore, Canada had consummated several treaties with the U.S. after 1923, exchanged missions with Washington in 1926, assumed a seat on the League of Nations Council in 1927, and established diplomatic relations with France and Japan in 1928.

Once the list of *dependent* entities with the requisite 10,000 population was established, it was pared down to exclude all those dependencies which are geographically contiguous to (or immediately off-shore) the metropolitan nation or another dependency which was itself contiguous to the metropolitan nation. (The Isle of Man, Guernsey, and Jersey, for which data are reported separately in the U.N. Yearbooks, were retained.) This exclusion merely recognized the impossibility of drawing a consistently valid and reliable distinction between component parts of various federations or unions and contiguous dependent territories. By the same token, we also excluded territories transferred from one contiguous nation to another without an intervening period of relative autonomy.

With the two basic classes of entity (independent or dependent) identified, the lists were recombined. The three types of dependency are indicated by "col" for colony, "man" for mandate, and "occ" for occupied.

The next problems were those of fission and fusion, including a change of name, and these were handled as follows:

- (a) Where the name of an entity has been changed, we use the most recent one, and in cases of possible confusion add the earlier name in *brackets*; e.g., Iran [Persia].
- (b) A larger entity which subsequently became divided into separate entities has

its original name in *parentheses*; e.g., (French Equatorial Africa). Its present-day components are listed immediately below. In those cases in which several entities merged for a while and then split apart again, the combined entity's name is shown in parentheses and the original components are listed below, indicating their present separate status, e.g., (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland), with Zambia [Northern Rhodesia], Rhodesia [Southern Rhodesia], and Malawi [Nyasaland].

- (c) Where there has been either merger or disunion around a dominant "core" territory, the present name of the core unit is used and both the core and the subsequent unit receive the *same code number*; e.g., Saudi Arabia/Nejd, or West Germany/Germany.
- (d) A larger entity which split temporarily but subsequently returned to the earlier boundaries is listed in its present status, with the peripheral entity *indented* below; e.g., Czechoslovakia with Slovakia below.
- (e) Smaller entities which subsequently merged into a larger one are *indented* one space in, under the larger one's listing; e.g., Alaska and Hawaii under the United States.

Thus, the indentation is used as a visual convenience for those who will be gathering highly contemporary data, and indicates that the indented unit is, at press time, part of a larger entity, but had been in the past an administratively separate unit. If a unit never experienced a particular status, no dates at all are entered alongside it under that status column; a dash under the "from" column means that such status existed as of 1900, and a dash under the "to" column means that the status continues as of date of publication.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: For comments on this article and its list of national political units, see Communications to the Editor, pp. 952-955.)

COMMUNICATIONS

TO THE EDITOR:

A central task in applying systems analysis is to enumerate all actors within a particular arena, since the notion of "system" focuses attention upon interrelationships between parts of a whole. Because "National Political Units in the 20th Century" is the most comprehensive international census to appear so far,¹ I am sure that members of the profession will be extremely indebted to Russett, Singer, and Small for years to come. But since all of the authors have conducted empirical investigations using lists based upon different criteria, further discussion appears warranted in the interest of demonstrating how to utilize the list in practice.

The criteria need to be examined more carefully. The obvious focus in the present enumeration is on whether a particular unit, in classical "political-legal" terms, may be classified as "independent" or "dependent." An exclusive emphasis on "political-legal" aspects of politics has of course long since been abandoned within political science; yet until publication of the Russett-Singer-Small list there was no classification of international actors relevant to the age-old concern for sovereign status. A study on the control of epidemics, however, would be incomplete without discussing the U.N.; international economists treat cartels and regional common markets; students of Southeast Asian military activity can hardly avoid including the Vietcong. In short, the criterion of legal status will not be satisfactory for all studies that are international and cross-national in scope. Different criteria will yield different lists, but to draw up all possible additional lists would be a most formidable task, one that the authors wisely have sidestepped. The question of whether the authors' formal criteria are preferable to behavioral ones, nevertheless, will be reraised as further efforts emerge.

A mere list of international *actors*, hence, will develop systems theory only if a *type* of system is specified; and, having defined such a whole, deductively derived criteria will serve the function of identifying *members* of a system. To illustrate, one could scarcely conceive of estimating "stability" of bipolar world power distributions without providing a list of mili-

tarily autonomous members which confront one another on strategic-security issues. In structuring research to answer this question, the smaller units reported by Russett, Singer, and Small will be nonmembers of such systems. But quite different members would qualify: The Pathet Lao, Vietminh, Greek Communists (1946-1949), Yugoslav Partisans, and Falangists certainly have been independent in a military sense. Nevertheless, in compiling just this sort of list of late,² I am convinced that the present list, however insufficient by itself to frame particular behavioral studies with specific data requirements, is so standardized as to constitute an essential initial source to consult. Readers, no less than are the compilers themselves, should be aware of biases built into any such enumeration.

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TO THE EDITOR:

At first sight, this article ["National Political Units in the Twentieth Century," by Bruce M. Russett, J. David Singer and Melvin Small] appears to ask a simple, straightforward question capable of a routine answer: "what are the political entities whose attributes and relationships must concern us?" The authors themselves do not attach undue importance to this problem and emphatically aver that in their opinion "this is hardly the *most* pressing issue facing our two fields" (of international relations and comparative politics). Indeed they think it can be solved essentially by the application of common sense and by consulting standard works of reference.

A cursory glance makes it clear however that the list falls somewhat short of its avowed promise to introduce "standardization" in the enumeration of political entities. Our purpose here is to argue that this failing is attributable to the absence of an adequate theoretical basis.

The authors offer us "a population of . . . national or quasi-national entities" and we take this to be a population of states, actual or potential. For even though they studiously avoid applying such familiar if variously interpreted terms as "state" or "political system,"

¹ Michael Haas, "International Subsystems," paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., September, 1968; Haas, *International Conflict* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, forthcoming), Appendix D.

¹ J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System," *World Politics*, XVIII (January, 1966), 236-82, is superseded by the present list.

their consistent reference to "national" units does in fact amount to using an adjectival form of the term "state" (confirming the identity political entity = national state previously established by Singer and Small in *World Politics* January 1966 page 245).

Hence we take this to be a list of what Russett, Singer and Small should call nation-states, even though they shy away from the word. We find the list unsatisfactory because it includes entities which on no reasonable account can be called states, either actual or likely, such as Alaska, Ifni, Gibraltar, Trieste, Danzig, Andorra, the Panama Canal Zone, San Tome and Principe, and excludes others which could also be judged to have been states or likely to become states, such as Tibet, Quebec, Kashmir, Biafra and why not, after all, Scotland, the Basque Country, Nagaland, the Kurdish Republic and so many others. In any event, how do the authors assess the likelihood of the emergence of a new state? Provided our threshold of likelihood is appropriately low, the number of candidates for statehood is, of course, extremely large. For instance, all the world's federal units, and not only Alaska and Quebec, might be looked upon as potential states. And so might all "agencies or bodies having an organized existence, governmental character and substantial autonomy: (this is the useful definition of a "governmental unit" adopted by the *United States Statistical Abstract*): The United States had, in 1962, 4,645 such units the population of each one of which exceeded 10,000 and all of which, we would hazard to guess, were more important than Ifni (*Abstract for 1967* p. 414: this includes states, counties, municipalities and townships). That, of course, is still not all: for likely states might arise not only by splintering or fission (of which process the colonial revolution is the contemporary exemplar and the only one the standardized list seems concerned with) but also by amalgamation or fusion e.g. the European Economic Community, or the United States of Central America. The moral of all this is that a list of potential national-states is plainly impracticable without an explicit theory for the universe of which they are a part; anything else can be no more than a fusillade in the dark.

So much for potential or likely states; but what about actual or real, observable states? At the source of the difficulties confronting Russett, Singer and Small is lack of clarity about the criteria used to establish the existence of a state: namely confusion between subjective (participants') and objective (observers') criteria of statehood. Intuitively, the

important criteria would seem to be subjective, that is those which participants in the social process themselves regard as significant. Thus in respect of statehood we would ask how do we know that participants in interstate relations treat some entities as states and not others? We would inquire into their perceptions in these matters, and also into their practices and would soon notice that "recognition," a well-understood diplomatic institution, is a key phenomenon here and that it has close links with the network of diplomatic representation and, more recently, with membership in international organizations. Broadly, entities recognized as members by other entities and joined together in a global network would constitute a world system. The system could be a club of sovereigns, or an association of organizations, partly formalized e.g. as the United Nations, not necessarily a closed-circuit association, but possibly an open-ended one. In the pure nation-state system statehood amounts to membership in such a circuit, and the criteria for judging whether an entity does or does not belong to the circuit are the criteria of statehood. (Conversely, of course when the system changes its nature and its structure, the characteristics and the relationships of the member units change too. Yet the authors proceed on the assumption that the world political system has continued unchanged for the past 70 years.)

Singer and Small imaginatively applied the subjective criterion of "recognition" in their earlier study (*ibid.*, pp. 246-9) but have failed to carry it through in this latest work. But even in their earlier study they confused the matter further by adding to this subjective standard (a state is a state if it is so regarded by other states) an extraneously objective one, in the shape of a population-exclusion factor. They in effect also said: a state is a state only if the population it controls exceeds 500,000. In their latest work they have lowered their sights considerably but still insist that a state cannot be (the Vatican excepted) unless its population exceeds 10,000. This is unconvincing: a state is a state irrespective of the population it controls. Population size describes no more than an attribute of a state (e.g. its "importance") but does not bear upon its existence.

The authors introduce a second objective criterion, that of independence, interpreted as control over territory and absence of occupation or of dependent status. Hence a state occupied by foreign (but hostile) troops, such as Belgium in World War II (surely also in World War I) on their reckoning was not a state in the period 1940-4. This again flies in the face of common sense. Of course, Belgium was un-

der hostile occupation, but it also had a government in exile (as it did in the First World War), continued to exercise authority in the Belgian Congo and retained recognition by numerous other states; hence, conclusively, remained in existence. Civil war regimes present similar difficulties. Independence, in any event, is a treacherous concept hardly susceptible to an either-or treatment. More promising would be a search for measures of "degrees of autonomy." Pending the development of such measures the use of "independence" as an objective criterion of political status should preferably be discontinued.

Even though conventional wisdom points the other way there are thus significant grounds for doubting that either population size or independence seen as territorial control can serve as objective standards of statehood. The essential character of states resides in their organizational features: states are first and foremost organizations of varying degrees of complexity and formality, they are organizations of a governmental character (hence concerned with order, use and control of violence and incidentally with a host of other functions) and they are relatively autonomous organizations. In this conceptualization we thus follow the definition used for the *Statistical Abstract*. As all organizations, states are, of course, oriented to populations, but states are not to be confused with populations, nor with any particular type of control over populations. States, too, are oriented to a territory but this is not to say that a piece of territory such as Ifni (and what happened to Antaretica?) does by itself constitute a state. Nor need we base our listing upon the supposition that in respect of a certain territory one particular political entity must always exercise a monopoly of jurisdiction. This condition certainly does not apply in federal and other complex states, characterized by a multiplicity of overlapping jurisdictions; it ignores international, and regional and functional organizations at all levels and generally presents a superficial and in fact misleading picture of political life. The game of dividing the world's surface into a number of mutually exclusive territorial entities may be a fascinating one, but belongs to "Monopoly" and not to political science.

An inventory of states thus represents, by all accounts, a formidable problem, amounting in some respects to a global census of political entities. But, depending on the criteria we choose, we could construct at least three lists to cover the problems and the period of the article under discussion.

(1) A historical list for the pre-1945 period: a complex arrangement taking note of the fact

that the Western states-system of that period was in large part still imperial, hence also to a great extent traditional, hierarchical and non-national. This would be, of course, a subjective list based on the Western point of view, but since the Western system did not at that time completely cover the earth, residual parts of non-Western political systems in Asia, Africa, and even in the Americas would have to be separately accounted for.

(2) The contemporary universal nation-state system is essentially a post-1945 phenomenon, with a new structure and new membership criteria; thus with reference to these latter criteria all its actual participants could be listed on a subjective basis of who recognized whom as what (without troubling about such extraneous data as population limits and territorial control). This could give us the composition of the system as seen by the members themselves and it should be a complete accounting. A simple beginning and the ideal basis for such an enterprise is membership of the United Nations (surprisingly the authors do not use it at all); additions could then be made to such a list only on the basis of criteria of subjective recognition, as evidenced by diplomatic representation, political contact, full or associate membership in international organizations, etc. The United Nations Organization is itself, of course, a member of that changing system and so are increasing numbers of other organizations, such as the EEC and the OAU, if once again we apply criteria of subjective acceptance.

(3) Finally we could attempt the staggering, but stimulating task suggested by the question: what are the entities which politically shape a world system? In the modern world the scope of such an inquiry is tremendous and would include a great deal besides states, for the number of autonomous political authorities alone runs into the tens of thousands, and that of other politically important organizations could easily be of a similar order. Yet this, precisely, is the universe of political science, and it is here that objective criteria of exclusion could help greatly in simplifying our work. For organizational dimensions, as measured by size of the budget, number of personnel, geographical scope of operations, would help us to distinguish between entities whose actions do and do not have significant, i.e. global repercussions. Yet other criteria could also be thought of but whatever they are we would have to conclude that for the contemporary world system such a list should feature not only the United States and say, Dahomey, but also the State of California, the Royal Dutch-Shell Petroleum Company, the Ford Founda-

tion, the World Bank and the Roman Catholic Church. This would bring home the fact that the world abounds with politically significant entities about which we know little, confined as we are by the theoretical perspectives of the nation-state system.

To conclude: a seemingly innocuous question has led us into one of the crucial problems of contemporary political science. If the information assembled by Russett, Singer and Small is intended to serve only as a check list against which certain statistics (e.g. mortality rates or election results) may be conveniently tabulated it would (despite gaps) have utility but it will require considerable academic caution. If it is, on the other hand, to present basic political data and an authoritative definition of the universe whose attributes and relationships we are to study, it must be judged inadequate.

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TO THE EDITOR:

Given the frequency with which authors chide their critics for attacking a work on grounds other than those selected by the authors, one might expect that critics would become more cautious. Alas, they do not. We stated our objective, our criteria, and the limitations. We intended neither an analysis of "the essential character" of statehood, a theoretical diagnosis of the global system, nor an exhaustive listing of all government units in the world, past and future.

We claim to do nothing more than offer a prominent solution to the need for a defined population, with standard code-numbers, of "territorially based political units" of a "national or quasinalational" nature, to serve comparative and international politics scholars who might want to compare or generalize about, "such entities, or a sample thereof, from 1900 to the present." At no point do we even suggest that this is a list of *states*, nor of *all relevant actors* in world politics. In response to Haas's original communication, we explicitly declared that "despite our belief in their importance, it (the list) does not, however, include the infinite number of sub-national and extra-national actors in world politics, territorial or otherwise." In earlier papers each of us has manifested his awareness of that importance; most recent is Singer's "The Global System and its Sub-Systems" in the Rosenau volume on national and international linkages. Had our critics taken our original language

seriously or thought to check with us before publishing their critique, there would have been no doubt as to our intention here.

As to other Modelski-Vellut complaints, there is again the problem of careless reading. (1) In their earlier listing Singer and Small made no pretence of identifying *all states* since 1815; rather they sought to define a considerably smaller population embracing only "nation-members of the international system" and made quite clear their criteria of inclusion. (2) At no point do we suggest that Belgium was not a state from 1940 to 1944; we merely say (at some length in the text) that it was not an active and independent member of the international system during that period. (3) We left unused code numbers throughout the list to permit the addition of new entities, without trying to predict which particular ones (Quebec, Biafra, or Delaware) might emerge, and anticipated a supplementary two-digit code for those who need sub-national distinctions. (4) Since, as Modelski and Vellut admit, we did not call our entities "nation-states" we need not rebut the charge that we proceeded "on the assumption that the states system has continued unchanged for the past 70 years." Anyone who wants separate listings for before and after World War II might begin with our compilation, with its dates. As we say at two points, one may always select a sub-set from a defined population by modifying the criteria used in the original definition.

We fully agree that other criteria might better suit particular theoretical interests, but remain persuaded that our list will be useful to many scholars in several disciplines. Nor do we doubt the potential value of a standardized listing of other types of social entities in the global system, and we will welcome one compiled by any of our critics. If Modelski and Vellut also care to list all past and present national units having fewer than 10,000 people, or all the sub-national "governmental units" in the world, beginning with the 4,645 in the United States, we are sure they will find the exercise an engaging one.

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TO THE EDITOR:

In a research note in the March issue of this *Review* ("A Theorem about Voting"), Thomas Casstevens asserts as a theorem and then attempts to prove the following proposition: in a

single-member district using the simple-majority single-ballot system of election, a rational voter will always vote for the candidate he most prefers.

The validity of this proposition is, of course, far from obvious, when applied to a multi-party system: in particular, if some voter prefers candidate A to B and B to C, and if candidate A has little chance of winning, while B and C are running evenly, then one might suppose that elementary strategic considerations would lead such a voter to cast his ballot for B, rather than waste it upon A. Casstevens' proposition, however, asserts that such strategic considerations will never arise, which if true would be both surprising and disturbing.

In fact, however, the proposition is not true. The proof is technically incorrect because of the treatment of ties, but the more fundamental difficulty is that the proof is essentially irrelevant to the theorem as stated, because of its dependence upon an unjustifiable "reduction postulate." It may be worthwhile to elaborate briefly on these points.

If there are more than two candidates and a finite number of voters, the probability of a tie in general will not be zero. The fact that it may be small is essentially irrelevant, since the proof depends upon showing that if a voter switches from one candidate to another, the resulting decrease in the probability of the first candidate winning must precisely equal (in magnitude) the increase in the probability that the second candidate will. Once the possibility of ties is admitted, however, such a switch in votes will in general also affect the probability of a tie (perhaps only slightly), so that exact equality will no longer hold and the result will not follow. (It is true, of course, that if the number of voters is infinite then the probability of a tie can be zero, as assumed; in that case, however, the contribution of any single vote to the outcome is also zero, which contradicts another of the basic assumptions of the proof.)

The more fundamental difficulty, however, lies in the presence of a "reduction postulate," to the effect that "if the voter changes his decision from [A] to [B], then the probability of [A] winning decreases and the probability of [B] winning increases, but the probability of [C] winning is not affected." The only justification offered for this assumption is that it "does not contradict the mathematical theory of probability," which may be true, but is in any event quite irrelevant. It certainly is not implied by that theory, or by the theory plus the institutional context in which elections are held; hence, its status is that of an assumption which is certainly not true of all elections, but which might be true of some (though plausible examples in which it is true are difficult to devise). Even if the technical difficulty arising from the treatment of ties could be resolved, the most that would follow is that in those rather special elections where the "postulate" happens to hold, voters will act in accord with their true preferences.* This, however, would clearly be a much weaker and a less surprising result than the theorem as originally stated.

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* In similar vein, an alternative "postulate," which would simplify the proof even further, would be to assume that all candidates are running equally well; or, more precisely, the conditional probability of a candidate winning, given that the voter in question votes for him, is equal for all candidates. This also has the status of an assumption which is true of some elections (and voters), and not of others, and it is trivial to show that the voter in question will act in accord with his true preferences in those elections for which this "postulate" happens to be true. It is clear, however, that this fact does not preclude the possibility of strategic considerations arising in other elections which will lead voters to act quite differently.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

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BOOK REVIEWS

Beyond Ideology: The Revival of Political Theory. BY DANTE GERMINO. (New York: Harper & Row, 1967. Pp. ix, 254. \$5.00.)

Political theory as "the study of the principles of right order in the psyche and in society," which is to say "reflection on the good life for man and society," is neither dead nor dying and this book is a protest against premature obituaries. Its thesis is that political theory is enjoying a revival which the neopositivists and behavioralists who dismiss political theory as normative and therefore outside the purview of science are unable to see. So argues Dante Germino who, instead of disassociating political theory and political science, insists that they are inseparable provided one does not confuse "authentic" political theory with ideologizing, utopianizing, partisan contention, subjective moral preference; and provided further that one does not commit the error of limiting science to dealing with overt behavior to the neglect of inner experience. If statements about the latter are by the positivist's criterion unverifiable, inner experience is nonetheless real and knowable by other means than sensory observation. Germino avoids the German term sometimes badly translated as "understanding," but it is to acts of "Verstehen" that he refers when he speaks of verifying propositions about inner experience by "meditatively re-enacting" such experiences. "Political theory is an experiential, as opposed to an exclusively experimental science," he writes, thereby placing himself in the ranks of phenomenologists like Alfred Schuetz, although he could also invoke the authority of MacIver ("imaginative reconstruction"), Weber ("interpretive understanding") and Cooley all of whom long ago urged that because we deal in the human sciences with motivational attitudes and intended meanings we cannot stop at the observation of external behavior. Whether or not we agree with Germino that Plato and Hegel transcended the level of ideology we may still affirm (with Mannheim if not with Marx) that it is possible to transcend bias or, as Germino puts it, make "the leap to the perspective of theory." One problem is that a writer who denies that Marxist doctrine is significant as political theory and asserts that Hegelianism is, or who dismisses Bentham and Burke as mere publicists and virtually ignores Locke and J. S. Mill may himself have failed to get "Beyond Ideology."

Can one affirm that value judgments made at the level of theory have cognitive status and

as such are confirmable or disconfirmable? Are they objective in the sense that they are something more or other than expressions of subjective preference? If political theory is to be identified with political science the answer must be affirmative. "Objectivity in political theory comes not from the vain attempt to avoid evaluation and thereby appear impartial but through the adoption of critical standards and criteria of evaluation that are not transitory or parochial but are based on an experientially sound anthropology." Many would go this far with the author but question the basis on which he reaches this conclusion once they are confronted by the specific uses to which he puts it. What, according to Germino, is "an experientially sound anthropology" and who qualifies as "sound"?

Those who qualify fall into two groups which the author, following Maritain, calls the "theocentric" and the "anthropocentric" humanists. Western theocentric humanism is rooted in classical philosophy, Judaism and Christianity. Its great exemplars were Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas. As these were governed by the Platonic dictum that "God is the measure of all things," so the anthropocentric humanists have been governed by the Protagorean dictum that "man is the measure of all things." In the case of the latter as exemplified by Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Hegel, the basis for a model society is not laid up in heaven but here on earth; "immanent" temporal existence is substituted for a timeless transcendent realm; the ordering principles are sought within the human community, as in the case of Hobbes' sovereign and the mundane contract from which the sovereign's authority is derived.

Although most modern political theory is of the anthropocentric variety, representatives of both traditions share a common opposition to the "messianic humanism" of a Comte, Marx, Mazzini, or (to mention a 20th century writer) Harold Laski which would "turn man into something other than he is or can become" (and is therefore antihumanistic), whereas for true humanists "man remains *man*, a finite creature of limited capabilities." It is, to be sure, difficult to see how this can be reconciled with an earlier statement that Augustine and Aquinas shared with the great classicists a belief that pleasure, power, honor, glory are illusory ends, the chief end of man being the *vita contemplative*; or the statement that for the theocentric humanist "existence is bathed

in a new light" and the "human person . . . discovers himself as little lower than the angels." Perhaps this reviewer has missed the point; if this is not an example of a millenarian fantasy involving "a qualitative transformation of existence" I fail to see what is. But we are told that millenarianism is precisely what theocentric and anthropocentric humanists, i.e. all political theorists in the authentic sense, reject, as they do the belief that man can conform reality to his will. While at one point "pseudo-objective descriptivism" is dismissed (along with "opinionated ideology"), we are told in this context that the task of political theory is to describe the human condition not to transform it. To be sure authentic political theorists may be concerned with changes within the realm of the possible, according to the author, a qualification which, while used to exclude Marx, specifically does not exclude Plato (presumably on the basis of Eric Voegelin's distinction between a utopia and a paradigmatic society) or Rousseau whose concept of a free body politic modelled after the "bands of peasants . . . regulating affairs of state under an oak, and always acting wisely" surely suggests millenarianism to this reviewer.

For Germino the hallmarks of authentic political theory are (1) *openness*, meaning critical detachment from the contemporaneous world of practical activity; (2) *theoretical intention*, meaning avoidance of the temptation to impose one's will on reality with a view to changing it; (3) *contentration on universal or perennial problems*, namely, those that "confront man as man rather than particular men at a particular time and place"; (4) *realism*, which avoids imposing "one's model of the food society directly upon a concrete historical situation"; (5) *modesty*, that is, the recognition of limits to knowledge; (6) *intellectual honesty and integrity*. The author often seems to apply these criteria arbitrarily. One wonders why a Plato, who believed that "true lovers of wisdom should come to hold political power" and who travelled to Syracuse "to work for the . . . overthrow of a despotism" (*Epistle* vii), should not be excluded by Germino from the charmed company—all the more so in that in going to Sicily Plato was expressly trying to apply his ideas to a concrete historical situation. One wonders also how the author can fail to reckon with the fact that the central fiction in the *Leviathan* of an irreversible delegation of power is a reflection of Hobbes' reaction to what was happening at a particular time and place, namely, the disorder attendant on England's civil wars. The admission of Hegel admittedly imposes some strain on the cri-

terion of modesty, but the philosopher who promised with characteristic reticence to answer the question, "What is the ultimate design of the world?" (Introduction, *Philosophy of History*) is nevertheless acceptable.

After Hegel political theory went into a decline brought about by the impact of Comtean positivism and Marxian ideologism in the nineteenth century and, in the English-speaking world, by the ascendancy of the logical positivists and language analysts. It was at least partly rescued from this state of desuetude, the author believes, by Croce, Bergson, Benda, Scheler and the phenomenologists, and, in general, all those (T. H. Green, Whitehead, Collingwood) who have stood guard at the citadel of metaphysics. Supplementing them have been those writers "who rediscovered the crucial importance of elites in any body politic," notably Mosca, Pareto, and Michels. (This is perplexing. The neo-Machiavellians, as Germino almost parenthetically concedes, were positivists *par excellence*. Mosca and Pareto explicitly eschewed moral judgments, although in practice they may have been incorrigible moralizers. It would be difficulty to find better exemplars of scientism and what Germino earlier criticizes as "pseudo-objective descriptivism.")

However, the rescue of political theory remained to be completed and this has been accomplished since World War II by such writers as Oakeshott, Arendt, Jovenal, Maritain, Leo Strauss, and, in Germino's judgment, the greatest political theorist of them all, Eric Voegelin, whose strong theocratic and elitist bias is shared by the author.

The author closes with a polemic against the behavioralists (e.g. Skinner, Simon, Caswell) whose position entails a closed society because they support the "world-immanent values of the modernizing ethos . . . to the detriment of the life of the spirit in openness toward transcendence." In its stead he proposes a society inspired by a new or theocentric liberalism and, as such, open to the "experience of transcendence." (In terms of conventional political labels the author turns out to be a liberal rather than a conservative, although conservatives are more likely to be attracted to this as to Voegelin's kind of approach to political theory.)

With the exception of a platitudinous last chapter (e.g. "the problem of leisure bids fair to become the central preoccupation of the age") which might be more appropriate for a service club than for the readers of this book, the author has given us a sophisticated, eloquent, and erudite account of a position which

deserves attention even from those who, like this reviewer, are unable to share his commitment to an ontologically grounded theory of politics which fails to reckon with the insights of evolutionary naturalism.

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Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. EDITED BY SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET AND STEIN ROKKAN. (New York: The Free Press, 1967. Pp. xvi, 554. \$9.95.)

In the sixty-four page essay ("Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments") with which they introduce this book, Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan have made an impressive and exceptionally important contribution to the comparative study of political parties. Their introduction, perhaps more important than the book itself, synthesizes and systematizes much of what is known about the relations between social stratification and competitive party politics. Variations in the traits of party systems, they show can be traced to variations in social cleavages, as differentially translated into political cleavages. Using Parsonian categories, they present a typology of possible bases for social cleavage, and argue that such cleavages can occur and be located at a range of points on two axes—"periphery-center" and "cross-local functional." They attempt to demonstrate that the Parsonian categories can be adapted for the study not only of consensus, integration, and stability but of cleavage, disruption, and development.

Having identified and mapped the "critical lines of cleavage," Lipset and Rokkan outline a theory to explain the translation of "cleavage structures" into party systems. Here the variables are political, rather than sociocultural. They include: "the traditions of decisionmaking in the polity"; "the channels for the expression and mobilization of protest"; "the opportunities, the payoffs, and the costs of alliances in the system"; and "the possibilities, the implications, and the limitations of majority rule in the system." These constitute four "thresholds," of varying historical height, which, in different combinations, produce, if not a single required pattern of party-system development, a set of ten party-system types that can be arranged into several patterns of development.

Which social cleavages are translated into party oppositions and which are aggregated *within* the parties? While admitting that not

much is known about variations in the saliency and intensity of cleavages, Lipset and Rokkan suggest as the critical factors the timing and character in each "Western" polity of what they call the National Revolution (against peripheral resistance to nation-building and against the Roman Church) and of the Industrial Revolution. The major variations among "Western" party systems emerge, they argue, in the period *before* universal suffrage, when the processes of political-cultural and economic mobilization resulted in the formation, in some but not all "Western" (i.e. West European) polities, of religious, regional, and agrarian parties. The authors present an impressive "Model for the Generation of the [West] European Party System," consisting of seven key sets of actors, postulated rules on the formation of alliances, and an eightfold typology of the possible resulting party oppositions. Admittedly the latter typology accommodates some empirical examples much better than others and a host of "special factors" must be adduced to account for the many misfits; yet the model must be accounted an example of historical sociology at its best.

The eleven essays that follow, written without guidance from the Lipset-Rokkan typologies or models, can themselves be located on the functional and territorial axes, some of them stressing class and others stressing regional factors in voting and partisanship.

Class factors are emphasized by Robert R. Alford in excerpts from his *Party and Society*, dealing with class voting in Anglo-American political systems. Alan D. Robinson applies Alford's concepts, hypotheses, and indices to New Zealand, finding a high rate of class voting in that country a "class polarization," however, that has curiously little impact on policy-making. The "deviant" case of the "working-class Tories" in England is analyzed by Robert T. McKenzie and Alan Silver, who find that workers who vote for the Tories resemble workers who vote for Labour in social characteristics, while many of the latter share the conservative social and political perspectives of the former. Working-class Tories, they conclude, are not so much deviants from working class political culture as they are normal representatives of a British national political culture, under fewer cross-pressures than their fellow-workers who vote for Labour. Joji Watanuki, in his essay on Japanese voting, also stresses the "deviant" in the relations between stratification and partisanship in Japan. Correlations between class and voting in that country are abnormally low, with large numbers of the poor voting for the Right and large

numbers of the better off (the white collar employees) voting for the Left. This is explained by the predominance of what Watanuki calls "cultural politics" over "class politics."

In one of two essays, Juan Linz investigates the "sociology of political consensus," probing the social changes that help to account for the many differences between the party systems of Weimer and Bonn. In a second essay, Linz analyzes in detail the Spanish party systems of 1875-1923 and 1931-1936, and then courageously predicts the shape of the third Spanish party system, yet to come. He uses Italy as a model both for purposes of historical comparison and for the prediction of future development. Mattei Dogan presents a long study on "Political Cleavage and Social Stratification in France and Italy," which surveys and compares the voting behavior of various social groups in those countries. He pays particular attention to "regional polymorphism"—regional diversities in the socio-economic and motivational bases for party support hidden behind nationally uniform partisan cleavages, while Linz explores the diversification *within* the regionalist politics of Spain. Immanuel Wallerstein shows the rather limited importance of class cleavages in West Africa as compared to ethnic-regional cleavages and broad-based nationalist movements, sometimes themselves only federations of ethnic-regional groups.

Regional factors are stressed even more by the analysts of Finland (Erik Allardt and Pertti Pesonen), of Norway (Stein Rokkan), and of Brazil (Glaucio Ary Dillon Soares). Rokkan sees the Norwegian party system as the result of the superimposition of "functional-economic cleavages" onto an existing set of "territorial-cultural cleavages" by uneven processes of economic development, urbanization, and bureaucratization. Glaucio Ary Dillon Soares explores "the politics of uneven development," using Parsonian concepts to characterize what he calls the two political cultures of Brazil: the culture of the Northeast, with its stress on particularism, ascription, and religion, and a "politics of backwardness," based on traditionalism vs. the culture of the Southeast, with its *relatively* greater stress on universalism, achievement, and secularism, and a "politics of development," based on class and ideology. The growing emphasis on the "territorial-cultural" axis among political sociologists should prove to be just as fruitful as their previous emphasis on the "functional-economic" axis. It may allow comparative political sociology to spread the scope of its analysis beyond what in comparative politics has almost

become the "dark continent" of Europe to include in systematic theory the party systems of a broader variety of polities.

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Strategic Persuasion: Arms Limitations through Dialogue. BY JEREMY J. STONE. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, Pp. xiii, 176. \$6.95.)

Prospects for Peacekeeping. BY ARTHUR M. COX. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967, Pp. xii, 178. \$3.95.)

World Order and Local Disorder: The United Nations and Internal Conflicts. BY LINDA B. MILLER. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, Pp. 234. \$6.50.)

It is worth observing that while two of the three books under review implicitly or explicitly identify the United Nations as the major instrument of keeping peace in the years ahead, each shares the assumption that the major hope for peace as well as the major threat to peace lies in the relationship of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite all the discussion about the end of the Cold War and the end of the bipolar world of the 1940s and 1950s which has preoccupied scholars in the last few years, the roles of the United States and the Soviet Union in or out of the United Nations dominate the pages of these three books. It is true Jeremy Stone alludes to a "growing disinterest in nuclear war"; Linda Miller sees an increasing dependence of both powers upon the United Nations for solutions to international problems they could not handle otherwise; Arthur Cox emphasizes the United States' recognition of the superiority of United Nations action in peacekeeping over the unilateral action and even over the intervention of a regional alliance. Yet it did not require the crisis in the Middle East in 1967 to alert each of the authors to the understanding that neither the internal difficulties of nor the external challenges to the superpowers in 1967 had changed the loci of power in world affairs. 1967 was closer to 1947 than the authors may wish to admit openly.

The continuing Soviet-American confrontation is probably most clearly expressed in Stone's *Strategic Persuasion* in which the United Nations makes no appearance. Indeed, it is surprising that the author was unable to find any place at all for the United Nations in light of his concern for suitable auspices of the dialogue between the great powers. His approach to the question of arms limitations is

the subtle technique of persuasion through dialogue. His essay—and it is essentially a speculative essay—takes for granted that there are no meaningful quantitative methods of reducing the arms stockpile or of slowing the arms race. The key to avoiding a holocaust is communication between the United States and the Soviet Union in such a way that the intentions of both parties are at all times perfectly clear. If this objective could be achieved the tensions generating the arms race would be relaxed. The result would not necessarily be the end of potential war but it might be the atrophying of the destructive nuclear weapons system.

In his discussion he avoids the formal methods of treaty or convention, such as the protracted Geneva discussion of arms control. Such a path with its fixed positions and above all with its bureaucracies talking to themselves or to their constituencies and administrative superiors frequently stimulates rather than ameliorates the problems. If there is a direct approach to arms limitation in which the parties sit across the table from each other, it should be under private auspices, as in the Pugwash conferences and it should be conducted by men with a considerable degree of objectivity about the problems. Stone weighs the merits and defects of scientists as members of the dialogue as compared with economists or politicians. Whatever the composition of the discussants their objective should not be formal treaties but means of improving the continuing dialogues.

But even more satisfactory than a direct confrontation, in the author's opinion, is the indirect approach to arms limitation which requires a sophistication on every level of government that is not apparent at this time. The President or the Congress must be continually aware that a Defense Secretary's report to the Congress or a Cabinet member's article in a journal of public affairs has a Soviet audience, one to which communications can be made. His primary example of how the strategic dialogue can be conducted by indirection are the various ways the United States and the Soviet Union reported the successes of their atomic and hydrogen bomb experiments. They could either produce terror or reduce tension. He particularly attacked Khrushchev's announcement of a 50-megaton bomb in 1961 for making the act "an act of terror by acting as if success had gone to his head," when "the act, in itself, was not monstrous, terrifying or unjustified."

Professor Stone makes his case and makes it with an ease that is too comforting for credibility. Is the style of dialogue sufficient in itself

to end secrecy in atomic matters and end interest in a nuclear war as a solution to international problems? It seems too optimistic and too simplistic. The role of the United Nations and the new nations which comprise a majority in the organization might have an effect on the strategic debate; and China's role, which is dismissed merely as a factor supporting the decline in Soviet-American rivalry, might be a very different one in the future.

Arthur M. Cox's study of peacekeeping is more monographic in nature than Stone's book. While the United Nations does not appear in the title, the emblem on the jacket makes it clear to the reader that the United Nations is the peacekeeper he has in mind. By peacekeeping he means "the use of soldiers not to fight and win, but to prevent fighting, to maintain cease-fires, and to provide order while negotiations are being conducted." In the first generation of the United Nations the preventive force has been used as observers and fact finders on a disputed border as in Greece or Kashmir, as emergency force maintaining cease fire in the Gaza Strip, or as soldiers helping to suppress secession in Katanga. Inevitably, the use of troops has become a subject of cold war controversy in which the United States and the Soviet Union clashed repeatedly over the years. In the early phase of UN history the United States had been a strong supporter of collective measures, including peacekeeping forces, but as the balance of power changed in the United Nations the United States was increasingly willing to act independently in the Dominican Republic, in the Stanleyville airlift, and in bombing of North Vietnam. Hostility or indifference of the Third World accounted for a large part of American disenchantment with collective action.

The author points out that the Soviet Union was far more opposed to peacekeeping in principle, particularly during the long period in which the United States dominated the UN. But with the rise of the former colonial countries courted by the Soviet Union there has been a shift in practice if not in theory. To win support in the Afro-Asian world the Russians had to temper their attacks on U-Thant and on the Congo operation, and even supported neutral action in the India-Pakistan controversy. Given the significance of the neutralist world and the impossibility of either superpower controlling the United Nations, Cox sees the possibility of strengthening and extending the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations.

His major expectations are with United

States policies, which he feels are in special need of the advantages offered by the peacekeeping services of the United Nations. The Vietnam involvement is brought up infrequently, but is obviously a major reason for urgency in promoting the peacekeeping function of the United Nations. Unilateral intervention is suspect in a neutralist-dominated world, as well as being a tempting invitation to Soviet counter-action. And America's numerous regional military alliances have no better chance of success, since as anticommunist military alliances they inject the Cold War into any area of operation and are incompatible with the impartial role the UN could play. It is in the interest of the United States to maintain peace and if the United Nations can serve this purpose it should be given much more support than has hitherto been the case. He is convinced that American initiative will be followed by Soviet response, if only to win friends among the Afro-Asian bloc.

Cox's mood is optimistic, and such problems as he points out such as authorization by Security Council or General Assembly, financing, staffing are all soluble if the will is there. The author's presentation is pedestrian, frequently repetitious, and brushes aside such questions as the United Nations' failure in the Middle East in 1967. He is vague about the relation of the Vietnam war to the peacekeeping process. Yet his prognosis is convincing: namely, the balance of terror between the superpowers makes the impartial peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations increasingly useful to both, if for different reasons. His proposals for strengthening the present machinery are both modest and sensible.

In Linda Miller's assessment of the United Nations' encounters with internal conflicts the rivalry between the superpowers once again is the dominant feature. Where the Soviet Union and the United States are in rough agreement, whatever the reasons, the United Nations can act with some effectiveness. This was particularly true of colonial conflicts in which Indonesians or Algerians strived for independence with an approving world looking on and beleaguered European powers willing to accept the United Nations mediation as a face-saving device for abandoning their empires. Although the United States position as an ally of France or Portugal has made a clearcut stand more difficult than it had been for the irresponsible Soviet Union, seeking to profit from Western embarrassment, American action has served the colonial rebels whenever possible. In cases involving simply the breakdown of domestic order the United Nations role has been more

difficult to define. In Cyprus and the Congo United Nations peacekeeping reflected both Cold War tensions and anticolonial feelings. Miss Miller feels that here the United Nations role is a limited one, "creating circumstances favorable to negotiations between parties." The only interest of the United Nations should be in restoration of stability rather than in any particular solution to internal disorder.

Essentially the author suggests that there is no such thing as a local disorder; the world, and the superpowers, are involved or involve themselves. The most dangerous and least amenable to United Nations treatment is the proxy war where charges of internal or external aggression intrude the Cold War directly into a local situation. In the Hungary crisis of 1956 intervention would have been rebuffed by the direct interest of the Soviet Union, or would have touched off a Third World War. Similarly, United States action in Lebanon, Guatemala, or in Vietnam, removed the United Nations from any effective role in those areas. A community of interest among the superpowers is necessary before the United Nations can be heard, beyond serving as a forum for verbal attack. The latter role is not necessarily negligible, as Russia's discomfort in Hungary in 1956 and America's unpopularity over Vietnam revealed ten years later. But Professor Miller is frank in using that adjective to describe the United Nations' influence in conflicts directly involving the United States and the Soviet Union. In this respect she is more pessimistic than the other authors. Her case studies, however, suggest important successes for the United Nations, and offers more hope for the future than she seems willing to concede.

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Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China. BY A. DOAK BARNETT, with a contribution by Ezra Vogel. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. xxix, 563, \$12.00.)

This work is an unparalleled account of institutional life in a Chinese ministry, county, commune and production brigade in the late 1950s and early 1960s. But the cases—and they are said to be real, not hypothetical—are presented "without specifically identifying the areas or institutions that are described" (p. xviii). Why? To guarantee the disguise of the three primary informants, each a refugee. Hints and approximations soften the elusive uncertainties of source and object. Nonetheless, the reader walks blindfolded as the author steers him into the Chinese political terrain,

describing the fauna and flora in great detail, but refusing to let the reader touch it for himself.

It is fortunate that Mr. Barnett and Mr. Vogel are trusted guides. This is a most important source of vivid images of Chinese political and administrative life. However maddening the repeated references to Ministry M, County X, Commune C and Productive Brigade B, the frustration of dealing with disguised objects can be tolerated. In time it will be possible to judge how representative, and in what ways unrepresentative, these images actually are. My guess is that they will stand up very well; and, in any case, they provide a description against which comparison can be made.

The plan of the work is straightforward. The ministry, county and commune-and-brigade cases are taken up in three separate parts. Each part is self-contained. Except in the case of commune-brigade relations, vertical ties receive scant attention. The discussion is organized around key institutions and topics, especially those involving personnel recruitment and management. In a concluding chapter Mr. Barnett advances generalizations and hypotheses on bureaucracy and politics in China. Ninety-odd pages of glossary are required for Chinese characters which would appear more conveniently beneath the text.

Although structured around institutional forms, the work is sustained throughout by concern for the political functions performed by party and government mechanisms. It is not, of course, rich in the informal politics and internal disputes which doubtless concern leadership; the informants knew structure, personnel, formal responsibilities and customary practices, but more intimate details of political life were presumably not known. Descriptions of the public security apparatus and coercive techniques acknowledge both the bases of apparent stabilities and the sanctions in reserve. County and local economic concerns are approached through relevant institutions. The author has endeavored to place local events in the broader context of concurrent national movements, too, and to record something of the changes of local institutional rôles which preceded his informants' departures from China in 1962 and 1964.

Barnett elects to omit any discussion of the eight bureaus of Ministry M "which were responsible for conducting the bulk of the ministry's substantive work" (p. 95). He argues, first, that he could not do so and still preserve the anonymity of the ministry; and, second, that each was *sui generis* "rather than typical

of organizations found throughout the bureaucracy" (ibid.). At the other extreme are detailed small-scale accounts: a page devoted to the Forestry Bureau and the Meteorological Station in County X (pp. 283-284) and four pages given to county-supervised industries, one employing 36 workers (pp. 300-304). The People's Bank of China branch in County X, we are told, employed two bank policemen and a messenger in the manager's administrative section (p. 293). I prefer the detailed account and wonder what scenes were sadly left on the cutting-room floor. Other readers, concerned more with conventional centers of power, may find they are put off by these choices of scale.

Is this a handbook? There are moments in which one is reminded of Brunnert and Hagelstrom's *Present Day Political Organization of China*, first published in 1910. In fact Barnett's is a very different book. First, it is a set of case studies. Second, since it does not specify the cases, it is not a work of reference. Third, it is far more concerned with relations *within* and *among* institutions, especially spatial and control relations. Fourth, it is directed in part to the quality of life enjoyed by cadres in the bureaucracy. Fifth and most important, it responds to current questions about political and social life which—despite some startling parallels—are qualitatively different from those which exercised Brunnert and Hagelstrom.

As a citable source, the volume rests on the reputations of Mr. Barnett and Mr. Vogel. The argument for disguising the identity of the informants is clear enough. Had the informants not been promised anonymity, they would not have talked. But anonymity, as *l'affaire Le-Clair* recently demonstrated to *The New York Times*, is not guaranteed merely by hiding names. The threatened institution can put two and two together and, if essential facts are not falsified, stand a good chance of identifying the party who wants to live outside its rules and controls. Punitive action can be taken.

The journalist's imperative—that he protect his sources—is not the scholar's imperative—that the evidential basis of his work be open. But scholarship directed at social systems in change, although it handles data in a manner more systematic and more telling than that of journalism, may be deprived of key data if it does not follow the journalist's canon. We might conclude that a book which must be handled responsibly by the reader is better than none. Is it responsible, then, for a scholar to speculate on the identity of a deliberately disguised "case study"? Without pursuing the puzzle that far, it should be sufficient to note that only five ministries correspond to Bar-

nett's description of Ministry M and that County X is even more closely specified to the careful reader. It is tempting to wonder whether the elaborate masque only puzzles the readership and comforts the informants. A party official bent on uncovering an informant's identity would be little hindered by having to examine personnel records in two counties rather than one. Or is there a false scent? One trusts not.

The mystery of Ministry M should not obscure the main thrust of Barnett's conclusions. He judges the Chinese leadership "remarkably successful" in extending the outreach and impact of central decisions and central power (p. 428). He observes that the party has had some success in resisting the rise of parallel bureaucratic structures (p. 430) but has suffered a "seemingly irresistible growth of complex bureaucratic patterns of social stratification" even among party members (p. 433). Such patterns have been one target of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Barnett also notes the existence of bureaucratic politics focussing more on allocation of resources and methods of implementing policies than on more fundamental issues (p. 440). And he concludes that "the key issues concerning the political process in Communist China still relate more to the question of how the ruling elite attempts to implement Party-defined programs and impose its will on the population than to the question of how persons outside of the elite may try to exert some minor influence on public policy" (p. 441). The Cultural Revolution has turned our attention back upon the old questions of who constitute the elite and how programs are defined. But it has also highlighted the difficulties of the leadership in "imposing" or inducing acceptance of its will at all levels. The author's attention is well-placed.

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Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance.

By JON B. McLIN. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. xii, 251. \$8.50)

The Canadian Economy and Disarmament. By GIDEON ROSENBLUTH. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. Pp. x, 189. \$5.50.)

The politics of arms and armaments is a traditional concern of the student of public policy, but this concern is heightened today with the increasing amounts of public funds spent on modern defense establishments. The above titles provide a useful glimpse into the defense problems of a middle-ranking power, and one which has a unique position in world politics.

Canada's uniqueness derives from its geographical position and its close political ties with the United States, both of which drain the classic concern for national security from Canadian defense thinking. Instead, Canada's defense policy is primarily directed toward securing goals other than national security, such as the preservation of diplomatic influence or the maintenance of multilateral alliances. McLin's book develops the thesis that Canada's postwar defense policy can be separated into three periods: 1946-56, 1957-63 and 1964 to the present. The first and third periods are characterized by widespread consensus on the objectives and instruments of Canadian defense policy. The middle years are viewed as a period of transition, during which the increasing costs of the defense establishment persuaded the government to accept a limited peacekeeping role in lieu of maintaining its relatively strong postwar position within the Atlantic alliance. This middle period was marked by confusion and controversy which ended with the fall of the Diefenbaker government on February 5, 1963.

In general McLin provides a compendium of detail on the defense questions of 1957 to 1963, which is complete down to the tactical roles of various items of military hardware. For the defense specialist this detail is desirable. What is unfortunate for the generalist is that the author does not satisfactorily analyze these questions within the broader context of Canadian politics. There is almost no consideration given to the role of public opinion or interest group politics in defense decision-making, and the interplay between the parties is inadequately developed. McLin has written about a controversial topic in a turbulent period of Canadian politics, but in failing to analyze important factors in the policy process his book fails to capture the spirit of the controversy.

For the specialist and generalist alike the book includes a useful discussion of the extent to which Canadian defense decisions and weapons procurement can be dependent on very minor alterations in U.S. policy. This discussion is of interest to students of alliance politics, for it points out the political liabilities for nations which become linked in a "special relationship" with the United States with respect to defense and security matters.

Rosenbluth's *The Canadian Economy and Disarmament* is a study of defense problems and policy written from the perspective of the economist rather than the political analyst. Essentially a replication of studies done of other national economies, this book attempts to project the likely effects of disarmament on the

Canadian economy, and to suggest alternatives which will make the adjustment process palatable both economically and socially. Special concern is given to the structure of Canadian defense expenditure and to the effects on research and development which occur with reductions in defense expenditure.

From the perspective of the political scientist concerned with public policy, this book presents important data about the relationship between the defense establishment and society. Rosenbluth uses input-output analysis to show which elements in society are primarily reliant on defense production, as well as those which are linked secondarily through the production process. One could easily posit hypotheses from these data as to the location and intensity of future political opposition to cutbacks in defense spending, let alone to complete disarmament. Also revealed in Rosenbluth's statistics are the close economic ties between Canada and the United States with respect to weapons procurement. The existence of these ties is likely to make collaboration with the United States a prerequisite for major Canadian defense decisions, if such decisions are to be implemented with a minimum of international and domestic friction.

For students of the Canadian economy the book commands a more general attention than the title indicates. The economic adjustments from disarmament are similar to adjustments caused by more normal circumstances such as automation or trade liberalization, and thus the author's findings are applicable to situations other than a disarming economy. For example Rosenbluth includes a brief discussion of factor mobility and presents a convincing argument that the demand for labor should be geographically mobile as well as labor itself. The author also suggests policies for bringing about adjustments to demand changes, which at the same time would maintain the growth in aggregate demand that is essential in making these adjustments possible.

As an analysis of public policy, Rosenbluth's work presents a challenging approach to political scientists. Economists are perhaps more willing than political scientists to make use of less than realistic assumptions in the course of theory-building and analysis, particularly if such assumptions promote useful investigation. Rosenbluth's assumption of disarmament is clearly unrealistic but he escapes the charge of being academic because of the practical "contingency plan" aura the book projects. Possibly political analysis could become more versatile if political scientists were more willing

to follow similar research techniques. For example, a politically-oriented study of the effects of disarmament might reveal strengths and weaknesses of various occupational groups in the society, which would undoubtedly affect the pattern of economic adjustments to disarmament policies. Such a study would be a useful complement to Rosenbluth's analysis. In the long run, economic criteria are not the most important considerations in building armies and defense industries, and it is unlikely that they would be the major considerations governing the dissolution of defense establishments.

In his conclusion McLin has referred to the desire of Canadian leaders to achieve some measure of distinctiveness in Canadian defense policy. Fact is, Rosenbluth's book points to what could be the most distinctive contribution of all. The likelihood of Canada's disarming is indeed remote, but what can be said is that Canada, more than any other Western nation, is in a position to seriously consider this step.

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Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations, BY ROBERT M. SPAULDING, JR. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. xiv, 416. \$10.00.)

For all the wonders of Japan's hundred-year "leap forward" in economic strength, no one would deny that political modernization has had a large part in the "miracle" of post-feudal Japan. Much attention has been paid to the changing nature of the top political leadership, but relatively little to the operations of government at the levels below the top. In some ways, the Japanese success in maintaining an efficient and unbroken flow of governmental services, such as tax collection, police protection, and the operation of courts, despite the tremendous disruptions of the shift from feudalism and isolation during the past century, is even more impressive than the mixed quality of top political leadership during this period. Certainly the development of an extremely strong and modernized civil bureaucracy has been an outstanding achievement and gives Japan today one of the most important foundation stones on which its spectacular economic success has been firmly based.

Professor Spaulding has contributed greatly to our understanding of this whole aspect of modern Japanese government by his meticulous study of the development of the examination system for higher civil service posts be-

tween 1884 and 1943. A major merit of his work is that he does not shy away from the complexities of the subject. Past treatments have tended to be great oversimplifications, merging original intentions, early beginnings, and ultimate outcomes into a vague whole. Professor Spaulding shows how complicated, diverse, and sometimes contradictory the system actually was, as is the case with all complex institutions developed over time in response to specific needs.

While this is the greatest merit of this book, it also might be called its greatest weakness, because the less knowledgeable reader can become easily lost in the mass of detail. The author, however, works manfully to avoid this danger by putting his materials whenever possible into excellent tabular form. There are no less than 12 diagrammatic figures, 61 statistical tables, and 10 appendices, all of which will help make this book an indispensable starting point and reference aid for anyone studying this aspect of Japanese government and history.

Professor Spaulding shows clearly that the nineteenth century Japanese, although they were familiar with the concept of civil service examinations from their borrowing of Chinese government institutions more than a millennium earlier and although they used German models for their new system, actually developed it in response to specific needs. They started off with the creation of special schools to produce the type of higher government servants they required. In the military field, as in other countries, this became the major source or recruitment, and the Tokyo Imperial University and subsequent Imperial Universities were designed primarily to produce top civil administrators for government. The adoption of the first examination system in 1884 was only a temporary measure to expand the judiciary in preparation for the elimination of extra-territoriality. The expanded system of 1887 was merely designed to supplement the inadequate flow of Tokyo University graduates into administrative posts, and, after six years of little use, it took on importance only in 1893 when it became evident that Tokyo graduates alone outnumbered the number of openings and thus would have to be subjected to examinations along with other applicants. Finally from 1918 to 1923 the system was standardized into the tripartite diplomatic, general administrative, and judicial system that has become familiar to students of modern Japan and has now for several decades produced not only the great bulk of Japanese governmental leader-

ship below the top decision-making posts, but also a surprisingly large number of the top decision makers as well.

Professor Spaulding has done such an excellent job of sorting out an extremely tangled body of material that it is unfair to blame him for not having taken on other even more difficult tasks. But one would hope that in further studies he would try to evaluate the results of the examination system more deeply. He does deal at great length with the long wrangles in Japan over discrimination against the students of private law schools (as opposed to the national ones), the narrow legalistic training of all candidates for the examinations, and the balance between the examination route to government office and the "free appointment" system for the top political leaders and the "screening" system for teachers in government schools and other "technical personnel" below the high administrative posts. One would wish, however, that some day he would try to evaluate more fully the examination system in terms of its recruitment of real talent from a broad spectrum of Japanese society and the efficiency of its products in government service. On both scores it probably rates high, but at present such an estimate is little more than a guess.

Professor Spaulding does show, through very conclusive statistics, how the products of the civil service examination system did take over the great bulk of high administrative posts from vice-ministers down to bureau and section chiefs. He also points out how the Japanese dropped the prolonged, unsalaried training period for the successful examination candidate which was an important part of the German system but constituted a serious economic barrier to high government posts for the less wealthy. He also argues that the Japanese examination system was really just the capstone of a pyramidal system of scholastic examinations, which was broadly open to all Japanese. He gives a few statistics to show the broadening scope of this system, such as the drop of the percentage of upper class (*shizoku* origin) law school students at Tokyo University from 82 per cent in the late 1880's to 50 per cent in 1895. He does not try, however, to develop these themes in detail or to evaluate the ultimate performance in government of the products of the examination system. These comments are not criticisms of an excellent book which opens up a whole new subject for serious study. They are merely offered as encouragement for more.

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Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics.

BY FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967. Pp. x, 356. \$6.50.)

The title of this collection of F. A. Hayek's latest writings is apt: it consists of essays or studies and they are about philosophy, politics, and economics. Some twenty-five essays, about equally divided among these three areas, testify to the extraordinary range of Professor Hayek's concerns, his vast erudition, and skill at conveying his messages. It would be a very rare political scientist who could not find at least one of these essays interesting and relevant to his own interests. Conversely, it would require a rather strange political scientist who would find all or even many of the studies germane to his own concerns. This reviewer is no exception as the remainder of the review will make clear. I should add that some of Hayek's points, especially in the philosophy section were not particularly meaningful to me so I intend to avoid discussion of them. Others, more learned in matters philosophic, will have to provide their own guidance among these eight chapters on such diverse topics as "explanation," "kinds of rationalism," and the "legal and political philosophy of David Hume."

While several of the essays in this volume are published for the first time relatively little is said that would disconfirm Hayek's observation that most of our basic ideas are formed early in life and only painfully revised in subsequent years. Hayek's philosophical commitments have been known for a long time because he has taken extreme and often unpopular but always articulate positions on science, political life and economic policies. These essays only restate those basic views in different contexts and on different occasions. This is not to say that Hayek has not learned; he has as he generously admits that Karl Popper taught him how to modify his views on "scientism." Hayek no longer views the physical and social sciences as quite so distinct because he has learned to observe what each does rather than what each claims it is doing. Attention to the processes of scientific inquiry suggest a much smaller gap than does comparison of the outputs, especially as they are ideally stated. Still, social scientists are well advised not to imitate their more esteemed colleagues in the physical sciences. This seems like eminently sound advice for political scientists and particularly so now that the battle over behavioralism is over and political behavioralists feel sufficiently secure that they need not continue arguing methodology from a defensive posture.

Professor Hayek's political and economic values have remained more constant and have undoubtedly been anathema to the liberal establishment of American social science. Perhaps they should have been so, but times do change and as "new" issues arise and experience accumulates we may find it necessary to review our own values and perhaps even admit to finding the highly individualistic philosophy of a Hayek somewhat more informed and relevant than previously was the case. The growth of central planning and our widespread experience with some of the less admirable consequences of bureaucracy and controls, etc. of the past three or four decades serves to remind us of Hayek's basic insights into social, political, and economic organization. While the intellectual and polemical debates over "planning" versus "laissez faire" have waned greatly the search for appropriate and optimal practical solutions to make political and economic choices continues in the real world of daily affairs. We now have had several decades of hard experience with various and diverse forms of public planning under a variety of conditions to compare with many more decades of private planning. The character of the current debate and the search is, therefore, quite different from earlier days when Hayek and his colleagues were first attempting to understand and predict the behavior of collectivist institutions for making social choices. The polemics of an earlier day provide little solid advice on operating various institutions especially in newly-developing nations although they may have served to educate socialists somewhat and perhaps even delayed the onrush of socialism. In any case, while some of Hayek's most dire predictions about socialism inevitably leading to totalitarianism have yet to be realized, if they ever will, many of his less dire assertions have been amply realized. Thus, Hayek had warned us on the shortcomings of complete planning and particularly of public bureaucracy. Ironically, many present-day radicals make similar observations and complaints about contemporary society. The quest for greater individualism and free choice, in all walks of life, through greater decentralization of power appears a major theme not only in Hayek's writings but those of today's self-proclaimed radicals. Few radicals demand socialism anymore even if their heroes may be Mao, Castro, or Ho. Several socialist countries are experimenting on a vast scale with decentralized decision-making through the use of markets and a more freely operating price mechanism as well as adapting some typical capitalist inducements or motivations to

achieve more efficient production and distribution. Perhaps, Hayek was right in dedicating *The Road to Serfdom* "To the Socialists of All Parties."

One of the more interesting chapters in Hayek's collection concerns *The Road to Serfdom* and its reception in Britain and the United States. Written some twelve years after the original publication date (1944) this essay constitutes an instructive chapter in the sociology of ideas. Hayek claims that the book received a most serious reception in Britain but a somewhat hysterical one in the United States. The author suggests that Europeans having had experience with socialism were open to his analysis but that many influential Americans were naive idealists with glittering hopes for public planning. One might add that those Americans who welcomed Hayek's book were not exactly playing it "cool" themselves. In any event, planning today assumes countless institutional forms and what is most needed is not further polemics but hard-headed analyses of the functioning and consequences of specific choice processes in all their great variability and social settings. Such inquiries are no longer likely to sound like *The Road to Serfdom*. More likely they will resemble the far more descriptive and dispassionate analyses of a Bergson, Nove, Stolper, Montias, or Hackett.

Although the positions taken by Professor Hayek on science, socialism, and economic policies have not been notably popular among academics his stature as a scholar is unassailable; he is a remarkable man. Oscar Lange, if I am not mistaken, is reputed to have said that a statue of von Mises ought to be erected in Moscow or Warsaw for his contribution to the socialist understanding of the economic problem of allocation. I would add Hayek not only for his technical contributions but his pleas for human liberty. He has served mankind well. As this volume amply conveys his high esteem for economic liberty and political freedom so too it reinforces his stature as a concerned philosopher.

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International Political Communication. By W. PHILLIPS DAVISON. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965, Pp. xii, 404. \$7.50.)

"Librarians faced with the necessity of classifying a book with 'Communication' in its title," the author wryly observes, "are tempted to hide it instead." Unlike any such bewildered librarian, Professor Davison insists on clarity and relevance, and he maintains both admi-

rably throughout his substantial, thoughtful and fact-filled book.

The author defines "communication" as "the whole process by which meaning is transferred" (his emphasis). The plural "communications," is then to "refer to the messages themselves." This process and these messages are then to be studied in the bulk of the book as "a tool of foreign policy."

The reader is to learn how they are used, and how they could be used more effectively, to advance national policy goals, and particularly the foreign policy goals of the United States.

For this task, a formidable array of professional experience and competence has been brought together. Professor Davison himself has had a rich experience in the practices, as well as in the study, of international communication, through his service with the United States government, the RAND Corporation, and a number of leading universities. In addition, this book has benefited from the work of a 1962-63 study group of the Council on Foreign Relations which included not only several leading educators and businessmen but also such specialists in journalism, communications research or international relations as Lester Market, Philip E. Mosely, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Leo Rosten, Hans Speier, Shepard Stone and Ralph K. White. Another dozen of specialists read parts of the manuscript, or contributed ideas which, says the author, were "incorporated without explicit citations."

The resulting book is, within the limits of its size and objectives, the most thorough, authoritative and up-to-date treatment of its subject than we have. Its large array of information is organized with sensitivity and good judgment. In order to know what one can do with communications, Mr. Davison insists, one must first know how and through what channels they are flowing, and what effects they are likely to have in the context of the existing memories and predispositions of the audiences which they reach. "People," he reminds us, "have an almost unlimited capacity to ignore information they find unwelcome or irrelevant."

Accordingly, the first part of the book deals with the international network of communication channels, the impact of communications on individuals and organizations, and the respective political roles of communication in democracies, Communist states, and developing nations. Only after drawing the attention of his readers so thoroughly to what is likely to happen in the world in any case—that is, to the autonomous probabilities and predispositions

of individuals and nations—does the author proceed in the second part of the book to discuss the deliberate use of communications to implement national policy. Here he first analyses the general structure of international communication programs, and then discusses in separate chapters "Communist International Communication" and the foreign information and cultural activities of the United States. The last two chapters of the book are then increasingly prescriptive: One deals with the problem of "focussing" or coordinating American Communication programs while the other examines the roles of the United States government in international communication, together with possible ways for making these more effective.

A book which covers such a broad field and summarizes so much knowledge and experience for the general reader, cannot avoid including a great deal of matters that will be quite familiar to specialists. Yet, even these familiar topics are treated with lucidity, and often with impressive humanity and wisdom. The policy recommendations range widely, from a call for a new form of area-wide reports on United States information activities (to supplement the present more narrowly segmented reports on an agency basis) to such shrewd and philosophic point as the observation that "the most important tool for explaining the United States to peoples from other countries is 'the big ear'"—a dramatic highlight for the author's persistent concern for keeping the flow of international communications free and keeping it a two-way process.

Here at the end, perhaps the book points beyond its own limits toward a task of communication research that is yet to be done. Messages are not only means to influence recipients and tools to promote policies which are supposed to be given. What we tell others also tends to be fed back into our own memories and to shape the premises of our own decisions tomorrow. Those who use communications to manipulate other people often end up having manipulated themselves, for today's manipulative message is often tomorrow's decision premise of the actor who first uttered it. Causation in the communication process moves not in straight lines but in feedback loops. The words "tool," "use," "effect," "impact," and the like, so frequent in Professor Davison's book, eventually will have to be supplemented by another set of words stressing the continuous process of orientation and reorientation, perception and misperception, goal pursuit and goal change, which are going on in each actor in world politics—whether it be a nation, a people, a government,

an interest group, or an individual statesman. It is one more indication of the merits of Mr. Davison's book that the momentum of its argument may well tend to move future research and policy analysis somewhat more in this direction.

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International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology. By BRUCE M. RUSSETT. (Chicago: Rand, McNally & Company, 1967. Pp. xvi, 252. \$8.50.)

In its opening pages, this book holds out promise of being a very model of proper modern scholarship in the social sciences. For one thing, Professor Russett promises to deal with important topics: "relations between political systems and their social and physical environment," "the formation and decomposition of coalitions among nations," and "the conditions of peaceful change in the [international] system." (vii) Furthermore, the work is based on a formidable array of data, much of which were collected for the same nations over time. And the author demonstrates, as he has in previous work, a clear mastery of many complex and varied tools of the social sciences. In light of these favorable portents, it is most surprising to find that the book itself is, in two respects, a remarkably narrow work. For almost the entire study rests upon but one theoretical proposition, and the bulk of the analysis is performed with but a single statistical technique.

The dominant proposition—actually of such broad import that it might be termed a paradigm—is that reliance upon social and economic variables is the way to explain political phenomena. At the beginning of his book, Russett alludes to economic and social "determinants" of politics. (vii) In an intriguing compound sentence he goes on to state that "International relations is truly an interdisciplinary study, and any attempt to explain its political aspects must depend heavily on social and economic variables." (viii) Few would challenge the first part of that sentence, but the second part is a good deal more questionable. Certainly some environmental variables will be part of any sound theoretical study of politics. But how many, and which ones? And what is the relative potency of the environment and such political variables as the structure of political relations, the nature of coalitions, the dynamics of political-decision-making, and the like? In what ways does political action alter the environment? In the presentation of his research, Russett clearly judges these questions

to be of secondary importance. By far the greater part of the text is devoted to categorizing nations on the basis of religion, culture, urbanization, gross national product, trade, and other social and economic characteristics. Political behavior is assumed to flow more or less directly from this non-political milieu. Such an assumption holds up rather well for some after-the-fact predictions. Both Albania and Mainland China, for example, do not cluster well with the other communist states on the basis of ecological factors. But the assumption may be cast in some doubt by the recent behavior of two other communist mavericks, Romania and Czechoslovakia, which Russett claims are unambiguous members of the "core group" of communist states. (171)

Heavy reliance upon factor analysis is, in a sense, the methodological counterpart of Russett's basic ecological paradigm. Factor analysis, in Russett's hands (or rather computer), is an extension of correlational techniques for the purpose of grouping ecological variables into a smaller number of general factors. But the theoretical-contributions of factor analysis can be only as great as the theoretical importance of the variables which are analyzed. Briefly, the dilemma of the factor analyst-theoretician is this: he must begin with some good theory before he can generate more theory from factor analysis. Russett proceeds as if his ecological perspective does in fact provide such theory. But until that theory is confirmed, a work, such as *International Regions*, which relies heavily on factor analysis, must be considered essentially a pre-theoretical sorting out of possibly interesting and relevant theoretical variables.

Problems associated with Russett's single theoretical perspective and single statistical technique are quite clearly illustrated in his treatment of U. N. roll-call votes. Consistent with his attraction to the ecological paradigm, Russett studies voting, a political act, in order to measure attitudes, a non-political ecological phenomenon. Despite the obvious conceptual difficulties involved, he says this is necessary simply because elite and mass attitudes are so hard to get at directly. But it does not follow from this why one should decide to pick out U. N. roll-call votes as the means for studying attitudes. This is especially so since votes would seem better measures of other interesting phenomena, such as international concordance and conflict, and the public stances of governments on the issues considered in the General Assembly.

Another difficulty with the analysis of voting is the technique used by Russett to render

U. N. roll-calls susceptible to factor analysis. Since nations regularly select one of three voting options, Russett has found it necessary to assign an arbitrary number to each of these positions. The numbers he has selected are 0 for a "No" vote, 1 for an "Abstain," and 2 for a "Yes" vote. These numbers are then correlated and factor analyzed. For Russett's 0, 1, 2 coding to be valid, the three voting positions must comprise a single dimension in such a way that "Abstain" is a moderate position, spaced equidistantly between "Yes" and "No." Contrary to this requirement, we know that some nations, as a matter of fact, abstain because they feel that a given resolution does not go far enough; others abstain because they feel even considering the resolution is improper. From what we do know about the reasons for voting, we can say that some countries, for a variety of reasons, adopt a common and distinct voting position of "Abstain," just as others, for a variety of reasons adopt, the common and distinct positions of "Yes" and "No." Voting positions are, in other words, nominal categories. They are not ordinal, and they are certainly not interval, as Russett's coding makes them out to be. And finally, his coding scheme results in treating any pair of agreeing votes the same, irrespective of whether the agreement appears as part of a large majority, or as part of a tiny minority. It has been plausibly argued that votes are especially important for political analysis when they are very closely divided; from this point of view we might wish to know how the agreement patterns differ as votes approach a nearly even division. Alternatively, it is interesting to note which states remain "foul-weather friends" and vote together even when they are opposed by a large majority. But these are concerns of one who views voting as a political phenomenon, rather than, as Russett, the registering of psychological predispositions. Russett's only acknowledgement of variations in vote distributions is his exclusion of those roll-calls in which 90% or more of the members cast the same votes since distributions of this sort cause serious distortion in correlation coefficients.

But however much one chooses to agree or disagree with Russett's arguments, it must be admitted that a brief review cannot do full justice to a book which tackles so many important questions and analyzes such massive amounts of data. At the very least, one should not be surprised if this book, as the author himself suggests, "stimulates work which makes it obsolete." (viii)

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Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. By MALCOLM H. KERR. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966. Pp. vii, 249. \$6.95.)

Modern Islamic reformism has been generated partly from within but mainly as a response to the Western assault, in both its intellectual and political dimensions, against the Muslim world. Modernism was born when Muslims for the first time asked the question: "why have the Europeans made so much progress while the peoples of the East remain backward?" "What is the secret behind the progress of the West and the cause for the backwardness of the East?" The impulse behind these and similar questions was the fear that the political ascendancy of the West, with its intellectual advances and pervasive influences of material civilization, would gradually erode the traditional bases for faith in God and menace Islamic existence.

In response to this challenge, three broad groups of reformists have evolved in modern Islam. (1) The revivalists, a strongly conservative group, advocate return to the purity and literalism of the *Shari'a* (Islamic Divine Law) as a means of strengthening Islam and uniting the Muslims. (2) The secularists, a Western-educated group, call for the separation of church and state and for the adoption of Western science and civilization. (3) The modernists who maintain that Islam is not opposed to progress, rather it is compatible with it, and consequently a reformulation of Islamic doctrines in terms of modern thought is not only possible but desirable. Their concern is essentially how to relate the past to the present and the future in a positive and meaningful way—how to become modern and remain Muslim at the same time. The dominant figure in this group is Muhammad Abduh, an Egyptian theologian of impressive intellectual ability, whose political and legal theories and those of his disciple, Muhammad Rashid Rida, an Egyptian of Syrian origin, are the subject of the volume under review.

Islamic Reform, by Dr. Malcolm H. Kerr, Chairman of the Political Science Department at the University of California at Los Angeles, is purported to be a study of the political and legal theories of the two Egyptian reformers. Yet, the author devotes half of the book to an exposition of the classical Islamic theories of the Caliphate (Islamic State) and canonical jurisprudence (*fiqh*). His justification seems to be that such an extensive analysis is important or necessary because "many modern reformists such as Rashid Rida, under the influence of

Muhammad Abduh, proclaimed it their objective to make these doctrines to serve as . . . a basis" for determining the processes of politics in the modern age. (p. 12) In view of the fact that classical Islamic theories have been adequately expounded by Gibb, Gardet, Khadduri, Laoust and Tyan, to whom the author readily acknowledges his debt, the need for such a lengthy 'introduction' becomes questionable. However, he does examine these doctrines with a fresh emphasis and the negative purpose "to show that they were not suitable as a basis for determining, with any precision at least, the processes or substance of medieval Muslim politics."

Analysis of 'classical Islamic theories on their formal level reveals that traditional jurisprudence, like the traditional doctrine of the Caliphate, "was closely tied to its theological foundations." This umbilical relationship between theology on the one hand and constitutional theory and jurisprudence on the other, hastened, in the judgment of the author, the obsolescence of the theory of the Caliphate and restricted the positive evolution of Islamic Law. Even *ijma'* (consensus of the community) *ijtihad* (personal opinion) and *istislah* (public interest), these promising and dynamic legal sources were also prevented by Muslim jurists from becoming wide-open doors for innovations and adaptations. *Istislah*, which Dr. Kerr regards as a principle of tremendous potential for positive reform, was subordinated by the jurists to Koranic considerations and restricted as an independent source of the Law. Only a fourteenth century radical champion of *istislah*, Najm ad-Din Taufi, asserted that every public interest is a necessity and must therefore take precedence over everything else, including the religious texts (p. 97). As Dr. Kerr later indicates, even the modern reformers have hesitated to go that far.

After outlining "some of the fundamental elements in the idealist tradition of Muslim legal and constitutional theory, and having tried to show that these elements were outgrowths of a conservative theology," the author then turns his attention to consider how this tradition was reformulated in late 19th and early 20th centuries by Abduh and Rida. Although Abduh is the most important figure, less space is devoted to him than to his disciple, simply because so much has been already said about him that the author admits he can add nothing more.

Abduh's dominant position in Islamic modernism derives from the fact that he is the first Muslim thinker to attempt a separation of religious issues from the political conflict of the

time, so that, in Gibb's words, "they were no longer interdependent and each was set free to develop along its own appropriate lines." He knew that Islam's fate in the face of modern secularism depended on its revitalization as a system of beliefs rather than a political order. Consequently, the two most important components of his program were: (1) the reformulation of Islamic doctrine in the light of modern thought, and (2) the reformation of Muslim higher education. Yet, according to Dr. Kerr, Abduh's reformist theology was not "thoroughly naturalist as it purported to be," and since Rida's legal and constitutional doctrines were based on this theology, they were bound to fail. "The shakiness of this basis," says our author, "underlay the incoherence of Rida's ideology, and thus appears to have contributed something to its failure as a political program." (p. 103)

The central point in Abduh's reformist theology is the assertion that the theory of natural law (and for that matter, the law of causality) is identical with the theory of divine voluntarism in the orthodox Ash'arite theology which dominated the Muslim mind since the beginning of the 10th century. His difficulty stems from the fact that a thoroughgoing naturalism would completely negate the cardinal Islamic dogma that God's constant intervention sustains this world. Less than that would not satisfy modern scientific thought. Rida accepted Abduh's reformist theology by insisting on the naturalism of Islamic legal and constitutional doctrines, "without consistently interpreting their processes in the ways that naturalism would demand." (p. 106) Rida was fighting a losing battle. When he wrote his treatise on the

Caliphate in 1922, the Turkish Grand National Assembly had stripped the Ottoman Caliphate of all its temporal powers (in 1924 it was completely abolished by Mustafa Kemal). This must have conditioned his decision to revive the classical constitutional and legal doctrines and base them on Abduh's shaky naturalism. He was bound to end up in fundamentalism, and Dr. Kerr's final epitaph that Rida's "intellectual career symbolizes in some ways the political failure of the whole Islamic modernist movement," is well deserved.

But in the final analysis, how does one judge the success or failure of an intellectual career? Is Plato a failure simply because his ideal regime is unrealizable? True to the Islamic ideal with its postulate that temporal life must have spiritual significance, Abduh and Rida dreamed of a reformation whereby the true spirit of Islam would infuse public life in all of its aspects thus leading to a revitalization of the Muslim nation with a culture and a way of life that is genuinely its own. Pragmatically, they have not been successful; but no serious person would ridicule their spiritual concern!

Dr. Kerr's training in modern political science and his intimate knowledge of the Middle East qualify him to address himself to the subject of Islamic modernism. His book is a welcome addition to a new kind of political literature on Islam and the Middle East. There are a few typographical errors that could have been avoided. Strangely enough, they abound in the text more than in the English transliterations of the Arabic.

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NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

The Nature of Political Inquiry. By FRED M. FRO-
НОК. (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press,
1967. Pp. vii, 218. \$5.00.)

The purpose of this book is to provide "a quick, wide scan of some landscape too often overlooked in contemporary political science, with a particular emphasis on values in political investigation." The landscape surveyed includes the epistemological premises of logical positivism and metaphysics; the nature of functional and causal explanations; the characteristics of scientific social analysis; the role of values in political behavior and political

analysis. The terrain is wide and in places treacherous. But there are tried and trustworthy guides—Brecht, Hempel, Kuhn, Mannheim, Merton, Nagel, Polanyi, Strauss, Familiar landmarks soon come into view: the scientific enterprise rests on epistemological premises which cannot themselves be validated through scientific method; value-statements cannot ultimately be verified through scientific method, yet values are an aspect of all social behavior including political behavior; scientific method presumes the value of objective neutrality, yet at any given time most scientific anal-

ysis is directed by a dominant paradigm which is defended by partisan adherents; although scientific knowledge is explicit and publicly accessible, the actual process of scientific inquiry involves tacit and intuitive elements which defy scientific analysis; total exclusion of value premises from political inquiry is impossible, but within the domain of empirical political phenomena, including the processes by which values are formed and applied, scientific method yields valid findings. Many other points are touched upon in Frohock's survey, but these are among the central tenets of the argument.

How should the argument be described? For want of a more elegant term I would call it sensible positivism; it is positivism shorn of its claim to a monopoly of truth, shorn of its epistemological arrogance. But if logical positivism is arrogant, it is also philosophically coherent; sensible positivism is appealingly modest—but is it a coherent doctrine? On the evidence of this book the answer must be a reluctant no. The answer is reluctant because sensible positivism is surely the prevailing epistemological faith among political analysts who share an empirical orientation. Although one may quarrel with some of Frohock's specific interpretations, his basic conclusions are widely accepted by the community of practicing political scientists. Yet these conclusions do not comprise a distinctive solution to basic epistemological problems.

An explicit purpose of Frohock's survey is to show how concern with fundamental problems in the philosophy of science can guide the selection and formulation of subjects for empirical research. We must ask, then, what redirection of effort is required if we take seriously the tenets of sensible positivism. Apparently, not much. For Frohock, the very model of a modern sensible positivist seems to be David Easton. Easton's strictures in *The Political System* on the connection between empirical theory and normative premises are quoted approvingly, and his work on the political socialization of children is cited as distinctly appropriate for enlightened research. Other subjects are also recommended—including the effects of political symbols and the impact of irrational forces on political behavior. Actually, however, I cannot see that any major current strand of empirical research falls outside the pale by the suggested standards. Studies of community formation, decision-making and the policy process, political participation and compliance—these are as much concerned with values and the place of values in political behavior as studies of political socialization.

Nor am I entirely convinced—and this is more serious—of the implications Frohock draws concerning the additional kinds of empirical research that should be included on our agenda. He calls

for greater attention to work by psychologists on early learning experiences and by ethologists on the biological bases of human behavior, which has perhaps not had sufficient impact in political analysis. This is fair enough. But two comments seem in order. First, why must we traverse such arduous terrain in order to decide that the origins of political cognition and the process of political socialization are appropriate subjects for further study? And second, why does our philosophic sojourn necessarily lead us to place greater emphasis on political psychology and less emphasis, say, on political economy? Frohock is familiar with recent efforts to apply economic analysis to the study of politics. But aside from some interesting comments on the concept of rationality he does not examine the claims of this important school of analysis. Yet his philosophic arguments hardly disqualify economic types of analysis as a useful approach to political phenomena. Frohock defines politics as prescriptive behavior that is "public, comprehensive, categorical, and/or legitimate." He gives no reason why such behavior cannot be studied within the framework of economic models. In other words, a major alternative type of analysis, neglected by Frohock, is also consistent with sensible positivism. It is thus difficult to accept as decisive the recommendations said to derive from his philosophic inquiry.—EDWIN FOGELMAN, *University of Minnesota*.

Marxism: A Re-Examination. By IRVING M. ZEITLIN. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand and Co., 1967. Pp. v, 170. \$1.95.)

Sidney Hook once wrote that conflicting doctrinal interpretations of Marx "were ways of making history, innocently paraded as methods of reading it." This astute observation has wide and continuing application but a special poignancy in the attempt of some East European scholars to emphasize the humanist foundations of Marxist thought in order to build a more just socialist society and preclude the revival of Stalinism. This attempt has gained force from the rediscovery of Karl Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, written by him in 1844, when he was 26 years of age, and first published in 1932, which form the point of departure for Professor Zeitlin's reevaluation of Marx.

In these early writings, Professor Zeitlin points out, Marx was deeply concerned with "alienation" which, under the capitalist mode of production, did not develop the worker's mental or physical energies, left him unfulfilled, and with a feeling of misery rather than well-being. "Communism" which will abolish private property and human self-alienation, wrote Marx, "is humanism." While, says Professor Zeitlin, Marx later abandoned the term "alienation" in favor of more precise, scien-

tific and politically effective terms, such as "exploitation" and "commodity-fetishism," he insists that Marx "was moved in *all* his work by humanistic values." (Author's emphasis.)

Many Western scholars, of whom Daniel Bell is typical, have argued that it is "myth-making" to read the conception of alienation back as the central theme of Marx because the historical Marx moved from concern with the individual worker's incapacity to express himself in his work to the doctrine of surplus value, seen as exploitation of the workers *en masse* so that for Marx "the only social reality is not Man, nor the individual but economic classes."

The curious thing to me is that although these positions, tenaciously held and seriously debated, seem irreconcilable, the conflict is more apparent than real, more Talmudic than substantive. It is true that Marx, to distinguish himself from the utopian socialists with their appeals to humanity, reason and justice, insisted that conceptions of justice derived from the existing economic order, that it was not a question of what the proletariat *ought* to do but what, in view of its being, it will be compelled to do as "capitalist production creates with the necessity of a natural process the negation of itself." Accordingly, he sought to eliminate from manifestoes and programs all references to abstract justice and rights of man as "ideological nonsense" which would only encourage hypocrisy and confusion of thought.

On the other hand, it is impossible to read Marx's writing, early and late, without being impressed with his passionate indignation as the cruelties and barbarities inflicted by capitalism in his day on men individually and collectively and his implicit and explicit affirmations that only under communism would men be truly human, free, and equal. Thus, for example, in *Das Kapital* he wrote that capitalist manufacture "converts the labourer into a crippled monstrosity" by reducing his work to detailed manipulation just as in certain places "they butcher a whole beast for the sake of his hide or his tallow." He set forth a searing condemnation of the labor of children of nine or ten years "dragged from their squalid beds at two, three, or four o'clock in the morning and compelled to work for a bare subsistence until ten, eleven, or twelve at night, their limbs wearing away, their frames dwindling, their faces whitening, and their humanity absolutely sinking into a stonelike torpor, utterly horrible to contemplate." As for communism, in his *Critique of the Gotha Program* in 1875, Marx specifically envisioned that it would come with "the all-around development of the individual" and end "the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labor." How, in fact, can it truly be maintained that communism, conceived of as a stateless, classless soci-

ety, built upon voluntary cooperation and complete freedom, and proclaiming the principle of equality, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs," (however utopian) is bereft of humanist concern with the individual? I believe, then, that Professor Zeitlin is essentially right when he maintains that Marx did not abandon the concept of alienation but "sharpened and concretized it as an objective process in the world of work."

What I find far less convincing is Professor Zeitlin's attempt, on the bases of Marx's analyses of events of his time and journalistic writings, to reformulate and denigrate Marx's economic determinism. While it is true that in these writings, Marx did not, as Zeitlin says, automatically assume that political events were always effects of economic causes, and attempted to treat such relationships empirically, there is no evidence to suggest that he considered conflicting data anything other than aberrant or transient conditions which did not undermine or make it necessary for him to recast his general theoretical formulations. It is dubious, too, whether Marx—so passionately convinced of the validity of his theories—would have shared Professor Zeitlin's notion that "his conception of society, and the historical change it underwent, was to be regarded above all as a 'guide to study.'"

For the rest, Professor Zeitlin undertakes to analyze which of Marx's theories have stood the tests of time and experience and to erect on this basis a guide for the analysis of structure and change in whole societies. While I, for one, would quarrel (if space permitted) with some of his specific findings, I can only applaud his conclusions that "non-dogmatic Marxism will continue to provide insights into the workings of social systems, and enlighten social research generally." I think, however, it would be well to recognize that the continuing importance and appeal of Marx lie not in the soundness of his specific theories which in fundamentals, such as the materialist conception of history, the increasing misery of the proletariat, the nature and role of class struggle, have proved simplistic but because Marxism still raises certain challenging questions, including the comparative abilities of capitalist and socialist economies to maintain high rates of economic growth, create conditions for full and meaningful employment, eliminate poverty, and build free and equal societies.—SAMUEL HENDEL, *The City University of New York*.

Politics and Social Science. By W. J. M. MACKENZIE. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967. pp. 392, \$1.95.)

Politics and Social Science, by W. J. M. Mackenzie, is a book in which an effort is made to in-

interpret "political science to the social scientist, and social science to the student of politics." Mackenzie is a British political scientist and is writing for a predominantly British audience. The scope of the book, however, is sufficiently broad for political scientists on either side of the Atlantic. Indeed, the breadth of the book is, itself, one of its major problems, for it purports to present a "complete survey of the incredible diversity of modern political science."

The book is broken into five parts, each dealing with a major area of social or political science: traditional political science, political science in the universities, contemporary theory, politics "without states"; and a concluding part on "men and their states." In part one Mackenzie summarizes briefly political science as it has been in the past dealing primarily with the classic writers on politics. Part two introduces the reader to the history and role of political science in the university. This includes proper noting of the teaching and research roles of political scientists, and the impact of American political science on that of England and the world. This part also introduces the reader to behavioral science, although he (rightly I think) avoids the traditionalist/behavioralist controversy in the United States with the hope that "we can avoid this sort of nonsense in Britain."

Part three, which is the first of the two most significant sections of the book, deals with contemporary theory. Mackenzie summarizes the role of theory, especially of "over-arching" or "general" theory, in its traditional context, then moves to a discussion of Easton's "systems theory," and "Parsonian" theory. The "partial" theories of information, games, and welfare economics, are also summarized. Part four is an attempt to deal with empirical study in political and social science, centering on social biology, small groups, tribal societies, community power, organizations, and linguistic analysis.

Although the purpose of the book is admirable, its execution leaves a good bit to be desired. First, with respect to contemporary theory, important as Parsons and Easton are, they are not the only examples of efforts at formulating general theory. Moreover, even though there are distinct differences between Parsons and Easton—as Mackenzie correctly points out—they, along with theorists such as Almond, represent the same "school" in the philosophy of science, namely, functionalism. Thus, using Easton and Parson does not, it would seem, present the reader with very broad scope in contemporary efforts in theory building.

One gains a similar reaction from reading the chapter on "partial" theories. Important as information theory, games theory, and the theories of welfare economics are, they are somewhat less il-

lustrative of major trends in political science than are other empirically-related theory building efforts. On the positive side, however, Mackenzie does make a distinct effort in these chapters to relate the theories he discusses to the study of politics. In this sense he is partially fulfilling his purpose of instructing the discipline.

In part four, "politics without states," Mackenzie seeks to introduce the reader, and perhaps the discipline of political science, to what he considers to be important sources of political data. What results is a very uneven presentation of what seems to be a "hodge-podge" of data collection techniques and orientations. A prime example of the problem is his chapter on small groups, based largely on Verba's summary of the literature in *Small Groups and Political Behavior*. Inexplicably, the one area in political science which has attempted to make extensive use of small group concepts, (both in technique and theory)—studies of judicial behavior—is nearly ignored. Such pioneers in small group research, such as Moreno, Bales, and Borgatta, are given scant notice. Most importantly, however, Mackenzie does not specifically address himself to the question of *how* a political scientist can utilize small group theory and technique. I presume he assumes that it should be self-evident from his presentation. That such assumptions of self-evidence are risky was amply illustrated to this reviewer when, after reading a methodological discussion of small group research, another member of the discipline commented that "even if (small group methods) were more widely known (by political scientist), it is unlikely that there would be any interest in using them." The fact that, apart from the judicial behavior articles, only one work (Wayne L. Francis, 56, pp. 953-960), using "legitimate" (Moreno's sociometric choice tests) small group methods, has appeared in the pages of this journal since 1960, also illustrates the apparent inability of political scientists to apply small group techniques. Mackenzie quite rightly emphasizes the study of "communications," "leadership," "group norms," and the like, in small group study, but nowhere is this explicitly related to why these should be studied in small political groups. Moreover, some sections, such as the one on "research problems and methods," are so uneven that the points attempted are hardly made at all.

Finally, on the positive side, it should be said that there is room in the discipline, for such a book as Mackenzie's. Even though the integration of the social sciences has been slowly progressing, political science still tends to be somewhat parochial, although, as Mackenzie notes, this may be more true of American than of British political science. In any event, at least some political scientists do need instruction in what can be gained

from other disciplines in the social and behavioral sciences. As a last note, it should be said that the foregoing criticisms may themselves be indicative of the somewhat parochial character of American political science. As Mackenzie points out, the distinctions between political science on the one hand, and social anthropology, social psychology, and sociology, on the other, have not been as distinct in Britain as in the United States. Hence, for a British audience, some of the points he puts forth may be more self-evident than they are for an American audience.—THOMAS WM. MADRON, *Western Kentucky University*.

Political Theory and The Rights of Man. EDITED BY D. RAPHAEL. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967. Pp. viii, 151. \$5.75.)

This book is a symposium of ten essays which arose out of a section of the Sixth World Congress of the International Political Science Association held at Geneva in September of 1964. The subject chosen then for discussion was that of human rights, and the programme was divided into two parts: one on natural rights in Hobbes and Locke, and the other on modern conceptions of human rights as formulated in the Universal Declaration of 1948. Five of the essays included in the volume are revisions of papers presented at the Congress, the remaining five were written later, four of them specially for this collection and designed to carry further the original discussion by way of rebuttal and elaboration.

For the most part the collection reflects the original two-part symposium. The first three essays are by C. B. Macpherson, Raymond Polin, and J. W. Chapman, all discussions of the rights of man in Hobbes and Locke. Macpherson sums up his well-known views as presented in his book *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (1962) by way of asking the question whether the concepts of natural rights as found in Hobbes or Locke can be of any use in formulating a concept of human rights today. He believes that they cannot. An acceptable concept of natural rights must, Macpherson believes, meet two requirements: (a) it must provide a certain minimum equality, at least as an equal access to the means of convenient living, and (b) it must include rights of recipience as well as rights of action, that is, there must be an obligation to respect each man's rights. Hobbes's doctrine allows for equality but does not establish rights of recipience; Locke provides for rights of recipience but his natural rights are extremely unequal in consequence of his arguments for the right of unlimited accumulation. The reason both Hobbes and Locke fail to meet our present day requirements for a theory of rights lies, in Macpherson's view, in their postulate that there is a permanent conflict between

the interests of separate individuals. But this assumption of natural contentiousness reflects their implicit conception of bourgeois man in a developing capitalist society. Given their place in history, Hobbes and Locke could not have been expected to see things otherwise. From our standpoint, however, we can see that a society of abundance rather than an economy of scarcity is possible, and so the postulate of necessary conflict among men is increasingly wide of the mark. A concept of human rights satisfying the two requisites of an acceptable notion is gradually becoming more realistic and workable.

Polin gives a careful and reasoned discussion of Hobbes and Locke, but his concern is primarily expository. He does not join issue with Macpherson or examine the use of their doctrines for today, although he does remark that for Locke the doctrine of natural rights is identical with that of liberalism, and that to condemn Locke is perhaps to condemn liberalism and the view of human rights expressed by it. But Chapman in his essay questions Macpherson's interpretation of liberalism. Macpherson, he believes, confuses liberalism with utilitarianism, and therefore regards a liberal society as one that maximizes satisfactions at the expense of justice and freedom. Chapman argues to the contrary that Locke's contract doctrine gives priority to justice and freedom, and that he may be interpreted to hold that inequalities are justified only when everyone directly participating in or affected by them may be reasonably presumed to be advantaged. When Locke allows for what Macpherson calls unlimited accumulation he does so subject to the restriction that all must gain, and this shows that he does not countenance a utilitarian theory of justice. Locke does not permit that the gains for some may be so great that they outweigh corresponding losses to others. Chapman maintains that when Locke's doctrine is properly elaborated the principles of justice, the criteria of economic rationality, and the values of liberty may be seen to be theoretically consistent. This alternative conception of liberalism offers, in Chapman's opinion, a plausible basis for human rights at the present time; it is not a morally defective or incoherent doctrine. Macpherson has failed to distinguish between the utilitarian and the contractarian elements in the liberal tradition, and to note the continuing value of the latter.

All but two of the remaining essays in the volume constitute a debate between Maurice Cranston, D. D. Raphael, and Bernard Mayo on the question of the appropriate definition and formulation of human rights in the modern world. Cranston starts off the discussion by maintaining that the philosophically viable concept of human rights has been obscured and muddled by includ-

ing under its specific claims of another type. It is a mistake, he believes, to conflate social and economic rights, such as the right to old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, and medical services, with traditional human rights such as the right to life, liberty, and a fair trial. The philosophical objection to this is that the new theory of human rights is not coherent, and a confused concept of human rights mitigates against the establishment of what are truly human rights. The Universal Declaration of 1948 is faulty in this respect. Cranston proposes three tests for authentic rights: it should be practicable to secure them by legislation, they should be genuinely universal as moral rights, and they should be of paramount importance. The rights to life, liberty, and a fair trial meet these tests; infringing them is never permissible, since certain freedoms should never be violated. Cranston grants that the so-called economic and social rights may be moral rights of some men in certain societies. But this is a matter of extending democracy as social and economic conditions allow. It is not a question of universal rights, and the case for extension is to be argued on other grounds.

Raphael's first paper contains a valuable discussion of the concept of a right on the basis of which he agrees that there is a genuine difference between the rights of liberty on the one hand and political, economic, and social rights on the other. In one case a man has rights simply as a member of the human race, in the other as a member of a particular society. But he disagrees with Cranston in thinking that both sorts of rights may reasonably be included in an international declaration the main purpose of which is to encourage states to grant these rights to their own citizens.

Readers of this journal concerned with political theory will find these essays a useful discussion of the problem of human rights.—JOHN RAWLS, *Harvard University*.

A Theory of Political Integration. BY CLAUDE AKE. (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1967. Pp. ix, 164. \$5.00.)

Political integration is defined in terms of some of its measures: "A political system is integrated to the extent that the minimal units (individual political actors) develop in the course of political interaction, a pool of commonly accepted norms regarding political behavior and a commitment to the political behavior patterns legitimized by these norms." (P. 3) Seven indicators, each described as scores, are proposed: legitimacy, extra-constitutional behavior, political violence, secessionist demand, alignment pattern, bureaucratic ethos, and authority. How these seven scores are to be validly and reliably obtained across diverse political systems is left to others. Suggestions of

some phenomena to be examined in measuring political integration are offered, and in the cases of legitimacy and bureaucratic ethos, "attitude survey research" is recommended.

The problem of political integration is defined as "... one of developing a political culture and of inducing commitment to it." (P. 1) This problem is expanded in the second chapter largely in the context of engineering political integration in the new states.

Following are four chapters which scan some of the relevant and related literature in classical social theory (Marx, Weber, Durkheim, etc.) and contemporary writing on charismatic leadership (Wallerstein, Apter, Runciman and Horowitz), on elite-mass relationships (largely Shils) and on the role of unipartyism (the scholarly writings of Ashford, Coleman and Rosenberg, and the rhetoric of some single party leaders).

Ake then attempts to pull everything together in the last chapter in a section subtitled "A General Theory." The interaction between the major variables, the basic structure of the theory, is presented first. This theory can be restated: *political integration* is a function of a *mature political culture* which is a result of *the broadening and intensifying of 'social communications,'* which in turn is a function of *social mobilization*, defined as removing physical barriers between people and increasing the flow of good and services between different parts of the country. This is a statement of process, a causal net, apparently a set of linear relationships starting with social mobilization which can presumably be manipulated.

There remains an obvious difficulty with this formulation. Too much social mobilization too quickly can lead to political instability. The problem is to maintain a minimum of political stability while political integration develops. There is also the question of "societal change." "Societal change" is cast in structural-functional language. The links between "Political Integration, Societal Change and Political Stability" (the title of this chapter), are not clearly established; but perhaps all that was intended was to express that a theory of political integration must be a process theory.

All this is not new. Major questions remain, such as under what conditions can social mobilization and thus political integration take place without creating political instability? Ake focuses on only one set of conditions, the political leadership factor: "Our theory is that the political system undertaking social mobilization maximizes its capacity for carrying out the process and remaining stable despite the potentially disruptive short-run effects of social mobilization if it is authoritarian [the government is large, concentrated and easily mobilized and willing to use power], paternal [dominated by a political class willing and

able to lead], 'identific' [mutual identity between the political class and the governed], and consensual [the solidarity of the political class and no threatening counter-elite]. Ake states that if any one of these "either-or" characteristics of the leadership of a political system is lacking, and if there are no "functionally compensating factors," then the chances of political stability in the face of social mobilization are decreased.

This theory is then briefly tested against "historical experience," the highlights of five cases—the United States (the Federalists), the Soviet Union (Stalinist period), Yugoslavia (Tito), Cuba (Castro), and Nigeria.

Scientists can rely on either of two standards to discipline their verbal theorizing: structured data or formalized statement. This is a verbal statement of theory, drawn in large part from the literature on political integration. If the relationships between the variables were formalized, perhaps with differential or different equations, account could have been taken of the process of interaction between the variables over time and precise expression given to the points of interaction where political instability (dis-equilibrium or decay) would occur. If these relationships were scrutinized with systematic data, then measures, not suggestions of them, would have been provided and perhaps some of the conventional ideas on political integration would have been modified to bring together what is happening in the world with what political scientists are currently thinking.—HENRY TEUNE, *University of Pennsylvania*.

The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine.

By HERBERT A. DEANE. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. xix, 356. \$2.45.)

St. Augustine was not—as Professor Deane says—a "system builder," and not even primarily a theologian. He was an exhorter of and spokesman for the Western church. Thus, most of his writings were occasional pieces, sermons, and polemics rather than finished treatises. The great single works—such as *The City of God*, *Confessions*, and *On Freedom of the Will* are a small part of the whole corpus of his writing. For the student of political thought they offer, furthermore, not only a limited sampling of Augustine's thought, but an indirect route to his social and political ideas.

One announced purpose of this book is to bring together in a single volume most of the important passages in which Augustine discusses human nature, society, and the state. This purpose seems a useful one. And the passages—numerous and many of them quoted at length—help to complete and balance the perspective that students of political thought are likely to gain by reading, typically, parts of *The City of God* and commentaries upon Augustine. In particular, the wide range of

quotations provides a counterpart or complement to the mystical and other-earthly aspects of Augustine's thought by illustrating many of the subtleties and tensions in his thought as well as providing some glimpses of his practicality and shrewdness.

The author also discusses Augustine's views of social and political life. These views he characterizes as a "pessimistic realism" about man and society and a "profound awareness of the inevitable limitations of a coercive political order." In broad tendency, this interpretation of Augustine is a familiar one. Its elements are to be found, for example, in Marsiglio of Padua, in Martin Luther, and, recently, in the neo-orthodoxy of Reinhold Niebuhr (Cf., *Christian Realism and Political Problems*.) The author's contribution does not lie, then, in presenting a novel interpretation of Augustine. He attempts to "organize the material" and "elucidate the general point of view," that supports this particular interpretation. To the author's credit, he does not attempt to import more organization or system into Augustine's thought than he believes there to be. He does not get entrapped by the layers of glosses upon Augustine. And he does not attempt to read into Augustine the wisdom of other or more recent theologians.

The book is primarily intended, the author states, to fill a student need. Scholars and teachers will probably find little that is new to them. Chapter Five—"War and Relations Among States" is of contemporary interest, in this age of "power politics" and "Christian Realism." Chapter Six, "Church, State, and Heresy," is also valuable, showing the complexity of Augustinian doctrine on these subjects.

The author's treatment of Augustine raises a perplexing issue of who is best suited to interpret the political theory of a religious figure: the political scientist or the theologian. Professor Deane attempts an organized and substantially independent treatment of Augustine's political theory. While he goes at length into Augustine's theology, he also separated politics and theology, which is appropriate for him to do as a political scientist. At the same time, Augustine's "political theory" loses that quality of being suffused with theology and dominated by a theological perspective that it has when expounded by a theologian—for instance, Reinhold Niebuhr. Is the political theory, as a consequence, interpreted more faithfully, or less so? In fairness, it seems an open question. Fr. Figgis's familiar account of Augustine provides a good example of the ways in which theological persuasion can blur political concepts. On the other hand, Professor Deane seems in danger of unduly secularizing Augustine's treatment of politics. He is caught and fascinated, for instance, by the similarities between St. Augustine and Thomas

Hobbes, (Hobbes, and not Luther?). Yet are they alike? For Hobbes, there is neither sin nor redemption. And for him, pessimism and realism are not the ground for resignation but for a progressive, secular order than Augustine would have condemned. The political theory of a great church figure is, at best, likely to be treacherous ground for most political scientists, even when negotiated (as here) without major mishap.

Unfortunately, Augustine's lack of system is matched to an extent by a lack of system and economical exposition on the part of the author. The text is wordy. The exposition detours at many points, is hard to follow, and seldom ends with a definite conclusion or summation. Since the present book is a paperback reissue of an earlier edition, an opportunity for editing was lost.—DAVID G. SMITH, *Swarthmore College*.

Private Politics: A Study of Five Political Outlooks. BY A. F. DAVIES. (Carlton: Melbourne University Press 1966. Pp ix, 267. \$13.50.)

This book, like Robert Lane's *Political Ideology*, is based on information gathered through lengthy psychoanalytical interviews. The similarity, however, ends there, for Davies is interested in the internal "thought system" of individuals as they develop outlooks concerning politics. To obtain his information he interviewed five "second drawer politicians" in Australia. This focus is a crucial flaw in the usefulness of the work for political scientists. There is virtually nothing here about the linkage between this "thought system" and the political system in general (or any subsystem in specific), yet this question of linkage is precisely the problem that troubles so many studies of personality and politics.

In all fairness it should be pointed out that the author did not attempt to discuss the questions of linkage; he is not being criticized for a poor job, or even for doing the wrong job. The point is that the author's focus makes the book more useful in psychology than political science. It is more a work of politics in personality than of personality in politics. A political scientist might well ask

himself if a book titled *Private Religion: A Study of Five Outlooks* might not contain as much information relevant to the general political system.

The book is based on interviews with a party organizer, a town planner, a state MP, a public servant, and a union lawyer. The total time spent interviewing each respondent varied from twelve to thirty hours and was spread over three to four months. The interviewing was conducted sometime after the 1956 Suez crisis (no question sampled reactions to the event), and the study was first published as a multilithed edition in 1961. This explains why the book does not draw from Lane and more recent works. The author finds that political theories (or "thought systems" about politics) are integrally tied to personality. Their development is a creative process (similar to the process that led to the theories of the great political writers, though surely a more crude one) guided by the need of the individual to cope with and build armor against his personal world.

How should material gathered from intensive and lengthy interviews be presented? The author chooses to present each respondent's views in a separate chapter, with one concluding chapter. Each chapter begins with a section of almost "raw" data from the interviews, followed by a discussion section. After examining this book I am convinced that an author must be responsible for reorganizing and editing material gathered in such studies. There is, however, a dilemma. In a psychological study, the flavor and tone of the responses can be quite important; one risks losing this in any editing.

A glance at this book reveals that it is somewhat out of date, has problems of organization, and does little to really unite the study of psychology and politics. We certainly have not adequately tapped the fund of knowledge in our sister discipline of psychology, but we are not likely to do so fruitfully unless we focus on the connecting links. I wish I could end by saying that a fine index allows the reader to draw these connections for himself through careful digging, but I cannot. There is no index.—KARL BRAITHWAITE, *Duke University*.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Every Second Year: Congressional Behavior and the Two-Year Term. BY CHARLES O. JONES. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967. Pp. ix, 118. \$6.00, cloth; \$2.25, paper.)

One of the standard proposals for altering the American Congress, the four-year term for Members of the House enjoyed a brief revival during the first three months of 1966. This time there was

no lack of interest in the idea, nor were Representatives slow to see its advantages to them. The proposal faltered not so much on its substantive merits as on its controversial (and previously unexamined) political consequences—particularly if the terms were to run concurrently with the Presidential term.

One product of the debate is Charles O. Jones'

study, prepared for the Brookings Institution. This brief, tightly written volume presents a thorough review of the pros and cons, along with an inquiry into the possible electoral and policy consequences of longer House terms. Jones has been mindful of the political dimensions of the issue and has avoided the temptations of viewing it through the lenses of *a priori* standards.

Jones concludes from his examination that no change should now be made in the Congressional term. He appears to believe (as does the reviewer) that, while the four-year term raises fundamental political issues, on other grounds it fails to qualify as a truly fundamental reform. The adverse effects of the present two-year term, as he demonstrates, are by no means obvious. Where effects can be identified at all, they may be welcomed by some and deplored by others. As Jones wisely observes, "One man's problem may be another man's principle." (p. 99) Finally, technical drawbacks plague some four-year-term proposals—particularly former Representative Frank Chelf's staggered-term version.

Jones' study represents precisely the kind of evaluative, policy-oriented inquiry which should rank high on the agenda of contemporary political science. Political evaluation need not imply a reversion to polemicism or the delineation of academic prejudices—vices which have plagued much traditional writing about Congress. The problems of conventional reformist writing was not, however, that it was reformist; but that its premises were too often unexamined (or unstated) and its arguments too often unresearched. Policy science, as we understand it, must be explicit, systematic, and empirically grounded.

Jones has met these criteria, and in doing so has rendered a valuable service to political scientists and citizens interested in the future of our national legislature. He has enumerated the problems to which the four-year term is presumably addressed, inquired into the actual effects of length-of-term on legislative performance, and identified alternative values which are brought into play.

On very many matters, however, empirical knowledge simply fails as yet to permit confident specification of the "problems" of Congress, much less speculation upon the effects of proposed changes. Jones has acknowledged this dilemma and has struggled valiantly to cope with it.

For example, longer terms are advocated by some to attract more "qualified" candidates. Yet, as Jones points out, little is known about historical changes in the "qualifications" of Congressmen (much less unsuccessful contenders). Others argue plausibly that longer terms will reduce spiralling campaign costs, but here again knowledge is far from adequate. Still others maintain that the con-

stant campaigning necessitated by brief terms promotes parochialism and errand-boyism, at the expense of lawmaking. Only recently have we gleaned some insights into the role perceptions and work habits of legislators, but much remains to be learned. Despite decades of careful and often productive research, the knowledge gap remains embarrassingly wide.

Thus, many of Jones' conclusions reveal a necessary tentativeness. Among the new data introduced in the study are results of roundtable conferences of Members. While useful for identifying some of the Members' attitudes and providing interesting quotes, this research technique demands a biased sample and thus yields few findings concerning the distribution of attitudes within the House. A mail questionnaire designed to compensate for this drawback revealed that "... [A]s of 1966, there was very little enthusiasm for a change" (p. 107): none of the various four-year-term proposals was supported by even a simple majority of the sample.

The author and the Brookings Institution have reminded political scientists of the increasingly relevant function of political evaluation and criticism. They have also reminded us, and equally usefully, of the unfinished empirical tasks which confront the discipline.—ROGER H. DAVIDSON, *University of California, Santa Barbara*.

Contracting For Atoms. By HAROLD ORLANS. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967. Pp. xvii, 242. \$6.00.)

The research and development contract may one day be recognized as having social implications as significant as that legal structure we know as the corporation. Some critics have suggested it as one way in which private business has preempted governmental decision-making. Others have suggested that the effect is just the reverse. Defenders have argued that the R & D contract is a way to maintain the vigor of private enterprise in our technological society, and others have suggested that it is the only way for government to remain flexible and responsive to social needs in a technological age. Polemical evidence is available to support each of these positions; what is needed is clarification of the sort that Orlans provides.

Given the labyrinthine nature of our technological society, and the struggling state of social science theory, case studies such as *Contracting For Atoms* are of great value to political science. Orlans' study of AEC policy consists of a detailed inquiry into the activities of an agency that is little more than an administrator of R & D contracts. It is an agency with a \$2.5 billion budget in which only 7000 of 120,000 people working in its facilities are directly on its payroll. The AEC, among other things, sponsors basic research, makes

weapons, promotes and governs the nuclear industry, develops new technologies, and does substantially all of this through contracts with "private" industry, universities, and non-profits. This study documents the erosion of that distinction between public and private which Don Price has discussed in more general terms.

As Orlans states it, "The contract is, of course, legally necessary to define the conditions under which public funds may be paid to private persons for a designated purpose, but the document itself is more useful in the event of litigation than in the practical course of day-to-day relations between contractor and government personnel. In a 'hands off' buyer-seller relationship, all of the terms that are necessary to the satisfactory completion of a contractual obligation may, perhaps, be put down on paper . . . But the most significant aspects of research, development, and managerial contracts are precisely those that cannot be satisfactorily reduced to writing. For they involve the quality of effort made to reach not a precise target but goals that must be continually readjusted by mutual agreement; and—beyond gross and obvious limits—the balance of initiative and responsibility, of freedom and control, that should lie in public and private hands is also a shifting one that must be worked out individually for each major contract." (p. 128)

Due in large part to the role universities and university scientists played in the birth of the nuclear age, nearly two-thirds of AEC funds go to universities or non-profits for research or for operating federally owned laboratories. Given the nature of the R & D contract it is not surprising that the AEC has continued to use the same contractors. Two decades after its creation, however, AEC policies are increasingly being questioned. One important reason for this is that the AEC is exhausting its original mission. Another reason is the growing private nuclear industry, interested in the ever-larger profits which loom on the horizon. Orlans investigates in detail the conflicting pressures that have developed with respect to AEC policies.

The first section of the study is concerned with the policy issues faced by the AEC. Of major importance are questions concerning: the choice of operating contractors, the interaction of public and private sectors, the relationship of universities to big science facilities, the role of the AEC's multi-program laboratories, and the growing problems of contract administration as AEC activities and budgets stabilize. These questions are of central concern to the major interest groups which Orlans then investigates. The interest groups are: The Commission, The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, The Department of Defense, The Scientists, and Industry. In examining the roles and political

styles of those interest groups, the author traces the policy-making process with skill and precision.

For those interested in the development and operations of a social system and the rules it designs to achieve effective accommodations among rather divergent political interests, this study has great value. For those, like this reviewer, who are impressed with the difficulty of making effective policy within the discrete functional segments of technological society, the book is of even greater worth. The problem which faces those making nuclear policy is not their inability to accommodate immediate political interests, but the question of how nuclear policy relates to broader public policy issues. Nuclear policy originally evolved around a set of technical skills and essentially technical goals. The fundamental question is what happens when these goals are achieved and/or decline in importance? As Orlans sees it, one specific question in this connection has to do with the future role of the major AEC laboratories. They can probably not be dismantled. Should they be focused on new social problems? If so, if at all, how can it be done? Another question has to do with the role of the AEC in the support of high energy physics. In some senses support for the latter has been the activity which has filled the vacuum left by the achievement of other missions. This particular development has major implications for the broader questions of how basic research support should be allocated and organized. Several of these issues are lucidly presented in the latter part of the study.

At a time when many political scientists are showing a growing concern for policy-oriented studies, this book provides a particularly able example of one type of work which enhances this new perspective.—DON E. KASH, *Purdue University*.

The American Far Right: A Case Study of Billy James Hargis and Christian Crusade. BY JOHN H. REDEKOP. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1968. Pp. 232. \$4.50.)

A major weakness of the social movement called "the extreme right" is its inability to persuade serious men to take its ideas seriously. This reviewer can recall few instances in which the ideologies, philosophies or programmatic pronouncements of individuals connected to the John Birch Society, We, The People or the various Christian Crusades have been treated as anything but political lunacy by observers not committed to the goals of these organizations.

In *The American Far Right*, John H. Redekop very nearly accomplishes that which may actually be impossible: the analysis of the ideas of Billy James Hargis as if they emanated from a mind which had mastered the processes of logical

thought or was, at the very least, sensitive to a complex reality. But Hargis' commitment to a peculiarly American version of Christian fundamentalism, untarnished (unlike Billy Graham) by any other intellectual or emotional experience, makes most of his political ideas and opinions sound as mean-spirited and simple-minded, if more traditionally based, as those of Ayn Rand.

As Professor Redekop makes most clear, by the use of extensive quotations, Hargis' vision of a "Christian Conservative" America is not distinguished by any notable respect for facts, logic or—surprising in a persistent traditionalist—history. So, the leader of the Christian Crusade, (legally, Christian Echoes Ministry, Inc.) indicts himself by such fatuities as: "with all United Nations Internationalists, the thought of religion is repugnant"; "it does not make the slightest difference what nine political experts who are called Supreme Justices [sic] say"; "The FCC is actually a gang of federal outlaws, operating with impunity inside the invisible machinery of the Kennedy dictatorship."

While presenting literally hundreds of similar insults to the intelligence, called from who-knows-how-many thousands in his files, Professor Redekop is able to keep his balance almost completely, as he traces the sources of "Hargisism" to Christian fundamentalism, militant Americanism and to various of the troubles of our time, and places his subject in the Christian, conservative and extremist traditions in America.

Men of Hargis' views would have felt very much at home in the nineteenth century, fighting reform even then, but confident in the backing of a huge portion of the population. As the values and expectations of Americans have changed, Hargis has not. The dialectic of "propertarianism," buttressed by a supportive Protestantism, no longer serves so well as before. But the old songs are still sung by some, though with a new pessimism.

In the end, unfortunately, the author fails to justify his conclusion that "... Hargis is a believer with an understandable creed fighting a very real foe ... [carrying] on the battle in good faith." I do not doubt that he is a believer and that his foe (Communism) is very real but one can wonder whether the overheated and over-propagandized domestic crusade is evidence of good faith or a "good thing." (Since he is an ardent pro-capitalist, perhaps one ought not object to the Crusade's purchase of a \$44,000 home, complete with servants, and two new autos, the cheaper one a Lincoln, for the traveling evangelist.) More important, and explicit in other portions of Redekop's analysis, is that Hargis does not, and perhaps cannot, distinguish between empirical reality and his personal, but hardly exclusive, fantasies. Hargis' Manichean and conspiratorial world-view leaves no room for any

awareness of the conditions and causes, secular or theological, which motivate men to beliefs or behavior displeasing to him and, he will surely insist, to his God.

The author has done his homework well, intelligently interpolating material from diverse sources, and he deserves much credit for his willingness to peruse reams of the dullest polemics imaginable without public protest. Although his own lack of sympathy with Hargis' crusade and the ideas which motivate it is apparent, the utter fairness of Redekop's analysis must be commended.

The volume would have been more valuable had the author attempted to explain Hargis' relative success at a "trade" whose practitioners are never in short supply. In addition, the reader may wonder just what kind of people are so clearly, if willingly, victimized when Hargis passes the hat, and whether his audiences are loyal over time or replenishing.

Although *The American Far Right* (an exaggerated title) is not quite definitive in its analysis of Hargis, I would not suggest that anyone else undertake the task. Although the sources of and stimuli to radical right behavior warrant continued examination, the intellectual quality of the beliefs of the leaders of the movement do not merit the skilled effort so heroically expended by Professor Redekop. To the left of Galbraith and Moynihan are Harrington and Marcuse; to the right of Friedman and Burnham is a swamp.—ROBERT A. SCHOENBERGER, *The University of Michigan*.

Trial Courts in Urban Politics: State Court Policy Impact and Functions in a Local Political System. BY KENNETH M. DOLBEARE. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967. pp. xi, 137. \$6.95.)

Basing his study on a functional analysis of the operation and policy-related outputs of the trial courts of a county of over 1,000,000 residents near New York City, encompassing varied governmental structures, and reflecting the pressures of rapid urbanization, Professor Dolbeare argues "that trial courts are significant in various ways so that their analysis is vital to full understanding of the judicial process and to an accurate conception of a local political system" (page 8). He demonstrates that the impact of trial court decisions—unlike those found at the appellate level—is "narrow, specialized, ... distinctively individualistic" (page 104) and, oftentimes, final. These decisions are conditioned by the recruitment process—here, a judgeship is a reward for loyal party service—and by the role conceptions held by trial court judges as well as by rules governing access to the courts and by the substantive law with its bias toward private property. The decisions influence the political process interstitially by providing a delaying or veto role, denying particular policy al-

ternatives but not compelling positive plans of action. Courts, however, have substantial impact in the field of zoning and land use, areas of grave urban concern where progressive programs are needed. "The problems of the cities require dramatic and innovative responses in which the general interest is projected into the future, but these are just the kinds of public action which are likely to receive the coldest response when challenged in court by those whose economic interests are best served by the status quo" (pages 127-128).

The courts staffed by dominant community interests, are most likely to be used by those who are more politically isolated in this system. These are suburban homeowners and businessmen, motivated by the drives of status-seeking and the desire to maximize private profit. Dolbeare calls this "the little man's means of veto and assertion of property rights within the local community" (page 118). These litigants find solace in the easily accessible trial courts whose judges are sympathetic to their aims and for whom the substantive law is favorable. Therefore, these courts perform an "economic rights" function by which the discredited doctrine of substantive due process is effectively enforced at this level against local decision-makers.

Another major function which the courts perform is that of insuring procedural fairness in the political process. Although this benefits minorities—for example, Dolbeare found this to be an asset to the developing county Democratic Party, some benefit more than others and these beneficiaries are most often defenders of the economic status quo who are asserting "minority" claims within the political process. A third function of the trial courts is to referee the allocation of powers among other governmental structures—a "natural" function of the courts in the American political context.

The fact that urban trial courts are defenders of the status quo in areas where forward-looking policies are needed augers poorly for evaluation of the courts as instruments of change. Their import for urban politics suggests that urban decision-makers must circumvent the courts, perhaps by relying on other levels of government to help solve their problems, thereby minimizing the role of this level of courts while also forfeiting a measure of urban autonomy. Likewise, the relative independence of the courts in most fields makes their relationship with appellate courts essentially non-hierarchical and "voluntary" in nature thus precluding here a possible source of restraining influence.

Dolbeare's effort to integrate court structure and functions into a working concept of the local political system is theoretically refreshing in a field where there is a relatively small, but growing,

body of research. His methodological contribution lies in careful and creative application and extension of tried methods. His research was extensive, covering a sixteen-year period, and utilizing many data sources—especially the outputs of the trial courts in question. His analysis is rigorous; his interpretations apply the empirical findings to the larger questions at hand.

Dolbeare may, however, be criticized on several points. First, it is unclear if the conclusions drawn here from an essentially suburban-oriented political culture are also applicable for the center-city portions of large urban areas as Dolbeare suggests. He attempts to meet this by stating that he has isolated general functions which are probably similar in form but perhaps not in substance; however, at some point, substance defines form. Likewise, attempts to apply the findings deduced here to a larger political system can be brought into question on similar grounds; at what point are these data reflective of a specialized political culture, distinctive political rules, and the vagaries of a specific recruitment process.

Overall, the book is a worthwhile addition to work on judicial process and its relations with urban politics. Its focus probably makes it of greater interest to a student of judicial politics than to a student of urban affairs; however, it is to be commended as a scholarly endeavor of significant importance.—IRVIN H. BROMALL, *Ohio University*.

The Democrats And Labor In Rhode Island, 1952-1962: Changes In the Old Alliance. BY JAY S. GOODMAN. (Providence: Brown University Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 154. \$5.00.)

Readers who pick up this volume expecting either a systematic case study or a detailed historical account of relations between a political party and an interest group will be disappointed with the results of Jay S. Goodman's treatment of the Democratic party and organized labor in Rhode Island between 1952 and 1962.

Goodman's objective is to test or rather to argue the hypothesis that the relationship between the Democratic party and organized labor in Rhode Island has undergone a fundamental change in the direction of lessened labor influence. Three corollary propositions are: (1) major elements in the party have come to feel that they can achieve their goals without depending upon labor's support; (2) organized labor has become dissatisfied with the prospects of obtaining what it wants through the party; (3) labor has sought to establish its independence from the old, automatic alliance (pp. 12-13).

The author's major source of data—besides the public record—are interviews with 27 labor executive board members, 15 rank-and-file Democratic

state legislators, 15 "labor" legislators (those who "obtained a livelihood from blue-collar work; held union office, or listed membership in a union"), 7 legislative leaders, 3 labor executives and 2 former Governors of Rhode Island. Goodman examines the "perceptions" of these respondents by asking basically similar fixed-alternative questions about labor's political activities, the "effectiveness" of these activities, the "satisfactoriness" of the relationship between Democrats and labor within the party, and any changes over the decade in the latter three areas. He accepts "expressed dissatisfaction," "perceived conflict," and, more generally, differences in perceptions of "political reality" between labor and party members as evidence supporting his hypothesis.

Goodman proceeds in straightforward fashion (1) to summarize, year-by-year, the public record, and (2) to summarize his interviews—sometimes in tabular form, more often in narrative style—with the various participants. In his final chapter, he concludes that his hypothesis and its corollaries have been supported by the data, adds a few more years to his account of Rhode Island politics, and then speculates about labor-Democratic party relations on the national level.

There are many difficulties with this effort. Perhaps the most important is the absence of a theoretical or operational definition of "influence." All the reader has before him are statements by some (and by no means all) respondents that labor's "influence" was greater before 1958 than after. (Of course, Goodman assumes that some respondents' perceptions are more accurate than others, and thus is able to dismiss contradictory evidence.) One does not even know, however, if all respondents interpreted "influence" in the same way.

Goodman does not clearly define the dimensions of the "relationship" between the Democratic party and organized labor which are significant in terms of labor's "influence." One result of this is that the chapters presenting the interview data are rather disjointed affairs in which responses about labor's electioneering activities are put side-by-side with data about perceptions of labor-party relations in Rhode Island and no effort is made to connect the two in a meaningful way.

This lack of theoretical clarity seems strange in light of Goodman's promising discussion of aspects of Truman's group theory (especially the variables related to a group's "external influence"), Eldersveld's "stratarchy," and Dahl and Lindblom's "bargaining process." Unfortunately, the "framework" of which these are parts disappeared entirely after page 12.

Goodman presents his interviews in sufficient detail, although he has the bothersome habit of presenting only raw figures in his tables and then using percentages in the text. Moreover, his data

is suspect because he never confronts the problem of recall. Why should a labor leader or a state legislator interviewed in 1965 accurately recall what happened in 1962, much less a decade before that?

Despite all this, Goodman's book makes a substantial contribution to the study of state politics. He has some of the best material to be found on the relationship in a state legislature between the rank-and-file on the one hand and the party leadership (including the Governor) and interest groups on the other. His data support the notion that a legislative role predominates over an interest group role. Chapter IV should be read closely by all students of the legislative process.—VERNON M. GOETCHEUS, *Columbia College*.

Knowledge and Power: Essays on Science and Government. Ed. by SANFORD A. LAKOFF. (New York: The Free Press, 1966. Pp. x, 502. \$10.95.)

Just during the last fifteen years, as a result primarily of social and political pressures and not of basic intellectual innovations, there has emerged in the United States a new specialty in the field of political science, the study of the politics of science. Like all other specialized sciences and disciplines, this one has no absolute beginning to its history: did not Plato and Aristotle discuss the problem of the social and political role of the "wise" man, the proto-scientists? Or, to mention only one more among a multitude of precursors, more recently, in the 1930's, did not the British "scientific humanist," J. D. Bernal, discuss "Science as Power"? The political role of knowledge and science has always been important enough to have received some attention from political scientists and their prototypes.

But the history of the politics of science presents a notable turning-point with the publication in 1954 of *Government and Science* by Don Price, to whom the anthology under review is most appropriately dedicated. His was the first book devoted entirely, seriously, and systematically to the analysis of the politics of science. It was the first book in the field by a trained, professional political scientist. And it was the first book that tried to be primarily scientific rather than ideological.

Since 1954, rather slowly for a few years, and more rapidly since Sputnik, the field has been taking on the full set of characteristics of an academic specialty. Price has set up and directed the productive efforts of the Science and Public Policy Seminar at Harvard. A variety of somewhat similar academic efforts have been started elsewhere: at last count, there were at least forty different colleges and universities where anything from a course to a program in the politics of science was offered. [Like much else of contemporary social and political science, this field has been predominantly an American development. Recently, when

the Committee of Experts of the O.E.C.D. gave their evaluation of science policy in the United States, they explicitly stated that here, as nowhere else, their views could be almost entirely based on the existing American science policy studies.]

In addition to courses and programs, this field now has its full-time specialists and "authorities." Price, of course, is pre-eminent, and his second book, *The Scientific Estate* (1965), is an important contribution to general political science. Sanford Lakoff, the editor of the volume under review, was trained by Price and is now a mature full-time worker in this vineyard. So also is Robert Gilpin, who has written *American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy* (1962), co-edited (with Christopher Wright) the valuable collection of essays, *Scientists and National Policy Making* (1964), and whose new book *France in the Age of the Scientific State*, is just published (1968). Some other professional specialists in the field are Bruce L. R. Smith (*The Rand Corporation*, 1966), Eugene B. Skolnikoff (*Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy*, 1967), and Harold Orlans (*Contracting for Atoms*, 1967). Besides the academic specialists, there have been major efforts by such civil servants and scientists as James L. McCamy (*Science and Public Administration*, 1960) and Alvin Weinberg (*Reflections on Big Science*, 1967). Beyond books, there have been important contributions in one or more essays by professional political scientists like Robert Wood, Wallace Sayre, Warner Schilling, and Bernard Brodie and by others such as Albert Wohlstetter, Harvey Brooks, Robert Kreidler, and McGeorge Bundy. Finally, the field has been most fortunate in having a brilliant journalist specializing in it, Daniel S. Greenberg of *SCIENCE*, whose weekly reports are indispensable, and whose recent book *The Politics of Pure Science* (1967), gives him a valid claim to be counted a peer among the professional political scientists.

Altogether, then, the existing corpus of work in the politics of science is now impressive both in its quality and quantity. Only one important feature of the "newer" political science seems to be missing: systematic survey research data, either specially collected for the purpose or brought under "secondary analysis" when collected for other purposes. So far, nearly all of the work in this field has been of the "case history" type, with important admixtures of census-type statistical data. As the field matures further, as it takes its initiative more from its own autonomous intellectual base and less from the pressures of political events and exigencies, then it will formulate its own hypotheses and collect its own survey data to these those hypotheses.

The reader that Sanford Lakoff has put together represents fairly well what this new field is like.

His own introductory essay, "The Third Culture," is a survey of "science in social thought" from Bacon to Bagehot. Part 1 includes "cases and controversies" on the trial of Robert Oppenheimer (by Lakoff), on the Mohole fiasco (by Daniel Greenberg, though this version is analytically not nearly so good as the one in his book cited above), on the nuclear test ban treaty (by Cecil H. Uyebara), on the establishment of NASA (by Enid Curtis Bok Schoettle, in what is really a small monograph that deserved separate publication as a book), on Comsat (by Roger Kvam), and on smoking and health (by Stanley Reiser). Part 2 is on the governing of science and includes a profile of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee (by Carl William Fischer), a discussion of scientific advice for Congress (by Eilene Galloway), and an overview on the place of the scientific establishment in a pluralistic American political structure (by Lakoff). Finally, Part 3 moves a little away from the earlier professionalism of the collection and offers Alan T. Waterman on federal support of science, Alvin Weinberg on criteria for scientific choice, McGeorge Bundy on the role of the scientist in forming national policy, Harvey Brooks on the needs for support of basic research, and Philip H. Abelson, in an upbeat, ideological statement chiefly on "science in the service of society."

Specialists in this field might have made different selections that did Lakoff, they might have included more of the "classics," but Lakoff's choice will serve any political scientist well who wishes to introduce himself or his students to this field which is now of considerable intellectual as well as policy interest. And the politics of science specialists will be grateful for the several solid pieces of work which are published here for the first time. A number of these are products of Price's Harvard Seminar.—BERNARD BARBER, *Barnard College, Columbia University*.

Congress and the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility. DONALD G. MORGAN. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966). Pp. xv, 465. \$8.95.)

This volume can be approached from three aspects: first, in terms of the problem the author is concerned with and his convictions on that topic. Second, in terms of a research project presenting his data and the conclusions derived from them. And, third, his prescriptions of reforms to deal with the problem. Although his informed concern and detailed scholarship are evident throughout, he is not equally successful with all three aspects of his work.

His main thesis, which he presents with vigor and conviction, is that in the modern world considerations of policy and constitutionality have

been divorced; they are now considered distinct topics to be dealt with by separate branches of government. As technical questions, matters of constitutionality are supposed to fall within the province of specialists possessing expert training and operating under special procedures. (Or in other words, the judiciary.) Congress, lacking these qualifications and procedures is supposed to deal with questions of policy, but in matters of constitutionality should defer to the pronouncements of the courts.

Vigorously attacking this "judicial monopoly" position, Morgan argues persuasively for a "tripartite theory" of responsibility for the consideration of constitutional questions. Congress, like the other two branches, will inevitably confront such questions in the normal course of their duty and must not, in Morgan's view, eschew such a confrontation as a matter of basic responsibility. Congress also brings to such deliberations some advantages which the courts lack, such as greater ability to reflect and, perhaps, create a community consensus, the basic for compliance with and acceptance of constitutional settlements. There are also issues which because of their special character (so-called "political questions") may never reach the courts and where congressional pronouncements have an air of finality.

Morgan contends there is an increased willingness in Congress to defer to the courts—to embrace the "judicial monopoly" theory—with the mid-1930's representing a turning point in that direction. Here he adduces his research to support this contention. But it is at this point that he is less persuasive, although still vigorous in his assertions. He relies primarily on a series of case studies largely drawn from the written record, some of which are very tedious. They range from a 1789 controversy over the presidential removal power and the Sedition Act of 1798, to more modern issues such as the Communist Control Act of 1954 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. But the criteria by which some controversies are included and others excluded are never made explicit. For example, why not include the still-relevant question of federal aid to church-related schools? Thus a reviewer can not be certain how representative the cases presented are as pictures of congressional consideration of constitutional questions. Particularly, if as the author contends, the 1930's are a turning point, why does he largely ignore developments between the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935?

At times he presents data, such as the length of tenure for congressmen participating in a debate, which apparently supports a point he is making. Yet in numerous instances his point is not really clear or the data is more erratic than his conclusion suggests. At other times, he makes judgments

without supplying any supporting evidence. Thus one learns (page 315) without being told how or why, that the major impetus to detached consideration of the 1964 Civil Rights Act came from Congressman Howard Smith of Virginia. Perhaps, I am too cynical or partisan, but this thought simply dazzles my mind. At other times his conclusion seems only one of a number of plausible interpretations of what happened yet these other possibilities are either ignored or given short shrift in his discussion.

The author also relies (mainly in an appendix) on a written questionnaire submitted to members of the 86th Congress, yet its usefulness is very limited. Personal interviews would have proven more informative, especially since respondents' statements could be checked against over behavior such as voting. And a questionnaire, if submitted to a number of congresses, would have been less static in character than one used only in the 86th.

In his concluding section, Professor Morgan prescribes a set of reforms. For he is convinced that when Congress deals with constitutional issues, it is ill-equipped in terms of internal machinery, procedural rules and expert sources of advice. His reforms, such as providing more experts or occasionally relying on a national commission of inquiry, seem reasonable. But the alleged defects—haste, lack of full deliberation, and partial and partisan information—are not wholly confined to constitutional questions but may be characteristic of modern legislatures. Certainly his reforms, no matter how well intended, are not panaceas. For example, the providing of additional experts does not guarantee the absence of disagreements among the experts or prevent the skewing of their views in the direction of the views of the appointing authorities. Finally, Congress operates in a highly political context—the target of various pressures and demands—which inevitably color and influence its judgments. But this character of congressional deliberations receives, at least to this reviewer, insufficient consideration in Morgan's indictment of Congress and his prescriptions for reform.

In conclusion, Morgan's work succeeds more on the level of a polemic from a concerned and dedicated scholar than it does as a piece of empirical research. And for the reader the volume is, perhaps, overly long and at times, somewhat tedious. —DALE VINYARD, *Wayne State University*.

The Politics of Provincialism: The Democratic Party in Transition, 1918-1932. BY DAVID BURNER. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968. Pp. xiii, Pp. 293. \$6.95.)

Those who read the *Historical Methods Newsletter* or other internal channels of communication realize that history is becoming more behavioral.

David Burner's study of the Democratic party is primarily old style historiography, but it does contain one example of what the new research may be able to contribute.

For most of his book Burner uses standard sources, primarily newspapers, magazines, memoirs, and collections of private papers from the era, in a conventional manner. He develops a "theme," namely that the 1918-1932 Democrats were "provincial." Their provincialism, in Burner's view, consisted in the determination of two contending internal factions to emphasize the differences in their values rather than to seek a unifying set of national goals. The native, rural, dry Protestants led by McAdoo and the immigrant, urban, wet Catholics led by Smith chose to fight each other, demonstrating "provincial" behavior. Burner's format is largely descriptive and chronological. He traces the origin of each faction, the temporary coalition under Wilson, the gradual disintegration of the early 1920's, the disastrous 1924 Convention and election, Roosevelt's subsequent efforts to build a national party apparatus, and the 1928 Smith campaign.

The descriptive chapters suffer from two difficulties. First, there is an absence of conceptualization about parties, voting, or elections. Although Burner's footnotes and bibliography indicate familiarity with the political science literature on these subjects, he makes minimal use of it. Things just happen; events roll on. Burner lacks the theoretical sophistication of the superb original essays on historical party development in the Chambers and Burnham volume, *The American Party Systems*. Where individual voting choices are concerned, Burner is literary, observing that (p. 222) his "... inquiry must be tentative, for in the final analysis the motives of an electorate are hidden—perhaps even from itself." He does not even treat Republican victories in the widely familiar framework of maintaining elections.

Second, Burner is reluctant to use hard data in his chronological sections. In a very thorough description of the values of each faction, he does not indicate adequately what offices in what states each side held. His long chapter on the 1924 Convention omits analysis of the roll call votes except for a table showing simple counts of candidate strengths on different ballots. Burner relegates to a footnote Bain's correlation analysis of the anti-Klan resolution and McAdoo's support, and quotes instead *The New York Times'* impressionistic report that there was some connection between the two. He does not utilize previous quantitative analyses of sectional voting at that convention or produce his own.

There are, however, several chapters where Burner departs from his descriptive approach. In Chapter Six he analyzes the behavior of the

Congressional wing of the Democratic party; in Chapter Eight he introduces original data to indicate the impact of Smith's candidacy on different ethnic and religious voting blocs. In his treatment of the legislative party, Burner knows what he wants to do—show the bloc patterns of intra-party behavior. Unfortunately, his methodology is limited to taking one vote at a time. He reports and interprets individual and party behavior vote by vote rather than analyzing sets of votes in any of the accepted and widely used ways—indices of cohesion, scaling, cluster-bloc or factor analysis. Other historians, for example Thomas B. Alexander in his treatment of roll calls and sectionalism in the House between 1836 and 1860, have learned to do much better.

In Chapter Eight, Burner finally makes an original and impressive contribution. He has uncovered special welfare surveys of so-called "sanitary districts" taken during the era in New York, Chicago, and Boston. These surveys identified the ethnic compositions of the populations. Then Burner has used election districts which lay wholly within homogeneous German, Irish, Italian, Jewish, or Polish sanitary districts as a basis for analyzing group voting between 1916 and 1932. For each group, Burner is able to document a marked shift toward increased Democratic support at the election of 1928. For example, in a New York sanitary district with 85% Italian population, the 1924 Democratic vote was 48%, the 1928 Democratic vote 77%. In a predominantly Polish Chicago sanitary district, the 1924 Davis vote was 51%, the 1928 Smith vote 83%. A Chicago sanitary district with a mostly Jewish population votes 37% for Davis, 78% for Smith. Burner thus adds additional evidence to that developed earlier by Key and more recently by Pomper which suggests that the present-day Democratic party began with Al Smith, not Franklin Roosevelt.

Throughout, Burner's writing is interesting and readable. One wishes that he had devoted more effort to material such as the sanitary district data and less to the description of already well-known events.—JAY S. GOODMAN, *Wheaton College, (Massachusetts)*.

Congressional Insurgents and the Party System, 1909-1916. BY JAMES HOLT. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. ix, 188. \$5.50.)

The theme of historian Holt's book is the failure of insurgent Republicans to attain their self-defined goals in Congressional and Presidential politics because of their minority status within their own party and their hesitancy to coalesce with like-minded Democrats on a sustained basis. Mr. Holt makes his case by selecting several "struggles" in which the insurgents were involved between 1909 and 1916, including, among others,

the fight to reduce Speaker Cannon's power, the Payne-Aldrich Act, the Underwood Tariff Act, and American foreign policy prior to activate entry into World War I. In each instance the author examines the insurgents' position, their justification of that position, and their relationship with the regular Republicans and the Democrats. His data consists of personal papers of principal insurgent actors, newspapers, and historical studies related to the period. In each instance the author asserts that the insurgents were divided from regular Republicans by their strong belief in the control or destruction of "trusts," in the extension of popular government (and concomitant hatred for real or imagined political machines which blocked popular government), or their noninterventionist stance on foreign policy. The insurgents were separated from Democrats, Holt argues, more by partisan identification than by ideological or issue disagreement.

Political scientists who hope that historians will do much of the work of examining relationships of factions within and among parties will be disappointed with this study for a number of reasons.

First, there is justification to be dissatisfied both with the thesis that the insurgents failed and with the explanation of why they failed. The author gives no reason why he selected the relatively few cases he used to document the insurgents' failure. It might be just as easy to choose a dozen cases to make the opposite argument. Even if they failed, the author is not successful in explaining why they failed. The insurgents' reluctance to risk their traditional Republican identification during the 1912 and 1916 presidential campaigns by joining other parties is well founded. In each instance the author documents the concern of various insurgents with giving up the loyalty and ballot box votes engendered by the Republican label in their district. However, he is less successful in using the same reasoning for explaining why the insurgents did not coalesce with Democratic congressmen on specific legislative proposals after 1912. Temporary legislative alliances would not have had such far reaching consequences as to bring about a realignment of parties and jeopardize the Republican identification of the insurgents as the author implicitly argues. In American government one does not have to cross the aisle to vote regularly with the opposition, as the records of literally dozens of congressmen attest. The insurgents may have had sufficient reason not to join the Democrats simply because the Democrats might not have been espousing the clearly identified progressive positions the author assumes they were.

Second, the study's methodology generates discontinuities in analysis. It skips from event to event, using information derived from specific personalities involved in each event. For example,

the study indicates that Senator Beveridge did something on one issue for certain reasons, Senator LaFollette something else on another issue for certain reasons, and at times certain well-known insurgents voted against their usual allies. There is never an analysis of the collective whole of the insurgent group on a particular position that permits the reader to know their composition and their strength relative to other factions and parties.

Finally, the author does not clearly define the "insurgents." Who were they? What issues divided and united them? Over a wide range of issues, to what extent did they agree with Democrats and regular Republicans? Who were the "hard core" and peripheral members of the group? The author virtually neglects these questions. Obviously, roll-call analysis by identifying clusters of like-minded members of Congress on a wide range of issues could define the membership of the insurgent faction and establish the extent of their cohesiveness. This would designate the range of issues on which they were united and permit identification of this faction in the context of other factions by allowing comparisons along several dimensions. The statement, "Nevertheless the existence of a relatively cohesive insurgent faction within the Republican party in Congress between 1909 and 1916 is indisputable" (p. 2) could have been subjected to empirical test. If the author had tested his hypotheses he would have had a focus for his study. He could then have used this very rich collection of data to go beyond roll-call analysis by explaining the patterns he found, the strategy of the participants, and so on. This procedure would have transformed his relatively diffuse analysis into a focused and intriguing study which political scientists would find useful.—DELMER DUNN, *The University of Georgia*.

Labor and Liberty: The LaFollette Committee and the New Deal. BY JEROLD S. AUERBACH. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1966. Pp. ix, 246. \$6.50.)

In view of the rapidly expanding interest, within political science, in Congressional standing committees, it seems surprising that little attention has been devoted to serious study of Congressional investigating committees. This is not to say that our literature omits mention of such investigations—how many times, after all, are we told that such investigations are seldom productive, and very often violate the personal dignity and private liberties of persons and groups subjected to scrutiny?

Jerold Auerbach, an able and articulate historian, has stepped into this void created by professional indifference and suspicion, and has produced a well-written and illuminating account of a

Congressional investigation perhaps less known to contemporary students than the Kefauver or McCarthy serials but nevertheless one which may have had a more profound effect on government policy—The LaFollette Committee. Between 1936 and 1940 this committee conducted exhaustive hearings into violations of labor's civil liberties during the New Deal period. The reports of the committee, Auerbach concludes, made Congress, the Roosevelt administration and the public aware for the first time of widespread and vicious violations of civil liberties by industry and local governments. In rising to protect the civil liberties of laborers, especially in their right to organize and picket, the stage was set for the post-1940 "civil rights revolutions," as the government and society accepted their responsibility to protect citizens from state, local, and private violations of civil liberties.

Auerbach first describes the unrest and violence in industry-labor and farm-tenant relations which led to demands for a Congressional investigation. Then we view the formation of the committee, the men who composed its membership, and its labor-oriented goals. Through the committee reports, we learn of the bloody and desperate industrial warfare of the New Deal period, and of the militant anti-Communist rhetoric of business and local government (not so different from later periods). Auerbach illuminates the Marxist biases built into the committee investigations and reports by its staff, a piece of analysis which is especially interesting and valuable. Finally, Auerbach weighs the successes and failures of the LaFollette investigations.

Any major work such as this inevitably has certain problems. I have never really understood why so many scholars place such great faith in quotations. At so many points, especially in historical research and writing, theses are advanced in a highly definitive fashion and are "proved" with one intriguing quotation from a hard-to-get-at paper collection. Auerbach more or less shares this definitely non-systematic approach to data collection. I can only warn that conclusions reached on the basis of such non-systematic, unspecified methods are likely candidates for scholarly *coup d'états* by future researchers. One could wish Auerbach and the other historians were more humble about their supporting evidence.

Certainly the major weakness of the book is that—while the author has clearly outlined the role the LaFollette Committee played in public exposure of industrial suppression of civil liberties—Auerbach fails to prove his larger point: that agitation for labor's civil liberties was the major impetus for federal government protection of all civil liberties. While labor certainly played its part, it is important to remember Supreme Court

actions in cases involving such groups as Jehovah's Witnesses or Negro college students. Auerbach barely mentions the Supreme Court, which, I think, must be considered a powerful independent variable in government's growing awareness of deprivations of civil liberties.

I hope other historians and political scientists will examine other Congressional investigating committees. The history and operation of such investigations are likely to provide rich data for our understanding of legislative behavior and of policy formation. Mr. Auerbach has done a great service in opening up this inquiry. And in so doing, he has provided an absorbing picture of the conflicts, torments, and revolutionary fervor in the New Deal years. The similarities and contrasts between New Deal political life and contemporary politics which Auerbach's book helps illuminate are especially valuable for those of us who, amazing as it may seem were born after the LaFollette Committee disbanded.—DOUGLAS CAMP CHAFFEY, *University of Montana*.

Congressional Ethics: The Conflict of Interest Issue. By ROBERT S. GETZ. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966. Pp. vi, 202. \$1.95.)

The disciplinary action taken by the House and Senate against Adam Clayton Powell and Thomas Dodd help make this book timely. The author's essentially reasonable and systematic treatment of conflict of interest on Capitol Hill make it relevant. Although the work was published in 1966, an Epilogue has been added to include events through April 1967.

Professor Getz examines the few formal restraints Congress has imposed upon the conduct of its members; discusses recent efforts to increase these restraints; suggests reasons inherent in the American legislative process to explain why most additional restrictions would be inappropriate; and prescribes financial disclosure as a feasible and justifiable remedy for responding to the intense pressure currently being exerted on Congress by an outraged public.

The book's thesis can be reduced to several essential ingredients. Congress has taken pains to prevent government employees, current or retired, from using positions of public trust for private ends. Efforts to extend conflict of interest restrictions to congressional behavior have been frustrated.

This failure, says Getz, can be traced to the nature of the representative function and the character of legislative employment. The increasingly diverse economic mix of most congressional districts and a rise in the number of matters upon which a legislator may act independently have induced many congressmen to see themselves as "brokers," rather than as "delegates" or "trustees." The bro-

ker orientation, together with the community of interest the legislator shares with constituents and his own diverse economic interests, make the limitations imposed upon other government employees inappropriate to his function. It would be unreasonable for a farmer-congressman, for example, to disqualify himself from voting on farm bills, or refuse to serve on the Agriculture Committee, or refrain from directing an inquiry to the Department of Agriculture on behalf of his constituents.

Moreover, the insecurity of elective office, the extraordinary expenses incurred by the office holders, and the frequency with which congressmen are retired to civilian life make post-employment restrictions on conflict of interest particularly inappropriate.

On the few occasions that each house has been forced to recognize alleged indiscretions, they have been loathe to mete out punishment. According to Getz, they have been content to permit the matter to be resolved in other ways, i.e., through election defeat, resignation, or in the courts. The author feels that, in light of recent events, the public is increasing the pressure for legislative remedies, and that some action must be taken, even if it is symbolic only. He asserts that financial disclosure is feasible, capable of being enforced, and consistent with the nature of legislative life. He concedes that the proposal has been rejected decisively when it has been suggested, but is encouraged by the intensity with which its advocates have supported it.

The thesis is plausible and imaginative, although some of the strands holding it together are tenuous. It is not altogether clear, for example, why "delegate" and "trustee" representational roles should be any more suitable to the application of conflict of interest restrictions than the "broker" role. While the latter denotes a somewhat different orientation toward legislative decision-making, delegates and trustees are likely to behave in precisely the same fashion as brokers in most of their dealings with the executive branch.

The author relies upon a few of the more recent works on congressional behavior to support his argument, but their findings are sometimes oversimplified. His assumptions about the rationale behind committee selection is a case in point (p. 73). His analysis of voting behavior also leaves something to be desired.

The book leans too heavily on detailed accounts of specific legislative situations, frequently giving more attention to concrete developments than the burden of the argument requires. Many are not entirely relevant and their abbreviation or relegation to the footnotes would have sharpened the presentation.

Finally, the writing is mechanical, occasionally labored, and frequently uninspired. Powell is de-

scribed as "having effectively muddled the outlook on his political fate" when he returned to Bimini (p. 188), and the House is charged with having "opened up a Pandora's Box of problems" when refusing to seat the Harlem Congressman (p. 191).

Nevertheless, *Congressional Ethics* deals insightfully within a narrow area of inquiry and compares favorably with most accounts which attempt to prescribe the medicine of reform.—IRWIN N. GERTZOG, *Yale University*.

W. J. Cash: Southern Prophet: A Biography and Reader. By JOSEPH L. MORRISON. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967. Pp. xiii, 309. \$6.95.)

This biography of the great historian of the southern mind reveals the inward struggles of the man who, probably as much or more than any other American writer, has written best on the origins and development of racial and racist attitudes in the South. Perhaps Cash did not foresee the tortured racial developments to 1968 in all their detail, but since his brilliant book, *The Southern Mind* will no doubt be read more than ever today, his biography by Joseph L. Morrison will be much welcomed, especially since it throws considerable light on Cash's personality as a social analyst. Cash's gloom, his grief, and obsessive fears of threat and persecution, which eventually led to his suicide by hanging in Mexico, are in some ways reminiscent of Rousseau.

Morrison traces the fascinating background of the man from the cotton mill town of Gaffney who went to an "intellectual awakening" at the Baptist Wake Forest College, during the turbulent presidency of William Lewis Potent, who taught Darwinism and was under attack throughout the South. We learn of Cash's omnivorous and insatiable reading habits, mercurial temperament, and of his perceptiveness as a Carolina reporter and contributor to the *American Mercury*. We are carried through the painful and extended authorship of *The Mind*, faithfully coddled by the sympathy and encouragement of H. L. Mencken and Alfred and Blanche Knopf. Lastly, pages are spent—too many for some—on the final days leading to his death.

The principal merit here is in clarifying that Cash's suicide was not traceable to depression over the South's future—gloominess in Cash's view. Nor was it related to public reaction to *The Mind of the South*, as has been asserted. On the contrary, Cash's book was well received and reviewed; perhaps the most notable exceptions to this were the Nashville Agrarians—notably John Crowe Ransom, Donald Davidson, and Allen Tate. Cash's overriding prepossession had, in fact, shifted from the gloom about the South to the German aggression and the Nazis, who in his last days, he thought were following him in Mexico. Morrison concludes

that his death was due to "toxic" origins. Morrison's concerns—giving way to belabored attention—seems to be in dispelling any idea that Cash, a neurotic throughout, might have had a diseased mind throughout. His point, even though some of the details might have been in an appendix—is indeed an important one.

The most valuable part of the book is the 24 pages of Chapter VII, entitled "Perspectives." Here Cash's work is related to other writers and groups such as Thomas Wolfe, William Faulkner, James Branch Cabell, Clarence Cason, The Nashville Agrarians, The Chapel Hill Regionalists, and Gunnar Myrdal. Myrdal, by the way, was far more optimistic about the South's future than was Cash. Regrettably, only in the few pages of this chapter are the criticisms of Cash really examined: that he may have ridden his thesis too far, that he overstressed the continuity and essential unity of the southern mind, that his attention to *The Southern Mind* eclipsed considerations of the Negro mind, that his work is impressionistic and fails to examine areas outside of the Carolina Piedmont, such as the Gulf, the Virginia Tidewater, the East Tennessee Unionist areas, and so forth.

Nowadays, with the civil strife, and the race problem having in part moved from the southland to the great northern cities, the diversity and the contradictions in the southern mind—its very lack of homogeneity—cries out for study. It is significant when *Fortune Magazine* conducts a survey and finds that Negroes in the South feel, in contrast to Negroes in the North, that the whites there are genuinely trying to find answers to mutual problems, and have less hypocrisy in their efforts. Many of these modern day southern whites are not in the mainstream of Cash's *The Mind*, and Morrison could have done more to examine these shortcomings.

Be this as it may, Morrison appropriately says about his hero: "No professional historian with daring enough to attempt so audacious an intellectual feat had ever come forward with an analysis of the southern mind in its totality." Whatever the shortcomings of *The Mind*, it is a great achievement. However one may wish Professor Morrison had spent more time in a critical analysis of *The Mind*, this biography is indeed well done, much needed, and very necessary for a reappraisal of what *The Mind* missed as well as what it stimulated and achieved.

The collection of Cash's short pieces in the reader section of Morrison's book—newspaper and magazine articles, and his address at the University of Texas shortly before his death—are of value only as a supplement to Cash's great book.

Professor Morrison, who teaches journalism at the University of Carolina, has done a thorough

research. He admires Cash intensely, and has produced an important and perhaps essential companion to Cash's book. Now lacking is a critical analysis of *The Mind*.—DAVID M. ABSHIRE, *Georgetown University*.

Public Management at the Bargaining Table. BY KENNETH O. WARNER AND MARY L. HENNESSY. (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1967. Pp. IXV, 490. \$11.95.)

This prescription studded discussion by Warner and Hennessy is designed to appeal more to the practitioner of public personnel administration than to students of political phenomena; as such, its value is limited. The currency of the appeal and its timely utilitarianism have been dramatized in recent weeks by the troubled labor relations between public management and public employees across the nation.

Warner and Hennessy specify four needs meant to be served by the book: (1) To describe the "current status of employee organizations and the extent of collective bargaining"; (2) To stimulate thought and crystalize ideas among management personnel engaged in collective bargaining; (3) To inform public officials not yet involved of the problems of collective bargaining and some consequences of alternative actions; and (4) To specify necessary decisions "that must be made if effective management-employee relations are to be maintained through the process of collective bargaining." To these ends the authors move smoothly and incisively, albeit redundantly (although the redundancy is an admitted and necessary strategy of the authors).

The book is organized in direct relationship to the several intents. Part I, the Dynamics of Collective Bargaining, analyses definitions, explores history and current status of public employee organizations and bargaining in Canada as well as the United States, and presents two case studies that whet one's appetite for what follows. The hors d'oeuvres which constitute Part II are capsulated in Chapter 7 dealing with "Collective Bargaining from Start to Finish." Covering in sequence preparation for negotiations, techniques of negotiations, and writing and implementing the agreement, the authors structure the subsequent four chapters around occasionally disparate but usually incisive opinions from a number of experienced labor relations spokesmen. Dissenting opinions highlight and underscore the author's attempt to disentangle the troubled morass of the public employee collective bargaining issue, but the confusion is also indicative of the growing pains being experienced in this vital area of public management. While somewhat muddled in concept, the authors deftly bring the reader through the atti-

tudes and divergent theories of the practitioners to a fuller appreciation of the problem.

If the reader is befuddled as he emerges from Part II, he can expect to find little solace in the main course: Part II, the Future of Collective Bargaining. The problem here is magnified and personalized, the idea being that public management cannot afford to ignore the collective bargaining movement or to approach the bargaining table with reluctance or animosity. Recognizing the lack of a standardized approach to collective bargaining (other than ostrich-oriented), the authors freely speculate and prescribe. For those unaccustomed to a bargaining situation, measures short of formal negotiations are presented and discussed. To the initiated, chapters are given over to the impact of collective bargaining upon public administration generally and public personnel administration in particular. As to the latter, an interesting discourse revolves about the merit system and its relationship to collective bargaining. In a final "Memo to Management," Warner and Hennessy bring to fruition their underlying intent: a warning against any twenty-five cent panacea. The book closes with an excellent set of appendices and an annotated bibliography, both of which enhance the value of the book to the practitioner.

To those who are interested in public employee collective bargaining as a political phenomenon, the book can be a valuable resource tool and should be taken with that expectation. To the public manager, for whom the book is directly intended, its broad coverage and moderate depth are ideal as a means to isolate issues and pose alternative questions and answers. The warning against a twenty-five cent panacea is well intended to dispel the who-has-change-for-a-quarter management approach.—DONALD P. SPRENGEL, *The University of Iowa*.

Economic Evaluation Of Urban Renewal: Conceptual Foundation Of Benefit-Cost Analysis.
JEROME ROTHENBERG. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967. Pp. xiii, 277. \$6.75.)

In its first nearly twenty years of existence the federal urban renewal program has aided American cities with some \$6 billion in grants for purposes of eliminating and preventing slums and blight. The political, social and economic impact of the urban renewal program has generated a relatively large volume of scholarly inquiries of varying interest to political scientists. Professor Rothenberg's study will more than likely be received by political scientists with equally varying attention.

This is clearly not a study of the politics of urban renewal. Rather, as one of a score of volumes published in the Studies of Government Fi-

nance series by the Brookings Institution, this work presents the dual thrust of a contribution to the extant literature on urban renewal and yet another formulation in the growing literature on cost-benefit analysis. The most significant achievement of the book is to be found in the formulation of a specific cost-benefit technique by which the urban renewal program may be evaluated in welfare economic terms. In presenting his analytic method of evaluation, Rothenberg discusses at length the problems of constructing "benefit" and "cost" categories and the difficulties in obtaining comparable data to fit those categories. The author's framework for analysis represents a healthy initial contribution for those attempting to evaluate the utility of the urban renewal program when contrasted with alternative methods of renewing American cities.

This study assembles an analytic framework applicable primarily to one of many urban renewal project types—that of residential redevelopment. Rothenberg's concentration on redevelopment projects is guided by the fact that this particular type of renewal program represents the largest and earliest program emphasis of the Urban Renewal Administration. Personally, I do not share the author's sometimes too uncritical view of the residential redevelopment program. For example, at one point Rothenberg concludes,

"In sum, there is recognition that slum removal in the past has imposed undesirably heavy burdens on slum dwellers, and changes are being made to correct this. They can be pushed further within the framework of redevelopment." (p. 226)

In fact, recent federal programmatic changes, resulting at least in part from burdens imposed on slum residents, have emphasized residential rehabilitation, Model Cities, rent supplements, Turnkey projects, etc., etc. These programs depart markedly from the redevelopment projects.

Rothenberg's book is not, nor was it intended to be, for the political scientist who is looking for a compendium of data on the urban renewal program. Only one serious attempt is made by the author, in chapter 11, to numerically illustrate his method of analysis. Five completed residential redevelopment projects in Chicago are probed for data amenable to analysis under the procedure developed in the study. The author explicitly declines to claim meaningful empirical findings here, but rather attempts to indicate how the method would be applied and what problems would have to be overcome in collecting the appropriate data. The variety of categories in Rothenberg's analytic procedure that are not amenable to statistical analysis points to the unresolved difficulties remaining in gathering data appropriate to the schema. In fact, this numerical illustration is of most value precisely in making us aware of the

limitations imposed on cost-benefit analysis by the types of data available. Taking the author on his own grounds however, he was not attempting an empirical study. We will have to await further study in the application of the method to available data.

A final reservation needs to be entered on the author's presentation of his cost-benefit procedure. Rothenberg in large part ignores the impact that the introduction of cost-benefit analysis would have on the decision-making process concerning the urban renewal program. That application of the author's analytic method by the ultimate decision makers *would* affect the direction of public policy is assured. But the questions of "in what direction" and "to what extent" remain unanswered in this presentation. The final two paragraphs of the book, which assess the role of cost-benefit analysis, are here viewed as incomplete.

What saves this volume from becoming a cookbook on "how to do cost-benefit analysis" is Rothenberg's often enlightened discussion of the substantive urban renewal program. In chapters 3 and 4, the author analyzes seven goals attributed to the urban renewal program. He finds the goals of the "mitigation of poverty" and the "provision of decent, safe, and sanitary housing in a suitable environment for all" to be in conflict with the goals of the "revival of downtown business areas of the central cities" and the "achievement and/or maintenance of an adequate middle-income household component in the central city." Later in the book, Rothenberg's introduction of the concept of "neighborhood externalities" elevates his assessment of the total contribution of the redevelopment program. The final two chapters offer an interesting discussion of the major criticisms of the urban renewal program and an evaluation of some alternatives to the urban renewal program as issues of public policy.

Despite the limitations and omissions of this study, we have here an important first step in conceptualizing a method by which to evaluate a major federal program affecting American cities in a time which begs for such evaluation.—DAVID J. OLSON, *University of Wisconsin*.

Food and Fiber in the Nation's Politics. By CHARLES M. HARDIN. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967. Pp. xi, 236.)

Students of agricultural politics and policy will be interested in this series of essays. Commissioned as a technical paper by the National Advisory Commission on Food and Fiber, they include studies of agriculture and the economic aspects of foreign policy, programs for price supports and allotments, soil conservation, agriculture and politi-

cal responsibility, and policy for agricultural sciences. Each essay sketches the history of public policy in a particular area of agriculture and joins it with an assessment of the equity of policy outcomes.

The author's thesis is a familiar one in political science. Agricultural policy making is fragmented, each fragment being comprised of administrative elites at the bureau level in USDA, legislative elites at the committee level, and interest group elites. Not only is the system fragmented, it is also highly decentralized with at least one USDA representative in virtually every county in the nation. Under conditions of fragmentation and decentralization, executive control is difficult either at the secretarial or presidential level. Consequently, there is no coherent national agricultural policy, in the author's view.

Some of the results of the operation of decentralized bargaining elites in agriculture are ably described. Overseas programs have been and are still heavily protective of established farm interests. The "farm program" for price supports, storage and allotments serves to provide greater advantages to established and relatively well off farmers than to those less well off and established. The well developed pattern of co-optation through the farmer-committee system and the extension program through land grant colleges, has resulted in a strong grass-roots clientele of better off farmers, and agriculturists. It has also resulted in policy outcomes that favor these interests in much the same way as independent regulatory commissions come to reflect the preferences of the elites of those regulated. Further, the field arm of the "farm program," the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, remains an important source of legislative patronage all the way from State committeemen to farmer fieldmen. Among the results of this system is the maintenance of discrimination toward Negro farmers and Negro land grant colleges in Southern and Border States, and continued strong support for tobacco and peanut interests. Similar patterns of racial discrimination and advantage to "better and more influential farmers" are described in the operations of the Soil Conservation Service.

The characterization of Agriculture as fragmented and decentralized is similar to assessments of other departments, notably Defense, HEW, HUD, and DOT. These findings square with the conclusion that elitism is a fundamental characteristic of large scale government. Although this may be empirically clear, it is painful on normative grounds to those who are concerned about the unequal distribution of advantages and disadvantages associated with democratic elitism. The author takes the normative question as his theme.

He insists that fragmented and decentralized policy making by agricultural elites which results in inequities in the distribution of advantages is "unconstitutional" because of the lack of "effective political responsibility and accountability." Al-

though he decries elitism and inequity in a democratic system, he does not wrestle with the fundamental normative questions either in terms of theory or specific policy recommendations.—H. GEORGE FREDERICKSON, *Syracuse University*.

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Political Participation in Communist China. By JAMES R. TOWNSEND. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, Pp. x, 233. \$5.50.)

In this admirable study, Professor James R. Townsend examines the ways in which the ordinary workers and peasants, men and women, of contemporary China participate in the political process. Throughout this century, in ever increasing numbers the people of China have become conscious of political developments and active participants in political life. Although the traditional Confucian regime disappeared in the Republican Revolution of 1911, traditional values continued to play their part in forming attitudes toward authority. The CCP was founded several years after the first great popular movement swept through China's cities in the wake of the May Fourth demonstrations of 1919. When the CCP came to power thirty years later, the Chinese revolutionary movement was directed against the "mutant tradition" of a transitional society disorganized by wars, piecemeal economic modernization, and chaotic political change. Wars and revolution made the Chinese masses long for a strong political regime, and the CCP demanded that literally everyone must participate in the regime it established.

Exploring the historical and ideological roots of the revolutionary style of political participation in Communist China, Professor Townsend discovers these roots in traditional Chinese attitudes toward authority, popular reaction to political and economic modernization in this century, the influence of Soviet Marxism, and the experience of the Chinese Communist elite in mobilizing the people for revolutionary and national war before 1949. Then he examines the CCP concept of political participation as it has evolved since 1945: the democratic dictatorship of several classes, party leadership in state organs, mass activism as the means to foster correctly oriented political consciousness, and the theory of non-antagonistic contradictions governing both the relations between leaders and masses and relations between theory and practice. He goes on with a lucid analysis of mass participation in the state structure and in non-governmental organizations.

By 1949, the CCP developed its own theory of

mass mobilization—the Maoist mass line. This theory or line is not based on Western democratic precedents but on traditional Chinese modes. That is, it inculcates values through face-to-face contacts, through small groups meeting in familiar social settings. New techniques such as *hsia-fang*—giving officials experience working directly with the masses—are intended to narrow the enormous gap between the masses and the modernized urban intellectuals. In actual practice, Professor Townsend asserts, the Maoist mass line may be directly antithetical to administrative modernization.

One of the great virtues of this study is its focus on the degree of conscious voluntary participation by ordinary Chinese in carrying out political decisions made by the party elite. Under the Communist regime, almost all Chinese must take part in political rituals as well as in normally non-political acts (like fly swatting, deep plowing, or stilt dancing) that the party has defined as politically supportive. The notion that guided involvement in implementing political decisions is a meaningful form of political activity runs counter to traditional democratic concepts of genuine political participation. Thus, for a modernizing state such as Communist China, Professor Townsend finds the concepts of political participation derived from democratic theory inadequate. The Chinese masses rarely participate spontaneously in the political process. Moreover, they have little influence, and certainly no direct impact, on the selection of Central Committeemen or on decisions made by the Politburo. The Chinese people may influence the development and operation of the political system either by cooperating willingly with Party policies or by dragging their feet. If most people readily cooperate, the system will require less compulsion than if some people play stupid and passively resists the implementation of Party policies.

For the purposes of his study, Professor Townsend has defined political participation as "all activities through which individuals consciously become involved in attempts to give a particular direction to the conduct of public affairs, excluding activities of an occupational or compulsory nature." (p. 4). This definition raises a most interesting and most difficult problem: measuring the

amount of spontaneity, voluntarism, and/or compulsion in the performance of political acts. There is no ready measure of the amount of voluntary participation in the Chinese Communist political system.

However, in Professor Townsend's judgment compulsion does not explain the Party's organizational success. Some of the Chinese masses who participate have a genuine ideological consciousness and commitment, but the voluntarism of the great majority rests on other factors: habitual obedience to authority, commitments to nationalism and progress, desire for personal advancement and social status, and shared interests in satisfying common needs. If popular participation gives a particular direction to the conduct of public affairs, that direction is not always one that the party would choose. Mass participation rarely reaches the level of conscious commitment that the Maoist doctrine of the mass line prescribes. The mass line of the party elite injects strong elements of continuity and predictability into Chinese politics, but its utopian claims have kept all political institutions outside the CCP in a constant state of flux. Mass political mobilizations without political institutionalization, the author suggests, may bring about disintegration and decay rather than development of a modern economy and a powerful state capable of meeting the needs of a developing nation. Distinguished by clarity in presentation, lucid, concise analysis, and broad historical perspectives, this book is a most valuable contribution to the growing body of literature on Communist China.—JOHN E. RUE, *Oakland University*.

Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change.

By ROBERT H. DIX. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 452. \$10.00.)

Among the lingering curses that traditionally have stultified the growth of a truly democratic politics within the nations of Latin America is the conspicuous absence of a genuinely pluralistic structure of interest groups and associations. In at least one Latin American nation, Colombia, there is cause to hope that tradition is now passing with the stormy vicissitudes of change. Robert H. Dix has shown, with assiduous care, that Colombia is moving toward a pluralistic democratic politics, albeit a planned democracy under the aegis of the *Frente Nacional*, and in which such traditional bulwarks of the *status quo* as Army, Church, and privileged oligarchy are showing incipient capacities for change. At the same time, however, he is able to see that the unique sort of consensus embodied in the *Frente Nacional*, i.e., placing severe constitutional limits upon entry of new power contenders into the political arena, may act con-

versely to frustrate the popular spirit of reform. The numerous crises that Colombia must solve in the coming decade are still without appropriate institutional channels for the articulation and redress of popular grievances and ills. Not the least of her ills are the violence, the continuing displacement of rural folk into the great cities, and the resultant burgeoning of slums and *barrios piratas*.

To those of us who have studied Colombia in field research situations (that were outside the towering shadow of any professional commitment to the United States' Alliance for Progress investment in that troubled nation) it may naturally appear that Colombia's violence reflects a direct attack upon the established order, its agents and instruments, as well as being symptomatic of the helpless futility of bringing about change by peaceful and rational means. Yet, Mr. Dix tells us "to qualify as genuinely revolutionary, violence must be centralized, and must attack the seats of political and administrative power, as well as the established social order. This the Colombian guerrillas never did." (p. 370) Instead, Dix portrays the violence as a process of catharsis in which sociopolitical-economic-ethnic and a cluttered mosaic of other violent and irreconcilable frustrations are sifted through the polarized conflict mechanism of the two traditional political parties. With the foregoing, this reviewer may disagree (as did later the Mexican journalist Mario Menéndez Rodríguez, editor of *Sucesos*, who lived during 1967 for one month with the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* in Colombia and was subsequently expelled from Colombia and later condemned for his published documentaries on guerrilla actions and goals). Dix tends to see Colombia's most poignant national problem as an inter-elite conflict rather than as a direct popular assault upon the established order itself. In so doing he does not do justice to the basic sociological fact that the violence, as Norman Bailey has argued, produced an accelerated overpoliticization of the peasantry which, in turn, generated a momentum of nihilism and anarchy that outran the capacity of the traditional order to contain that which it had itself nurtured.

I stress what appears to me as a shortcoming constructively and with full recognition of the obvious fact that Dix has produced an excellent work with which there is otherwise really very little to find fault. If he would permit me to indulge in two more observations that are slightly negative, I would say that 1) despite numerous caveats to the contrary Dix comes off sounding mildly like a partisan of the "modernizing elite" which, in Colombia, probably does not merit the honor of his confidence (any more than Rojas Pinilla merited that of Fluharty), and 2) he paints an exces-

sively laudatory picture of the North American influence in terms that would not be shared by the slum prisoners of "Alpujarra" in Medellín nor by those of "Chambacú" in Cartagena.

The historical, environmental, and theoretic sections of this work are superior. Dix has done a superlative job of bringing contemporary sociopolitical-economic theory to bear upon the ongoing traumata of a developing nation. Although this book may not be as colorful in its description of the ethos of Colombian political change as are the excellent works of Vernon Fluharty and John Martz, the Dix treatise approaches new dimensions of theoretic rigor in its introspection of a given Latin American political system and is an important complement to the foregoing works. Most important, however, Mr. Dix has given us a work that is not only intellectually stimulating but one that is a challenging instrument of pedagogy as well. I have assigned his book to graduate and undergraduate classes. That, of course, is the critical test, and an important one, especially for those struggling academic neophytes whose research funding limitations make Bogotá a place only to be read of.—KENNETH F. JOHNSON, *University of Southern California*.

Canadian Legislative Behavior: A Study of the 25th Parliament. By ALLAN KORNBERG. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967. Pp. vii, 161. \$2.95.)

The central assumption Professor Kornberg brings to this study is that "... legislative behavior is a product of the interaction between the individual legislator, the influence of his society, and the influence of the legislature per se." (p. v) To develop this conception he examines categories consonant with some recent studies of American legislatures. Data relevant to his concerns are gathered by structured interviews with a sample of 165 MPs.

In his early chapters, Professor Kornberg sets out his conceptual scheme, discusses the institutional setting of Parliament, and deals with such matters as social background, socialization, and recruitment. Though generally there is little that is startling in these chapters, his discussions of the role of the party as a recruitment agent and the importance of early political socialization are of some interest. The middle chapters deal with legislative goals and role orientations and their relationship to certain other variables. Goals and role orientations are in turn treated as dependent variables and correlated with a number of independent variables including both those of a pre-parliamentary and postparliamentary nature. Pre-parliamentary variables utilized include positions on a French Canadian Index, Political Environ-

ment Index, and Cosmopolitan Index, as well as education, father's occupation, prior political experience, and motives for becoming a candidate. Post-incumbency variables include such matters as party affiliation, urbanism of districts, perceptions of party competition, contact with constituents, and parliamentary experience. Articulated goals and roles are then employed as independent variables and correlated with differences in motives for maintaining a legislative career, differences in contacts with and attitudes toward constituents and interest groups, and attitudinal differences toward contrived conflict situations. In general (though not without exception), correlations that resulted from pre-incumbency variables ranged from minute to modest (the author wisely acknowledge this), those that resulted from post-incumbency variables were better, and those that ensued from using goals and role orientations as independent variables were more substantial. A chapter entitled "The Normativeness of Party," accents the author's findings that there is much ideological agreement within Canadian Parliamentary parties, that party discipline is not perceived by MPs as being unduly restrictive, and that local party organizations loom rather large in the lives of members of Parliament. In an excellent concluding chapter, the author generalizes that the bi-cultural theory of Canadian politics is largely unsubstantiated as it applies to the behavior of MPs, a fascinating conclusion in and of itself. He goes on to attempt to account for the paradox that about three-quarter of the MPs expressed policy aspirations as goals in a system that allows individual members scant opportunity to influence policy outcomes. Again, he attempts to explain why most pre-incumbency variables were not more meaningfully associated with legislative goals and role orientations. This, he suggests, is the influence of party writ large.

Acknowledging the importance of comparable categories to the development of systematic knowledge about legislatures, it is nonetheless to be regretted that professor Kornberg did not focus more sharply on a problem of particular importance to the Canadian Parliament. That is, given the fact that about one-third of the nation is separated sectionally, ethnically, linguistically and religiously, how is it that a body such as Parliament is able to engage in conflict management and yet keep that conflict in bounds? Certainly the author generates information relevant to this problem. The *two-party plus* national party system and the parliamentary system require that integration on a national scale take place continuously within each of the major parties; the largest proportion of MPs are motivated to keep up legislative careers for personal-instrumental reasons and thus must

maintain party and system to maintain their offices; and again, the recruitment and socialization roles of the major parties contribute to party cohesion and minimize the importance of differences in prelegislative experiences.

There is a danger in the area of legislative behavior, also manifested in Kornberg's work, of confusing what is being referred to as "role orientations" (utilized to mean expectations of a *single* partner in a potential role set) with the concept of "role" defined as *mutual* expectations. Data about the former result from responses to a few questions which ought to be accepted only provisionally; indeed, established in this way, role orientations may be little more than self-justifications. When conceived as mutual expectations, however, role can be a powerful concept. It can be usefully employed to study interactions in a decisional process, it allows the scholar to distinguish between institutional and personal forces, it directs attention to expectations that are in conflict, and it invites discussions of systemic integration via the notion of role complementarity. It is highly questionable whether the data being gathered under the rubric of role orientation are sufficient to deal with these problems.

Still, Professor Kornberg has accomplished a worthwhile task. He has carried out a quite comprehensive analysis of the Canadian Parliament utilizing categories which facilitate the development of a comparative dimension. His book ought to receive wide use in legislative behavior courses, even in those courses where the focus is primarily on American legislatures.—DEAN L. YARWOOD, *University of Missouri, Columbia*.

The Development of Modern Nigeria. OKEI ARIKPO. (Baltimore: Penguin African Library, Pp. 176. \$1.25.)

To Americans, Nigeria resembles the little girl of doggerel fame: "when she was good, she was very very good, and when she was bad, she was horrid." Any current study of Africa's most ethnically complex and populous country faces the dual and seemingly contradictory task of explaining 1) how such a diverse group of peoples could attain independence as a single sovereign state featuring such aspects of Western democracy as multi-party competition and a relatively free press, and 2) why Nigeria should suddenly have turned "horrid," with two military coups, the massacre of some 30,000 Ibos, the secession of its Eastern Region (Biafra), and a tragic civil war occurring within the past two years. The contradiction is only apparent, as Okei Arikpo shows in this little book, for the very diversity of a country can pull it in two quite different directions. On the one

hand, diversity may convince many leading citizens, including the author, of the necessity and desirability of what David Apter has termed a "reconciliation system"; on the other hand it may contribute to the breakdown of the political system itself once the fragile institutions of unity cease in fact to reconcile the interests of major groups within the polity. Although most of the book was written prior to the demise of the First Republic, one is made aware throughout of the dual potential of diversity, and a final chapter and Additional Preface analyze these failures to reconcile ethnic, regional, and generational interests which precipitated the military coups of 1966.

Mr. Arikpo's background enables him to write a well-balanced and objective appraisal of the development of his own country. As a member of an Eastern Minority group, he analyzes events without obviously favoring any of the major contending "nationalities"—Yoruba, Ibo, or Hausa-Fulani,—and he points up the important mediating and centralizing role played by minorities in the political and cultural life of Nigeria. As a one-time politician, the author writes knowingly of the pressures and temptations to which political leaders are subject, and he quite properly emphasizes that the allocation—and withholding—of amenities to particular communities is a central concern of politicians in new states such as Nigeria. As an administrator—he has been Secretary of the National Universities Commission—Mr. Arikpo discusses realistically some of the problems confronting top bureaucrats. How, for example, can educational planners cope with massive unemployment among primary school leavers and with simultaneous shortages of high-level manpower in certain vital fields?

The book is least successful in dealing with the forces of tribal and regional chauvinism, which the author decries as "incompatible with the development of a rising educated populace and an expanding modern economy." (p. 11) Mr. Arikpo fails to point out that such chauvinism is dependent on these very aspects of social mobilization for its emergence and maintenance. In a traditional society "tribalism" scarcely exists, for social relations occur at a face-to-face and/or kinship level. With modernization different ethnic groups converge on the city, where they become acutely aware of what separates them from each other—including different opportunities and incentives to modernize—while engaging in a new kind of competition for scarce political and economic resources. And the very involvement of Nigeria's regions in raising per capita income and extending literacy has accentuated conflict among the regions and between them and the federal government. Nigeria is an excellent example of the dual

potential of social mobilization for disintegration as well as integration, and this second set of dualities might have been stressed as strongly as the first.—DAVID B. ABERNETHY, *Stanford University*.

The Prime Minister's Policy Speech: A Case Study in Televised Politics. By COLIN A. HUGHES AND JOHN S. WESTERN. (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1966. Pp. xvi, 227. \$4.50 (Aust.), paper.)

In November, 1963, the then Australian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, produced an innovation in Australian politics by opening his party's parliamentary campaign with a televised policy speech to the nation rather than with the customary personal address to a gathering in his own constituency. Hughes and Western's *The Prime Minister's Policy Speech* is a report on their study of the impact of this political stimulus on a sample of Australian television viewers.

The authors attempt to measure this influence through analysis of change in the candidate, party, and issue orientation of their respondents after viewing the speech. The primary dependent variables studied are images of Menzies and his Liberal Party, plus knowledge of and affect toward issues raised in the campaign. Other than exposure to the televised address, the independent variables utilized by Hughes and Western consist of respondent characteristics such as educational level, objective and subjective social class, and partisanship. The conceptual framework for the study is provided by cognitive dissonance theory.

In general, the findings presented by Hughes and Western are consistent with prior studies of political perception in that partisanship is found to structure cognition and individuals tend to change their opinions in ways that lead to "cognitive balance." However, the authors attempt to cover a broader range of topics as well, extending from the sources and effects of "radicalism" to causes and consequences of partisanship.

A basic strength of the Hughes and Western examination consists of their effort, both in the construction of instruments and in the analysis of data, to relate their research effort to prior studies on comparable topics. Thus the authors are able to present some interesting semi-replications in a different social setting of prior research by such investigators as Pool, Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, and Steiner.

Weaknesses of the study stem, at least in part, from the problem of inadequate time for prior planning which is typically involved in the study of elections in political systems where the timing of the election is left to the discretion of political leaders, rather than occurring on a fixed, periodic basis. The brief period of time between announce-

ment of the Prime Minister's intention to call an election and the presentation of his policy speech precluded the possibility of pre-testing the questionnaire and thus resulted in several lacunae. In addition, the results of the authors' untried sampling approach were disappointing. Five hundred names were carefully drawn from electoral rolls in Canberra with the assistance of a table of random numbers but, in the end, doubtless due to the small number responding to the invitations, questionnaires of any spouses and interested friends who showed up were tabulated along with those of the selected respondents. A basic N of 262 was thus attained.

That the variable deemed by the authors to be of greatest importance to the study—partisanship—was tapped by so questionable an indicator is particularly regrettable. Instead of determining the political orientation of respondents by asking how they intended to vote, their party identification, or their voting record, for this study partisanship was obtained by asking, "If the election were being held today, which party would you want to win?" Unfortunately, this question was not posed to the panel in the initial questionnaire, but only after exposure to the Prime Minister's speech. To attribute primary causal influence to partisanship measured in this way is clearly tautological, as is exemplified by a hypothetical "independent" voter who, due to his favorable reaction to the Prime Minister's speech, subsequently indicates the Liberal Party as the one which he would want to win. In Hughes and Western's study, his "partisanship" would be interpreted as influencing his perception of the speech.

Another weakness of the study derives from an attempt to present more data than the authors are able to properly analyze within the pages they devote to them. Some examples of problems arising from the attempt to cover too much data are the presentation of four rather complex tables sequentially without a word of discussion intervening (pp. 166-169), and a two-sentence "analysis" of a table containing 48 entries (p. 55).

Finally, this study would have benefited from greater attention to details of data analysis. Such occasional errors as percentage breakdowns based on N's as low as four, five, and six respondents, percentages which could not possibly be derived from the bases given, and inexplicable changes in the base N from table to table mar an otherwise sophisticated analysis.

Hughes and Western introduce their report with the not untypical caveat that "our study may best be regarded as a pilot project for larger, more expensive research which could perhaps provide more satisfactory answers." While the book contains findings of undoubted interest to those con-

cerned with mass media influence on public opinion, this judgment by the authors appears to be based not on false modesty, but on a valid appraisal of their effort.—KENNETH H. THOMPSON, *University of Southern California*.

Parliament Factions and Parties: The First 30 Years of Responsible Government in New South Wales, 1856-1889. By P. LOVEDAY AND A. W. MARTIN. (Melbourne University Press. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967. Pp. xiii, 207. \$10.50.)

Political Scientists seem to be increasingly realizing that generalizations about politics can—and should—be tested as much by historical data as by data describing present situations. For this reason political scientists interested in the dynamics of party systems should find this book invaluable. It is a scholarly and readable account of politics in New South Wales, Australia, between the granting of responsible government in 1856 and the development of a more or less stable two-party system toward the end of the '80's.

This was a period in which politics was carried on not by the political parties usually associated with parliamentary government but by a fluid faction system that had no basis in the electorate and could usually create only impermanent majorities in Parliament. The factions themselves were composed of small groups of men who shifted freely from faction to faction but frequently stayed together for long periods. The authors trace the development of various factional alignments with admirable clarity, and argue, despite some preconceptions to the contrary, that the faction system was not incompatible with good—that is to say, stable—government.

But the most interesting aspect of this book is the way in which it traces the evolution of the faction system into the subsequent two-party system. Given the situation as it existed between 1856 and 1880, it does not seem that there was anything inevitable about a two-party system. Its important features were a small fragmented electorate, and the absence of any major economic crisis. As Schattschneider suggests is normal, it seems that the factions did seek to gain strength by mobilizing the electorate, but this mobilizing did not or could not take a form of permanent party organization; rather, according to the authors, "they acted covertly, seeking through widespread 'wire pulling' to exploit a variety of local conflicts to promote the election of members likely to support them in Parliament." Under more or less prosperous conditions and given the isolation and localism of the electorate, the bargains developed in this way between members of Parliament and more or less unorganized interests apparently kept both satisfied. Because there were

no great issues cutting across the electorate the incapacity of coalition majorities to enact sustained legislative programs was not of great significance; the faction system could, and did, provide perfectly adequate "housekeeping" legislation for the colony.

The givens of the situation began to change by the end of the '70's. On the one hand, the size of the electorate grew, and its fragmentation declined. On the other hand, various political organizations in the electorate began to develop and search for representation in Parliament. When the boom finally broke a few years later the resistance of the faction system to such demands also collapsed. The authors give a fascinating account of the way in which the demands of these non-Parliamentary groups and the power-seeking of factional leaders adapted to each other in the developing party system.

As all good case studies should be, this one is highly suggestive. Not only does it give a fine description of coalition formation in a situation where the major payoffs seem to have been the unashamed enjoyment of power, but it also shows quite clearly that under some circumstances a parliamentary system can function adequately short of a developed party system. It is a valuable addition to the party literature.—JOHN ORBELL, *University of Oregon*.

The Commonwealth Bureaucracy. By GERALD E. CAIDEN. (Melbourne University Press. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967. Pp. xiii, 445. \$16.50.)

Commonwealth Bureaucracy is a comprehensive analysis of personnel administration in the Australian civil service. Caiden is concerned not merely with all administrative agencies comprising the Commonwealth government, but also, though less directly, with the role played by the public bureaucracy in Australian society. Despite this wider interest, Caiden's approach is quite straightforward. He first describes the environment, role, nature, organization, and composition of the public bureaucracy. He then analyzes the variety of personnel authorities and controls. Finally, he examines personnel structure and classification, recruitment, promotion, remuneration, fringe benefits, employee rights and obligations.

As no self-respecting work on public administration would be complete without a full offering of suggested reforms, Caiden closes his study with a series of intelligent and far-reaching proposals for improving the Commonwealth Public Service. Given his extensive interviews with service officials, Caiden's proposals require serious consideration by scholars and administrators alike. He is clearly sympathetic with the recommendations of the Boyer Committee (1958) and expects them to

prove functionally necessary for a bureaucracy capable of serving Australian society in the decades ahead. His own recommendations go beyond those of the Boyer Committee, and are guided by both his sense of the hostility to change and his somber observation that "the first point that must be stressed about the Commonwealth Service . . . is that nobody knows how efficient it really is or how capable are the staff." (434) Given these premises, it is no surprise that even Caiden's committee like prose is redolent with a restrained desperation about the need for radical changes. This need is underscored by the dynamic role public bureaucracy is coming to play in Australia. According to Caiden, it is the "most important single organization . . . combining the skill and talents of Australians and utilizing them for tackling future problems." (vii) It is the "national unifier, largest economic force, major socializing influence" (4); the "most important social institution" (27); a "major egalitarian force . . . irrespective of . . . the party or coalition in office" (29); and withal the bearer of "new responsibilities . . . detrimental to democratic political processes." (23) Though these alarming assertions tend to be unargued and somewhat impressionistic, they do lead one to wonder whether it is the Australian future we are headed for.

Despite its late development, the Australian public service displays many of the difficulties of any modern bureaucracy. But its long-term troubles are the product of a developing system searching for its own administrative style. A richer insight into this aspect of the subject is provided by Caiden's earlier and in many ways more interesting study of the history of personnel administration in the Australian Public Service (*Career Service, 1965*). The Australian system was the product of a fusion of American and British approaches to public administration. This is evident both in its concrete institutional arrangements and practices and in the cultural patterns of Australian society and the public service. Nothing else explains the number (29), vigor, and retrograde outlook of staff associations, i.e., civil service unions. One of the more fascinating elements in the situation, especially in its historical dimensions, is the "mix" of deferential, formal, and class-conscious mores with an informal and egalitarian ethos. Another expression of this has been the general resistance within the service to tougher meritocratic policies in the recruitment, training, and promotion of an administrative elite.

While *Commonwealth Bureaucracy* occasionally resembles a government organizational manual, there is much in it of interest for students of comparative administration. To an American raised amidst lush theories of developmental change and bureaucracy, the overall value of the book is

marred by a certain lack of theoretical focus. Caiden wavers between employing a strict Weberian model of bureaucracy and utilizing the perspectives established either by the sociology of informal organization or the group theory of administrative pluralism. His tie-in of culture and bureaucracy is suggestive but not systematically explored, while his description of the functional role of the bureaucracy is not wholly supported by empirical evidence. A more explicit theoretical approach might well have provided Caiden with a discriminating cutting-edge for his general analysis. I do not mean to detract from the admirable product of his exhaustive and pioneering researches. This is as definitive an examination of Australian personnel administration as we are likely to have for some time. Perhaps Professor Caiden will provide us with a more generalized study of Australian bureaucracy in the future.—HENRY J. STECK, *SUNY, Cortland*.

Lenin: The Man, The Theorist, The Leader A Reappraisal. Ed. by LEONARD SCHAPIRO AND PETER REDDAWAY. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. x, 317. \$7.50.)

Fifty years after the birth of the Soviet state, its founding father has become the subject of a growing body of literature. The large volume of Soviet publications in this case feeds Western scholarship because the former contains many bits and pieces of hitherto unknown or unpublished material; and there still remain sources to be tapped. Some of the contributors of the volume under review make use of selected new information. But they do not do so systematically, and in the bibliography even the Soviet works that may have been cited in the text are omitted. Western sources fare better, although here too the list of works consulted is spotty. Most of the contributions themselves fall short of systematic coverage of their topics. They are essays or summaries rather than scholarly monographs. In a book setting out to "reappraise" Lenin this is perfectly justifiable, and my mentioning it does not imply a qualitative judgment.

Still, collective works of this kind are inevitably of uneven quality. Some of the chapters contain brilliant observations or novel statements of great interest to the scholar; I would single out the contributions of Reddaway, Erickson, and Nove in this regard. Some others barely go beyond summarizing materials with which undergraduates in this field are likely to be familiar.

This qualitative unevenness may be related to a strain between two aims motivating the contributors—that of making a scholarly assessment of Lenin's thoughts and activities, as against that of giving an ideological critique of his failures and inadequacies. The tone for this second theme is

struck in the Introduction, where the senior editor contrasts socialist dreams with Lenin's achievements and then proceeds to question Lenin's sanity (at least after 1917). To be sure, it would be impossible and undesirable to make a rigid distinction between scholarly appraisal and ideological critique. But it does seem that those chapters in which the note of indignation and scorn is toned down happen to be the more rewarding ones for the scholar.

On the whole, a negative attitude toward Lenin predominates among the contributors. Yet, almost as if despite their efforts, they manage to convey an image of him that brings out his versatility, depth, and political genius. Victor Frank, in a thoughtful essay, discusses his place within the Russian intelligentsia, which he defines in a highly stimulating fashion. Peter Reddaway quite surprisingly reveals the depth of Lenin's devotion to art, literature, and music. J. C. Rees researches, in fair and balanced fashion, the old scholastic question of whether or not Lenin was a Marxist. John Erickson's brilliant piece on Lenin's crucial and successful role as a civil war leader is a fine contribution. So is Alec Nove's assessment of Lenin's strength and weakness as a political economist (Nove rates him more highly than Western writers have in the past). Henry Willetts points out that his analysis of peasant life was thorough, original, and scholarly, albeit polemical. Had he given up politics in 1900, he argues, Lenin would be remembered as an expert on agrarian Russia. Both Willetts and Nove discuss Lenin's least well-known work the monumental treatise on the development of Russian capitalism, which Willetts dubs the best Marxist book since *Das Kapital*. Mary Holdsworth's summary of Lenin's views on the national question is thoughtful, but contains no new insights.

I find the chapter on Lenin as a philosopher unimpressive and a bit incoherent, and the appraisal of Lenin as a tactician unconvincing. It overstates the differences between his machiavellian amorality and that of other politicians and does so probably because it is based excessively on a conspiratorial interpretation of bolshevism. This in turn results from taking bolshevik delusions about their own ability to plan, manage, and control political events much too seriously. At the same time, and quite inconsistently with his conspiratorial view the essay on Lenin as a tactician underestimates his shrewdness and his political realism. In retrospect, this political horse sense rather than some abstract operational code appear to be the secret of his great successes.

Although the book discusses Lenin from almost every conceivable angle, there are two topics I would have liked to see added. One is Lenin's

views on organization and his activities as the master of a political machine. The other is the question concerning his qualities as a charismatic leader; and, needless to say, the combination of charismatic and bureaucratic leadership is so rare and remarkable that, from the point of view of the political scientist, the omission of these two topics is deplorable.—ALFRED G. MEYER, *The University of Michigan*.

Islam in the Soviet Union. BY ALEXANDRE BENNIGSEN AND CHANTAL LEMERCIER-QUELQUEJAY. (New York: Frederick A. Prager, 1967. Pp. xiii, 272. \$7.00.)

This book represents a remarkable success in condensation and coverage; seldom has so much been said so well with such brevity. The sources cited are few, but they include essentially all of the best ones. These authors know their subject thoroughly, and their outstanding competence shows through on every page. Their knowledge of Islam especially adds a depth to this study of twentieth century Soviet Central Asia, and other Muslim areas of the USSR, which is lacking in most other discussion of it.

It falls short of greatness because it lacks a general theory, of the middle or any other range. It offers no theoretical or generalized conclusions or even suggestions about Soviet nationalities policy generally, about the USSR and its government as reflected in the area, about nationalism, or religion, or even Islam-Communism attraction or repulsion. The book is weakest in economics and politics, and strongest in cultural analysis. The handling of nationalism, however, is careful and sophisticated; indeed the whole book possesses these qualities.

The authors deal primarily with the twentieth century, but provide good and solid discussion of pre-1917 as well as of post-1917. Their consideration of the Tatars and Kazan represents a significant addition to the usual limitation of studies of Islam in Russia to Soviet Central Asia. Some references to Muslims outside of Russia appear, but no serious comparative study is attempted. Throughout, there appears a neat and sophisticated balancing of generalization and detail, and indication of what united and what separated the Islamic peoples of Russia. Creative and substantive footnotes add biographical and other information of great interest.

It also is a tribute to Geoffrey Wheeler that he arranged the publication of, and wrote a generous introduction to, a book dealing with "his" subject, a book providing what is probably a better introduction to Soviet Central Asia than his own works.

This small book constitutes a significant contri-

bution, and its authors deserve high praise.—ROBERT A. RUPEN, *University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.*

Resistance: The Political Autobiography of Georges Bidault. BY GEORGES BIDAULT. trans. by Marianne Sinclair. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967, Pp. xx, 348 \$6.95.)

"*Toute ma vie je me suis fait une certaine idée de la France.*" So General de Gaulle begins his famous war memoirs. *Resistance* reveals that Bidault too has a certain vision of France, and the surprising thing is how much it overlaps with his arch antagonist's. Both men have an obsessive notion of a mythical France, the center of civilization; are exasperated by the real France and by flesh-and-blood Frenchmen; and manifest unmentionable contempt for French parliamentarianism, political parties, and public opinion. The one refers to the "plague" of democracy, the other to the "vomit" of party haggling. Both are Christians without much charity for their opponents; show a puritan-like intolerance for human foibles; and would obviously like to substitute order, piety, and a somewhat prudish temperance for the virtues (or vices) that they see currently dominant in the lives of their countrymen. And both, needless to say, are massive egocentrics whose vanity stands out even in a nation whose politicians are not particularly noted for their personal modesty. The fact that both had similar upbringings—rigid bourgeois family; provincial setting; Catholic education with its emphasis on patriotic songs and legends about past French glories—accounts no doubt for much of this overlap.

And yet, of course, there are major differences. Chief among them is that de Gaulle, for all his lofty conceptions and pronouncements, is a superb opportunist who has uncanny ability to detect future developments in any situation and no inhibitions about shifting his position in order to drift along with them. In this he demonstrates consummate political skill; "things being what they are," his favorite catchphrase, is after all only a variant on the timehonored truism that "politics is the art of the possible." The secret of the General's success resides in his mastery of the politics of the possible while disguising this opportunism by means of his carefully cultivated inscrutability and his no less carefully conceived highminded rhetoric. Bidault does not apparently understand this secret. By all odds he should be the supreme political intriguer since he showed such amazing staying power in the unsettled political situation of the Fourth Republic; between 1944 and 1954, he was twice Premier and held the post of either Foreign Minister or Vice-Premier almost without interruption. Yet he turns out on the strength of

his book to be hopelessly rigid in his beliefs and quixotically devoted to futile causes. His doctrinal honesty is what has made him so vulnerable to a masterful operator like de Gaulle who plainly used him, not only in 1944, but in 1958 as well. Ironical as it may seem, his downfall derives from the fact that he has the stubborn courage of de Gaulle's convictions.

Take his impenitent colonialism. Many are the reviewers who have contrasted Bidault unfavorably with de Gaulle on this sore; and if a man's actions are to be judged by their consequences rather than by the motives behind them, then the comparison is undoubtedly just. Without question de Gaulle performed a signal service for France in extricating it from its imperial tangles in Africa. But if we ask what the General really aspired after at the time and perhaps continues to believe in? In this case Bidault may have something when he speaks of hypocrisy. At any rate, the General now and then forgets himself and lets the cat out of the bag, as in his April 1961 sneer about "improvised States" dominating the UN General Assembly. There is nothing new in this stratagem of identifying a purely national mission with the greater interests of mankind, especially when that mission aims at increasing the rank and power of one's own nation at the expense of an alleged hegemon; the heavyfooted leaders of Wilhelmian Germany, for instance, found themselves urged to adopt it by liberal imperialists like Hans Delbrueck and Friedrich Naumann. But whereas de Gaulle can readily appreciate such a maneuver, Bidault, the frustrated idealist, cannot. Not only is he an old fashioned colonialist who sees only childlike savages, godless terrorists, and Red troublemakers afoot in the new nations of the third world, but in addition he is absolutely opposed, *on principle*, to de Gaulle's policy of maintaining French influence there by means of extensive foreign aid.

Bidault must thus be counted an honest man in expressing these views at some length in *Resistance*. They are clearly the views that have driven him to the desperate course that he took over Algeria. As for the quality of these views—this, obviously, is a different matter. It is a strange process of mental blockage that prevents a former President of the National Council of the French Resistance from grasping that others, too, may desire national freedom. Seen in this light, Bidault's formation of a second National Council in 1962, with its links to the terrorists of the Secret Army Organization, looms as a grisly parody of patriotism grown narrow and idealism gone sour.

Resistance is sub-titled a political autobiography. This is not completely justified by its contents. It is more in the nature of an embittered

and combative indictment of the author's enemies, which seem to include nearly everybody active in French politics but especially de Gaulle. But the abuse and egomania that pervade its pages do not make it an effective polemic, and it is decidedly inferior as an assault on Gaullist politics to Paul Reynaud's *La Politique Etrangère du Gaullisme*. One does not expect a hounded exile to be charitable to his enemies, but \$6.95 seems a lot to pay for a protracted outpouring of invective and regrets.—MICHAEL R. GORDON, *University of California, Santa Barbara*.

Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military Relations in Modern France. By PHILIP C. F. BANKWITZ. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. xiii, 445. \$10.00.)

In much of the world, the military *coup d'état* and "man-on-horseback" are such pervasive and recurrent phenomena as to constitute almost "natural" features of the political landscape. That the great majority of these more overt forms of military intervention have occurred in non-Western settings sometimes tends to obscure the fact that, even in so-called "developed" industrial societies, military men have not infrequently risen to challenge civilian supremacy. This stark reality is no more better illustrated than in the example of modern France where, twice within the past decade alone, the army has directly intervened in domestic politics. The French deviation from what many would regard as the "normal" Western pattern of an apolitical military has increasingly attracted the interest of social scientists and Philip Bankwitz' study is but the most recent addition to a growing literature on the subject.

In focusing upon the inter-war years, Professor Bankwitz examines a particular period of French civil-military relations which until now had received little scholarly attention. Although one might argue with the author's premise that the army's act of disobedience in 1940 was of decisive import in structuring its later de-stabilizing role in the Fourth and Fifth Republics, there can be little question that it did set an unfortunate precedent fully capable of finding future emulation. Central to the discussion is the personage of General Maxime Weygand and the complex set of psychological, situational, and environmental factors that are seen as contributing to his leading role in June 1940 in toppling the Reynaud government. Widely rumored as the natural son of Leopold II, Weygand is revealed to be of illegitimate Belgian origin, driven throughout his military career by an unconscious search for personal identity. Having entered St. Cyr in 1885, emerging from the Dreyfus affair "never convinced that Dreyfus was innocent" (p. 9), and having earned a reputation as a "star to watch" while instructing at Saumur, the

future Chief of the General Staff is said to have found a father figure in Foch while serving as the Marshall's much misunderstood staff officer in World War I. Foch, according to the author, embodied precisely those qualities of authority and acceptance that Weygand's past had denied him and in so doing fulfilled "one of [his] . . . great psychological needs" (p. 14).

But it was with the army itself that Weygand is seen to have found his primary sense of identity and over which he came to exercise an almost paternal protectiveness in a post-war France whose governments displayed neither the authority nor the apparent "understanding" of the military which Weygand, on the personal level, had found in Foch. Threats to the military interest are described as deriving from a variety of sources during Weygand's tenure as army chief from 1930 to 1935 but those dealt with in most detail are the crises over manpower levels, disarmament, and doctrine. Professor Bankwitz views these as the base factors "poisoning" civil-military rapport in the 1930's and in terms of which Weygand became convinced "that the entire military system was facing annihilation by a historically antimilitaristic enemy" (p. 48).

What little theoretical meat that the book offers is contained largely in Chapter 6 where Professor Bankwitz attempts to weave each of the above variables—i.e. psychological, situational, and environmental—into a coherent explanatory framework. The result is somewhat disappointing and involves a rather disorganized and inconclusive effort to establish a linkage between these and the transformation of Weygand (and much of the army command) from a mood of unconditional to conditional obedience to the government. What emerges out of all this is the hardly original conclusion that: "Guardians of the besieged Army, many high officers were becoming protectors of the harassed country as well. They no longer felt themselves to be the instrument of the Government's policy but rather the true representatives of the nation itself." (p. 240.) How often have we been offered virtually the same explanation of an identification between the military's institutional interests and those of the "nation" with reference to civil-military relations in other contexts?

The only really novel twist involves the author's persistent though fleeting references to an alleged relationship between Weygand's inner needs and his ultimate actions. The closest that Professor Bankwitz comes to articulating this is on page 232 where he describes the army as "Weygand's only 'real' family" after a "harsh and empty childhood." Throughout, Weygand is portrayed sympathetically as a political novice having little or no conception of the changing balance of power between the military and government

that developed in the waning days of the Third Republic. Thus, we are told in the conclusion that the "General's very professionalism—the totalization of his life in the service of the Army which had made him into a man—was responsible for the interlocking series of illusions and defenses which robbed him of self-awareness, deprived him of an accurate view of the world, and blinded him to the true significance of his most important acts." (p. 379). However, with the evidence presented, one could just as easily take the opposite and equally popular point of view—namely, that there was a deliberate effort by Weygand and the army command between the wars to undermine civilian authority.

Balanced against these negative comments, is the fact that Professor Bankwitz has produced a substantial and impressively researched work of history and it is highly recommended to students having an interest in contemporary French politics. Unfortunately, for those of us with a more far-ranging commitment to the general study of civil-military relations, it provides few new insights. —JOHN N. COLAS, *The American University*.

The Social Programs of Sweden, A Search for Security in a Free Society. By ALBERT H. ROSENTHAL. With a Foreword by Marquis Childs. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967. Pp. xvi, 193. \$6.00.)

With his subtitle, *A Search for Security in a Free Society*, Rosenthal proffers an interesting and potentially useful approach to the rather old, fundamental, and unsolved conflict between individual needs and social responsibility. It is an approach which has particular political address to a community of under-developed public philosophy in which political ideas are more concerned with eighteenth century civil rights and protection of the individual against supposed tyranny, than with looking forward to government being a useful means to solving hard-pressing common problems. Security versus freedom is, however, a very ambitious concept and difficult to realize as a fundamental feature in a rather limited research project.

According to Rosenthal, "Politicians are applauded when they object to increased governmental activity—especially at the federal level. Most Americans rarely think of the over-all question of the role of government or consider it in philosophical terms" (p. ix). "... many ... look at government as an 'enemy' rather than as a 'servant' ... take from you your money and your good old-fashioned rights. ... [identify] the growing national government as the paramount threat to our way of life" (p. 170).

As pointed out by Marquis Childs in the Foreword, "There has been a great deal of emotional writing in this area ... now comes an author

ideally equipped to appraise ... by reason of his background" (p. vi f.). Childs may well be right, but Rosenthal succumbs to attributing the common antagonism toward the role of the growing national government to a basic question, giving his book doubtful political and partisan overtones.

The Preface, and also the concluding chapter, Chapter 8—Freedom in a Secure Society—are mainly concerned with the problem of balancing basic social needs with maximum personal freedom. There is no attempt at a systematic theoretical analysis—neither an outline of the general concept nor a statement of the criteria and premises of the study. The phenomena are merely presented and loosely described as they are observed, without any relationship to patterns of political theory. Not even the two main terms, security and freedom, are given operational definitions, and this despite the fact that the theme has been a matter of ideological and political controversy for more than 200 years. Nor do the theoretical components seem to have any function for the body of the book, apart from being a kind of reminder of interesting comments and footnotes, to the empirical description.

The main part of the book, however, lives up to its title and the author's statement in the Preface: "This book was undertaken on the premise that a description of the major Swedish social programs would be of value to Americans and others seeking to improve the social programs in their countries" (p. xi). Those who are seeking insight into a highly integrated social and political system will undoubtedly benefit from studying this book about the Swedish experiment. The growth and kinds of social programs are briefly described in Chapters 1 to 5: Growth of Social Programs; The Social Security Programs; Health Insurance; Public Health; and Welfare and Related Programs. The author has to a great extent achieved accurate descriptions free from evaluations.

Chapter 6 is devoted to the relationship between—The Government and the Individual. Rosenthal introduces the chapter with: "An understanding of the administration of the social programs in Sweden requires some knowledge of basic concepts, structure, and operation of the government. Most important, this understanding must include a comprehension of the confidence the citizen has in, and his relationship to, the government" (p. 92). It is probably true that confidence or support and structure of a political system are expected to be mutual variables in over-all decision-making, but the description of the public institutions involved, although accurate, does not add much light to the complicated and fundamental relationships mentioned. The lack of a theoretical approach is obvious.

Chapter 7 deals with: A Program—Comparisons

Between Sweden and the United States. Rosenthal finds that "examination of the similar social programs in the two countries indicates a striking . . . similarity in both stated objectives and accomplishments" (p. 137). "Comparative statistics must be reviewed in the light of the differing classifications of welfare programs used in the two countries as well as the federal-state character of the major programs in the United States" (p. 152). It is a moot question, however, how fruitful it is to directly compare statistics from two such different countries, particularly in relation to a freedom-security approach.

Finally, as previously mentioned, Chapter 8 is devoted to Rosenthal's basic concern—freedom versus security. He presumes that Sweden is almost a "secure society" and attempts to discuss whether this has brought serious reductions in individual liberty and free enterprise. In his examination of individual liberty, role of government, free enterprise, loss of incentive, cost of social programs, and moral standards, he does not find any serious threats to the freedom of individuals. Individual rights, so far as they have any isolated meaning, seem to be taken care of through mechanisms strongly integrated in the system. This is not at all surprising in such a highly developed and stable political system, but it may calm some of the more fanatic and fearful proclaimers against ultimate freedom.

Rosenthal's book presents a worthwhile collection of data and an excellent description of a highly developed social security system and its related political system. He has undoubtedly made many correct and important observations and hopefully will soon follow them up with an effort at systematic theory. In the meantime, this book will serve as an introduction both for politicians and political science students.—ARNE J. STOKKE, *University of Oslo*.

The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century. BY JOHN LEDDY PHELAN. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967. Pp. xvi, 415. \$10.)

Not everyone has heard of the Kingdom of Quito, which never existed. The subject of the book is the Audiencia of Quito, a division of the viceroyalty of Lima and ancestor of the state of Ecuador (although the map in the text gratuitously excludes modern Ecuador from the territory of the audiencia). An audiencia was also called a "reino," which usually meant kingdom; hence the title.

Why a longish book on a relatively minor subdivision of the Spanish empire, of no great economic or political importance, during a period when nothing of outstanding significance occurred? For one thing, the author ranges without

obvious scruples for relevance over the whole of the Spanish American empire and beyond and through the entire period of its existence and after, bringing in many facts, from the world-wide conflict of Spain and the Netherlands to the contemporary boundary dispute of Peru and Ecuador, and the incidence of measles in modern Chile. For another, Prof. Phelan, by diligent work in archives, especially in Madrid, garnered a large amount of information, especially from reports of an inquisitorial inspection of the Audiencia of Quito from 1624 to 1637, which washed publicly a lot of very dirty linen. He has woven his facts into an unusual and fairly readable book, and he has demonstrated again that North American scholarship can devote far more intellectual energy to the study of Latin American nations than these devote to themselves. However, he apparently felt that laboriously mined details must never be thrown away, and he generously gives us all of them.

One can here, consequently, learn much of a section of the Spanish empire, its population, its primitive economy, its society and government. The picture is not pretty: sweat shops of chained Indians; class divisions and antagonisms, and an extraordinary amount of factionalism among the elite; immorality, with much detail of who was whose mistress for how long; omnipresent venality and corruption; a Church given to ritual, splendor, and corporate self-seeking, as the Spanish clergy refused to dilute the lucrative priesthood by opening it to Indians; and a complicated and inefficient administrative system, designed, one gathers, to keep maximum authority in the hands of men in Madrid who were unable to govern effectively because of distance and their own confusion. These are all familiar from other studies of Spanish colonial rule, but it is well to have them further documented.

In areas of interest to political scientists, however, Prof. Phelan does not have much to offer. He makes much of the fact that the king, although he was theoretically absolute and the only source of law, was little more than a final arbiter and did not decide very much of himself; kings never do unless they are strong personalities, and seventeenth century Spanish Hapsburgs were a very poor lot. His principal specific finding is that the "basic cause of graft at all levels was inadequacy of salaries" and believes this evil could have been simply cured in a fundamentally rotten society by better feeding (with unavailable funds) insatiable appetites. The administrators are several times discussed in terms of Plato's guardians, an ideal of which they might better be called the caricature.

Finally, in a more ambitious concluding chapter, the author finds in the Spanish imperial bureau-

cracy elements of charismatic rule (feeble); feudal traits, as in the real weakness of central control; local powers staked out de facto fiefs, law was privilege, society was divided into exclusive classes, and the elite was imbued with an exaggerated sense of formal honor; patrimonial elements, in that all in theory were absolutely subject to the king, who employed the usual checking devices of absolute rulers; and legal elements, as some fixed norms were essential to make the creaky system function as well as it did, although a common response was, "I obey but do not execute." But the same thing can be said of any large closed empire. This labelling process deepens comprehension of imperial rule in the same way that understanding of stomach pains is improved by attributing them to gastritis.—ROBERT G. WESSON, *University of California, Santa Barbara*.

The Genesis of German Conservatism. By KLAUS EPSTEIN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 733. \$17.50.)

In this detailed and readable history of German thought and politics between 1770 and 1806, the late Klaus Epstein divides the Conservative "movement" into three main species: Defenders of the Status Quo, Reactionaries, and Reform Conservatives. His sympathy with the Reform Conservative position is explicit (p. viii), reflected in his distribution of praise and criticism, and related to his conception of history. The typical Defender of the Status Quo is "ahistorical" in outlook, while the Reactionary romanticizes the past at the cost of "historical accuracy." The Reform Conservative, on the other hand, "has an understanding of the course of historical development and sees the inevitability of certain changes"; accordingly, he acts to maximize continuity by adapting the old order to "modern needs." Small wonder that the Reform Conservative, suspect to his contemporaries, is apt to receive the acclaim of "historians." (Pp. 7-11.)

Epstein's book itself is cast in the Reform Conservative mold, mediating between a radical challenge and an older order of scholarship. The traditional view was that "German political thinking . . . is the child of the French Revolution" (G. P. Gooch). This was challenged by Fritz Valjavec, who attempted to show that liberal, democratic, and conservative "tendencies" in Germany began before 1789. Specifically, "Central European Conservatism first arose not as a response to a political event, the Revolution, but as a response to an intellectual tendency, the Enlightenment, although only the events after 1789 led to its development." (*Die Entstehung der politischen Strömungen in Deutschland, 1770-1815*, München, 1951, p. 5.)

In Part One (1770-1790) Epstein follows the

general lead of Valjavec. He discusses *Aufklärung* and the secret societies formed to propagate and oppose it, surveys the religious, social, and political controversies provoked by the impact of *Aufklärung* (controversies over toleration, serfdom, absolutism, etc.), and concludes with a "portrait of a prerevolutionary Conservative," Justus Möser, the administrator and historian of Osna-brück, who still stands where Karl Mannheim left him, "at the threshold between an unreflective traditionalism and a self-conscious Conservatism" (p. 335). Part One aims "to establish the general theme that Germany possessed a well-articulated Conservative movement before, and therefore independent of [the French Revolution]" (p. 23), but issues in the more moderate conclusions that (a) the time was ripe only for *ad hoc* responses to *ad hoc* criticisms, and (b) "the elements for future Conservative systematization were all present in [Möser's] work" (pp. 335f.). The latter conclusion is dubious for two reasons. First, Möser lacked altogether the *kind* of historical perspective essential to Reform Conservatism. Second, neither in Möser nor in any of the others discussed do we find seeds of the dialectical worldview that was to become so prominent with the great Conservative theorists Müller and Hegel (who are not treated within the limits set by Epstein for this volume). Their fusion of politics with speculative philosophy grew out of the tension between *Aufklärung* and traditional faith, to be sure, politicized by the Revolution, but Epstein has discussed the impact of *Aufklärung* primarily as manifested in pamphlets on matters of policy and in controversies over Masons, Illuminati, and Rosicrucians. The deeper intellectual and emotional crisis—still largely underground, but documentable from manuscripts, letters, and even published writings—is not treated in this book.

Part Two (1790-1806) sets the stage with chapters surveying the political situation in Prussia and the Hapsburg monarchy and ends with chapters chronicling the disintegration of the Empire. At times the focus blurs and the book takes on the appearance of "a general history of Germany" (p. vii), which it is not. The core of Part Two, however, consists of chapters on "the challenge of the French Revolution," "the conspiracy theory of the Revolution," and the life and thought of August Rehberg, the Hannoverian statesman and publicist sometimes called the German Burke and presented here as "a good example of the Reform Conservative." Along the way, Epstein redresses the emphasis of Part One: "there is obviously a core of truth in the traditional view, for the French Revolution did have a great impact upon political development"; and Valjavec's book is rebuked as "unfortunately not without the exaggera-

tions too often characteristic of 'revisionist' historiography." (P. 434.) Thus is rough justice meted out to old and new: judicious scholarship, like judicious statesmanship, lies in taking a middle path.

A less detailedly descriptive, more analytic treatment of these issues would make more of certain distinctions: e.g., between a pre-existing non-political conservatism that was politicized by the Revolution (as in Rehberg's case) and a conversion to conservatism prompted by the excesses of the Revolution. (This seriously affects the issue of continuity between Parts One and Two.) There is also a question of the quality of political thinking. The world reconstructed by Epstein is a culturally "democratic" world of journalism and pamphleteering, in which we encounter an occasional insight (e.g., Möser on the psychological cost of a merit system, p. 326). But all the German political thought worth reading today for other than antiquarian purposes—with the exception of an essay by Kant—appeared after 1789, and most of it appeared during the Romantic and Napoleonic period after 1800. The question of chronology and of preconditions thus depends on the *level* of thinking, as well as on how *political* it is. Continual reliance on terms like "tendency" and "movement" (neither of which is critically explored) does not conduce to clarity of comprehension.

Finally, there is the problem of "the specificity of . . . Conservatism," which concededly makes a history of European Conservatism more difficult than a history of European Liberalism. (Pp. 6f.) Given the variety of social conditions and regimes in the German states of the late 18th century, however, does it make sense even to speak of "German Conservatism?" How meaningful is it to treat under the same heading a defender of the semi-medieval *Ständestaat* and a defender of enlightened absolutism, even though each could appear as a Defender of the Status Quo in some part of "Germany"? It may be that the focus on "German Conservatism" obscures the more basic political dilemma of the time: too often "progress" and absolutism seemed to go hand in hand, while constitutionalism seemed linked with a discredited social order. In this and in certain other respects, the German states were the first "backward" societies responding to the intellectual and political imperialism of Western Europe. The pattern of responses and, in particular, the fortunes of the varied strategies of compromise termed by Epstein "Reform Conservatism"—whose problematic "triumph" in theory and practice after 1807 would apparently have been discussed in the next volume of this history—are therefore of some enduring interest.—JOHN RODMAN, *Pitzer College and The Claremont Graduate School*.

The Foundations of Indian Federalism By K. R. BOMBWALL. (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1967. Pp. xiii, 348., \$6.50.) Distributed by Taplinger Publishing Company, Inc., New York.

Professor Bombwall has analysed the social, constitutional, and political forces and factors that have helped shape the present-day federal system in India. The book contains four main hypotheses: 1) Due to the size of the Indian subcontinent and its regional diversities, a federal structure of government was not only unavoidable, but inevitable; 2) Federalism was a logical development of the British decision to introduce responsible government in India; 3) Rising Nationalism on one hand and the British encouraged separatist demands, communal as well as feudal, on the other, could only be reconciled through the promotion of "national unity within regional diversity"; and 4) India's experience with federalism has been successful and the system has come of age.

The author examines these hypotheses in detail and relies heavily on information generally available in public documents and a number of partial studies on the subject. His method understandably is historical and more than two-thirds of the book is devoted to an analysis of the developments before the constitution of free India came into force in 1950. New insights, however, are readily visible throughout the discussion which help the reader gain a better understanding of the past developments. For instance, it has been generally believed that until the *Montford Reforms* of 1919 when "Dyarchy" was introduced in the Provinces, the British rule symbolized the epitomy of Central authority in India. Professor Bombwall's insightful discussion of the developments points toward an opposite direction, that a significant delegation of power to the Provinces started as early as 1861 with the enactment of *Indian Councils Act* (pp 57-93).

The obvious stepstones to Indian Federalism, of course, began with the *Montford Reforms* (Supra) and *The Government of India Act of 1935* when "Provincial Autonomy" was introduced. The author expresses the view, shared by many, that if the federal structure envisaged in the 1935 Act had come to fruition and if Indian leaders had not failed in resolving the Hindu-Muslim question the partition of the country could have been avoided through a federal system of government. (After all, though the diversity of Indian subcontinent is readily visible, its unity is much deeper. It is a single geographical and economic unit and did maintain political unity for prolonged periods of time).

The partition of the country changed the social and political setting radically. Gone were the re-

straints of communal demands and feudal and princely obstructionist devices receded into background. A new concept of federalism with a strong center came into being. Here again, Professor Bombwall convincingly counters the general belief that India with its "federal structure and unitary spirit" is not a "true" federation. He points out that the framers of Indian Constitution realized rather early in the game the nature of modern federal governments where Central authority inevitably comes to assume a policy-making role for the entire nation and also recognized the dual problem of the emergent polity—the maintenance and consolidation of Indian national unity along with rapid economic development through national planning. In this sense, Indian federalism is not only a more accurate reflection of current practice, but also is more functional in terms of its contemporary needs (p. 296).

Finally, discussing the experience since independence, the author maintains that despite a further growth in the powers of the Central government, mainly due to national planning and a virtually monopolistic dominance of a single political party at the Center and the States for twenty years, a new political "balance of power" has begun to emerge. And with the 1967 elections we can look forward to the establishment of a true partnership between the Center and the States.

This is an "old fashioned" book—no tables, charts or graphs, yet it is systematic, detailed, and scholarly. Professor Bombwall has made a needed and valuable contribution to our understanding of the Indian experience with federalism.—BALJIT SINGH, *Michigan State University*.

Laissez-faire-Pluralismus: Demokratie und Wirtschaft des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters. Ed. by GOETZ BRIEFS. (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1966, Pp. xiv, 532. 59.60 DM.)

The West German economic recession of 1966–1967 has demonstrated that even the much-heralded "economic miracle" created by the former minister of economics and chancellor Ludwig Erhard could not last forever. Since December 1966 the coalition cabinet composed of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats has veered away from the Erhard neo-liberal model of encouraging a competitive social-market economy to a Keynesian model of engaging in a massive pump priming program whenever necessary. Under the skillful touch of Minister of Economics Karl Schiller, a Social Democrat, and Minister of Finance Franz-Josef Strauss, chief of the Christian Social Union, the recession is ebbing, as government expenditures are cut and deficit financing and public investment programs are embarked upon.

Since this book, edited and primarily authored

by Professor Goetz Briefs, was published before the West German recession had gained momentum, one can only surmise what position the chief author would take presently. Professor Briefs, teaching at Georgetown University and at the Technical University at Berlin, obviously has sympathies for the classical liberal system of the nineteenth century, but realizes that such a system could not be operative in a modern industrial system. Thus in the context of the contemporary period he seems to be supporting those neo-liberals who advocate a mix of a free enterprise system with some government regulation, if only interest associations were to refrain from putting governments under excessive pressure.

As he surveys the relationship of interest associations to governments in the nineteenth century, he finds those situations ideal where associations representing labor and peasants were weak and where they served primarily to correct existing inequalities. But as he surveys the contemporary neo-liberal or semi-planned economies not only of the Federal Republic of Germany but also of Western Europe and the United States he concludes that the interest associations have become so powerful in a pluralistic environment that they constitute a threat to the existing order.

Thus, he is especially highly critical of trade unions, such as the American longshoremen's unions which have the power to paralyze shipping along the entire eastern or western seaboard for weeks on time. Briefs claims: "The democratic process hangs on one thread when mighty trade union leaders have it in their power through strike threats to bring it to a standstill" (p. 287). The threat is even graver, he maintains, when a strong labor party is allied with trade unions, hence combining political and extra-political weapons, such as a mass strike.

But what Briefs forgets in this sharp indictment is that none other but the German trade unions called a mass strike in 1920 at the time of the right wing Kapp Putsch when the very existence of the democratic Weimar regime was threatened. And if the trade unions had called a mass strike in July 1932 when Chancellor von Papen ousted the legitimate Prussian coalition government headed by Social Democrats then perhaps the Nazi seizure of power might have been averted. Thus the trade unions might often act as the champions of democracy rather than its killers. In addition, as shown in Great Britain, Scandinavia, and recently in the Federal Republic of Germany, when socialists are in or share power, they tend to restrain exorbitant wage demands made by organized labor.

Moreover, Briefs fails to equate the power of business with that of labor. In many democratic

countries conservative business interests wield much political, economic, and financial power, and are prone to support non-democratic movements. Thus, a certain balance is missing in his indictment of the power of interest groups in modern democratic systems.

Of course the author raises significant questions to which contemporary societies have not yet found satisfactory answers. As interest groups become increasingly powerful, can the state be more than a broker of their claims? Will the groups be able to undermine the fabric of government, and reduce further the role of the individual in society? The author is most pessimistic when looking into the crystal ball. He sees associations determining price, wage and taxation policy, even in planned economies. He sees the danger of welfare states turning to absolutism and totalitarianism under the flag of democracy. He sees democracies losing their "moral and metaphysical" foundations.

What remedies does the author suggest to prevent these trends? The supremacy of the state to promote the general welfare must be established, while the interest groups must be relegated to the "societal space." This can be accomplished if the activities of interest groups are limited to legitimate economic tasks now taken over by the state.

But, we may ask, will not a powerful state lead to new dangers? And who will determine the nature and content of general welfare? Given these problems and given the dynamics of political and economic movements will the advocates of a modified laissez-faire pluralism win out in the end? The weakness of liberal parties in Great Britain and on the continent would suggest that their academic supporters face many obstacles in gaining converts to their cause.

In addition to this thought-provoking essay (317 pages long), three other authors contribute shorter pieces on the state, law, and welfare (Dr. Bernd Bender); inflationary forces in a pluralistic free economy (Professor Cyril Zebot); and wage and profit policy in an industrial society (Professor Hans-Joachim Rustow).—GERARD BRAUNTHAL, *University of Massachusetts*.

An Essay on Marxian Economics. By JOAN ROBINSON. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966. Pp. xxiv. 104, \$3.50.)

Aims and Methods of Soviet Planning. By MIKHAIL BOR. (New York: International Publishers, 1967. Pp. 255. \$6.95.)

It is a pleasure to welcome and to highly recommend to the reader the revised text, with an added new introduction, of Professor Joan Robinson's enduring classic, first published a quarter of a century ago. This book deservedly achieved its reputation as probably the best critical introduction to Marxian economics, written by one of the

leading economists of our time—remarkably versed in modern economic theory to which she so much contributed.

"The purpose of this essay is to compare the economic analysis of Marx's *Capital* with current academic teaching" we read in a foreword to the first edition. The book is also an assault on and a searching criticism of "traditional orthodox economics," expressing Mrs. Robinson's profound discontent with the state of economic science. What finally emerges is an admirably lucid, succinct, critical, and searching, but very sympathetic commentary on the three volumes of *Capital*. Mrs. Robinson stresses the crucial contribution of Marx and evaluates the *differentia specifica* of the Marxian approach to economic problems. Since *Capital* is representative of the "nineteenth-century metaphysical habits of thought . . . alien to a generation brought up to inquire into the meaning of meaning," Mrs. Robinson "tried to translate Marx's concepts into language that an academic could understand. This puzzled and angered the professed Marxists, to whom the metaphysic is precious for its own sake." (vii-viii) There is no need to turn Marx, "as many seek to do, into an inspired prophet. He regarded himself as a serious thinker, and it is as a serious thinker that I have endeavoured to treat him." (5)

Mrs. Robinson maintains that Marx was a precursor of the modern theory of effective demand. There is a germ of truth in a joke that Marx was "a little-known forerunner" of Kalecki and Keynes. (vi) Marx was predominantly concerned with explaining the genesis, development, and structure of a capitalist economy. In his analytical scheme the theory of exploitation—theory of distribution of industry's net-product between wages and profit—emanated from the theory of value (relative prices). The unfortunate association of the two concepts has been a "plentiful source of confusion." (vii) Mrs. Robinson remarks: "The concept of *value* seems to me to be a remarkable example of how a metaphysical notion can inspire original thought, though in itself it is quite devoid of operational meaning." (xi) According to the third volume of *Capital*, under developed capitalism, value is modified into the price of production and commodities produced with dissimilarly constituted capital. Under competition the conversion of surplus value into an average rate of profit expresses the principle of equal profit on equal capital, and is the essence of the transformation of value into the price of production. I would be inclined to join Mrs. Robinson in her argument that "the transformation is from prices into values, not the other way." (xi)

I can only allude here to Mrs. Robinson's illuminating discussion of value under socialism. No doubt, "no system of prices based upon costs will

prove practicable," and the recent debates in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe attest to it. Moreover, it is the marginal cost, rather than the average as reckoned by Marx, that, in most cases, is relevant for decision-making.

Mrs. Robinson notes the new trends in economic thought: "Nowadays the academics are impatient of static analysis; the classical problems of growth and development have come back into fashion, reviving interest in the classical economists and Marx amongst them." (vi) On the other hand, there is a discernible trend among Marxists to separate ideology from analytical tools of economics and to apply these tools to real problems. It is difficult to disagree with her comment that "on both sides a radical rethinking of the theory of prices is evidently required." (xxi)

Professor Bor's book emerged from a report prepared for the United Nations. It is presented with an interesting introduction by Maurice Dobb. The stated aim is "to tell readers how national economic planning developed in the U.S.S.R. and what methods it now adopts." (8) Professor Bor is one of the leading Soviet authorities on planning. He is particularly known for his refinements of the material balances techniques and as an advocate of the need for an integrated (over-all balance) approach to economic planning. His book constitutes a notable effort to rationalize planning as practices in the U.S.S.R. He also devotes some space to changes in the approach to planning techniques. In the final chapter of his book he contrasts Soviet planning with indicative planning, with more partiality than could be desired, as witnessed by his comment that "far from introducing any essential changes in the capitalist mode of production, programming only accentuates the class contradictions in it." (246)

Before turning to a Western evaluation of Soviet planning the interested reader will undoubtedly wish to refer to a first hand account by a Soviet scholar who for over a quarter of a century participated in shaping the planning techniques. However, it should be noted that Professor Bor does not belong in the ranks of the new school of Soviet planometrics. There is much that is traditional in his thinking.

When reading his work one should keep in mind that the Soviet planning system was primarily designed for swift, massive, and expedient redirection of resources for forced and rapid industrialization, relying primarily on extensive use of resources and nonmarket instruments. It is a moot question whether with a different growth strategy and alternative working arrangements the results would have been better. Be it as it may, it seems that at the present stage, with the necessary shift to intensive use of resources, a radical changeover in plan construction and working arrangements is

mandatory. But what is the nature and optimum combination of the plan and the market, what is the objective function of the economy, and what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the success of the alterations—are all vital, fascinating, complex, and yet unresolved questions.—GEORGE R. FEIWEL, *The University of Tennessee*.

The Politics of Conformity in Latin America. Ed.

BY CLAUDIO VELIZ. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. x, 291. \$7.00.)

The editor states this book was to have been entitled, "The Politics of Change in Latin America," focussing on the ideas and activities of those groups "most obviously and efficiently determined to bring about profound changes in the institutional structures of Latin American society." But the forthcoming contributions instead revealed these groups as primarily seeking to gain a higher position in the existing social structure, and to protect the structure by preventing fundamental change. A reading of the contributions indicates, however, that the present title is somewhat misleading, since one finds analyses of deviant and innovative as well as conformist political behavior.

E. J. Hobsbawm documents the massive migration of the rural poor to the cities since the 1930's, and the consequences of this demographic transition for the emergence of populist political parties. He suggests that while there is a temporary lull in urban mass politics, we can anticipate demands for radical transformation from the urban proletariat in the future. In a careful analysis of the Mexican *ejido*, Francois Chevalier points out that the achievements of the Mexican Revolution, especially under Cardenas, in the extension and preservation of communal and private small landholdings, is threatened by over-population and the growth of a younger urban and rural generation for whom these achievements are not likely to be considered sufficient. Conformity in the sense of preserving the achievements of the past will not assure future political stability in Mexico.

Alistair Hennessy's wide-ranging discussion of university students does not support the editor's assertion that they are essentially conformist. While social mobility is a major individual motive for university attendance, collective student protest constitutes a continuing pressure on governments for major reform, while former student leaders are seeking to modernize their societies in Venezuela, Cuba, Chile and elsewhere. Collective student conformism is best exemplified in resistance to university modernization, leading to government attempts to depoliticize the university through both repression and reorganization.

In the major theoretical contribution of the book, José Nun argues persuasively that the mili-

tary coup represents the interests of the middle class, compensating for its inability to achieve hegemony, rather than constituting a threat to the middle class or serving the interests of national development. Hugh Thomas disputes the thesis that the Cuban Revolution was a middle-class protest movement betrayed, arguing instead that the absence of liberal institutions and the compromise of business with the Batista regime left responsible middle-class *políticos* in a weak position from which to oppose Castro's radical program.

Papers by Oscar Cornblit and Emanuel de Kadt discuss respectively the suppression of immigrant industrialist interests by Argentine political parties, and the role of the Church as both conservative and innovative political force in Brazilian political change. Finally, Richard N. Adams discusses the relations among social class, power and prestige without locating his analysis within specified political and social systems, and without proposing answers to clearly defined theoretical or

substantive problems, virtues present in most of the other papers.

To summarize, this collection constitutes on the whole a valuable contribution to the growing literature on Latin American politics, especially where the authors confront prevailing interpretations with well-reasoned and documented alternative analyses. One might prefer, however, that such a collection would produce a better payoff for the reader, and a better contribution to Latin American studies, were it to focus on the analysis of a single phenomenon, such as the distribution of power, class structure and relationships, or the rural proletariat, viewed from a shared theoretical perspective, and focussing on this phenomenon comparatively in each of several Latin American societies. But this is perhaps a personal preference, and if it points to a weakness in this book, it is one shared by many others in the field.—KENNETH N. WALKER, *University of Toronto*.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

Force, Order and Justice. BY ROBERT E. OSGOOD AND ROBERT W. TUCKER. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. viii, 374. \$10.00.)

This is a difficult book to discuss. It is divided into two parts, each by a different author, which are meant to arrive at the same goal by different paths. The two parts do not really fit together, however, and they are also of strikingly different quality. Professor Osgood's section, an historical discussion of changes in the means of international violence, the role of violence, and strategic thinking about its use over the last two centuries, is disappointing, often unoriginal, and unsatisfactory; Professor Tucker's essay, addressed strictly to normative concerns, is stimulating, original, and valuable.

Osgood's introductory chapter, on the insuperability of obstacles to international order, is a good summary which, as he acknowledges, owes much to Rousseau, Aron, Waltz, Hoffman and others. (It also states a viewpoint that Tucker relies on later, and thus represents the only problem discussed about which one can be certain the authors are in agreement). Osgood then proceeds to give a good brief history of modern warfare up to the nuclear era, demonstrating the failure of both "laissez-faire" (e.g., balance-of-power) and "systemic" (e.g., general disarmament) theories about the control of international violence. In a chapter titled "The Control of Force" he continues with an account of developments since the end of World War II, in which the problems and prospects of nuclear arms control receive an informed

and speculative (though not often original) discussion.

Osgood's history is marred, however, by the virtual absence of any consideration of *political* factors in the expansion and control of force. His emphasis is entirely on developments in weaponry and strategic thinking, and on the gradual breakdown of European alliance systems. Taken in conjunction these factors are said to account for the drastically increased scope and intensity of violence in the last century. But of the political roots of international disorder, the underlying processes—nationalism, imperialism, revolution and the emergence of mass-based governments—which determined that the developments Osgood discusses would have such catastrophic results, almost no mention is made. His preference for regulatory (as opposed to laissez-faire or systemic) controls on force remains merely a prejudice, therefore. The "professional" managers of conflict who are expected to accomplish such regulation seem to be the same kind of people whose strategic thinking is earlier described as having once been so disastrous. Nor are Osgood's assurances that "they" have learned the lessons of the past satisfactory, for it is not the state of decision-makers' intellects but the political forces operating on them which are decisive in setting the direction of their behavior.

For what purposes do the professionals—the theorists and practitioners of nuclear deterrence today—manage force? *Cui bono?* Professor Osgood's few references to such questions are not

reassuring for here, when he does discuss the political dimension of violence, he betrays an often unalloyed cold-war nationalism, as evidenced by the following remarks: "... military deterrence in Asia must depend far more than in Europe on local non-nuclear fighting capabilities. Yet no military deterrent can prevent wars that capitalize on the vulnerability of the Third World to insurgency, except by the demonstration through military resistance that such wars will fail or involve too great a risk of disadvantageous escalation." The "Third World" is a concept from the realm of propaganda, not social science; and the theory here put forth is one not of "deterrence" or "regulation" but rather of expansive American power. Osgood rather precisely describes where such thinking has led in the past, but apparently fails to see any connection, and this is discouraging since he is presumably a professional manager of force himself.

Professor Tucker's contribution, a discussion of the philosophy of force developing contemporaneously with the events Osgood describes, is of a different order altogether. His is a lucid, often brilliant treatment of normative judgments and their empirical roots and consequences: still the sort of thing that political science does best. Among the propositions for which he offers persuasive argument the following are the most challenging: 1) The perceived aversion to force in modern times is unfortunately accompanied by a ready ability to justify its excessive use. 2) The "moral economy" of force depends largely on its quantitative effects, and the development of nuclear weapons therefore heightens all preexisting dilemmas about the use of force. 3) Rules for the restraint of force are in practice completely fragile as long as the rightfulness of any degree of force thought requisite for preservation of the state *in extremis* is accepted; the theory of nuclear deterrence, which proposes to police "limited" wars with the underlying threat of utter destruction, is the ultimate expression of this essential incompatibility between the idea of limits and the idea that national self-protection is necessary for the preservation of individual and communal happiness.

Tucker's own view of the role of force is ambiguous, since he recognizes both the sometime validity of the argument from necessity and the perverse uses to which it is often put. (Indeed, his discussion of the intellectual and physical crimes committed in the name of *raison d'état* is both trenchant, and happily free of Osgood's nationalism). He offers a qualified "optimism" about the prospects for successful deterrence and "crisis management" regulation. This solution to the problem of force is also Osgood's, and here Tucker's analysis is like Osgood's in being not political

enough: his idea of a "new beginning" seems at the moment to be wishful thinking (though that is surely preferable to nationalist bias). After his previous comments, this conclusion is surprising. At the end, however, he does note the extent of the disaster that will occur if his optimism proves unjustified, and asserts that we must somehow go "beyond deterrence" eventually (which is the point that Osgood ignores). Having pointed out the critical need for some world order, and the presently insuperable obstacles to it, he has taken his analysis as far as it can go. The result, in any event, is an essay well worth reading and rereading.—PHILIP GREEN, *Smith College*.

The Trial of the Germans. By EUGENE DAVIDSON. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967. Pp. vii, 636. \$12.50.)

Yet another book on the Nazi Era—could well be one's first reaction to the title of Eugene Davidson's *The Trial of the Germans*. That reaction could be followed by a second one, upon reading the sub-title "An Account of the Twenty-two Defendants Before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg": Why rehash the Nuremberg Trials more than twenty years after they occurred?

After reading Mr. Davidson's voluminous account and perusing his twenty-two page bibliography which is a painstaking collection of Allied and German primary and secondary sources, both contemporary and historical, and covers the entire period of the Third Reich as well as much of the material of the Trials, I submit that this book be ranked the definitive one volume study on Nuremberg.

It is not only a very scholarly volume, but it raises the questions of the Nuremberg Trials—the legal as well as the moral ones—in a manner and at a time that make this book a major addition to the bookshelf of the historian, the political scientist, the international lawyer, the legal scholar, but above all, the political decision-maker in the age of nuclear weapons, total war, and such "undeclared" warfare as Vietnam.

The leaders of National Socialism and the architects of the Thousand Year Reich come to life again in the book the twenty-four originally named the twenty-two who stood trial of whom eleven were sentenced to "death by hanging"; those who would be tried later; and those who did not have the courage to face the consequences of their actions which resulted in the deaths of millions of innocent people, and escaped trial by suicide.

Grouped into the major political, social and economic institutions which were the pillars of the Third Reich, the reader encounters once more Ju-

lius Streicher, at the "Core of the Conspiracy"; "The Number-Two Man," Hermann Goering; Bormann, Hess (the only man still in Spandau Prison and probably the only one of the defendants who should have been committed to a mental hospital) and Rosenberg representing the NSDAP in "Action and Theory." "The Diplomats," Ribbentrop, Neurath, and Papen; Schacht and Funk for "the Party and Big Business"; Frick "The Law" and "Youthleader" Baldur von Schirach; "Party, Police, and Army" are tried in the persons of Kaltenbrunner, Keitel and Jodl; and Grandadmirals Raeder and Doenitz representing "The Navy." The final chapters of the book deal with "The Proconsuls," Frank and Seyss-Inquart; Speer and Sauckel, who were charged with "Building the War Plant" on "Forced Labor," and the "Propagandist" Hans Fritzsche making a poor substitute for Goebbels who had taken his own life.

Each one of the men and his ambitions, his rise to power, his weaknesses and vices in many cases, his strengths in some instances, as well as their pettiness and rivalries, their visions and blindness are portrayed with painstaking accuracy, based on thorough examination of memoirs, documents, records of interrogations, and on what friends, rivals and foes said about the defendants. Their behavior during the various stages of power in their lives and while they stood in the dock as accused is described and analyzed. If most of them emerge as a weak, sick and sorry lot, it is because that is what they were—not of what the author made them. By the same token, the Tribunal, the Prosecutors, and the Defense appear as they must have been—and in the sober light of hindsight some of their actions are as petty and sorry and as motivated by blind zealotry and political overzealousness as most of the defendant's actions had been in earlier days.

In his meticulous examination of the Trial records and his fair narration Eugene Davidson presents all facets of the drama at Nuremberg: the arguments of judges and prosecutors, the struggle of the defense lawyers to obtain evidence on behalf of their clients, the ideological orientations of the justices representing the Allied powers, and the attitudes of the defendants towards their former superiors, who had escaped the trial by suicide, and their behavior towards each other as well as their responses to their charges. The greatest merit of the book, however, is the re-examination by its author of the moral and legal questions raised by Nuremberg, the complex issues of "war guilt," "crimes against humanity," and "preparations to wage war." These issues have been confronting mankind since the beginning of time, but they have taken on new, vast dimensions with the systematic extermination programs of innocent

peoples devised by the National Socialists as well as the large-scale killing of soldiers and civilians in total warfare.

Davidson concludes his first chapter with the observation that the Nuremberg Trials served as "catharsis of the pent-up emotions of millions of people" which had to be provided, and as a "record of what had taken place duly preserved for whatever use later generations would make of it." "The record would not completely document the infamy in the twentieth century, but it would reveal one vast concentration of evil that could be exorcised."

The final chapter, an evaluation "Two Decades Later," defends Nuremberg as a "political event," "if not as a court." In it, the Nuremberg Tribunal is assessed as of doubtful legal validity, but once more its role in pinpointing the moral issues confronting mankind in our age of kill and overkill is stressed. The book presents an autopsy of an era, but the author goes one step further, he does what a true scholar should do—once the facts have been presented as accurately as possible, he tries to relate them to the norms and values which must be our concern in this age of ideology and total warfare.—ELKE FRANK, *Hunter College, City University of New York*.

The Years of Opportunity: The League of Nations, 1920-1926. BY BYRON DEXTER. (New York: Viking Press, 1967. Pp. xxiii, 264. \$8.50.)

Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919. BY ARNO J. MAYER. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967. Pp. viii, 918. xx. \$15.00.)

New perspectives on the Versailles settlement and the early history of the League of Nations, such as those suggested by the titles of these works, are overdue. Neither book, however, provides convincing explanation of the interpretive thesis which its title suggests. Neither faces up to the task of explicitly relating the historical record to an appraisal of the possible and the probable. The gap between what is asserted or assumed and what is demonstrated is partially closed by argument in Dexter's book, but one wishes for more evidence; in Mayer's lengthy work, citations abound, but no sustained attempt is made to show just what it is that they prove.

Byron Dexter, the long-time managing editor of *Foreign Affairs*, has written an interpretive essay for "the general reader." The book is padded by discursive background commentary and by the texts of the Covenant and the Charter, leaving only about 120 pages which deal with the first seven years of the League. It provides a mellow résumé which is not inaccurate (except for the assertion that Japan did not submit reports on its

mandate in the Pacific) but which immerses events in atmospherics so deeply that they lose outline. Discussion of the Mosul opinion of the Permanent Court, for example, which could hardly have been less incisive, is followed by the comment: "It was a very interesting judicial opinion, following a line of reasoning along curves that caused eyebrows to be raised among lawyers."

The principal thesis, however, is clearly set forth and is worthy of attention, for it contrasts both with an orthodoxy which has long prevailed and with the assumptions of the Mayer book. The "opportunity" which Dexter sees was to make use of the League as the instrument of Britain and France in maintaining a settlement which, on the whole, was fair and moderate. The crisis for the League was the attempt to maintain an effective guarantee of the territorial provisions of Versailles as an essential condition for disarmament and the reconstruction of Germany, through the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol. "The pacifist illusions of the time," however, gave Stresemann the opportunity through adroit appeal to deprive the League of the "core of organized power" which was needed for collective security and to turn it into an instrument of appeasement through the Locarno agreements. While Locarno "did not itself produce Hitler," it "guaranteed the success of his strategy."

Mayer's work, in contrast, is a major feat of historical scholarship. Following his *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918* by eight years, it represents an exhaustive exploration of available sources in many countries. At the very least, it is a vast compendium of contemporary comment. Unfortunately, it is not much more than that.

It is clear that the author has brought to his work a viewpoint based on conviction. In the preface, he deplores the tendency "either to avoid crucial controversial issues or to treat them in terms consonant with the current conventional wisdom" and gives credit to several "fellow internal exiles" for having "fortified" his "critical outlook." Already his work has been hailed by the New Left for having identified the origins of what it sees as the main theme of American diplomacy: "Containment and Counterrevolution." But nowhere in a very long work is there more than a sketchy statement of the interpretative thesis or an attempt to weight its merits in comparison with other viewpoints or emphases. In part, it is because the present work is a sequel that one feels a lack of orientation. The main categories are established in the earlier book and the various strands of political and social movements in the several countries are identified. But one looks in vain there also for an appraisal of options which justifies the categories.

In Mayer's approach, "the forces of order" confront "the forces of movement." In "this first round of the international civil war of the twentieth century," the European Right undertook the "twin assignment of stabilizing governments throughout Europe and of containing if not destroying the Russian Revolution." They used the "spuriously inflated bogey of Bolshevism" in calculated efforts both to advance foreign policy goals and to fortify political positions at home. It might appear that "the clamor for a punitive peace" was not the best approach to these objectives. In Mayer's view, however, this "was stirred up as part of a vast political design" the purpose of which was not to fend off the revolutionary Left but "to rout and destroy the very core of the forces of change, . . . pre-emptively" before it could rally around Wilson and make gains toward "the forty-eight hour week, collective bargaining, graduated income taxes, and social welfare measures." Wilson and Lloyd George, who correctly, Mayer points out, "rejected the conspiratorial view of the Russian Revolution," fell victim, it would seem, to this counter-conspiracy of the Right.

Ultimately, it is a matter of taste and of philosophy whether one accepts a conspiratorial (or a counter-conspiratorial) view of history. Neither proof nor disproof is likely to be convincing. It must be pointed out, however, that a thesis may gain currency and prestige from the apparent substance of narrative and citation to which it is related. It is almost an earmark of revisionist history to mobilize detail and disregard proportion: one thinks of Tansill and of Beard. In my opinion, the mass of evidence which Mayer sets forth does not support his view. It is an extended catalog of folly rather than a telling collection of clues. It shows the blindness and despair of men overwhelmed both from within and from without by forces not comprehended, and taking refuge in nationalism, rather than conspiratorial calculation. It induces renewed respect for Wilson and even engenders sympathy for Lloyd George. In this new time of turmoil, it is poignant reading indeed.

One matter of revisionism in style should be noted. Mayer has succumbed to two expressions which are dear to undergraduates but which have rarely if ever appeared in serious writing. Neither was used in his earlier work. In the belief that they constitute linguistic decay rather than linguistic development, I have woven them into a concluding assessment: While I am "not about to" deny the value of this work as documentation of popular and political responses to a turbulence which swept across national boundaries, it is "not all that" valuable as an interpretation of the moves and the motives of the men at Versailles. —WHITNEY T. PERKINS, *Brown University*.

The Functioning of the International Political System. By ANDREW M. SCOTT. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967. Pp. x, 244. \$3.95.)

Professor Scott seeks in this essay to apply systems theory to the field of international politics. He is inspired to do so by his disenchantment with the persistent vogue of the "view of world politics that has been dominant for generations." Founded on the "obsolete" concepts of equilibrium and balance of power this traditional view is unable to cope with new realities, fails to avail itself of modern empirical techniques and is of little use in the practical exercise of problem-solving and policy formation. Yet the "new approaches" which treat today's problems with today's techniques have failed to make this old approach the relic it deserves to be. No one has as yet gathered these new approaches together and presented them in an ordered fashion.

What is needed is a new method. The author proposes to use systems analysis which has the capability of integrating these new yet disparate approaches into a coherent whole. The integrating mechanism is the "vocabulary" of systems analysis which "makes possible the conversion of separate currencies into a common currency" linking together "observations relating to nationalism, loyalty, ideology, capabilities, statecraft, collaboration, conflict, escalation, deterrence, negotiation, decision-making, communication, community formation and so on" (p. 9).

His second point is a promise not to clutter his model with normative assumptions. He admits that systems theory is no freer from involvement with normative elements than the theories of yesterday, but he does not propose to substitute a new set for the old. He explicitly rejects models such as Easton's "authoritative allocation of values" and anthropomorphic and teleological "baggage" such as "systems maintenance" and pursuit of goals. To be effective, he claims, the systems approach must produce a value-free framework "hospitable to many types of supporting analysis."

Professor Scott then uses the vocabulary of systems analysis to describe the "new approaches." International relations, the nation-states, governments and politicians are replaced by such terminology as systems, subsystems, actors and decision-makers. The language stresses the interrelationship of the "individuals, organizations and nation-states" that make up the international system. It also succeeds in dividing the new approaches into two categories—one dealing with activities occurring within a system, the other with activities occurring between or among systems. Creation of images, ideology, communication and decision-making are examples of intrasystemic

phenomena; they are either attributes of specific systems, as would be the case of ideology, or are specific functional systems in themselves, such as communication. Intersystemic activities may be exemplified by negotiation, deterrence, threats, conflict and collaboration. The latter category clearly demands a plurality of systems. To sum up, the first category presupposes interaction among disparate functions within a unified whole. The second presupposes interaction between or among unified wholes. The point is that both intrasystemic and intersystemic activities and the approaches which analyze them deal with aspects or parts or a larger whole but not with the whole itself. Thus the new approaches emerge as applicable to elements of the whole international system, but not to the system itself.

What is this total system? The application of systems language to the new approaches suggests that the model of a system at a subordinate level is a self-contained unit composed of complementary interrelated parts. It follows that the maximal system—in this case the international system—should be structurally similar. But the picture of the international system which emerges bit by bit as one makes his way through the book turns out to be a different type. One is first told that the international system is a "conflict" system. Then it is asserted that the system is evolutionary. And finally, in a burst of candid prescriptive rhetoric, the reader is apprised that the defects of the international system stem from a characteristically unsystemic lack of capability to provide direction and purpose. The system "has been seriously deficient in rules, norms, and institutions to facilitate collaboration and to regulate conflict" which "can be remedied only by the development of supplementary forms of (transnational) authority" (p. 230f). The Hobbesian world of nation-eat-nation will evolve contractually into one that will in the end produce a world sovereign. It is evident that until such time as the miracle is wrought, normative assumptions which appear not uncongenial to the lesser constellations would be inapplicable to a "system" that has yet to arrive at systemic coherence. Once achieved, however, one is left to wonder if such an ideal world polity, alone and unchallenged by anything but environment, could justifiably be considered a system.

Professor Scott's target appears to be the undergraduate classroom. He has made an interesting contribution by applying systems analysis to the "new approaches" in order to bring them together in a single volume. In attempting to give them place in one all-inclusive theory, however, he has stretched the analytical framework beyond its capability.—FREDERIC WURZBURG, *University of New Hampshire*.

The Politics of the Third World. By J. D. B. MILLER. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. xiv, 126. \$3.75.)

This brief, readable volume begins with the observation that "the Third World [is] a cant phrase, derived from the French *tiers monde* and used to describe those countries which are plainly neither Communist nor Western." It ends with the conclusion that "A Third World characterized by unity, purpose, and effective tactics is . . . a chimera." In the intervening pages, the author struggles to demonstrate the existence of something resembling that cant phrase while at the same time denying its vitality if not its validity.

Despite the concept's ephemeral nature, however, the author identifies the states that comprise the Third World, analyzes the well-springs of national interest that often undergird their policy determinations, discusses their roles in the United Nations and regional groups, and evaluates their relations with the major powers. Finally, in a chapter entitled "Vulgar Errors," the author attacks what he somewhat patronizingly refers to as "certain illusions about the Third World." This endeavor more so than the rest of the book seems to depend almost wholly on the author's judgments of what motivates Third World states, what exactly they are striving to do, and why. After describing the first "vulgar error" as one of viewing the states as a bloc or harmonious group, the author proceeds to commit what often appears to be the same error by treating them as a unified group in foreign policy attitudes and actions. Yet, his analyses, taken individually, usually make sense to this reviewer. In their demands for trade liberalization without reciprocity, for example, the author asserts that Third World states are not seeking to despoil the advanced countries but to give impetus to an increase in trade that can only serve to enrich both sides. The widely shared myth that the poor countries of the world, like the poor of the American ghettos, can improve their lot only at the expense of richer states or citizens is one of the most durable and devastating fables. It must be exposed and discarded if some semblance of real stability is ever to be achieved.

Throughout this book, Professor Miller develops interesting if not unique observations concerning the special attributes and needs that characterize the political life of Third World states. Their leaders, he notes, began as agitators for independence who promised great changes once the imperial yoke was removed. Their failure to achieve these kinds of changes has produced a "decaying national movement" in many, and it has become clear (at least to Professor Miller) that two groups are now indispensable: one, the European-educated people in commercial, professional, and

administrative posts who are the only ones who can run the government and the economy effectively; and, two, the army, which is the only group that combines discipline, modernization, and opportunity to coerce. The author provides a few examples of military-governed states—Egypt, Nigeria, Burma, Ghana, Pakistan, and Indonesia—but he suggests no evidence that might support a conclusion of indispensability. Although the case for greater "efficiency" is an obvious one, whether a class of technocrats aided by a military elite can evoke the national spirit and call forth the sacrifices of the masses to support a successful modernization effort remains an unresolved question.

Times have also changed in terms of the foreign policy imperatives of Third World states, according to Professor Miller. The early flamboyant militancy of the independence movements and the efforts to stay clear of entangling alliances with the East or West established a common bond among them that led to the holding of the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the enunciation of the "Bandung spirit." The abortive effort to hold a "second Bandung" in Algiers in 1965—described appropriately by the author as a "non-event"—leads him to the conclusion that "there is little future for Afro-Asianism as such." Yet, much of the book tends to belie such a sweeping conclusion. More positive bases for developing unity and cooperation than the older anti-colonialism and anti-Westernism are emerging in such fields as trade, aid, development, and United Nations politics. Although the author avoids discussion of human rights, here in particular Afro-Asianism has found a rallying cause that can support a unanimous Third World condemnation of South Africa and Rhodesia as the worst offenders. The efforts of Afro-Asian states to spur the world community into taking effective action against these two major transgressors have, in fact, been far more productive of Afro-Asian unity than of changing policies within the two states. In addition, the terrible destruction that has been visited upon Viet Nam to "protect" it has tended to rekindle a common abhorrence of military alignments that may have been weakened prior to 1965 and the massive American involvement.

The author, who is Professor of International Relations at the Australian National University, has done a generally first-rate job of discussing and interpreting the politics that characterize many Third World states. The book, however, contributes little to scholarly inquiry in the field that is essentially new or helpful to a deeper understanding of the Third World states. One can hardly expect a penetrating, definitive piece of work on such a complex, motley group of entities in little over one hundred pages. But, in spite of

this drawback (or conceivably because of it), the book is one that can be highly recommended as a supplement to the introductory international politics course. It should have a stimulating and challenging impact on the student who is in the process of being initiated into the rather nebulous world of international politics because its central themes are developed from a different frame of reference than those found in most textbooks on international politics. Thus, it can supply the student with a new perspective for analyzing and evaluating world politics.—JACK C. PLANO, *Western Michigan University*.

The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises. By ORAN R. YOUNG. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. viii, 427. \$10.00.)

The author in this volume on third-party intervention in crises asserts that his purpose is to break new ground in generating hypotheses about the management of conflict. He further states that the study is chiefly "an hypothesis-raising" rather than "an hypothesis-testing" effort. The central goal of the various lines of enquiry—six in number—is to outline at least the rudiments of general theory of third-party intervention.

But the theoretical material and apparatus which the author develops, he feels, is not sufficient. To add clarity and relevance to the theoretical material and apparatus, it is necessary to engage in testing of theory by applying it to pragmatic situations. He singles out the peace-keeping effort of the UN as the concrete situation to test, and points out that this form of third-party intervention is currently under the doctrines developed during the Hammarskjöld regime, which "take a dim view of the possibility of constructive United Nations intervention in superpower crises."

Since the international system is changing rapidly (what the author means by "system" is not explained), he advances the proposition that "the overall framework of the international system" including "the more specific relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States, have been moving in directions which place the notion of constructive United Nations intervention in future Soviet-American crises clearly and definitely within the realm of the possible."

While the Hammarskjöld concept of the limits of the United Nations intervention in conflicts between power blocs still prevails today and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future, the author asserts that the propositions he advances in this volume "are more nearly a set of supplementary ideas than the basis of an alternative to the present theory. . . . In fact, they constitute," in the author's opinion, "a response to the broad spectrum of international crises to which the prevailing theory does not address itself."

These "supplementary ideas" derive from an analysis of the rapid and substantial changes that are presently taking place on a number of fronts. The author observes that there is a decline of bipolarity and a trend toward a pluralistic arrangement of power centers. He describes the developments in this area as focusing on four themes: "1) polycentrism within the established blocs; 2) the declining efficacy of major alliance systems; 3) the rise in the numbers and salience of extrabloc actors; and 4) the emergence (or indicated emergence) of several new 'great' powers." The analysis of these four themes, predicated on a number of possible variables, is highly speculative. However, the speculations appear to be educated ones and require the thoughtful and concentrated attention of the reader.

How then will all this affect the prospects for third-party intervention by which the author, if the reviewer understands him correctly, means the United Nations? Is it likely to reduce or enhance the prospects for third-party intervention? The author continues his speculation, and engages in a somewhat tortuous description of "a full-blown version of a modified balance-of-power" where "the United Nations could come to act more nearly as a concert mechanism than as an independent opinion factor." This, however, the author avers might be a temporary phase since it would very likely be highly unstable. He concludes that "the possibilities of third-party intervention in various situations would almost certainly become salient again." Whether the author's "supplementary ideas," based on predictions such as the "hard shelled" territorial state is declining and that the sense of international community is growing, thanks to the advent of nuclear weapons, will indeed supplement the Hammarskjöld concept, this reviewer can not predict. The author manifests no hesitation in answering the question affirmatively.

The review's conclusion about this book is that the hypothetically minded student of international relations might possibly find the analysis stimulating even if somewhat discursive, and the pragmatically minded, unrealistic and difficult to follow.—DAVID W. WAINHOUSE, *Johns Hopkins University*.

French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle. By ALFRED GROSSER. (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1967. Pp. xiv, 175. \$5.00, \$2.50 paper.)

Professor Grosser first presented this sensible, perceptive guide to contemporary French foreign policy as a lecture course at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris in 1964. The Club Jean Moulin sponsored its publication in France and now it has survived the difficult trans-Atlantic passage. Despite the lapse of time in the fast-moving world of diplomacy, the book holds up well.

Professor Grosser begins with the proposition that foreign policy may be evaluated on the basis of the extent to which it has "attained the goals for which it was intended." His concluding chapter, using that criterion contends that de Gaulle's "positive record is short, and the negative record very long." In between, chapters examine that record with respect to Algeria, tropical Africa, Franco-German relations, Europe, defense, and East-West relations and NATO. Prefatory chapters deal with the record of the Fourth Republic and de Gaulle's foreign policy conceptions. An epilogue carries the account forward from 1965 to 1967. Professor Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard University wrote a special foreword and the author revised the epilogue for the American editions and Lois Ames Pattison made the very competent translation.

The author does not apply his criterion to de Gaulle systematically, nor does the material lend itself to such application consistently. Often, de Gaulle's goals are not defined publicly or are so ill defined as to be useless in attempting to evaluate his success.

Take Algeria, for instance. What goal did de Gaulle have in Algeria in 1958? Integration? Independence? Autonomy? One may argue very plausibly that he had no goal except to end the war as soon as possible while preserving as much of French influence and interests as possible. If so did he succeed? No one can say. No one knows what was possible. Grosser believes that "de Gaulle did not, from the beginning, desire the policy that he adopted in the end," that he wanted Algeria to have "a sort of internal autonomy," rather than full independence. If so he failed. By Grosser's criterion, de Gaulle also failed in tropical Africa. His "community on a federal model" collapsed within two years and de Gaulle was compelled to improvise another facade behind which French control might be maintained. So, too, with his policies toward the western alliance. Neither NATO nor Britain nor West Germany nor Spain has become a suitable weapon in his assault on the United States. Grosser sees "the most important aspect of other European countries have not yet become aware of that role." He may, indeed, be playing that role *as he sees it*, but as long as "his five European partners are in fundamental disagreement with him," he cannot play it very well. Is that success?

Grosser is especially severe in evaluating de Gaulle's military policy. He believes that conventional forces would be more effective for French defense, especially as de Gaulle's nuclear force lacks that essential element of deterrence-credibility. But, is defense de Gaulle's goal? If so, only conjecture can measure its success until-or-unless his force fails to deter. If not, what is his goal? In

either case, the problem of evaluation by Grosser's criterion is very difficult.

Quite apart from problems of application, moreover, one is obliged to ask whether the author's criterion is adequate. De Gaulle suggested another criterion himself in *The Edge of the Sword*: "men are remembered less for the usefulness of what they have achieved than for the sweep of their endeavors."

By that criterion, de Gaulle fares well. The restoration of France to great power status, the use of NATO to control American foreign policy globally, the elevation of balance-of-power politics to a global plane, the organization of a bloc of neutral nations behind France, and the replacement of American influence in Latin America are sweeping endeavors, indeed. But, is the amount of remembrance as important as the cause? Is de Gaulle to be remembered as the greatest showman since Barnum or as a great statesman who maximized French power and influence.

To answer that question one must adopt different criteria than either Grosser or de Gaulle. Does not "the usefulness of what they have achieved" evaluate statesmanships? Should not de Gaulle be judged by the extent to which he has served the enlightened self-interest of France than by the glamor of his performance or his ability to achieve such goals as he chooses?

Grosser's selection of criteria and his failure to apply them systematically detract from the value of this essay. Nevertheless, it deserves the attention of serious students of French and international affairs. The author is an astute, perceptive Gaullogist who sheds much light on his subject. We will be much in his debt when he writes for the Fifth Republic as systematic and scholarly a study as his *La Quatrieme République et sa politique extérieure*.—WILLIAM G. ANDREWS, *State University of New York, Brockport*.

The Sea in Modern Strategy. BY L. W. MARTIN.
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. 190, \$5.00.)

There is hardly any question that the grand concepts of war at sea as developed primarily by Alfred T. Mahan have lost their glorious individuality. The reasons for this are at least three-fold. First, the nuclear weapon sits perched above all considerations of war, and, despite much talk about "firebreaks" and the "tradition of non-use," the super-powers can hardly envisage a major war between themselves in which there is little danger of nuclear weapons being used. One of the results of this circumstance is that it inhibits conceiving of a war which is both on a grand scale and prolonged, which is the kind of war that makes the classical naval strategy come to life. Second, with sea forces able to throw inland and land forces

able to hurl out to sea missiles or aircraft capable easily of three thousand miles range, the previously sharp distinction between the dominion of the sea and that of land has become exceedingly blurred. Third, we live in a world in which, at least so far as surface and naval air power are concerned, there is really only one great sea power, the United States. The Soviet Union has a formidable submarine fleet, and, after some backtracking, is now adding substantially to her surface fleet. Nevertheless, despite its tremendous advances in performance since World War II, the submarine (where it is not a strategic weapons launcher) is still mostly an instrument for challenging maritime control rather than establishing it, and the Soviet surface fleet is not the kind of challenge to U.S. naval power that we have observed in naval races of the past.

One might also add that insofar as naval operations like those conducted in 1950-1953 around Korea and since 1964 around Vietnam need to be described in strategic terms, the conceptions handed down by Mahan and others still do well enough. At least, our present author seems to think so, and I believe he is right. This situation very much affects what is left to write about.

On the other hand, large sums of money are being spent on naval armaments, in which there have been very great changes since the end of World War II. These changes, as well as comparably drastic changes, which have occurred also in the political climate, call for continuing clarification of the appropriate character and functioning of modern naval arms under those various sets of circumstances that appear sufficiently probable to warrant the kind of anticipation which costs money.

Hardly more than two years ago we had the work by Admiral Sir Peter Gretton, *Maritime Strategy*: but Professor Martin has justified the assumption of himself and of the Institute for Strategic Studies, under whose auspices he produced the present book, that there was room for yet another approach. Admiral Gretton's book and this one are, after all, the only new books of their kind that have been available for some time, and the market has therefore hardly been surfeited.

Professor Martin first examines the nature of modern naval forces. He has done his homework well, and the disposition to do so is usually an excellent substitute for a high security clearance—without entailing the disabilities often clinging to the latter. Professor Martin then moves on to consider such things as the use of sea power in "wars of intervention" characterized by Korea and Vietnam, and "occasions for limited war at sea" where he discusses among other things the curious view originally put forward by Mr. Paul Nitze and apparently embraced also by Mr. Robert S.

McNamara (although neither is mentioned in this connection in the book) that naval power acting by itself may on occasion serve an important role in restraining enemy aggression, thereby presumably making it unnecessary for troops to become involved in the mud and jungles of another Vietnam. I think the generally negative attitude which Professor Martin shows to this idea is entirely correct. Other chapters, among the total of eight, bear titles like "Cost and the Naval Balance" and "Sea Power and Non-Belligerent Action," which adequately describe their content.

This is an honest book, and it contains a good deal of useful information. It is also intelligently organized. I wish it were possible for me to be more enthusiastic about it. The reasons I cannot, lie in the tone of the book, both stylistically and intellectually. The writing is clear enough, but exceedingly and everlasting bland, lacking the occasional penetrating and skillfully executed phrase which makes the person reading it content at the moment not to be doing something else. No doubt more important is the equally bland quality of the thinking, reflected in the author's disinclination really to struggle with an idea or insight, whether his own or someone else's.

Professor Martin often expresses a preference for one view over another, but it is rarely other than a mild and tentative preference. He observes that contemporary admirals seem not to grapple with the really critical questions of future naval war, but neither, beyond pointing this out, does he. A significant question to which he draws notice he dismisses with the comment that it "might perhaps be debated"—but the debating he leaves to others. On what is among the most crucial of relevant issues, the effects of nuclear deterrence in determining levels of engagement or combat, he gives to the somewhat exceptional views of a colleague the accolade that his argument "is by no means implausible," but that is the end of it.

All this gives one the sense of non-involvement, and how is the reader to become involved when the author is not?—BERNARD BRODIE, *University of California, Los Angeles*.

The European Common Market and the World.

BY WERNER FELD. (Englewood Cliffs. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. Pp. vii, 184. \$4.95.)

This is a valuable little book, which is almost monographic in nature. It seems to be one of several studies of the European Economic Community commissioned by Prentice-Hall. Professor Werner Feld, Chairman of the Department of Government at Louisiana State University, has examined the relationships, internal and external, that have grown up with the existence of the European Economic Community.

The EEC is a political entity whose chief worth

is economic. Its inception created the third great economic union. These economic unities—American, Soviet and European—create a host of problems and prospects. They cannot be ignored; they must be accommodated.

The formation of the EEC was no simple process. It had predecessors of limited purpose and value. Its members were involved in organizations as various as NATO, OEEC (OECD), and GATT. The possibility of conflicting allegiances was serious. Most nations brought with them a baggage train—special relationships with former colonies, monetary zones, and settled trade patterns.

Reconciling these conflicting interests and obligations was no easy task, and the first decade of the EEC was devoted to this delicate, often exasperating task of internal harmonization. The coming years must be devoted increasingly to a reconciliation of conflicts with the rest of the world, the theme of Feld's work.

The relationship of the EEC to the American common market has been one of efforts to accommodation marred by irritating incidents like the "war of the frozen chickens." The connections with the Communist bloc has been one of growing intercourse with surprisingly minimum frictions. The EFTA nations are an especial difficulty, for this is a rival bloc of like nations with common associations. The most crucial matter could be the special relationships with the developing societies, most of whom are former colonies. These prideful nations—so jealous of their nationhood and their economic independence—have practically demanded and received a special association with the EEC from their former metropolis. With this privileged position goes inevitably the peril of economic dependence, the handmaiden of political dependence.

The EEC is no monolith; it is beset by strains and fissures. Vital interests must be protected. The sheltering of French agricultural inefficiency has aggravated the more efficient agricultural nations of the market. The privileged arrangement for the many and diverse French client-states caused no small exacerbation within the walls. The strength of the German industrial complex constitutes a source of discomfort, raising faintly the specter of the *Zollverein*. The French veto of the British application caused a trauma among certain quarters within the EEC. Moreover, there is a fundamental disharmony in the Common Market along the lines of the ancient American experience—the suspicion and conflict between the large and the small states. The Benelux powers fear and resist the transformation of the entity into a Gallic or Teutonic economic community.

The political and economic power of the Common Market is quietly and steadily growing, and its existence creates certain problems for the world

economy. Any such markey is a form of economic regionalism with its protectiveness, provincialism, and discrimination. It has begotten other such regional corporations—the Latin American Free Trade Association and the Central American Common Market. This economic regionalism can produce distortions in the trade patterns of the world economy. The common markets and customs unions promote intramural trade at the expense of international trade. More and more, trade may be between the blocs, not among the nations. High tariffs may decline among the nations only to reappear among the blocs. True international trade may suffer with the proliferation of these markets.

The greatest prospect for the EEC lies in the political arena. The original conception envisaged the growth of political unity, possibly a supranational European state. Already, the embryonic structure exists in the form of extranational parties, interest groups, parliaments, courts, and councils of ministers. Certain practices and rituals of the Eurocrats approached diplomatic intercourse and vaguely hinted of sovereignty. De Gaulle complained that Commission President Walter Hallstein was assuming the prerogatives of a "chief of state." Moreover, present French policy resists political integration while basking in the benefits of economic union. De Gaulle seeks instead a *l'Europe des patries*—united in certain political and economic matters but separate in their nationhood and sovereignty.

Professor Feld has ably considered the place of the EEC in the politics and economics of the world. The work is written with a husbandry of words and a care of expression that is admirable. It is comprehensible to the informed layman without losing its value to the specialist. The treatise avoids the pitfalls—common to such works of political economy—of inundating the reader with charts and statistics. Detail and statistical illustrations are abundant and useful, but the book is not burdened by them. The excellence of the work is slightly lessened by the absence of a bibliography. The EEC literature is growing rapidly, and such a compilation would have been helpful. However, this omission is partially compensated by complete references in footnotes.—VERNON C. WARREN, JR., *Austin Peay State University*.

The Foreign Aid Programs of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China: An Analysis. By KURT MULLER. (New York, Walker and Co. 1967. Pp. xiii, 331. \$15.00.)

The translation of Kurt Muller's book only proves that you can not tell a book by its outside cover. Only if the reader happens to look inside the title page will he discover that originally Muller's book was entitled *Über Kalkutta nach*

Paris? The title change in the translated version therefore gives the impression that it is completely devoted to a discussion of communist foreign aid. Although the original title is sexier than the actual product, it is nonetheless a more accurate reflection of the scope of the book. Unfortunately the discussion of foreign aid makes up less than one half of material covered and much of what is devoted to foreign aid is simply a listing of foreign aid and trade agreements. Because of the mislabeling, the reader sits with the expectation that there will be more analysis of communist foreign aid than there actually is and therefore he is disappointed when he does not find it. Much of the other material in the book if taken on its own terms would be interesting in itself, but since the appetite is whetted for a discussion of foreign aid, one sits and waits for the main course only to see it flit by without feeling really satisfied.

As for what is actually in the book, it is fair to say that Muller has brought together a good deal of useful information about Soviet relations and ambitions in the less developed world. Thus this could be a handy reference source. Unfortunately there are numerous shortcomings in this volume which prevent the realization of this prospect.

One of the major problems is that Muller's book was originally written in 1963 and subsequently revised for its translation into English. Since communist policies in the developing countries have changed so rapidly, it is not enough to make an alteration or two in the old manuscript in the expectation that the book will then reflect the current state of events. In several cases the entire context has changed. For example on p. 73, Muller attempts to show how the communists attempt to subvert a country through the use of communist trained functionaries in the schools, cadres, and publishing houses etc. As an illustration he cites the Ghanaian weekly paper, *The Spark*. But as Muller himself recognizes, since the German version was published, Nkrumah has been overthrown. Since this is the best example that Muller seems to be able to find, it would appear that this particular case if it proves anything, proves the opposite. That is, such endeavors have not been ultimately successful from the communist point of view. His example of communist support for Oginga Odinga in Kenya is similarly inappropriate.

Because of the day to day gyrations in Cuban foreign policy, Muller finds himself with all kinds of inconsistencies in his handling of Soviet and Chinese relations with Cuba. On p. 56, he talks of the Russian desire to create Cuban-style bridgeheads all over the world. Subsequently he describes China's anger because Cuba has opted to follow Russian foreign policy. At this writing at least, the Russians would be quite surprised to

hear that the Cubans have been classified as loyal followers of the Moscow line.

The changes over time may also explain why Muller's long lists of reasons and explanations always fail to provide a complete answer to the problem he is trying to analyze. This happens on p. 62 and again on p. 92. It often seems that new paragraphs which have been added to bring the book up to date disprove the analysis so one is left wondering why the analysis was made in the first place.

The effect of such incidents creates a very disjointed book. Perhaps this can be blamed on poor editing. This unsettling feeling is made worse by the fact that the last two-thirds of the book consists of 200 pages divided up into 28 chapters; that is an average of 7 pages per chapter. To say the least, it is uncommon to read chapters that are only 3 to 4 pages long in a book devoted to the social sciences. Moreover the book's editors apparently made no effort to tone down some of the intemperate political language. The communists or their sympathizers are almost always referred to in such terms as "hacks" or worse.

The book also contains numerous small mistakes. On p. 26, Muller says that communist countries provided sizeable loans only after 1956 whereas on p. 240 he acknowledges that the Czechs were an exception and started lending in 1954. He omits a Soviet loan of \$45 million worth of sugar to China in 1961. He is also wrong on p. 96 when he states that India does not extend foreign aid. Similarly he is incorrect when he claims that the other communist countries are incapable of building a complete plant without Russian support or supplies. There are important exceptions such as the Rumanian oil refinery at Gauhati, India and the Czech tool works at Ranchi, India. On occasion, it is the Russians who find themselves forced to rely on outside help as in Nepal where they have had to call in the Czechs to provide equipment for the Russian sponsored sugar mill and cigarette factory. Muller is also wrong when he says that Soviet statistics do not reflect technical services provided by Soviet technicians.

There are some larger questions as well that Muller never confronts. Have the Russians ever thought through the consequences of their foreign aid program? If their aid is successful, and economic development in fact takes place, will this lead to communism as Muller seems to think or to an economically viable and independent government?

Lest the reviewer be misunderstood, there are many redeeming sections in this book. Muller finds traces of Sino-Soviet animosity as early as 1956. He also shows how the Russians start with an adverse foreign trade balance in their dealings with less developed countries and generally end

up with strongly favorable balances of trade. Only Malaysia seems to have avoided this hazard. He also explains how the Russians have managed to provide themselves with a loophole for the legal reselling of commodities purchased from the developing countries. Also Muller has gathered fairly complete lists of loan agreements extended by both the Russians and the Chinese. But as if Muller were destined to have a difficult time with this translation, even that which is valuable may be of no use for the researcher. For some reason, the translators have neglected to include either an index or bibliography. This makes much of the material irretrievable and therefore of limited use. —MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN, *Wellesley College*.

Insurgent Era: New Patterns of Political, Economic and Social Revolution. BY RICHARD H. SANGER. (Washington: Potomac Books, 1967. Pp. 231. \$6.95.)

One category of books on international politics is that of the interpretive report by the diplomat or journalist who does not pretend to be a social scientist and who may be pleased that he is not. In the 1920-40 period books of this sort were especially numerous and influential in shaping popular images of such things as conditions in the Ukraine or the exploits of Abd-el-Krim. Too few of them were written by shrewd diplomats. Some went beyond personal involvement to discuss events they did not know immediately. This book falls into the latter sub-class. Written by a former American F.S.O. with experience in the Middle East and Africa, it is representative of a category which has declined in numbers during an age of higher levels of knowledge and new methods.

The author undertakes to sketch the history of eight cases of unrest since 1917. He uses "societal revolutions" as the frame for Communist struggles in Russia and China, the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 and Cuba's 26th of July Movement. Distillation creates unsatisfactory generalizations, e.g., the account of the Bolshevik seizure of power (pp. 29-31). Problems of analysis are also apparent. The chapter on Egypt begins with the statement that "The Egyptians are not Arabs. . . ." They might not be, but their recent leaders have thought that they were with significant political results. Glibness is not absent. Mohammed Ali is described as a "son-of-a-Macedonian-tobacco-merchant-turned-Pasha" and his importance in mod-

ern Egyptian history passed over lightly. Few of the book's historical summaries are creative. The best one of them is about Cuba.

Under the heading of "Independence Rebellions" Mr. Sanger discusses Indo-China, concentrating on the emergence of Ho Chi Minh and the military events up to the Geneva Conference. Subsequently, Vietnam from 1954-1967 is discussed under the third main part of the book, "Cold War Conflicts," a section which also includes chapters on Magsaysay and the Huks, and the Congo. The author adopts the view that communism is largely responsible for Vietnam's troubles. He did not make use of Douglas Pike's study of the Viet Cong. Against the liberal tide, his interpretation of Diem is sympathetic without being unbalanced. Included under "Independence Rebellions" is Gandhi's nonviolent nationalism. More might have been said about the inclusion of the Indian leader and *satyagraha*. Apparently it was the author's intention to illustrate that protest takes many forms and to suggest that the study of insurgency should not be limited to political violence.

What principles were used for inclusion of some struggles but not others? No clear explanation is given. Is there a theory to tie together the cases selected? The reviewer could not discover any other than what is found in the statement that "no man need settle for a dirt floor merely because his father did." Some men, of course, will settle for a dirt floor if they can get rid of foreigners, a point indirectly recognized by the discussion of India. A "Life Cycle of A Revolt" is presented in Chapter 1. The model includes the elements of the leader, popular cause, support for the party of revolt, outside help, use of mobs, and others. All the cases selected do not fit the model. Is there any larger pattern to these upheavals? The author speaks of seven waves of unrest since 1648, the most recent beginning about twenty years ago. In an appendix he offers an uneven listing of violent events for 1945-1966. Yet there is no suggestion about the meanings of these waves and events other than the implied teaching that change is permanent.

Perhaps the main disappointments about the book are the lack of definitions to help tell one conflict from another, and the fact that the insights of the diplomatist were withheld in his efforts to photograph epic landscapes.—PAUL F. POWER, *University of Cincinnati*.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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